Brandon Raub v. Michael Campbell

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1277

BRANDON RAUB,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL CAMPBELL,

Defendant – Appellee,

and

DANIEL LEE BOWEN; RUSSELL MORGAN GRANDERSON; LLOYD C.
CHASER; LATARSHA MASON; MICHAEL PARIS; TERRY GRANGER;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN DOES 1−10,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:13-cv-00328-HEH-MHL)

Argued: January 28, 2015 Decided: April 29, 2015

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and DIAZ and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Thacker joined.

ARGUED: William H. Hurd, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Stylian Paul Parthemos, COUNTY
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, Chesterfield,
Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stephen C. Piepgrass,
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia; John W. Whitehead,
Douglas R. McKusick, THE RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE, Charlottesville,
Virginia; Anthony F. Troy, Charles A. Zdebski, ECKERT SEAMANS
CHERIN & MELLOTT, LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Jeffrey L. Mincks, Julie A.C. Seyfarth, COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
FOR THE COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, Chesterfield, Virginia, for
Appellee.

2
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

In the summer of 2012, Brandon Raub composed a series of

ominous Facebook posts, which drew the attention of his former

fellow Marines. They contacted the FBI expressing concern, and

the FBI--in coordination with local law enforcement--dispatched

a team to Raub’s Virginia home. After speaking with Raub, and

on the recommendation of Michael Campbell, a local mental health

evaluator, the local officers detained Raub for further

evaluation. Campbell then interviewed Raub and, on the basis of

that interview and Raub’s Facebook posts, petitioned a state

magistrate judge for a temporary detention order, which was

granted. Raub was subsequently hospitalized against his will

for seven days.

Raub filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages and

injunctive relief against Campbell for violating his Fourth

Amendment and First Amendment rights. The district court

granted summary judgment to Campbell on the basis of qualified

immunity, concluding that Campbell acted reasonably in

recommending Raub’s seizure and further detention. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

In reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment, we recite the facts and all reasonable inferences to

3
be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party--in this case, Raub. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

In August 2012, two Marine veterans who had served with

Raub during his deployment to Iraq contacted the FBI. They were

concerned by Raub’s “increasingly threatening” Facebook posts.

J.A. 532. In an email, one of the Marines, Howard Bullen,

provided specific examples of Raub’s posts:

• “This is revenge. Know that before you die.”
• “Richmond is not yours. I’m about to shake some shit
up.”
• “This is the start of you dying. Planned spittin with
heart of Lion.”
• “Leader of the New School. Bringing Back the Old
School. MY LIFE WILL BE A DOCUMENTARY.”
• “I’m gunning whoever run the town.”
• “W, you’re under arrest bitch.”
• “The World will Find This.”
• “I know ya’ll are reading this, and I truly wonder if
you know what’s about to happen.”
• “W, you’ll be one of the first people dragged out of
your house and arrested.”
• “And Daddy Bush, too.”
• “The Revolution will come for me. Men will be at my
door soon to pick me up to lead it ;)”
• “You should understand that many of the things I have
said here are for the world to see.”

J.A. 532–33. Although Bullen characterized Raub’s statements as

“typical extremist language,” he also told the FBI that Raub

“genuinely believes in this and is not simply looking for

attention.” Id. at 533. Bullen expressed concern that Raub’s

“threatening and action-oriented” rhetoric had worsened in

recent months. Id.

4
 The FBI decided to interview Raub. 1 Supported by a team

comprised of federal and local law enforcement officers,

Detective Michael Paris and FBI Agent Terry Granger approached

Raub at his home and questioned him about his Facebook posts.

Raub, wearing only a pair of white shorts and speaking to

the officers through the screen door of his home, admitted that

he wrote the posts. Although he never threatened violence, Raub

refused to answer directly when asked if he intended to commit

violence. At one point, he told Paris and Granger, “[W]e will

all see very soon what all of this means.” J.A. 193.

Paris observed that Raub’s demeanor shifted wildly over the

course of the conversation, alternating between calm and

“extremely intense and emotional.” Id. Raub questioned Paris

and Granger about their knowledge of government conspiracy

theories--including Raub’s theories that the government launched

a missile into the Pentagon on 9/11 and that the government

exposes citizens to radioactive thorium--and wondered why the

officers were not arresting government officials for these

crimes.

After interviewing Raub for nearly half an hour, Paris and

Granger discussed whether they should detain Raub for a mental

1
Agents had conferred with state and federal prosecutors,
who advised that Raub’s statements, by themselves, did not
provide sufficient grounds for criminal charges.

5
health evaluation. To that end, Paris spoke by telephone with

Michael Campbell, a certified mental health “prescreener” with

the local emergency services agency. Paris described Raub’s

Facebook posts and told Campbell that Raub appeared “preoccupied

and distracted” during the interview, with rapid mood swings and

roving, intermittent eye contact. J.A. 574. In addition, Paris

expressed concern about Raub’s military weapons training and his

potential access to weapons. 2 Campbell, believing that Raub

might be psychotic, recommended that Paris detain Raub for an

evaluation.

Raub was placed in custody and transported to the local

jail. 3 There, he was handcuffed to a bench in the jail’s intake

room. Because Raub was not allowed to retrieve his clothes

before being detained, he was both shirtless and shoeless when

Campbell arrived to speak with him. Campbell asked Raub about

the Facebook posts, as well as Raub’s beliefs in government

conspiracies and an impending revolution. Although Raub said

little in response--declining after twelve minutes to answer any

2
The record does not say why Paris thought Raub had access
to weapons.
3
Virginia law requires that a person seized for an
emergency detention be taken to an “appropriate location to
assess the need for hospitalization or treatment.” Va. Code
Ann. § 37.2-808(G) (2011).

6
further questions--when asked whether he felt justified in

following through with the threats that had caused his

detention, Raub replied, “I certainly do, wouldn’t you?” J.A.

576. In addition, he told Campbell, “the revolution is coming,”

and “if you [k]new of what was coming[,] wouldn[’]t you try to

stop it[?]” J.A. 705. When asked why he thought the

authorities had approached him about his posts, Raub replied,

“because they know I am on to them.” J.A. 523.

Campbell also noted that Raub appeared preoccupied and

distracted and had difficulty answering questions. This

behavior, combined with Raub’s professed belief in an impending

revolution that he was destined to lead, prompted Campbell to

conclude that Raub might be paranoid and delusional, and that he

was “responding to some internal stimulus.” J.A. 576.

After speaking with Raub, Campbell read the email that

Bullen had sent to the FBI. Campbell also spoke with Raub’s

mother, who said that she shared her son’s beliefs and had

noticed no change in his behavior. Campbell nonetheless

concluded that Raub met the statutory standard for involuntary

temporary detention, 4 given Raub’s “recent change in . . .

4
The statute authorizing temporary detention requires a
finding that (1) a person has a mental illness; (2) “there
exists a substantial likelihood that, as a result of [that]
mental illness, the person will” harm himself or others; (3) the
person needs hospitalization or treatment; and (4) the person
(Continued)
7
behavior[] and more severe posts about revolution with plans for

action,” as reflected in the email. J.A. 705.

Consequently, Campbell petitioned for and received a

temporary detention order from a magistrate judge. Raub was

taken to a hospital, where a psychologist examined him and

agreed that Raub exhibited symptoms of psychosis. Hospital

staff thereafter petitioned the state court for an order of

involuntary admission for treatment. After a hearing, held four

days after Raub was detained, the court ordered that Raub be

admitted for thirty days; however, just three days later, the

court ordered Raub released from the hospital, concluding that

“the petition [was] . . . devoid of any factual allegations.”

J.A. 879. 5

Raub subsequently filed suit against multiple defendants,

alleging claims under state and federal law. He amended his

complaint twice, with the Second Amended Complaint alleging

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against only one defendant--

Campbell. In addition to damages, Raub also sought to enjoin

Campbell from seizing Raub in the future or retaliating against

will not volunteer for hospitalization or treatment. Va. Code
Ann. § 37.2-809(B) (2010).
5
The court provided no further explanation for its
conclusion.

8
him based on the exercise of his constitutional rights. The

district court granted Campbell’s motion for summary judgment on

the basis of qualified immunity and denied Raub’s request for

injunctive relief.

Raub appeals, pressing three arguments. First, he contends

that Campbell violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free

from unreasonable seizures by recommending that Raub be taken

into custody for a mental health evaluation and by petitioning

the state court for a temporary detention order. Second, Raub

avers that Campbell violated his First Amendment right of free

speech by basing his conclusion that Raub was delusional on

Raub’s Facebook posts and his responses to Campbell’s questions.

Finally, Raub contends that, even if his constitutional claims

fail, he is still entitled to injunctive relief. We address

each argument in turn.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant

Campbell summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2014). Generally,

qualified immunity operates to protect law enforcement and other

government officials from civil damages liability for alleged

constitutional violations stemming from their discretionary

functions. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987).

9
The protection extends to “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Indeed, as we have emphasized repeatedly,

“[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they

are liable for transgressing bright lines.” S.P. v. City of

Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992)).

The defense of qualified immunity is broader than a mere

defense to liability. Rather, intended to “spare individual

officials the burdens and uncertainties of standing trial,” it

provides for immunity from suit where a state actor’s conduct is

objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Gooden v.

Howard Cnty., Md., 954 F.2d 960, 965 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc);

see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)

(plurality opinion) (noting that qualified immunity is

“effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial”). We therefore prefer questions of qualified immunity to

be decided “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”

Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d

324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). And we have recognized that, on

a defense of qualified immunity, once a state actor’s conduct is

established beyond dispute, the question of whether that conduct

10
was reasonable is one of law for the court to decide. Id. at

333.

Our qualified immunity analysis typically involves two

inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff has established the

violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

West, 771 F.3d at 213 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 232 (2009)). However, we need not reach both prongs of the

analysis. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. Rather, we may address

these two questions in “the order . . . that will best

facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”

Id.

III.

Raub’s Fourth Amendment argument is based on the claim that

Campbell acted without probable cause in recommending that Raub

be taken into custody for a mental health evaluation, and when

he petitioned the state court for a temporary detention order.

We choose, however, not to reach the question of whether

Campbell’s conduct amounted to a constitutional violation.

Rather, we hold that because Campbell’s conduct was not

11
proscribed by clearly established law, summary judgment on the

basis of qualified immunity was proper. 6

In this prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the

“inquiry turns on the objective legal reasonableness of

[Campbell’s] action, assessed in light of the legal rules that

were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Pearson,

555 U.S. at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a

result, we look not to whether the right allegedly violated was

established “as a broad general proposition” but whether “it

would be clear to a reasonable official that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001), as modified by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223;

see also S.P., 134 F.3d at 266 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he

established contours of probable cause [must have been]

sufficiently clear at the time of the seizure such that the

6
We reject Campbell’s argument that he cannot be held
liable under § 1983 because he was not directly responsible
either for Raub’s initial seizure or his temporary detention
under the magistrate’s order. Section 1983 “imposes liability
not only for conduct that directly violates a right but for
conduct that is the effective cause of another’s direct
infliction of the constitutional injury.” Sales v. Grant, 158
F.3d 768, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 344
n.7 (explaining that § 1983 liability extends to the natural
consequences of a person’s actions). Thus, because Raub’s
seizure and detention were based, at least in part, on
Campbell’s recommendation, Campbell is liable under § 1983
unless he is entitled to qualified immunity.

12
unlawfulness of the officers’ actions would have been apparent

to reasonable officers.”).

Raub points to three general reasons why Campbell’s conduct

was unconstitutional. First, he contends that a reasonable

mental health professional would not have relied solely on

Detective Paris’s report, but rather would have spoken to Raub

prior to recommending his initial seizure. Second, he argues

that no reasonable mental health professional would have

interviewed Raub in a jail intake room, while he was shirtless,

shoeless, and handcuffed to a bench. Finally, Raub asserts that

no reasonable mental health professional would have concluded on

these facts--Raub’s Facebook posts, conflicting reports about

Raub’s behavioral changes, and Raub’s statements and behavior

during his interview with Campbell--that Raub should be detained

for a mental health evaluation.

Our previous decisions concerning seizures for mental

health evaluations have indeed emphasized a “general right to be

free from seizure” absent a finding of probable cause. Gooden,

954 F.2d at 968. However, we have also noted a distinct “lack

of clarity in the law governing seizures for psychological

evaluations,” compared with the “painstaking[]” definition of

probable cause in the criminal arrest context. Id.; see also

S.P., 134 F.3d at 266. Although our cases and the governing

statutes provide some guidance as to the standards for probable

13
cause to seize someone for a mental health evaluation, we are

aware of no case clearly proscribing Campbell’s conduct, or even

conduct similar to it.

Rather, all of our decisions involving mental health

seizures have involved circumstances in which law enforcement

officers seized an individual because they feared he or she

might be a danger to him- or herself. In most of these cases,

we granted qualified immunity to the seizing officers. For

example, in Gooden, officers were twice called to an apartment

complex on reports of screams emanating from one of the

apartments. 954 F.2d at 962. On the second occasion, the

officers personally heard “blood-chilling” screams and other

strange noises coming from the apartment. Id. However, when

the officers spoke with the woman who lived in the apartment,

she denied hearing or making any such noises (although she did

admit to “yelping” once because she had burned herself on an

iron). Id. Nevertheless, the woman appeared to have been

crying, and the officers were concerned that she was “mentally

disordered” and might pose a danger to herself. Id. at 963. As

a result, they took her to a nearby hospital for evaluation.

Id. at 964.

In our en banc reversal of the panel’s decision to affirm

the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, we held that

the officers’ conduct was reasonable, as they acted on the basis

14
of multiple complaints, personal observations, and their own

investigations. Id. at 966. We also found relevant the fact

that the officers acted pursuant to a Maryland law authorizing

mental health seizures. Id.

We came to a similar conclusion in S.P. There, officers

responded to an emergency dispatch and found the plaintiff at

her home, crying and distraught. 134 F.3d at 264. She admitted

that she had had a “painful argument” with her husband but

denied having thoughts of suicide or depression. Id. at 264,

267. At the same time, however, she told the officers that, if

not for her children, “she would have considered committing

suicide.” Id. at 267. Because of the woman’s demeanor and the

officers’ concern that she may cause harm to herself, the

officers took her to a nearby hospital for evaluation. Id.

Again, we concluded that because the officers “had ample

opportunity to observe and interview” the plaintiff, “did not

decide to detain [her] in haste,” and acted pursuant to state

law authorizing mental health seizures, they acted reasonably in

detaining the plaintiff. Id. at 267-68. Moreover, we noted

that, just as in Gooden, even though the plaintiff “exhibited no

signs of physical abuse and denied any psychiatric problems,”

the officers acted reasonably in relying on their perceptions of

the plaintiff as “evasive and uncooperative.” Id. at 268.

15
 In contrast, in Bailey v. Kennedy--notably, the only case

in which we have denied qualified immunity for seizures in the

mental health context--law enforcement officers detained the

plaintiff based solely on a 911 report that he was intoxicated,

depressed, and suicidal. 349 F.3d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 2003).

There, the officers responded to the plaintiff’s home, where

they found him sitting at his dining room table eating lunch.

He denied thoughts of suicide, declined to give the officers

permission to search the house, and asked them to leave. Id.

The officers did not see weapons or other indicia of a potential

suicide in the house.

After leaving, the officers decided they “ha[d] to do

something” and returned to knock on the door. Id. at 735. When

the plaintiff told them the suicide report was “crazy” and that

the officers needed to leave, the officers instead entered his

home and subdued him by handcuffing him and striking him

multiple times in the face. Id. We concluded that “the 911

report, viewed together with the events after the police

officers arrived, was insufficient to establish probable cause

to detain [the plaintiff] for an emergency mental evaluation.”

Id. at 741.

When confronted with a similar situation in Cloaninger, we

distinguished that case from Bailey on the ground that the law

enforcement officers had more information than the “mere 911

16
call in Bailey.” 555 F.3d at 333. There, police officers were

summoned to Cloaninger’s home after he called a VA hospital

seeking medical help, and a police dispatcher informed law

enforcement officials that Cloaninger had threatened suicide.

Id. at 328. In addition, one of the officers was aware that

“Cloaninger had previously made suicide threats” and also

believed that he “had firearms in the house.” Id. at 332.

When officers arrived at Cloaninger’s home to check on him,

he refused to respond “to their concerns for his well-being.”

Id. The officers then called a VA hospital nurse, who confirmed

that Cloaninger “had a history of threatening suicide.” Id.

The nurse also indicated that, under the circumstances, an

emergency commitment order would be appropriate. Id. at 333.

We held that “the initial VA call, coupled with knowledge of

Cloaninger’s prior suicide threats and the belief that he

possessed firearms,” constituted probable cause that Cloaninger

was a danger to himself. Id. at 334.

While these cases outline the standard for probable cause

in situations where law enforcement officials must decide

whether to detain an individual on the belief that he might be a

danger to himself, they provide less guidance here. Indeed,

none of the cases delineates the appropriate standard where a

mental health evaluator must decide whether to recommend a

temporary detention on the belief that an individual might be a

17
danger to others. They certainly do not speak to the necessity,

length, and substance of a psychological evaluation, nor to the

evidence needed to support probable cause in such a

circumstance.

Nonetheless, to the extent the cases should have informed

Campbell’s conduct, they support the view that he acted

reasonably under our prevailing legal standards. Unlike in

Bailey, Campbell’s recommendation that Raub be detained was

supported by far more than a 911 call. Rather, it was based on

the initial observations of law enforcement officers, the

content of Raub’s Facebook posts, the information provided by

Raub’s former colleagues, and--later--on Campbell’s own

evaluation and observations of Raub. Indeed, the quantum of

evidence here is greater than that in Cloaninger--where we found

probable cause based only on an initial hospital call, a history

of suicide reports, and a belief that Cloaninger possessed

firearms--and is more like the circumstances in Gooden and S.P.-

-where officers based their seizure on both prior reports of

distress and their personal observations of individuals at the

scene.

In sum, we think it doubtful that Campbell violated Raub’s

Fourth Amendment rights based on our existing precedent. We

need not, however, pass on that question because we hold that

Campbell is entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that

18
the unlawfulness (if any) of his conduct was not clearly

established at the time he recommended Raub’s seizure. 7 See

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241 (cautioning against deciding “questions

of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is

unavoidable”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating

that avoiding the Fourth Amendment question in qualified

immunity analysis is appropriate where the “inquiry involves a

reasonableness question which is highly idiosyncratic and

heavily dependent on the facts”). 8

7
The report of Raub’s psychological expert, Dr. Catherine
Martin, does not change our conclusion. Although Dr. Martin
questions whether Campbell’s probable cause determination was
ultimately correct, we need not resolve that issue under this
stage of our analysis. Our inquiry here is “not whether another
reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can
be constructed . . . years after the fact,” Hunter, 502 U.S. at
228 (1991), but whether Campbell’s conduct was reasonable under
then prevailing law.
8
We also reject Raub’s argument that Campbell is not
entitled to qualified immunity because he negligently omitted
from his petition for a temporary detention order the statement
of Raub’s mother, who told Campbell she had noticed no changes
in Raub’s behavior. In the arrest context, a law enforcement
officer’s omission of material facts from a warrant affidavit
deprives him of qualified immunity only if the omission was made
intentionally or with a “reckless disregard for the truth.”
Miller v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171
(1978)). Allegations of negligence or mistake are not enough.
Id. at 627–28. To the extent Raub contends Campbell
intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate judge, he
failed to properly raise this issue below. Thus, we decline to
(Continued)
19
 IV.

We turn next to Raub’s contention that the district court

erred in granting summary judgment on his First Amendment claim.

Raub’s argument is based on his allegation that Campbell

recommended Raub be detained for an evaluation based on Raub’s

“unorthodox political statements.” Appellant’s Br. at 50.

Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the

district court concluded that Raub failed to advance facts

sufficient to support a First Amendment claim, and we agree.

A plaintiff seeking to assert a § 1983 claim on the ground

that he experienced government retaliation for his First

Amendment-protected speech must establish three elements: (1)

his speech was protected, (2) the “alleged retaliatory action

adversely affected” his protected speech, and (3) a causal

relationship between the protected speech and the retaliation.

Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685–86 (4th Cir.

2000). Of note, our causal requirement is “rigorous.” Huang v.

Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., 902 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th

Cir. 1990). “[I]t is not enough that the protected expression

played a role or was a motivating factor in the retaliation;

claimant must show that ‘but for’ the protected expression the

consider it. See Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560
F.3d 235, 242 (4th Cir. 2009).

20
[state actor] would not have taken the alleged retaliatory

action.” Id.

Raub’s evidence falls far short of this requirement. Raub

contends that Campbell recommended his detention based on his

“political” statements concerning 9/11 conspiracies and

impending revolution. Assuming these statements are indeed

protected by the First Amendment, Raub ignores the numerous

other facts on which Campbell’s recommendation was based,

including the nature of Raub’s Facebook posts, both Campbell’s

and Paris’s observations of Raub’s demeanor, the information

contained in Bullen’s email about the recent increase in the

seemingly threatening posts, and Bullen’s belief that Raub

should be taken seriously. Thus, even if Raub’s protected

speech contributed to Campbell’s decision to recommend his

detention, it was not dispositive.

As a result, we agree with the district court that Raub did

not make out a First Amendment violation, and that Campbell is

therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

V.

Finally, we reject Raub’s claim for injunctive relief. As

the district court noted, a finding of qualified immunity

extends only to Campbell’s liability for damages. See Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.34 (1982). Nevertheless, the

21
district court concluded that Raub did not meet the standard for

injunctive relief because, among other reasons, he could not

demonstrate the “immediate threat of future injury,” required

for the equitable remedy. Raub v. Campbell, 3 F. Supp. 3d 526,

540 (E.D. Va. 2014). We review a denial of injunctive relief

for abuse of discretion. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,

Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1055 (4th Cir. 1985).

We agree with the district court that injunctive relief is

not appropriate on this record. First, we have recognized that

“federal injunctive relief is an extreme remedy.” Simmons v.

Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995). To obtain such an

injunction, a plaintiff must show (1) irreparable injury, (2)

remedies at law “are inadequate to compensate for that injury,”

(3) “the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and

defendant” warrants a remedy, and (4) an injunction would not

disserve the public interest. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed

Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010).

Where a § 1983 plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, it

will not be granted absent the plaintiff’s showing that there is

a “real or immediate threat that [he] will be wronged

again . . . in a similar way.” Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1382

(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111

(1983)). Even assuming Raub could make out a violation of his

constitutional rights, “past wrongs do not in themselves amount

22
to that real and immediate threat of injury.” Simmons, 47 F.3d

at 1382 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103). Consequently, Raub’s

claim that he will in the future be subject to “unreasonable

seizures and retaliation because of his political beliefs,”

Appellant’s Br. at 58, is merely speculative, such that he

cannot make out “this prerequisite of equitable relief.” See

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.

VI.

For the reasons given, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

AFFIRMED

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