State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Matthew Medgyesy

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1570

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MATTHEW MEDGYESY; KIMBERLY MEDGYESY,

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge.
(6:12-cv-00044-MGL)

Submitted: February 27, 2015 Decided: May 5, 2015

Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jeffrey A. Merriam, S. Brook Fowler, CARTER, SMITH, MERRIAM,
ROGERS & TRAXLER, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellants. T. David Rheney, Stephanie G. Flynn, GALLIVAN,
WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Matthew and Kimberly Medgyesy appeal the district court’s

orders granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) and denying their

subsequent postjudgment motion. “We review a court’s order

granting summary judgment de novo.” Feldman v. Law Enforcement

Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir. 2014). Summary

judgment should be granted only when “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). With regard to the postjudgment motion, our

review is for an abuse of discretion. Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n

for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir.

2012). We affirm.

The Medgyesys first argue that the district court erred by

concluding State Farm was entitled to a conclusive presumption

that it had made them a meaningful offer of underinsured

motorist (“UIM”) coverage. South Carolina requires automobile

insurers to offer optional UIM coverage up to the limits of the

insured’s liability coverage. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160

(2015). Such an offer must be meaningful. Cohen v. Progressive

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N. Ins. Co., 737 S.E.2d 869, 872 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013). If the

insurer fails to make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage, a

court will reform the policy to include that coverage up to the

insured’s limits of liability coverage. Id. An insurer is

entitled to a conclusive presumption that it made a meaningful

offer of UIM coverage if the insured has signed a form that uses

a state-approved offer format and meets certain statutory

requirements. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-350(B) (2015).

The Medgyesys concede that the offer forms used by State

Farm followed a state-approved format, were signed by Matthew,

and satisfied all of the technical requirements in S.C. Code

Ann. § 38-77-350(A) (2015). They argue, however, that the offer

forms contain ambiguities caused by the handwritten entries of a

State Farm agent. These ambiguities, the Medgyesys reason,

should have precluded a finding that State Farm had made a

meaningful offer under § 38-77-350.

Under South Carolina law, insurance policies are subject to

the formalistic rules of interpretation that are applied to

contracts generally. Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 757

S.E.2d 399, 406 (S.C. 2014). “It is a question of law for the

court whether the language of a contract is ambiguous.”

Williams v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 762 S.E.2d 705, 710 (S.C.

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A contract is

ambiguous when it is capable of more than one meaning or when

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its meaning is unclear.” N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v.

Richardson, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, 2015 WL 80900, at *3 (S.C. Jan.

7, 2015). “Whether a contract is ambiguous is to be determined

from examining the entire contract, not by reviewing isolated

portions of the contract.” Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 710. The

construction that reasonably gives effect to the whole

instrument and each of its parts will be adopted. Yarborough v.

Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 225 S.E.2d 344, 349 (S.C. 1976).

Only if the terms of the contract are ambiguous may the court

look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.

C.A.N. Enters., Inc. v. S.C. Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n,

373 S.E.2d 584, 586 (S.C. 1988).

We conclude that the offer forms were not ambiguous. The

Medgyesys assert that the offer forms are susceptible to three

meanings. However, the offer forms are only reasonably

susceptible to the meaning offered by State Farm because only

that meaning gives effect to each part of the offer forms.

Yarborough, 225 S.E.2d at 349. Accordingly, we conclude that

any error in the district court’s failure to consider the

alleged ambiguity is necessarily harmless.

Next, the Medgyesys claim that the district court erred by

not considering whether its decision invites an absurd result,

thereby defeating the purpose of South Carolina UIM statutes,

and by granting summary judgment when a factual dispute remained

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over the amount of UIM coverage to which the Medgyesys were

entitled. For both of these claims, the Medgyesys rest on the

assumption that the offer forms contained ambiguities. Because

the offer forms did not contain ambiguities, any errors asserted

by the Medgyesys on these grounds would be harmless.

Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the district court.

See United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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