Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector,
2014 IL App (2d) 130995
Appellate Court In re APPLICATION OF THE COUNTY TREASURER AND
Caption ex officio COUNTY COLLECTOR, for Judgment and Order of Sale
Against Real Estate Returned Delinquent for Nonpayment of General
Taxes and/or Special Assessments for the Year 2008 and/or Prior
Years (John Zajicek, d/b/a Z Financial, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lloyd
Giordano, Respondent-Appellant).
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-13-0995
Filed June 30, 2014
Rehearing denied October 3, 2014
Held In proceedings on a petition for a tax deed where respondent redeemed
(Note: This syllabus his tax delinquent property under protest based on the argument that
constitutes no part of the petitioner failed to comply with the Property Tax Code, the trial court
opinion of the court but erred in striking respondent’s protest, since petitioner failed to
has been prepared by the properly notify respondent of an extension of the redemption period,
Reporter of Decisions and in view of petitioner’s right to seek a refund of the purchase price
for the convenience of and other taxes paid and posted to the tax judgment by showing a
the reader.) bona fide attempt to comply with the statutory requirements to obtain
a tax deed, the cause was remanded to allow the trial court to rule on
that issue and make an appropriate award of the redemption money to
petitioner or respondent.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, No. 12-TX-7; the
Review Hon. Brendan A. Maher, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded with directions.
Counsel on Nathan J. Noble, of Belvidere, for appellant.
Appeal
Thaddeus M. Bond, Jr., of Law Offices of Thaddeus M. Bond Jr. &
Associates, of Waukegan, for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Burke and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 On April 5, 2012, the petitioner, John Zajicek, d/b/a Z Financial, filed a petition for a tax
deed as to property owned by the respondent, Lloyd Giordano. On October 2, 2012, the
respondent redeemed his property under protest, arguing that the funds he paid should be
returned to him because the petitioner had not complied with the requisite provisions of the
Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 et seq. (West 2012)). After the trial court struck the
respondent’s protest, the respondent filed a timely notice of appeal. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse and remand for additional proceedings.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The respondent owns property in Boone County. He failed to pay his 2008 real estate
taxes on that property in a timely fashion. On November 6, 2009, Z Financial, LLC,
purchased the unpaid taxes and received a tax certificate.
¶4 On February 3, 2010, Z Financial (an entity distinct from Z Financial, LLC) provided
notice to the respondent that the period for redemption was extended to June 4, 2012.
¶5 On April 5, 2012, Z Financial provided notice to the respondent that the period for
redemption was extended to October 4, 2012. On that same day, Zajicek, as managing
member of Z Financial, LLC, filed a document indicating that it was assigning all of its rights
in the tax certificate to the petitioner. Also on that day, the petitioner filed a petition for a tax
deed.
¶6 On October 2, 2012, the respondent redeemed his property by paying the unpaid taxes,
plus fees and interest. The respondent also filed a document indicating that he was redeeming
his property under protest pursuant to section 21-380 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS
200/21-380 (West 2012)). The respondent argued that, because the petitioner had not
complied with all of the requisite provisions of the Property Tax Code in attempting to obtain
a tax deed, the respondent was entitled to all of the funds he had paid to redeem his property.
¶7 On February 25, 2013, the trial court struck the respondent’s protest. The trial court
further dismissed the petition for a tax deed in light of the redemption and ordered the Boone
County clerk to remit all posted funds to the petitioner upon surrender of the tax certificate.
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Following the denial of his motion to reconsider, the respondent filed a timely notice of
appeal.
¶8 ANALYSIS
¶9 The respondent raises four contentions on appeal. However, as the respondent’s second
contention is dispositive, we address only that issue. In that contention, the respondent argues
that the trial court should have sustained his protest because the petitioner failed to comply
with the requisite notice provisions of the Property Tax Code and thus could not have
obtained a tax deed. Specifically, the respondent argues that any tax deed had to be recorded
by November 6, 2012, unless the respondent was given notice that the redemption period had
been extended. Although Z Financial provided such notice on February 3, 2010, that notice
was not valid, because Z Financial did not have any rights in the tax certificate when it gave
such notice. Because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisite notice provisions of
the Property Tax Code, the respondent insists, the trial court should have ordered that all of
the funds that he deposited with the Boone County clerk be returned to him.
¶ 10 The respondent’s argument requires us to construe the following provisions of the
Property Tax Code. Section 21-380 of the Property Tax Code pertains to the redemption of
delinquent real estate taxes under protest. That section provides in pertinent part:
“Redemption under protest. Any person redeeming under this Section at a time
subsequent to the filing of a petition under Section 22-30 or 21-445 [(35 ILCS
200/22-30, 21-445 (West 2012))], who desires to preserve his or her right to defend
against the petition for a tax deed, shall accompany the deposit for redemption with a
writing [setting forth the objections.]
***
*** The specified grounds for the objections shall be limited to those defenses as
would provide sufficient basis to deny entry of an order for issuance of a tax deed.
***
***
The county clerk shall enter the redemption as provided in Section 21-230 [(35
ILCS 200/21-230 (West 2012))] and shall note the redemption under protest. The
redemption money so deposited shall not be distributed to the holder of the certificate
of purchase but shall be retained by the county clerk pending disposition of the
petition filed under Section 22-30.
***
When the party redeeming appears and presents a defense, the court shall hear and
determine the matter. If the defense is not sustained, the court shall order the protest
stricken and direct the county clerk to distribute the redemption money upon
surrender of the certificate of purchase and shall order the party redeeming to pay the
petitioner reasonable expenses, actually incurred, including the cost of withheld
redemption money, together with a reasonable attorneys fee. Upon a finding
sustaining the protest in whole or in part, the court may declare the sale to be a sale in
error under Section 21-310 or Section 22-45 [(35 ILCS 200/21-310, 22-45 (West
2012))], and shall direct the county clerk to return all or part of the redemption money
or deposit to the party redeeming.” 35 ILCS 200/21-380 (West 2012).
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Section 22-40 requires strict compliance with the notice provisions of the Property Tax Code
before a deed is issued. That section states:
“If the redemption period expires and the property has not been redeemed and all
taxes and special assessments which became due and payable subsequent to the sale
have been paid and all forfeitures and sales which occur subsequent to the sale have
been redeemed and the notices required by law have been given and all advancements
of public funds under the police power made by a city, village or town under Section
22-35 have been paid and the petitioner has complied with all the provisions of law
entitling him or her to a deed, the court shall so find and shall enter an order directing
the county clerk on the production of the certificate of purchase and a certified copy
of the order, to issue to the purchaser or his or her assignee a tax deed. The court shall
insist on strict compliance with Section 22-10 through 22-25.” 35 ILCS 200/22-40
(West 2012).
Section 22-10 provides:
“Notice of expiration of period of redemption. A purchaser or assignee shall not be
entitled to a tax deed to the property sold unless, not less than 3 months nor more than
6 months prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, he or she gives notice of
the sale and the date of expiration of the period of redemption to the owners,
occupants, and parties interested in the property, including any mortgagee of record
***.” 35 ILCS 200/22-10 (West 2012).
Section 22-85 provides a basis to deny a tax deed. That section provides in pertinent part:
“Failure to timely take out and record deed; deed is void. Unless the holder of the
certificate purchased at any tax sale under this Code takes out the deed in the time
provided by law, and records the same within one year from and after the time for
redemption expires, the certificate or deed, and the sale on which it is based, shall,
after the expiration of the one year period, be absolutely void with no right to
reimbursement.” 35 ILCS 200/22-85 (West 2012).
¶ 11 In interpreting a statute, the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the legislature. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass’n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440 (2010). The
legislature’s intent in enacting a statute is best determined by the plain and ordinary meaning
of the statutory language. Id. “In determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider
the statute in its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in
enacting it.” Id.
¶ 12 When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must give it effect
without resorting to other aids of construction. Id. The statute is deemed ambiguous if it is
capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different
ways. Id. Courts should construe statutes so as to yield logical and meaningful results and to
avoid constructions that render specific language superfluous or meaningless.
In re Application of the County Treasurer, 2012 IL App (1st) 101976, ¶ 37 (CCPI). Courts do
not depart from plain statutory language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or
conditions that conflict with the expressed intent. Solon, 236 Ill. 2d at 441. Courts may also
consider the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other.
Id.
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¶ 13 A statute should be interpreted as a whole, meaning that different sections of the same
statute should be considered in reference to one another so that they are given harmonious
effect. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). One
section of a statute should not be interpreted in a way that renders another section of the same
statute irrelevant. CCPI, 2012 IL App (1st) 101976, ¶ 38.
¶ 14 Section 21-380 of the Property Tax Code provides that a redemption under protest may
be sustained only on those grounds that would provide a basis to deny the issuance of a tax
deed. 35 ILCS 200/21-380 (West 2012). Section 21-350 of the Property Tax Code provides
that the period of redemption is two years from the date of sale, unless that period is
extended. 35 ILCS 200/21-350 (West 2012). Section 21-385 of the Property Tax Code sets
forth that the purchaser or his assignee may extend the redemption period for one additional
year if he provides notice to the property owner that the redemption period has been
extended. 35 ILCS 200/21-385 (West 2012). Section 22-85 of the Property Tax Code
provides that, if a tax deed is not recorded within one year of when the redemption period
ends, the tax certificate holder loses his right to obtain a tax deed. 35 ILCS 200/22-85 (West
2012). Section 22-40 of the Property Tax Code provides that a court must insist on strict
compliance with section 22-10 of the Property Tax Code before it issues a tax deed. 35 ILCS
200/22-40 (West 2012). Section 22-10 of the Property Tax Code provides that the purchaser
or his assignee shall not be entitled to a tax deed unless he gives the owner three to six
months’ notice of the expiration of the redemption period. 35 ILCS 200/22-10 (West 2012).
¶ 15 Here, Z Financial, LLC, purchased the unpaid taxes and received a tax certificate on
November 6, 2009. The redemption period therefore expired on November 6, 2011, unless
the period was extended. 35 ILCS 200/21-350 (West 2012). Z Financial, LLC, did not extend
the redemption period. The petitioner therefore would be entitled to a tax deed only if he
strictly complied with section 22-10 of the Property Tax Code and gave the respondent three
to six months’ notice that the redemption period was ending on November 6, 2011. 35 ILCS
200/22-40 (West 2012). Because the petitioner did not strictly comply with section 22-10 of
the Property Tax Code, the petitioner was not entitled to a tax deed. That was a proper basis
to sustain the respondent’s protest. 35 ILCS 200/21-380 (West 2012). The trial court
therefore erred in not sustaining the protest.
¶ 16 In so ruling, we reject the petitioner’s argument that the notice that Z Financial provided
to the respondent was sufficient to extend the redemption period. We note that a similar
argument was rejected by the Appellate Court, First District, in CCPI, 2012 IL App (1st)
101976. In that case, in June 2006, GJ Venture, LLC (GJ), bought property at a tax sale. The
original redemption expiration date was June 12, 2008. Id. ¶ 8. On July 11, 2006, GJ
assigned the certificate of purchase and all of its right, title, and interest in the property to
Sabre Group, LLC (Sabre). Id. ¶ 9. On April 10, 2008, GJ filed a notice to extend the period
of redemption to July 25, 2008. Id. ¶ 11. On February 4, 2009, Sabre assigned the certificate
of purchase to CCPI. Id. ¶ 17. On February 11, 2009, the trial court entered orders
substituting CCPI as the tax deed petitioner and directing the clerk to issue a tax deed to
CCPI. CCPI recorded its tax deed on November 4, 2009. Id.
¶ 17 In December 2009, the property owner filed a motion to declare the tax deed void
pursuant to section 22-85 of the Property Tax Code. Id. ¶ 18. The property owner alleged that
the tax deed was void because CCPI failed to record it within one year from June 12, 2008,
the original redemption expiration date. The property owner argued that the deed had to be
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recorded by June 12, 2009, because GJ’s attempt to extend the redemption period was invalid
where it had previously assigned away any rights to the property. Id.
¶ 18 The trial court denied the property owner’s motion to dismiss, but the reviewing court
reversed. Id. ¶¶ 26, 45. The reviewing court explained that only the certificate holder could
extend the redemption period. Id. ¶ 39. Because GJ had already assigned away its rights in
the tax certificate to Sabre, GJ had no right to extend the redemption period. Id. ¶ 41 (“ ‘An
assignment shall vest in the assignee *** all the right and title of the original purchaser.’ ”
(quoting 35 ILCS 200/21-250 (West 2008))). Consequently, the extension filed by GJ was a
nullity, and the June 12, 2008, expiration date remained in effect. Id. Because no tax deed
was recorded by June 12, 2009, the tax deed that was ultimately recorded was untimely and
therefore void. Id.
¶ 19 Here, on February 3, 2010, Z Financial purportedly extended the redemption period until
June 4, 2012. However, Z Financial did not have any interest in the property until Z
Financial, LLC, assigned it its rights on April 5, 2010. Thus, the extension that Z Financial
filed on February 3, 2010, was a nullity and did not extend the redemption period.
¶ 20 We next consider whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of any of the money spent
for the tax certificate. In arguing that the petitioner is not, the respondent points to section
22-85 of the Property Tax Code, which provides that, if a tax purchaser does not timely
record a deed within one year of the end of the redemption period, then the tax certificate
becomes void and the tax purchaser is not entitled to any reimbursement for the money he
spent acquiring the tax certificate. 35 ILCS 200/22-85 (West 2012). Section 22-85 of the
Property Tax Code does not apply here, because the respondent redeemed his property under
protest before the time period set forth in that statute had expired.1
1
We note a possible inconsistency between sections 21-350 and 21-380 of the Property Tax Code.
Section 21-350 of the Property Tax Code provides that a property owner has two years from the date of
the sale to redeem his property, unless the redemption period is properly extended (which in this case it
was not). 35 ILCS 200/21-350 (West 2012). Section 21-380 provides that a redemption under protest
must be filed after a petition for a tax deed has been filed. 35 ILCS 200/21-380 (West 2012). Section
21-380 does not specify the last date that a redemption under protest may be filed, only that it must
occur before the hearing on the petition for a tax deed. Id. Thus, section 21-380 seemingly allows a
redemption under protest to be filed even after section 21-350’s period for a redemption has expired.
We need not resolve this possible inconsistency, however, because it would not impact our ultimate
resolution of the case. Under section 21-380 of the Property Tax Code, the respondent’s redemption
under protest was timely filed. See A.P. Properties, Inc. v. Goshinsky, 186 Ill. 2d 524, 533 (1999) (the
provisions of section 21-380 apply to a person redeeming under protest after a petition for tax deed has
been filed and when the redeemer desires to preserve the right to defend against the petition for a tax
deed). Further under section 21-350 of the Property Tax Code, although our courts have found that a
redemption filed after the end of the statutory period is a nullity (In re Application of the County
Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 378 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846 (2007)), our courts have also
determined that a trial court may equitably extend the statutory redemption period (id. at 849) and that
the tax purchaser may waive strict adherence to the redemption period (In re Application of County
Collector for Judgment of Sale Against Certain Lands & Lots, 131 Ill. App. 2d 509, 512 (1970)). Here,
as both the trial court and the petitioner treated the respondent’s redemption under protest as having
been timely filed due to the petitioner’s attempt to extend the redemption period, we will also treat the
redemption under protest as timely filed. Based on this determination, the respondent may not argue on
remand that his redemption under protest was a nullity.
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¶ 21 We instead look to section 21-380 of the Property Tax Code. 35 ILCS 200/21-380
(West 2012). That section provides that a person may pay the required redemption amount
under protest by specifying defenses that would provide a sufficient basis to deny the entry of
an order for issuance of a tax deed. In his redemption under protest, the respondent correctly
argued that the tax certificate had expired. When the petitioner did not provide timely notice
of the expiration of the redemption period (35 ILCS 200/22-10 (West 2012)) or file a petition
for a tax deed within the required time, as the redemption period was not extended (35 ILCS
200/22-30 (West 2012)), the tax deed petition could have been successfully challenged.
Under section 21-380 of the Property Tax Code, if a protest is sustained, the court may
declare the sale to be a sale in error and shall direct the county clerk to return all or part of
the redemption money to the party redeeming. Here, the trial court should have sustained the
protest and declared the sale in error. A determination of the amounts to be returned to the
parties requires that several sections of the Property Tax Code be read together. See In re
Application of the County Collector, 325 Ill. App. 3d 152, 156 (2001) (Darco).
¶ 22 In Darco, the court determined that, once a redemption under protest has been filed, the
character of the tax deed proceedings changes, “with the tax purchaser attempting to obtain
the statutory penalty interest and the delinquent taxpayer attempting to ward off the
purchaser and recover some of the funds it has deposited with the county clerk.” Id. at
155-56. The court noted that the respondent in that case could have defended against the
petitions for tax deeds without redeeming, because defective notices precluded the tax deeds
from issuing. Id. at 156. Had that occurred, the petitioner would have been entitled to petition
for a refund pursuant to section 22-50 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/22-50 (West
1994)) if she could establish that she made a bona fide attempt to comply with the statutory
requirements for the issuance of a tax deed. See Darco, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 156. The court
determined that the petitioner should not receive any less after the respondent’s redemption
than she would receive if she were to obtain a refund pursuant to section 22-50 absent a
redemption. Id. at 157.
¶ 23 Here, as in Darco, the respondent could have successfully defended against a tax deed
petition based on the expiration of the certificate. Then, the petitioner would have been
entitled to seek a refund under section 22-50, provided that it could show a bona fide attempt
to comply with the statutory requirements to procure a tax deed. Such a refund would consist
of “the purchase price and other taxes that were paid and were validly posted to the tax
judgment, sale redemption and forfeiture record after the tax sale [citation] but no penalty
interest or costs.” Id. at 156 (citing In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio
Collector, 305 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1000-01 (1999)). The respondent would receive a partial
refund of the redemption money. Should the petitioner fail to prove a bona fide attempt, the
petitioner would not be entitled to any refund and the respondent would be entitled to a full
refund of the redemption money.
¶ 24 Whether the petitioner made a bona fide attempt is a factual question. In re Application of
the Kane County Collector, 297 Ill. App. 3d 745, 748 (1998). Because the trial court did not
make that factual finding in this case, we remand for the trial court to make that
determination.
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¶ 25 CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Boone County is reversed
and the cause is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this decision.
¶ 27 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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