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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
PHILADELPHIA WHOLESALE PRODUCE
MARKET A/K/A PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL
PRODUCE MARKET AND PHILADELPHIA
FRESH FRUIT TERMINAL CORPORATION
A/K/A PHILADELPHIA FRESH FOOD
TERMINAL CORPORATION,
Appellees No. 1862 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): January Term, 2013 No. 03651
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MAY 07, 2015
Appellant, Transystems, Inc., appeals from the order entered on May
13, 2014, that granted the motion for summary judgment filed by
Philadelphia Wholesale Produce Market, also known as Philadelphia Regional
Produce Market, and Philadelphia Fresh Fruit Terminal Corporation, also
known as Philadelphia Fresh Food Terminal Corporation (collectively
“Appellees”). We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter were set forth
by the trial court as follows:
In October 2010, Lee Real Estate sued [Appellant] in
federal court for copyright infringement for using its copyrighted
architectural plans without permission. The plans in question
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were designs for the construction of a new fruit and produce
terminal in South Philadelphia. [Appellant] promptly filed joinder
complaints against [Appellees] raising claims for negligent
misrepresentation for allegedly having erroneously told
[Appellant] that Lee’s plans could be used without concern for
copyright issues, and for contribution and indemnification.
It is not disputed that the misrepresentations took place in
2006. Lee and [Appellant] settled the federal matter in August
2012. The settlement terms specifically excluded [Appellant’s]
contribution and negligent misrepresentation claims against
[Appellees] which the federal judge dismissed as being strictly
state law claims.
It is undisputed that in [June of] 2013, [Appellant] filed a
new legal action against [Appellees] in the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas for contribution and damages … instead of
proceeding pursuant to the Transfer of Erroneously Filed Matters
Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 5103.[1]
Pleading and Discovery have closed and [Appellees have
moved] for summary [judgment] claiming that the negligent
misrepresentation claim is barred by the two year Statute of
Limitations, and that the contribution claim is barred by the
terms of the relevant statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 8324(c)[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 5/13/14, at 1-2. The trial court granted Appellees’
motion for summary judgment in an order filed on May 13, 2014. This
timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:
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1
“Section 5103 allows a party to transfer a case dismissed by a federal
court on jurisdictional grounds to an appropriate state court, bringing with
the case its federal filing date for purposes of the statute of
limitations.” Kelly v. Hazleton General Hosp., 837 A.2d 490, 493 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103) (emphasis added).
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1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of Appellees, dismissing Appellant’s claim for
contribution with prejudice, by misapplying the provisions of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8321
et seq., where Appellees were not original defendants.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it granted summary
judgment in favor of Appellees, dismissing Appellant’s claim for
negligent misrepresentation with prejudice without considering
the application of the discovery rule to the applicable statute of
limitations.
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
An order granting summary judgment is subject to the following scope
and standard of appellate review:
Our standard of review [in] an appeal from the grant of a
motion for summary judgment is well-settled. A reviewing court
may disturb the order of the trial court only where it is
established that the court committed an error of law or abused
its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.
In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary
judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment
may be entered. Where the non[-]moving party bears the
burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his
pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment.
Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on
an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden
of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to
judgment as a matter of law. Lastly, we will review the record in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts
as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be
resolved against the moving party.
Shepard v. Temple University, 948 A.2d 852, 856 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(quoting Murphy v. Duquesne University, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001)).
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In its first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees by misapplying the provisions of
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8321-8327
(“the Act”). Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant argues that, because no
determination has been made as to Appellees’ status as a joint tortfeasor
under the Act, the trial court’s decision was premature. Id. We disagree.
The relevant portion of the Act provides as follows:
§ 8324. Right of contribution
(a) General rule.--The right of contribution exists among joint
tort-feasors.
(b) Payment required.--A joint tort-feasor is not entitled to a
money judgment for contribution until he has by payment
discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro
rata share thereof.
(c) Effect of settlement.--A joint tort-feasor who enters into a
settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover
contribution from another joint tort-feasor whose liability to the
injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8324.
After review, we conclude that the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment in favor of Appellees with respect to Appellant’s
argument on joint-tortfeasor status under the Act. If, as Appellant argues,
Appellees are not joint tortfeasors, then the Act does not apply; therefore,
Appellant is not entitled to contribution from Appellees because the Act
permits contribution only from joint tortfeasors. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8324(a).
Conversely, if Appellant establishes that Appellees are joint tortfeasors,
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Appellant is not entitled to contribution because it is undisputed that
Appellant’s settlement in the federal case did not extinguish Appellees’
liability. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8324(c). Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to no relief
on this issue.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees without considering the
application of the discovery rule. Appellant claims that, while the alleged
negligent misrepresentations were made in 2006, Appellant was not aware
of these misrepresentations until depositions in the federal case on
December 6, 2011. Appellant’s Brief at 16. Thus, Appellant asserts that the
discovery rule tolled the accrual date to December 6, 2011, providing
Appellant until December 6, 2013, to file a timely complaint. Id. We
disagree.
As noted above, Appellant claimed negligent misrepresentation in its
complaint against Appellees. Trial Court Opinion, 5/13/14, at 2; Complaint,
6/3/13, at ¶¶ 21-26 Count I. This negligence claim carries a two-year
statute of limitation. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(7). “[I]t is well-settled that the
statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and
maintain a suit arises.” Morgan v. Petroleum Products Equipment Co.,
92 A.3d 823, 828 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Once a cause of
action has accrued and the statute of limitations has run, a party alleging
damages is prohibited from bringing its cause of action. Id. However, the
discovery rule is an exception to this general rule that may toll the running
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of the statute. Id. The discovery rule is a “judicially created device which
tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations until the point where
the complaining party knows or reasonably should know that he has been
injured and that his injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.” Id.
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The record reveals that in a December 20, 2011 deposition, a vice
president and representative of Appellant, Mr. William Bremner, testified
that as far back as 2006, Appellant was aware of issues with the use of the
copyrighted material, but he claimed he was informed that the issues had
been resolved and that Appellant was permitted to use the copyrighted
designs. N.T., Deposition of William Bremner, 12/20/11, at 181-184.
However, Lee Real Estate specifically averred in its complaint in the federal
action that Lee Real Estate did not intend to transfer the copyrights of the
architectural plans to Appellant and that the copyright issue was unresolved.
Second Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement, 10/13/10, at ¶¶ 18-
59.
Accordingly, despite Appellant’s belief that the misrepresentation
concerning the copyright was resolved in 2006, Appellant was on notice by
way of the Second Amended Complaint, filed October 13, 2010, that the
misrepresentation regarding the use of the copyrighted materials remained
at issue. The trial court, finding that Appellant’s claim was specious,
concluded as follows:
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Even if [Appellant] could prove it did not know that it had
been damaged until Lee Real Estate filed the federal court action
in October 2010, its claim is time barred; at the most optimistic,
it is chargeable with knowledge of injury from the time it joined
[Appellees] in the federal court action [on November 12, 2010].
Therefore, the Market defendant’s motion for Summary
Judgment as to Count I, negligent misrepresentation, is granted
and the claim is dismissed.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/13/14, at 3. Thus, Appellant was on notice of the
alleged misrepresentation, at the latest, on November 12, 2010.
Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Appellant as the non-moving party and giving Appellant the benefit of the
doubt regarding discovery, Appellant was required to initiate its cause of
action alleging negligence on this issue on or before November 12, 2012.
Here, Appellant did not file its writ of summons until January 30, 2013, and
did not file its complaint until June 3, 2013. Accordingly, Appellant did not
initiate its cause of action until after the statute of limitations expired, and
therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of Appellees.
For the reasons set forth above, we discern no error of law or abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s May 13, 2014 order. Thus, we affirm the order
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/7/2015
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