J-S28029-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEVEN CRAIG MORRISON,
Appellant No. 1953 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered October 31, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003060-1992
BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and LAZARUS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED MAY 06, 2015
Steven Craig Morrison (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the order
denying his serial petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
The PCRA Court succinctly summarized the pertinent facts and
procedural history as follows:
[Appellant] is a serial PCRA petitioner who pled guilty to
statutory rape, aggravated indecent assault, and
corruption of a minor. [According to the criminal
complaint, the crimes occurred between November 1990
and July 1992, when the female victim was five or six
years old and Appellant was in his mid-twenties.] On
August 27, 1993, [Appellant] was sentenced to 9.5 years
to 30 years of incarceration. At that time, he was
represented by Assistant Public Defender Scott
Oberholtzer, who subsequently filed an unsuccessful
motion to modify the sentence. His subsequent appeal to
the Superior Court also was unsuccessful. See
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 644 A.2d 807 (Pa. Super.
[] 1994) (unpublished memorandum). [Appellant] did not
J-S28029-15
petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. However, since then, he has filed a litany
of motions, petitions and appeals that regurgitate a
multitude of untimely and baseless complaints.
His latest effort in this regard underlies the appeal sub
judice. On October 27, 2014, he filed a pro se 9th [PCRA
petition], coming before this Court with yet another
attempt to avoid the consequences of his heinous crimes
by seeking to have his guilty plea withdrawn and his
sentence vacated. By order dated October 31, 2014, [the
PCRA court] denied the [petition as untimely filed].
PCRA Court Opinion, 12/15/14, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted). This timely
appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a
petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is
supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA
court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164,
1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a
hearing on the petition if the PCRA court determines that the petitioner’s
claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the
record or from other evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011
(Pa. Super. 2001).
-2-
J-S28029-15
Before addressing the claims raised by Appellant in his pro se brief, we
must first determine whether the PCRA court properly determined that
Appellant’s ninth PCRA petition was untimely.
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (citation
omitted). Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither an appellate court nor
the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the petition. Id. “Without jurisdiction,
we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims”
raised in an untimely petition. Id.
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, an
exception to the time for filing the petition. Commonwealth v. Gamboa-
Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Under
these exceptions, the petitioner must plead and prove that: “(1) there has
been interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; or
(2) there exists after-discovered facts or evidence; or (3) a new
constitutional right has been recognized.” Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930
A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). A PCRA petition
invoking one of these statutory exceptions must “be filed within sixty days of
the date the claim first could have been presented.” Gamboa-Taylor, 753
A.2d at 783. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Moreover, exceptions to
-3-
J-S28029-15
the time restrictions of the PCRA must be pled in the petition, and may not
be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936
A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not
raised before the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.”).
Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on April 28, 1994, after
the expiration of time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with our
Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant filed this latest
petition over twenty years later. Thus, “the lateness of [Appellant’s ninth
petition] is glaringly obvious,” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/15/14, at 4, unless
Appellant has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the
enumerated exceptions applies. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741
A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 1999).
Appellant has failed to prove the applicability of any of the exceptions
to the PCRA’s time restrictions. The PCRA court addressed Appellant’s
unsuccessful attempt to meet this burden:
[Appellant] did not carry his burden. Recognizing the
lateness of his claims, [Appellant] sought to invoke the
timeliness exceptions set forth at Section 9545(b)(1)(i), by
alleging government interference only by way of Assistant
Public Defender Oberholtzer’s filing of the untimely [post-
sentence] motion, and Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), by alleging
only that he previously did not know that Attorney
Oberholtzer’s late filing violated his constitutional rights.
For a number of reasons, this effort to save his otherwise
untimely Petition fell far short of surmounting the
jurisdictional threshold.
-4-
J-S28029-15
First and foremost, [Appellant] failed to assert, let alone
prove, that he satisfied the 60-day-limitation period set
forth at Section 9545(b)(2) as to any claim set forth in his
otherwise untimely Petition. Considering that all of his
complaints revolve around alleged unfairness at his
preliminary hearing and at this 1993 guilty-plea hearing
and also considering his relentless filing of a multitude of
motions, petitions, and appeals since then raising, in part,
the same or similar allegations upon which the instant
Petition was based, the existence of any factual scenario
justifying such an assertion was absolutely implausible.
Simply put, it was impossible for [Appellant] to plead and
prove that he filed the Petition within 60 days of learning
about government interference or previously unknown
facts upon which to invoke any timeliness exception.
Indeed, he made no effort to do so.
Even putting aside that fatal deficiency, [Appellant]
failed to make any argument whatsoever for the
application of the timeliness exception as to claims other
than the ineffective-assistance claim. Therefore, those
claims remained untimely for that additional reason. As to
the ineffective assistance claim, it also remained untimely
for the additional reason that his arguments for the
application of the two timeliness exceptions were not
compelling. First, a late filing by a public defender is not
the sort of government interference with the presentation
of a claim to which the governmental interference
exception applies. [See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(4).]
Likewise, a defendant’s realization of the legal impact of a
later filing is not the sort of unknown fact to which the
unknown-facts exception applies. Second, even assuming
arguendo that, by some stretch of the imagination, the
exceptions could have applied to the instant facts,
[Appellant] would have, or could have, become aware of
the lateness of the filing and the legal implications no later
than his receipt of the 1994 appellate decision denying his
appeal. This further supported [the PCRA court’s] initial
determination that [Appellant] did not file the late Petition
within the applicable 60-day limitation period.
To summarize, [Appellant] failed to establish that he
satisfied the 60-day limitation period for filing his
otherwise-untimely PCRA claims, and he failed to establish
the application of any timeliness exception. Therefore, this
-5-
J-S28029-15
Court lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of his
substantive claims, and the Petition had to be denied.
PCRA Court Opinion, 12/15/14, at 5-6 (citation omitted).
Our review of the record amply supports the PCRA court’s conclusion
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s ninth PCRA petition.
Although within his pro brief Appellant makes additional assertions regarding
his inability to obtain his court records and claims that he filed his latest
petition within sixty days of speaking with a “prison legal aid,” these new
claims cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. See generally,
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying
Appellant post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/6/2015
-6-
J-S28029-15
-7-