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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11050
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-02848-TWT
MICHAEL L. BULLARD,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, JENKINS CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
COMMISSIONER OF THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondents - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(April 27, 2015)
Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Michael Bullard, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which
challenged his convictions for incest, sexual exploitation of a minor, and
possession of cocaine. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
I
In September of 2009, Mr. Bullard pled guilty to incest, sexual exploitation
of a minor, and possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Mr. Bullard to a
20-year “split” sentence, requiring him to serve eight years in prison and the
remainder on probation. A few weeks after sentencing, Mr. Bullard obtained new
counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea. He raised several claims, namely
that his original counsel, Mr. Neil Smith and Ms. Renee Boston, provided
ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from his home. Specifically, he alleged that the search warrant was defective
because it did not particularize the items to be seized and merely referenced an
“Exhibit C,” which supposedly contained the description of the items. He argued
that the government never attached Exhibit C to the proposed warrant prior to
obtaining the magistrate’s signature, thereby rendering it defective.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance
claim. At the hearing, both of his original counsel admitted that the warrant did
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not list the items to be seized but referenced an “Exhibit C,” which was not
included in the discovery packet that they received from the state. They testified
that another exhibit, “Exhibit B,” listed some of the evidence sought by the state
but was not expressly incorporated by reference in the warrant. They also
acknowledged that, had they realized that Exhibit C was missing from the
discovery packet, they would have filed a motion to suppress at least some of the
evidence obtained during the search of Mr. Bullard’s home. Both attorneys further
testified, however, that because Mr. Bullard had submitted letters to the court and
the district attorney confessing in detail that he had engaged in a sexual
relationship with his seventeen-year old stepdaughter, they believed that it was best
for him to plead guilty. As a basis for upholding the guilty plea, the state
introduced those letters into evidence.
Based on his admissions of guilt and other factors, the trial court denied Mr.
Bullard’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Mr. Bullard appealed the denial of
his motion, but the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Mr. Bullard did not present any evidence that the warrant was defective
at the time the magistrate signed it, and he, therefore, failed to make a strong
showing that a motion to suppress would have been granted. Mr. Bullard then
filed a state habeas petition, which the trial court denied after conducting an
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evidentiary hearing. The Georgia Supreme Court denied Mr. Bullard a certificate
of probable cause to appeal.
Mr. Bullard timely filed his first federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2254. In it, he raised several claims, all of which the district court denied. We
granted a certificate of appealability on one issue: Whether Mr. Bullard’s counsel
were ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress a “defective” warrant.
III
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 precludes
federal courts from granting habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on
the merits in a state court proceeding unless the state court’s decision
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it
applies a rule “that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case
law” or reaches “a different result from the Supreme Court ‘when faced with
materially indistinguishable facts.’” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d, 1144, 1156 (11th Cir.
2010). “A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established
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law if the state court unreasonably extends or fails to extend a clearly established
legal principle to a new context.” Id.
Our evaluation of state-court rulings is “highly deferential” and “demands
that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,
537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). We “must determine what arguments or theories
supported or . . . , could have supported, the state court’s decision; and . . . ask
whether it is possible [that] fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments
or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme
Court].” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
IV
To obtain habeas relief, Mr. Bullard must demonstrate that his counsel’s
performance was deficient and “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). If Mr. Bullard
makes an insufficient showing on one component, we need not address the other.
Id. at 697. Having conducted a thorough review of the record, we agree with the
district court that Mr. Bullard is not entitled to relief.
First, a “defendant’s plea of guilty, made knowingly, voluntarily, and with
the benefit of competent counsel, waives all nonjurisdictional defects in that
defendant’s court proceedings.” United States v. Yunis, 723 F.2d 795, 796 (11th
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Cir. 1984). This includes any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the
deficient performance relates to the voluntariness of the plea itself. See, e.g.,
McMillin v. Beto, 447 F.2d 453, 454 (5th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d
677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983). Here Mr. Bullard does not contend that his plea was
involuntary due to his counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, so the
ineffectiveness claim is waived by the plea.
Second, even if we were to reach the merits of the ineffectiveness claim,
there is no indication in the record that Exhibit C did not accompany the proposed
warrant at the time the magistrate signed it or the police searched his home. “In
fact, [Mr. Bullard] did not offer any testimony or documentary evidence regarding
the original warrant or its contents,” Bullard, 706 S.E. 2d at 155, but merely
presented proof that the state failed to turn over Exhibit C during discovery. The
Georgia Court of Appeals reasonably found that Mr. Bullard did not make a strong
showing that the evidence from his home would have been excluded had his
counsel filed the motion to suppress.
Third, the record makes clear that, even without the evidence found at his
home, Mr. Bullard had great reason and incentive to plead guilty. Prior to entering
his plea, Mr. Bullard wrote several letters to the trial court and to the district
attorney admitting that he had engaged in a sexual relationship with his seventeen-
year-old stepdaughter. Mr. Bullard was charged with a total of fifteen sex and
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drug offenses. Given his admissions, he was at risk of receiving a more severe
sentence had he chosen to go trial. On this record, we cannot say that there was a
reasonable probability that Mr. Bullard would have gone to trial had the evidence
been suppressed. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112 (“The likelihood of a different
result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”).
V
In sum, we conclude that Mr. Bullard has not overcome the burden imposed
by § 2254(d). Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Bullard’s habeas
petition.
AFFIRMED.
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