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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10590
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20509-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DANIEL JEAN CHARLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 17, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Jean Charles appeals his 57-month sentence, imposed after he
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pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit access device fraud, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(b)(2), and one count of aggravated identify theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
On appeal, Charles argues that the district court committed clear error when it
denied a joint recommendation for a reduction to Charles’s offense level for his
allegedly minor role in the offense under United States Sentencing Guideline
§ 3B1.2. Specifically, Charles alleges that the district court failed to properly
analyze his role in the offense under the test provided in United States v.
Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (De Varon). He
also argues that the district court failed to consider his co-conspirator’s more
significant role in the larger criminal scheme. After careful consideration, we
affirm.
“[A] district court’s determination of whether a defendant qualifies for a
minor role adjustment under the Guidelines is a finding of fact that will be
reviewed only for clear error.” Id. at 934. The defendant “bears the burden at all
times of establishing her role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Id. A defendant warrants a two-level reduction for playing a minor role in the
offense if he is “less culpable than most other participants, but [his] role could not
be described as minimal.” USSG § 3B1.2 comment. n.5. A district court is not
required to find a participant’s role is minor merely because the government
recommends such a finding. See United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 381 (11th
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Cir. 1989).
Under De Varon, a district court conducts a two-pronged analysis of the
defendant’s conduct to determine whether a minor-role reduction applies. 175
F.3d at 940. First, “the district court must assess whether the defendant is a minor
or minimal participant in relation to the relevant conduct attributed to [him] in
calculating [his] base offense level.” Id. The first prong does not evaluate whether
he played a minor role in a larger conspiracy. Id. at 944. Second, the district court
may assess a defendant’s relative culpability compared to any other participants in
the relevant conduct. Id. Under this prong, the court is limited to considering only
those participants who were involved in the particular conduct for which the
defendant was convicted. Id. The court does not take into account the role of any
participants in any larger criminal conspiracy. Id. Furthermore, “[t]he fact that a
defendant’s role may be less than that of other participants engaged in the relevant
conduct may not be dispositive of role in the offense, since it is possible that none
are minor or minimal participants.” Id.
Here, the district court did not clearly err in denying a minor-role
adjustment. Although the district court made no factual findings as to the first De
Varon prong, “the sentencing judge has no duty to make any specific subsidiary
factual findings.” Id. at 939. “So long as the district court’s decision is supported
by the record and the court clearly resolves any disputed factual issues, a simple
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statement of the district court’s conclusion is sufficient.” Id. The facts set forth in
the factual proffer signed by Charles provide sufficient support for denying the
adjustment. According to the proffer, Charles “agreed to help Wesly Compere use
debit cards numbers and social security card numbers to obtain fraudulent income
tax refunds and social security Retirement Income Benefits (RIB) payments.”
Charles allowed Compere to use addresses under his control in furtherance of this
scheme and forwarded any payments and correspondence in exchange for part of
the proceeds. Charles also sent text messages notifying Compere and other co-
conspirators of the arrival of such correspondence and passing along personal
identification information like social security numbers and dates of birth. Charles
was involved with fraudulent returns totaling $239,433.90. In short, the record
supports the district court’s finding that Charles did not play a minor role in the
offense.
Neither did the district court err when it considered Charles’s culpability in
the conduct for which he was convicted in comparison to that of Compere, his co-
conspirator. Charles asks this Court to consider Charles’s role in Compere’s larger
criminal scheme. But under De Varon, “the district court may consider only those
participants who were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the
defendant.” 175 F.3d at 944 (emphasis added). The district court properly
compared the financial loss and roles of Charles and Compere in the conduct for
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which Charles was convicted. We affirm the sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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