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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
EDWARD PRINTUP
Appellant No. 1345 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered July 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001191-1980
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MAY 07, 2015
Appellant Edward Printup appeals pro se from the July 7, 2014 order of
the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus on the basis that the claim is untimely pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
Printup was convicted on December 15, 1980, of first-degree murder
in connection with the death of his step-father. He was sentenced to a term
of life imprisonment. The lengthy procedural history of the instant case has
been accurately set forth by the trial court in its opinion dated September
17, 2014, and we see no need to restate it. In his brief to this Court,
Printup presents the following issue for our review:
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1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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Did the Common Pleas Court abuse its discretion by denying the
Appellant, here, the relief as sought when the Appellant
presented a claim for relief in a habeas corpus writ petition
asserting a freestanding claim of actual innocence?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Printup argues that because his “freestanding claim of actual
innocence” is not cognizable under the PCRA, it was proper to raise it in a
petition for habeas corpus. In support, he avers that “[i]f not for the
fabricated, bias testimony by one of [Harry Koons], Appellant could not have
been convicted.” Appellant’s Brief at 13.
It is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of
achieving post-conviction relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542; Commonwealth
v. Haun, 32 A.3d 697 (Pa. 2011). Unless the PCRA could not provide for a
potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus.
See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223–224 (Pa. 1999). Issues
that are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition,
and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition. See Commonwealth v.
Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d
462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (a collateral petition that raises an issue that the
PCRA statute could remedy is to be considered a PCRA petition). “Phrased
differently, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his
petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. Only post-conviction
claims that fall outside the sphere of the PCRA can be raised in a habeas
corpus petition. See Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2007).
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Our review of the certified record compiled over the past 35 years
indicates that Printup’s habeas corpus petition is based on the same claim
that was denied in his last PCRA petition.2 His naming the petition as a
habeas corpus petition based on an alleged “freestanding claim of actual
innocence” does not take the claim out of the sphere of the PCRA. See,
e.g., Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 293 (Pa. 2001) (Castille, J.,
concurring) (“The specifically enumerated, substantive claims deemed
reviewable under the PCRA all have to do with matters affecting the
conviction and sentence.”). As the PCRA court observed:
Judgment in [Appellant’s] case became final over 30 years ago.
Therefore, [Appellant’s] most recent Petition … is untimely.
[Appellant] argues that newly discovered evidence not previously
known regarding Harry Koons entitles him to overcome the
timeliness requirements of the PCRA. Petitioner also made this
argument in his fourth PCRA petition and this [c]ourt noted that
“a simple review of the docket at that time would have revealed
the charges pending against Harry Koons[.] … Clearly,
[Appellant] has not demonstrated that, even in the exercise of
due diligence, Koons’ pending charges could not have been
discovered prior to trial.” This [c]ourt finds that [Appellant] has
failed to provide any evidence to support his claims. Therefore,
[Appellant’s] petition is untimely and [he] is not entitled to relief.
PCRA Court Opinion, dated 7/7/14, at 5 (emphasis added).
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2
Appellant’s challenge to Koons’s testimony has been characterized in a
variety of ways over the years. His characterizing it now as “the bomb that
the prosecutor utilized to win the conviction against Appellant at the trial”
challenges the weight given the testimony, an issue decided long ago.
Moreover, contrary to Appellant’s description, Koons’s testimony
corroborated other evidence, including a letter Appellant had written to his
mother in which he admitted that he had killed his step-father.
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We agree with the PCRA court. Appellant’s claim, which could have
been raised in a PCRA petition, is untimely. Accordingly, we have no
jurisdiction to provide further review.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/7/2015
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