FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 28 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10185
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:13-cr-01141-RCC-
ORP-1
v.
GILBERTO MADRID-ROMERO, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Linda R. Reade, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 29, 2015**
Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.
Gilberto Madrid-Romero appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 70-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for
attempted re-entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Madrid-Romero contends that the district court procedurally erred at
sentencing. He did not object on these grounds in the district court, and we
therefore review for plain error. United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 761-62
(9th Cir. 2008). The court did not plainly err. Madrid-Romero asserts that the
district court failed to consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors presented by defense
counsel and the Probation Officer. There is no evidence in the record to support
this assertion, especially given that the court addressed the issues raised by defense
counsel and the Probation Officer and stated that it had considered all of the
factors. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(recognizing that a court must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, but that the
court need not tick off each of the factors to show that it has considered them).
Madrid-Romero also argues that statements made by the prosecutor should be
characterized as erroneous findings by the district court. We reject this argument.
There is no evidence that the district court adopted these statements or relied on
them as a basis for its sentence. Thus, there was no procedural error.
Madrid-Romero also contends that the sentence, which is at the bottom of
the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, is substantively unreasonable because
the district court placed too much weight on his criminal history and not enough
weight on his family issues. The sentence is not substantively unreasonable in
2
light of all the 18 U.S.C. factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez,
587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the “weight to be given the
various factors in a particular case is for the discretion of the district court” and
holding that the district court did not place undue weight on need for deterrence
where defendant repeatedly entered the United States illegally); United States v.
Espinoza-Baza, 647 F.3d 1182, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that 96-month
sentence for illegal re-entry was not substantively unreasonable based on the
totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s criminal history and the
need to provide deterrence and protect the public from further crimes).
AFFIRMED.
3