MEMORANDUM DECISION
Apr 21 2015, 8:10 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jill M. Acklin Gregory F. Zoeller
McGrath, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Carmel, Indiana
Brian Reitz
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mary Stephens, April 21, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A04-1409-CR-453
v. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable J. Richard Campbell,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Cause No. 29D04-1310-FD-8683
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015 Page 1 of 6
Statement of the Case
[1] Mary Stephens appeals her conviction for theft, as a Class D felony, following a
bench trial. Stephens raises one issue on appeal, namely, whether the State
presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 19, 2013, Stephens was working as a member of a probation work
crew clearing brush and trees from a Hamilton County park. Probation Officers
C.J. Miller and Breanne Lewis were supervising the work crew. At the end of
the day, Officer Lewis and a probationer took the final load of cleared brush to
an off-site “burn pile,” and Officer Miller waited with the other nine
probationers in the work group, including Stephens, who sat in and around a
fifteen-passenger community corrections van.
[3] After a probationer informed him that Stephens had taken items from Officer
Lewis’ purse, Officer Miller approached the van and saw Stephens putting
things into the purse, which Officer Lewis had left beneath the front seat of the
van. Stephens attempted to zip the purse shut and shove it under the seat in
front of her and, when confronted, told Officer Miller that the purse had fallen
down and that some items had fallen out of it.
[4] When Officer Lewis returned, Officer Miller described what had happened and
suggested that they search Stephens. Officer Lewis looked around Stephens in
the van to see if she had anything of hers, and Officer Lewis asked Stephens to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015 Page 2 of 6
take off a sweatshirt that she was wearing. Officer Lewis then took Stephens to
a women’s restroom at the park to search Stephens. Stephens brought the
sweatshirt with her. In the restroom, Stephens dropped the sweatshirt on the
floor. When Stephens bent to pick it up, Officer Lewis noticed a clutch
belonging to Officer Lewis on the ground beneath the sweatshirt. Officer Lewis
then searched Stephens and found a bottle of prescription medication, which
also belonged to Officer Lewis and had been in the clutch.
[5] Stephens apologized and asked the officers not to call police, but they called
Cicero Police Department Officer Kyle Comer to the scene. When Officer
Comer asked Stephens why she had Officer Lewis’ prescription bottle, Stephens
said that she had noticed that it had fallen out of Officer Lewis’ purse and she
had attempted to put the bottle back in the purse. Stephens explained that she
panicked when confronted by Officer Miller and hid the bottle instead of
returning it to the purse.
[6] The State initially charged Stephens with possession of a controlled substance
and theft, both as Class D felonies. However, the State dropped the possession
charge and amended the theft charge to read: “On or about October 19, 2013,
Mary Kathryn Stephens did knowingly exert unauthorized control over the
property of Breanne Lewis, to-wit, [a] purse, with the intent to deprive said
person of any part of the use or value of the property.” Appellant’s App. at 27.
[7] Following a bench trial, the trial court found Stephens guilty as charged and
sentenced her to 730 days, with ninety days executed in the Hamilton County
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015 Page 3 of 6
Jail, 275 days executed on home monitoring, and 365 days suspended. This
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Stephens contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her
conviction. Our supreme court has held that when there is substantial evidence
of probative value to support a conviction, it will not be set aside. Jones v. State,
783 N.E.2d 1132, 1139 (Ind. 2003). When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence
and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. See Dallaly v. State, 916
N.E.2d 945, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We do not assess witness credibility or
reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to
the trial court’s ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)). It is not
necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. Id. Rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably
be drawn from it to support the conviction. Id.
[9] To prove theft, as a Class D felony, the State was required to show that
Stephens knowingly exerted unauthorized control over Probation Officer
Lewis’ purse with the intent to deprive Officer Lewis of any part of the use or
value thereof. Stephens’ sole contention on appeal is that the State’s
presentation of evidence misled the trial court regarding whether she was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015 Page 4 of 6
charged with having stolen a purse or a clutch, or smaller purse, contained
within a larger purse.1 In particular, Stephens maintains that the State charged
her with theft of a purse, not items kept in the purse. And, she asserts, because
there was no evidence that she stole a purse, her conviction cannot stand.
[10] In support of her contention, Stephens directs us to the following colloquy
during cross-examination of Officer Comer:
Defense Counsel: Do you know, [sic] personal knowledge, whether
anything was stolen out of the clutch?
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney: Objection. Relevance. The charging
information and the charge here is that she took the purse[,] not items
from inside the purse. It specifically says the purse.
Defense Counsel: I think it says property, Judge, on the amended
information.
Deputy Prosecutor: It says, to wit, purse[,] not items inside.
The Court: So the State is just charging theft of the purse?
Deputy Prosecutor: That’s right.
The Court: Sustain the objection.
Tr. at 30.
[11] But Officer Comer then explained that one of the items Stephens had stolen
from inside the bigger purse was a clutch. And Officer Comer described a
1
We note that Stephens makes no contention that her conviction cannot stand because of a fatal variance
between the charging information and the proof at trial. See, e.g., Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671 (Ind.
1997).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015 Page 5 of 6
clutch as “a smaller purse or wallet that you would put inside your purse.” Id.
at 33.
[12] A clutch is a purse. The evidence shows that Stephens stole Officer Lewis’
clutch. The State charged Stephens with theft of a purse. At Stephens’ bench
trial the trial court, as trier of fact, found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and we are confident that the court was not confused.
[13] Thus, the State presented evidence that Stephens stole a purse from Officer
Lewis, and the evidence clearly supports the conviction. Stephens’ contentions
on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh evidence previously evaluated
by the trial court, which we will not do. The State presented sufficient evidence
to support Stephens’ theft conviction.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015 Page 6 of 6