Quinton Brown v. Nucor Corporation

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1779

QUINTON BROWN; JASON GUY; ALVIN SIMMONS; SHELDON
SINGLETARY; GERALD WHITE; RAMON ROANE; JACOB RAVENELL,
individually and on behalf of the class they seek to
represent,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

NUCOR CORPORATION; NUCOR STEEL-BERKELEY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. C. Weston Houck, Senior District
Judge. (2:04-cv-22005-CWH)

Argued: September 17, 2014 Decided: May 11, 2015

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated in part, and remanded with instructions by published
opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Keenan
joined. Judge Agee wrote the dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., WIGGINS, CHILDS, QUINN &
PANTAZIS LLC, Birmingham, Alabama, for Appellants. Lisa Schiavo
Blatt, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: Armand Derfner, D. Peters Wilborn, Jr., DERFNER, ALTMAN &
WILBORN, Charleston, South Carolina; Ann K. Wiggins, WIGGINS,
CHILDS, QUINN & PANTAZIS LLC, Birmingham, Alabama, for
Appellants. Cary A. Farris, John K. Linker, J. Shannon Gatlin,
ALANIZ SCHRAEDER LINKER FARRIS MAYES, LLP, Houston, Texas;
Dirk C. Phillips, Sarah M. Harris, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP,
Washington, D.C.; J. Tracy Walker, IV, Robert L. Hodges,
Matthew A. Fitzgerald, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellees.

2
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

This case concerns the certification of a class of black

steel workers who allege endemic racial discrimination at a

South Carolina plant owned by Nucor Corporation and Nucor Steel

Berkeley (collectively, “Nucor”). Plaintiffs-appellants (“the

workers”) accuse Nucor of both discriminatory job promotion

practices and a racially hostile work environment under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The

district court originally denied class certification for both

claims, and this Court reversed. See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576

F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Brown I”).

The district court has revisited certification and

decertified the promotions class in light of the Supreme Court’s

opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __ U.S. __, 131 S.

Ct. 2541 (2011). 1 We thus again confront the question of whether

the workers’ have presented a common question of employment

discrimination through evidence of racism in the workplace.

Despite Wal-Mart’s reshaping of the class action landscape, we

hold that the district court has for a second time erred in

refusing to certify the workers’ class, where (1) statistics

1
The district court refused to decertify the workers’
hostile work environment claim. We have previously denied as
untimely Nucor’s petition for interlocutory review of that
decision. Nucor Corp. v. Brown, 760 F.3d 341, 342 (4th Cir.
2014).

3
indicate that promotions at Nucor depended in part on whether an

individual was black or white; (2) substantial anecdotal

evidence suggests discrimination in specific promotions

decisions in multiple plant departments; and (3) there is also

significant evidence that those promotions decisions were made

in the context of a racially hostile work environment.

Against that backdrop, the district court fundamentally

misapprehended the reach of Wal-Mart and its application to the

workers’ promotions class. We thus vacate the district court’s

decision in part and remand for re-certification of the class.

I.

The Nucor plant encompasses six production departments that

work together to melt, form, finish, and ship steel products to

customers. See Brown I, 576 F.3d at 151. At the start of this

litigation, 611 employees worked at the plant. Seventy-one

(11.62%) were black. 2 There was, however, at most one black

supervisor in the production departments until after the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) initiated charges

that preceded the putative class action.

2
By comparison, more than 38% of the available local labor
market is black, according to Census data provided by the
workers’ experts.

4
 The workers’ promotions claim rests on alternative theories

of liability under Title VII, which prohibits employment

discrimination because of an individual’s “race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The

promotions claim first alleges a pattern or practice of racially

disparate treatment in promotions decisions. See Teamsters v.

United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). Second, it charges

that Nucor’s facially neutral promotions policies and procedures

had a racially disparate impact. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,

401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.

Both theories are grounded in a statistical analysis of

racial disparities in job promotions at the plant combined with

anecdotal evidence of discrimination. The workers’ statistical

evidence spans the four-year period preceding the litigation,

between December 1999 and December 2003. Because Nucor

destroyed and/or discarded the actual bidding data for the

period before 2001, the workers’ experts established an

alternative benchmark using ‘change-of-status’ forms filed by

the company whenever a promotion took place at the plant. The

experts extrapolated comparative statistics for that period

using an assumption that the racial composition of the bidding

pool for those jobs was the same as for the post-2001 jobs

analyzed (when Nucor retained actual bidding records).

5
 The workers also presented abundant direct and

circumstantial anecdotal evidence of discrimination in

promotions, including:

* Anecdotal evidence provided by the seven named
plaintiffs and nine other putative class
members, claiming discrimination in specific
promotions decisions in the Nucor production
departments;

* A description of complaints, contained in
affidavits and depositions, made to plant
General Manager Ladd Hall, who the workers
allege failed to meaningfully respond;

* Descriptions of retaliation against those who
complained to management;

* A written copy of Nucor’s promotions policy and
testimony that the policy was largely ignored in
favor of giving unbridled discretion to
supervisors; and

* Testimony by a white supervisor that his
department manager told him that “I don’t think
we’ll ever have a black supervisor while I’m
here.”

The facts undergirding the workers’ separate hostile work

environment claim, not directly at issue in this appeal, also

bear on the promotions analysis. Those facts are disquieting in

their volume, specificity, and consistency. Supervisors

allegedly routinely referred to black workers as “nigger” and

“DAN (dumb ass nigger),” with one supervisor reportedly stating

“niggers aren’t smart enough” to break production records, while

others tolerated the routine use of epithets like “bologna

lips,” “yard ape,” and “porch monkey.” These epithets and

6
others were broadcast over the plant-wide radio system -

comprising a network of walkie-talkies used to communicate -

along with monkey noises and the songs “Dixie” and “High

Cotton.” The workers’ declarations and depositions further

suggest that departmental supervisors and the plant’s general

manager consistently ignored racial harassment carried out by

white workers, including the circulation of racist emails, the

prominent display of a hangman’s noose, the commonplace showing

of the Confederate flag, and an episode when a white employee

draped a white sheet over his head with eyes cut out in the form

of a KKK hood.

In 2007, the South Carolina district court denied the

workers’ motion for class certification for both the promotions

and hostile work environment claims. In 2009, a divided panel

of this Court reversed, concluding that the workers satisfied

the threshold requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23. We remanded the case “with instructions to certify the

appellants’ class action.” Brown I, 576 F.3d at 160.

On February 17, 2011, the district court followed our

instructions to certify the class, concluding that the workers

satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements that common questions

predominate and that the class action was superior to other

litigation devices to resolve the dispute. The district court

7
later declined to stay the case pending a ruling in Wal-Mart,

and it declined to reconsider its order certifying the class.

The Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart in June 2011,

decertifying an unprecedented nationwide class of approximately

1.5 million female employees spread over 3,400 stores. Wal-Mart

held that the plaintiffs had failed to present a “common

contention” of employment discrimination capable of “classwide

resolution,” as required by Rule 23(a)(2). Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct.

at 2551. Given the diffuse class and number of employment

decisions at issue, the Supreme Court observed that “[w]ithout

some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions

together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all

class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to

the crucial question why was I disfavored.” Id. at 2552

(emphasis in original). The plaintiffs, Wal-Mart concluded,

failed to meet that standard when they premised liability on a

company policy of decentralized subjective decision-making by

local managers, combined with statistics showing gender-based

employment disparities, limited anecdotal evidence, and expert

testimony about a corporate culture that allowed for the

transmission of bias. See id. at 2551, 2554-55.

On September 11, 2012, the district court relied on Wal-

Mart to decertify the workers’ promotions class, invoking the

court’s authority under Rule 23(c)(1)(C) to amend a

8
certification order at any time before final judgment. Wal-

Mart, the court observed, clarified and heightened the

commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), requiring the workers

to present “significant proof” that Nucor “operated under a

general policy of discrimination” and that they suffered a

common injury. J.A. 10934 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at

2553).

Under that standard, the district court concluded that

decertification of the promotions class was required because:

(1) this Court’s examination of the workers’ statistical

analysis in Brown I was not sufficiently “rigorous” to assess

whether it raised questions common to the class under Rule

23(a)(2); (2) the workers’ statistical and anecdotal evidence

failed to establish such commonality because it did not provide

“significant proof” that there existed both a “general policy of

discrimination” and a “common injury”; (3) the delegation of

subjective decision-making to Nucor supervisors was not, without

more, a sufficiently uniform policy to present “‘common’ issues

appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis”; and (4) even

if the workers had identified a common question of law or fact

satisfying Rule 23(a)(2), they failed to independently satisfy

Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements that common issues predominate and

that the class action is a superior litigation device.

9
 Although the court decertified the class for the promotions

claim, it refused to do so for the hostile work environment

claim. The district court reaffirmed that the workers had

demonstrated that the “landscape of the total work environment

was hostile towards the class.” J.A. 10964 (quoting Newsome v.

Up-To-Date Laundry, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 356, 362 (D. Md. 2004)).

Unlike the promotions claim, the court determined that the

hostile environment allegations required no showing of a

company-wide adherence to a common policy of discrimination.

Still, the court found that “there is significant evidence that

management ignored a wide range of harassment” and that the

workers “met their burden to present significant proof of a

general policy of discrimination.” J.A. 10968.

On September 30, 2013, the workers appealed the district

court’s decertification of the promotions class.

II.

We typically review a district court’s certification order

for abuse of discretion. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 183 (4th

Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 540 U.S. 614 (2004). We

review de novo, however, whether a district court contravenes a

prior express or implicit mandate issued by this Court. United

States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993); S. Atl. Ltd.

P’ship of Tenn. v. Riese, 356 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 2004) (“We

10
review de novo . . . whether a post-mandate judgment of a

district court contravenes the mandate rule, or whether the

mandate has been ‘scrupulously and fully carried out.’”

(quoting 2A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 3:1016)).

Determining the appropriate standard of review thus

requires a two step approach. First, we examine de novo whether

the district court’s decertification order violated our mandate

in Brown I to certify the workers’ class. Second, if no such

violation occurred, we must determine anew whether the district

court abused its discretion in decertifying the promotions

class.

As to the first question, an “extraordinary” exception to

the mandate rule exists when there is “a show[ing] that

controlling legal authority has changed dramatically.” Bell, 5

F.3d at 67 (alteration in original). Moreover, Rule 23(c)(1)(C)

provides a district court with broad discretion to alter or

amend a prior class certification decision at any time before

final judgment.

Against that backdrop, the parties disagree about whether

Wal-Mart provided sufficient justification for the district

court to invoke its powers to revisit certification. Nucor

maintains that Wal-Mart represents a “sea change” and that

“class actions may proceed only in the most exceptional of

cases.” Resp’ts’ Br. 15, 20. The workers suggest, however,

11
that the Supreme Court instead largely reaffirmed existing

precedent. Appellants’ Br. 34.

The truth has settled somewhere in between. See Scott v.

Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 113-14 (4th Cir. 2013)

(discussing limitations on the scope of Wal-Mart’s holding);

McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672

F.3d 482, 487-88 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338

(2012) (finding that Wal-Mart provided the basis for a renewed

class certification motion); DL v. District of Columbia, 713

F.3d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (surveying how Wal-Mart has

changed the class action landscape); Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing

A Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases

Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 Hofstra Lab. &

Emp. L.J. 433 (2012) (using an empirical analysis to predict

Wal-Mart’s likely impact on class certifications in the future).

At the very least, Wal-Mart recalibrated and sharpened the lens

through which a court examines class certification decisions

under Rule 23(a)(2), an impact plainly manifested by the number

of certifications overturned in its wake. See, e.g., EQT Prod.

Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2014); Rodriguez v. Nat’l

City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 376 (3d Cir. 2013); M.D. ex rel.

Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839, 841-44 (5th Cir. 2012);

Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.

2011).

12
 In that light, we find that the district court’s decision

to reconsider the certification of the workers’ class did not

itself violate our mandate in Brown I. Per this Court’s

original remand instructions, the district court certified both

the promotions and hostile work environment classes. Although

the court had no discretion to then reconsider questions decided

by this Court under then-existing facts and law, Wal-Mart

provided a sufficiently significant change in the governing

legal standard to permit a limited reexamination of whether the

class satisfied the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). 3

There are, however, instances described below when the district

court unnecessarily revisited other discrete determinations made

by this Court in Brown I, such as whether the Nucor plant should

be treated analytically as a single entity, and whether the

class independently met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). The

reconsideration of those determinations was not compelled by

Wal-Mart and contravened our mandate in Brown I.

Because the district court could reexamine whether the

workers met the requirement of commonality, we review those

3
Furthermore, this Court’s original mandate did not
entirely divest the district court of its ongoing authority
under Rule 23(c)(1)(C) to monitor the class and make changes
when appropriate. See Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266,
1273 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Class certification orders . . . are not
final judgments impervious to lower court review and
revision.”); Gene & Gene, L.L.C. v. BioPay, L.L.C., 624 F.3d
698, 702-03 (5th Cir. 2010).

13
findings under the abuse of discretion standard that typically

applies to certification orders. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (“The law gives broad leeway

to district courts in making class certification decisions, and

their judgments are to be reviewed by the court of appeals only

for abuse of discretion.”); Brown I, 576 F.3d at 152; Thorn v.

Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 317 (4th Cir.

2006). A district court abuses its discretion when it

materially misapplies the requirements of Rule 23. See Gunnells

v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003);

Thorn, 445 F.3d at 317-18 (“A district court per se abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law or clearly errs in its

factual findings.”). The decisive question here is whether the

district court materially misapplied Rule 23(a)(2) to the facts

at hand in light of Wal-Mart. 4

4
The dissent is skeptical that an appellate court can
articulate a deferential standard of review while then finding
reversible error in many of the factual and legal determinations
made by a district court. See post at 84. Deference, however,
clearly does not excuse us from conducting a detailed review of
the record. Nor does it blind us from factual findings that
were not supported and legal determinations that represent a
fundamental misunderstanding of Wal-Mart’s scope. Indeed, we
recently applied similar scrutiny when overturning a district
court’s class certification order. See EQT Production, 764 F.3d
at 357-58.

14
 III.

Rule 23(a)(2) establishes that a class action may be

maintained only if “there are questions of law or fact common to

the class.” The district court determined that Wal-Mart

required decertification of the workers’ promotions class

insofar as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rule (1)

emphasized the analytical rigor required to evaluate a

plaintiff’s statistical evidence of commonality at the class

certification stage, (2) placed the burden on plaintiffs to

provide “significant proof” of a “general policy of

discrimination” and “common injury,” and (3) relatedly

established that a company’s policy of discretionary decision-

making cannot sustain class certification without a showing that

supervisors exercised their discretion in a common way.

Each of these arguments is considered in turn.

A.

Wal-Mart reaffirmed existing precedent that courts must

rigorously examine whether plaintiffs have met the prerequisites

of Rule 23(a) at the certification stage, an analysis that will

often overlap with the merits of a claim. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.

at 2551 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,

160-61 (1982)). But as the Court later clarified, “Rule 23

grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits

inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.

15
Plans & Trust Funds, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95

(2013). Instead, the merits of a claim may be considered only

when “relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites

for class certification are satisfied.” Id. at 1195. 5

This Court’s precedent and its approach in Brown I are

consistent with Wal-Mart and Falcon. See Gariety v. Grant

Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (observing that

“while an evaluation of the merits to determine the strength of

the plaintiffs’ case is not part of a Rule 23 analysis, the

factors spelled out in Rule 23 must be addressed through

findings, even if they overlap with issues on the merits”). In

Brown I, this Court expressly invoked Falcon’s requirement of a

rigorous analysis to determine compliance with Rule 23. 576

F.3d at 152. More important, of course, we actually conducted

5
The Wal-Mart majority confronted a split among courts
regarding the depth of review necessary to sustain class
certification under Rule 23. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 582-84 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011) (describing the split between circuits); Wal-Mart,
131 S. Ct. at 2551-52. On one end of the spectrum, a number of
courts liberally construed the Supreme Court’s language in Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), stating that
“nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 . . .
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry
into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may
be maintained as a class action.” 417 U.S. at 177. On the
other end, many courts, including this Circuit, heeded the
Supreme Court’s later call for a “rigorous analysis,” as
announced in Falcon. See 457 U.S. at 160. As Falcon held,
“sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the
pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.”
Id.

16
such an analysis, providing a detailed evaluation of the

workers’ anecdotal and statistical evidence to ensure that it

presented a common question under Rule 23(a)(2). Id. at 153-56.

Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we do not (and Brown I

did not) suggest that Rule 23 is a mere pleading standard. See

post at 92. Far from it. It is true that Brown I cautioned

that “an in–depth assessment of the merits of appellants’ claim

at this stage would be improper.” Id. at 156. Such a

statement, however, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s

dictate in Amgen that a court should engage the merits of a

claim only to the extent necessary to verify that Rule 23 has

been satisfied. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194-95. Brown I did

precisely that.

1.

Even evaluated in a still more painstaking manner, the

workers’ statistical evidence is methodologically sound while

yielding results that satisfy Wal-Mart’s heightened requirement

of commonality discussed below. The parties’ central dispute

concerns the data used to analyze the period from December 1999

to January 2001, when Nucor failed to retain actual bidding

records. For that period, the workers’ expert developed an

alternative benchmark that uses 27 relevant ‘change-of-status’

forms – filled out when an employee changes positions at the

17
plant – to extrapolate promotions data because actual bidding

information was unavailable.

Of course, it belabors the obvious to observe that the

alternative benchmark is a less precise measure than actual

bidding data. It is also clear, however, that plaintiffs may

rely on other reliable data sources and estimates when a company

has destroyed or discarded the primary evidence in a

discrimination case. More than two decades of this Court’s

precedent affirm as much. See Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc.,

773 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. County of

Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1980); see generally Ramona

L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, The Statistics of

Discrimination: Using Statistical Evidence in Discrimination

Cases § 4.03 (2014) (describing the use of proxy data when

actual data is unavailable or unreliable). In Lewis v.

Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., this Court approved the use of Census

data to establish a hypothetical available pool of black female

job applicants after a company discarded employment applications

for the relevant period. 773 F.2d at 568. 6 Plaintiffs then

compared the “observed” annual rate of hires of black women with

6
In Lewis, the company had “improperly disposed” of the
relevant employment applications, unlike the present case where
there is no direct evidence of any impropriety. 773 F.2d at
768. That fact, however, does not affect our analysis of the
workers’ alternative benchmark.

18
the “expected” rates based upon the proportional availability of

black females in the labor pool. Id. We endorsed a similar use

of proxy data in United States v. County of Fairfax, involving a

county government that had destroyed three years of employment

applications. 629 F.2d at 940. To analyze hiring during that

time, plaintiffs assumed that the proportion of black and women

applicants for those years was the same as in the first year for

which the county retained records. Id. This Court approved,

concluding the alternative benchmark was “the most salient proof

of the County’s labor market.” Id. 7

2.

The critical question is thus not whether the data used is

perfect but instead whether it is reliable and probative of

discrimination. To that end, a court must examine whether any

statistical assumptions made in the analysis are reasonable.

See Paetzold & Willborn, supra, § 4.16. The district court here

7
The dissent cites Allen v. Prince George’s County, 737
F.2d 1299, 1306 (4th Cir. 1984), to support its argument that a
court has wide discretion to reject alternative benchmarks.
Post at 110-11. In Allen, however, the defendants produced
actual “applicant flow data” that contradicted the conclusions
of the plaintiffs’ statistics that were based on more general
workforce/labor market comparisons. Allen, 737 F.2d at 1306.
Here, like in Lewis, such actual applicant data is unavailable.
See Lewis, 773 F.2d at 568 (noting that “applicant flow data”
was not available). Furthermore, Nucor has not presented any
alternative statistical study, or shown that data exists that
may be more reliable than the alternative benchmark used by the
workers.

19
identified two assumptions made by the workers’ experts as

problematic.

The district court first questioned the assumption that the

job changes described on the 27 forms represent promotions. See

J.A. 10942. As an example of clear factual error committed by

the court, it quoted at length from the dissent in Brown I to

argue that the forms may represent job changes unrelated to

promotions. J.A. 10942 (quoting Brown I, 576 F.3d at 167-68

(Agee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The

forms cited in Judge Agee’s original dissent, however, are

plainly not among the 27 relied upon by the workers’ experts in

constructing the alternative benchmark. Compare J.A. 10942 (the

district court’s decertification order quoting the dissent in

Brown I), with J.A. 11005-11032 (copies of the actual change-of-

status forms used in the expert analysis). Worse still, the

dissent in Brown I reached the question of whether the 27 forms

represented promotions without the issue having been raised,

much less analyzed, by the district court in its original order

denying certification, see J.A. 8979, or by Nucor itself in its

briefing before this Court in Brown I. 8 The dissent in Brown I

8
Nucor instead argued that the change of status forms
failed to capture whether black employees bid on the positions,
and whether the positions were open for bidding in the first
place. Given the lack of controversy surrounding whether the 27
forms described promotions, the forms themselves were not
(Continued)
20
thus both engaged in sua sponte fact-finding to divine which

forms were used, and then got the facts wrong. 9 Using the flawed

data, the dissent concluded in Brown I that “[o]n this record,

it is difficult, if not impossible to discern whether the 2000

data based on the nebulous change-of-status forms proves those

positions were promotion positions available for employee

bidding and thus relevant to the formulation of statistical

evidence for the appellants’ claims.” Brown I, 576 F.3d at 168

(Agee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The

district court expressly embraced that conclusion in

decertifying the promotions class after Wal-Mart. J.A. 10942.

Upon examining the correct change-of-status forms,

discerning whether they represent promotions is a relatively

straightforward enterprise. Nineteen of the 27 forms expressly

state they are for a promotion, for a “successful bidder” on a

“higher position,” or for a new position that was “awarded” or

introduced into the record until 2012, after the district
embraced the fact-finding conducted by the dissent in Brown I
and observed that “the Court has never seen the 27 change-of-
status forms. . . .” J.A. 10943. The workers then appended all
the forms to their motion to “alter and amend” the
decertification order – a motion that was denied. J.A. 11005,
11083. Notably, it also appears that in 2006 the workers’
expert provided Nucor with a list of the 27 employees used in
the benchmark analysis. See J.A. 1409, 1438.
9
Given that history, we would be remiss not to acknowledge
the irony inherent in the dissent’s insistence that we are now
impermissibly making factual determinations without due
deference to the district court.

21
“earned.” Two of the forms describe changes in job

classification accompanied by an increase in pay. One form

notes that an inspector was a “successful bidder” on a mill

adjuster job – a move referred to on another change form as a

promotion. Two forms are for a “successful bidder” on a new

position where no new pay grade is noted. The remaining three

forms appear to involve changes in positions or training that

involved a decrease in pay, but there is no indication, or

argument by Nucor or the district court, that the exclusion of

those forms would substantially undermine the probativeness of

the expert analysis.

The second assumption criticized by the district court was

that the bidding pools for the 27 positions filled between

December 1999 and January 2001 had the same average racial

composition as the pools for similar jobs analyzed from 2001 to

December 2003, when the company retained actual bidding data.

Because of discovery limitations imposed by the district court,

the information available regarding the 2001-2003 promotions was

restricted to positions similar to ones bid on by the named

plaintiffs, where there was at least one black bidder. However,

because Nucor failed to retain bidding records for 1999-2000,

the data from that period could not be limited to positions

where there was a known black bidder. Instead, the alternative

benchmark had to assume that there was at least one black worker

22
applying for each promotion analyzed – an assumption that the

district court concluded helped render the statistical analysis

unreliable. But as we already determined in Brown I, the

assumption does not fatally undermine the probativeness of the

experts’ findings. The workers’ experts limited the records

they analyzed to the same positions identified in the later

period when bidding data was available, positions for which

there was a black bidder. J.A. 1161-62. In its original order

denying certification, the district court observed that the

assumptions regarding bidding “may be reasonable and the

statistics based thereon may be relevant to prove discrimination

at the plant,” but “the necessity of the assumptions diminishes

their probative value.” 10 J.A. 8987; see also Brown I, 576 F.3d

at 156. As we previously concluded, an incremental reduction in

probative value – which is a natural consequence of the use of

proxy data – does not itself render a statistical study

unreliable in establishing a question of discrimination common

to the class. Brown I, 576 F.3d at 156. Indeed, to conclude

otherwise would undermine our prior precedent in cases like

Lewis and Fairfax, rendering plaintiffs unable to bring a

statistics-based employment discrimination claim after a company

10
After we pointed to this language in Brown I, the
district court did an about-face and changed its conclusion to
state that the statistics were “fundamentally unreliable.” J.A.
10941.

23
has intentionally or inadvertently destroyed actual applicant

data. 11 See Lewis, 773 F.2d at 568; Fairfax, 629 F.2d at 940.

3.

The dissent points to still more statistical assumptions –

assumptions not discussed by either the district court or Nucor

– to further question the reliability of the alternative

benchmark. Specifically, the dissent suggests that the black

workers may not have been qualified for higher paying jobs and

that they may have been denied promotions because of

disciplinary records that were not themselves the result of

racial animus. See post at 111, 114-17. As to the

qualifications of the workers, Nucor identifies nothing in the

record – or in any factual findings by the district court - to

suggest that black workers regularly applied for jobs for which

they were not qualified, such that the reliability of the study

would be compromised. Indeed, the Nucor job postings explicitly

listed the minimum qualifications required, and the workers’

experts reasonably assumed that individuals would normally apply

11
The workers’ experts acknowledged that the incomplete
data “undermined” their “ability to use posting and bidding
records to analyze [those] promotions.” J.A. 1161. In context,
however, the experts were lamenting the failure of Nucor to
“produce all such records.” J.A. 1161. As the experts
concluded, they were able to “calculate reliable statistics” for
the limited universe of positions they analyzed, even though
greater discovery would have allowed them to make a more
“powerful” study of plantwide disparities. J.A. 1253-54; see
also J.A. 1340-41.

24
only if they believe they met such qualifications. See J.A.

7763 (an example of a job posting); J.A. 1162. That is not to

say that patently unqualified workers did not apply in isolated

cases. But there is no reason to believe that such incidents

would have substantially reduced the reliability of the

statistical conclusions. It also bears repeating that it was

Nucor that failed to retain or produce records that would have

allowed the experts to take other variables like qualifications

more precisely into account. See J.A. 1165.

The dissent, however, goes a step further in speculating

that black workers may have been denied promotions because of

their disciplinary records. See post at 111. Again, Nucor

itself does not make this argument. Instead, the argument the

dissent constructs is based on the company’s self-serving

responses to the workers’ interrogatories and requests for

production – where Nucor asserts that some of the black workers

were not chosen for promotions due to disciplinary issues. The

record, however, does not include disciplinary records for the

named plaintiffs or putative class members. More fundamental,

the workers allege that any disproportionate disciplinary action

levied against them was itself a product of racial

discrimination, with the disciplinary records then used as a

pretext in hiring decisions. As worker Ramon Roane has stated:

25
 Discipline, attendance, and safety allegations are
similar factors that are not equally applied and that
have been used as an excuse to deny promotions to me
and other persons of my race. The attitudes I have
experienced with white supervisors lead me to believe
that my race and that of other black employees makes a
difference in how we are treated and viewed for
discipline[,] promotions[,] and training.

J.A. 1000; see also J.A. 1024 (Alvin Simmons’s statement that a

white employee was promoted over him despite the fact that the

white employee “had been disciplined less than a year earlier

for ‘not paying attention’ when operating equipment”); J.A. 1111

(Earl Ravenell’s statement that black workers were

disproportionately singled out for disciplinary action); J.A.

6783 (Michael Rhode’s description of discrimination in

disciplinary action). See generally J.A. 10960-10972 (the

district court’s factual findings regarding the existence of a

racially hostile work environment); Desert Palace, Inc. v.

Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003) (allowing the use of

circumstantial evidence to show that race was a motivating

factor in a “mixed-motive” case involving both legitimate and

illegitimate reasons for an employment decision); Rowland v. Am.

Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 193-94 (4th Cir. 2003) (allowing

the use of circumstantial evidence to show that gender was “a

motivating factor” in a failure to promote an employee). Given

that background, it is easy to see why the district court chose

not to advance the arguments that the dissent makes today.

26
 Finally, the dissent criticizes the assumption that the 27

positions identified were actually open for bidding. 12 Post at

109. That assumption, however, derives directly from Nucor’s

stated policy that every job vacancy is posted on plant bulletin

boards and is open to bidding plant-wide – a policy cited by

Nucor’s own expert and the district court. See J.A. 5887 (the

Report of Finis Welch, observing that “[o]pen positions are

posted on bulletin boards and through email,” and that “[a]ll

employees in the plant are eligible to bid on a posted job”);

see also Resp’ts’ Br. 9 (“Department managers set the process

in motion by sending postings for available promotions to

Personnel employees, who performed a purely clerical role and

advertised postings plantwide.”); J.A. 8979 (the district

court’s original order denying certification, finding that

“[w]hen a position in a department becomes available, the job is

posted on the plant’s e-mail system, which is accessible to all

12
At times, the dissent seems to suggest that statistical
assumptions themselves are to be viewed with great suspicion.
What matters, however, is not whether an analysis makes
assumptions based on imperfect data, but whether those
assumptions are reasonable. Indeed, statistics are not
certainties but are merely “a body of methods for making wise
decisions in the face of uncertainty.” W. Allen Wallis & Harry
V. Roberts, The Nature of Statistics 11 (4th ed. 2014); see also
M.J. Moroney, Facts from Figures 3 (1951) (“A statistical
analysis, properly conducted, is a delicate dissection of
uncertainties, a surgery of suppositions.”).

27
employees in the plant”). The dissent nonetheless argues that

the statistical assumption was unreasonable. 13 We disagree.

4.

With the alternative benchmark evidence included, the

statistical disparity in promotions is statistically significant

at 2.54 standard deviations from what would be expected if race

were a neutral factor. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United

States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n. 14 (1977) (indicating that anything

greater than two or three standard deviations in racial

discrimination cases is suspicious, at least for large sample

sizes); Brown I, 576 F.3d at 156 n.9 (applying the Hazelwood

standard to the workers’ statistical evidence); Jones v. City of

Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2014) (observing that two

standard deviations has become the commonly accepted threshold

for social scientists and federal courts “in analyzing

statistical showings of disparate impact”). According to the

experts’ analysis, black employees constitute 19.24% of those

13
The record does indicate that “supervisory positions” are
not typically posted for bidding under the Nucor hiring policy.
J.A. 257. Neither Nucor nor the district court, however, has
provided any reason to believe that any of the 27 records at
issue describe open supervisory jobs, as Nucor defined the term,
and were thus not posted. Furthermore, the dissent suggests
that there may have been isolated instances when Nucor did not
follow its posting policy for non-supervisory jobs. The fact
that a company does not follow its policy to a tee, however,
does not fatally undermine a statistical assumption based upon
such a policy.

28
who applied for relevant promotions. Yet such employees were

only 7.94% percent of those promoted.

Of course, statistical significance is not always

synonymous with legal significance. EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank

of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 648 (4th Cir. 1983) rev’d on other

grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467

U.S. 867 (1984). Indeed, the usefulness of statistical evidence

often “depends on all of the surrounding facts and

circumstances.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340. Here, the

surrounding circumstances and anecdotal evidence of

discrimination, as described in greater detail below, are

precisely what help animate the statistical findings. 14 As we

held in Brown I and reaffirm today, “because the appellants’

direct evidence alone was sufficient to demonstrate common

claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact, their

statistical data did not need to meet a two-standard-deviation

threshold.” Brown I, 576 F.3d at 156-57. Thus it is plain that

when the statistical disparity actually exceeded two standard

14
Indeed, the workers’ statistical analysis may actually
underestimate the impact of race on promotions at Nucor. As
worker Eric Conyers stated in his declaration: “If I believed
that a truly level playing field existed at the company I would
have bid on numerous other positions such as Roll Guide Builder
in the Beam Mill.” J.A. 1079. But the expert analysis at issue
could not capture the impact of discrimination on depressed
bidding rates.

29
deviations, the district court abused its discretion in

decertifying the class.

B.

The district court further concluded that the workers’

statistical and anecdotal evidence was insufficient for class

certification insofar as the evidence did not demonstrate a

uniform class-wide injury that spanned the entire Nucor plant.

As the court observed, Wal-Mart instructs that plaintiffs must

present a common contention capable of being proven or disproven

in “one stroke” to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality

requirement. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Thus, a class-wide

proceeding must be able to generate common answers that drive

the litigation. Id.; see also Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765

F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (observing that “a class meets

Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement when the common

questions it has raised are apt to drive the resolution of the

litigation, no matter their number” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). For a claim based on discrimination in employment

decisions, “[w]ithout some glue holding the alleged reasons for

all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that

examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will

produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I

disfavored.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (emphasis omitted);

30
see also Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 113

(4th Cir. 2013).

The workers here most generally present two such common

contentions capable of class-wide answers under Title VII.

Under a disparate treatment theory, the common contention is

that Nucor engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful

discrimination against black workers in promotions decisions.

See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336. Under the workers’ disparate

impact theory, the common contention is that a facially neutral

promotions policy resulted in a disparate racial impact. See

Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31. As Wal-Mart observed, however,

semantic dexterity in crafting a common contention is not

enough. Commonality instead “requires the plaintiff to

demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same

injury[.]’” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Falcon, 457

U.S. at 157). As such, a court must examine whether differences

between class members impede the discovery of common answers.

Id. at 2551.

In the absence of a common job evaluation procedure, Wal-

Mart held that statistical proof of employment discrimination at

the regional and national level, coupled with limited anecdotal

evidence from some states, was insufficient to show that the

company maintained a “general policy of discrimination” present

in each store where class members worked. See Wal-Mart, 131 S.

31
Ct. at 2553. Similarly, the district court here found that the

workers’ statistical and anecdotal evidence was insufficient to

show a general policy in all Nucor departments that caused the

class injury.

The district court, however, failed to adequately

appreciate three significant differences from Wal-Mart that make

the case largely inapposite to the facts at hand.

1.

First, Wal-Mart discounted the plaintiffs’ statistical

evidence in large part because the statistics failed to show

discrimination on a store-by-store basis. See Wal-Mart, 131 S.

Ct. at 2555. As such, the plaintiffs could not establish that a

store greeter in Northern California, for instance, was subject

to the same discrimination as a cashier in New Hampshire. These

dissimilarities between class members were exacerbated by the

sheer size of the Wal-Mart class - 1.5 million members working

at 3,400 stores under “a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and

female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all

differed.” Id. at 2557 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).

The scale and scope of the putative class, combined with the

nature of the evidence offered, was thus essential to Wal-Mart’s

holding. Had the class been limited to a single Wal-Mart store

spanning multiple departments, or had the plaintiffs’ evidence

32
captured discrimination at a store level, a very different Rule

23(a)(2) analysis would have been required.

In contrast to Wal-Mart, this litigation concerns

approximately 100 class members in a single steel plant in

Huger, South Carolina. The class members shared common spaces,

were in regular physical contact with other departments, could

apply for promotions in other departments, and were subject to

hostile plant-wide policies and practices. See Brown I, 576

F.3d at 151. Such differences are not merely superficial.

Instead, a more centralized, circumscribed environment generally

increases the uniformity of shared injuries, the consistency

with which managerial discretion is exercised, and the

likelihood that one manager’s promotions decisions will impact

employees in other departments. That is particularly the case

where, as discussed further below, the entire Nucor plant was

allegedly infected by express racial bias and stereotypes – a

culture that management took few affirmative steps to

meaningfully combat.

Nonetheless, the district court analogized to Wal-Mart in

finding that the workers’ evidence of discrimination was

insufficient because it disproportionately concerned a single

department – the Beam Mill – and because there was an

insufficient showing that all departments operated under a

common policy of discrimination. J.A. 10949-54. As such, a

33
class-wide proceeding would not generate “common answers” as

Wal-Mart required, the district court found. See Wal-Mart, 131

S. Ct. at 2551.

The district court, however, inappropriately discounted,

and often ignored, evidence that establishes discrimination in

other Nucor departments. Although 11 of the 16 employees

submitting declarations on behalf of the plaintiffs worked in

the Beam Mill, the declarants describe frequent instances of

alleged promotions discrimination in other departments. See

J.A. 1021-24; 1032-35; 1049-51; 1055-56; 1061-63; 1085-86; 1091-

92; 1103; 1110-11; 1118-19. Even the additional affidavits

obtained by Nucor, discussed in further detail below, present

numerous allegations of discrimination in non-Beam Mill

departments. See J.A. 5992-95 (discrimination in the Hot Mill

and Melt Shop); 6143-45 (discrimination in the Hot Mill); 6174

(general observations of promotions discrimination); 6369-70

(discrimination in the Melt Shop); 6505-07 (discrimination in

the Hot Mill); 7036 (discrimination in the Melt Shop). The

record additionally indicates numerous complaints of

discrimination made to the plant’s general manager, who

allegedly did little to nothing in response. Such alleged

tolerance of discrimination from top management at the plant

34
supports the workers’ contention of a class-wide injury that

affected them all. 15

The district court made a still more fundamental error by

choosing to treat the Nucor departments as autonomous operations

in the first place instead of part of a single facility,

contravening both this Court’s instructions in Brown I and the

district court’s own prior findings. The district court’s

original order to certify the class recognized that a

department-by-department approach had been foreclosed, writing:

Since the Fourth Circuit rejected this Court’s
characterization of the production departments as
separate environments, the Court must proceed under
the assumption that the production departments were
permeable, if not unitary. This assumption is
buttressed by the fact that Nucor’s bidding is plant-
wide, and this Court already has held that “potential

15
As the district court found in the context of the
workers’ hostile work environment claim:

These affidavits support the Court’s conclusion that
although allegations of a hostile work environment
were most prevalent and severe in the Beam Mill,
employees from all of the production departments were
subjected to abusive behavior. Specifically,
employees from every department reported seeing the
Confederate flag, employees from every department
reported seeing racist graffiti; and employees from
every department reported receiving racially offensive
e-mails. Furthermore, in several instances, employees
who worked in one department indicated they were
harassed by employees from other departments, and many
employees reported observing what they considered to
be racist symbols and racist graffiti in common areas
of the plant.

J.A. 10968.

35
 applicants are eligible to prove they would have
applied for a promotion but for the discriminatory
practice.”

J.A. 9705. Wal-Mart provided no grounds for the court to

reconsider that finding because nothing in the Supreme Court’s

opinion suggests that single, localized operations must be

analytically dissected into component departments. 16 Here, all

of the workers’ evidence concerns a single connected facility.

Even if not required by our prior ruling, treating the

plant as a single entity remains sound. In addition to the

direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination in

promotions decisions in multiple departments, racial bias in one

Nucor plant department itself diminished the promotional

opportunities for black workers in all the departments –

including those who wanted promotions into the infected

department and those who sought promotions to other departments

and needed their supervisors’ recommendations. To that end, the

workers cogently observe that requirements for dual approvals

16
The dissent insists that Brown I’s determination that the
Nucor plant should be treated as a single facility only extended
to the hostile work environment claim. Post at 123-24. Yet the
discussion of the issue in Brown I was specifically premised on
the district court’s findings regarding both the “pattern or
practice” and the work environment claims. Brown I, 576 F.3d at
157. A district court may not typically relitigate “issues
expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court.” Bell, 5
F.3d at 66. Here, even the district court has recognized that
Brown I prevented a finding that the plant was not a unitary
environment in the context of the promotions claim. J.A. 9705
(Certification Order).

36
for promotions – by originating and destination department heads

– “carr[ied] the effects of racial discrimination from one

department and supervisor to another, either by systemic

tolerance, acquiescence or design.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 24

(citing Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 897 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2012)).

Such a conclusion is further strengthened by the workers’

hostile work environment claim. As the district court itself

found, “the plaintiffs have submitted significant proof that the

landscape of the total work environment at the Berkeley plant

was hostile towards African-Americans and that the defendants

failed to take ‘remedial action reasonably calculated to end the

harassment.’” J.A. 10966; see also Brown I, 576 F.3d at 157-58.

That environment, the workers argue, supports their showing of

an atmosphere of systemic tolerance of racial hostility by

managers and supervisors, forming part of the overall pattern or

practice that “infected black employees’ promotion

opportunities.” We agree.

2.

Second, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs’ theory of commonality

relied, in part, on showing that the company maintained a

corporate culture that facilitated the uniform transmission of

implicit, or subconscious, bias into the hiring process. See

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548. To that end, the plaintiffs’

expert testified the company was “vulnerable” to “gender bias.”

37
Id. at 2553. The Court, however, concluded that the expert

could not with specificity determine how the culture concretely

influenced individual employment decisions. Id. at 2553-54.

The testimony was therefore insufficient to show a common policy

that produced a common injury.

Here, however, the workers have provided substantial

evidence of unadulterated, consciously articulated, odious

racism throughout the Nucor plant, including affirmative actions

by supervisors and a widespread attitude of permissiveness of

racial hostility. The examples in the record are ubiquitous:

bigoted epithets and monkey noises broadcast across the plant

radio system, emails with highly offensive images sent to black

workers, a hangman’s noose prominently displayed, a white

supervisor stating that “niggers aren’t smart enough” to break

production records, and abundant racist graffiti in locker rooms

and shared spaces. Moreover, no more than one black supervisor

worked in the Nucor production departments until after the EEOC

charge that preceded this litigation. It strains the intellect

to posit an equitable promotions system set against that

cultural backdrop, particularly in light of the other evidence

presented.

The dissent rejects the idea that evidence of a racially

hostile work environment may help establish a claim for

38
disparate treatment in promotions decisions. 17 Post at 124-25.

Indeed, the dissent goes so far as to observe that “locker

rooms and radios bear no relationship to promotions decisions.”

Id. at 125. Such a perspective, however, is perplexingly

divorced from reality and the history of workplace

discrimination. It is difficult to fathom how widespread racial

animus of the type alleged here, an animus that consistently

emphasized the inferiority of black workers, bears no

relationship to decisions whether or not to promote an employee

of that race. Although the dissent asserts that “nothing in the

record supports” making a connection between the work

environment and promotions practices, we are not limited to the

record in making such elementary judgments. Justice is not

blind to history, and we need not avert our eyes from the

broader circumstances surrounding employment decisions, and the

inferences that naturally follow.

3.

Third, and related, the anecdotal evidence of

discrimination in this case is substantially more probative than

17
We do not suggest, of course, that evidence of a hostile
work environment is sufficient by itself to support a disparate
treatment or disparate impact claim. Rather, we merely observe
that the substantial showing of endemic prejudice at the plant –
a prejudice that was allegedly tolerated and/or encouraged by
management - heightens the probativeness of the workers’ other
evidence.

39
that in Wal-Mart. The Wal-Mart plaintiffs presented affidavits

from about 120 female employees, representing approximately one

affidavit for every 12,500 class members. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.

at 2556. The affidavits captured only 235 of Wal-Mart’s 3,400

stores, and there were no affidavits from workers in 14 states.

Id. The evidence thus fell far short of the benchmark for a

showing of company-wide discrimination established by Teamsters,

431 U.S. 324. In Teamsters, the plaintiffs produced statistical

evidence of racial bias combined with approximately 40 accounts

of discrimination from particular individuals. Id. at 338.

Given the class size of approximately 334 persons, there was

roughly one anecdote for every eight members of the class. See

id. at 331, 338; Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556. “[T]he anecdotes

came from individuals spread throughout the company who for the

most part worked at the company’s operational centers that

employed the largest numbers of the class members.” See Wal-

Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Similarly, this litigation includes anecdotal evidence from more

than 16 individuals 18 in a class that numbered approximately one-

18
This number includes both the 16 declarations introduced
by the workers and other accounts of discrimination included in
affidavits obtained by Nucor after the EEOC charge was filed.
See, e.g., J.A. 5992-95, 6143-45, 6174, 6369-70, 6505-07, 7036.
Of the 16 worker-filed declarations, Byron Turner’s statement
fails to mention specific instances of promotions
discrimination, but instead affirms that that he was “affected
(Continued)
40
hundred “past and present black employees at the plant” at the

time litigation commenced – an approximate ratio of one anecdote

for every 6.25 class members. 19 See Brown I, 576 F.3d at 151

(describing the class size).

by the same practices that Ramon Roane and the other named
plaintiffs” have raised. J.A. 1124. The dissent argues that
the declaration of Walter Cook also fails to mention promotions.
Post at 134. Cook’s declaration, however, states that he heard
white employees talking about a black worker’s application for
an Operator position. According to Cook, the employees stated
they would “do everything that they could to make sure that
nigger didn’t get the job.” J.A. 1075. Further, the dissent
argues that the declaration from Kenneth Hubbard includes a
complaint that Nucor in fact promoted him. Post at 134.
Hubbard’s declaration, however, accuses Nucor of placing him “in
the position to get [him] out of the mill and the line of
progression that lead to supervisory positions.” J.A. 1097.
Hubbard also observes that his trajectory at the company was
dramatically different from that of a white co-worker who
started at the plant at the same time and later became a
supervisor. Id. Indeed, the dissent’s approach to the
affidavits, consistent with its approach to the anecdotal
evidence throughout, appears to be to cherry pick facts from an
11,000 page record, strip those facts of context, and then argue
that they undermine the substantial, credible evidence of
discrimination that the workers have produced.
19
There is some uncertainty about the precise size of the
class. At the time the litigation began, seventy-one workers at
the Nucor plant were black. Brown I, 576 F.3d at 151. As the
district court found, there was a total of “ninety-four black
employees who worked at the plant from 2001 through 2004.” Id.
at 152. The workers’ experts estimated that there may have been
about 150 black workers in total who “were potentially affected
by the selection decisions regarding promotion at Nucor-
Berkeley.” J.A. 1154. Even assuming a class size of 150, there
would be more than one anecdotal account of racial
discrimination for every 9.38 class members, a ratio that
remains in line with the evidence in Teamsters. Furthermore,
that number does not take into account the descriptions of
(Continued)
41
 Balanced against such evidence, the district court gave

“limited weight” to approximately 80 affidavits from Nucor

employees largely disclaiming discrimination at the plant -

affidavits taken by company lawyers after the EEOC charges had

been filed. See J.A. 10950-51. Common sense and prudence,

however, instruct that the affidavits do little to rebut the

evidence of discrimination insofar as they were given under

potentially coercive circumstances, where the company reserved

its ability to use them against other employees in any future

lawsuit (a fact that was omitted from the Statement of

Participation given to affiants). See J.A. 6003 (the Statement

of Participation), 9379 (Nucor’s statement that it intended “to

use the affidavits for every purpose permitted under the Federal

Rules of Evidence,” including the opposition to class

certification and the impeachment of witnesses); see also

Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1202

(11th Cir. 1985) (observing that after a class action has been

filed, “[a] unilateral communications scheme . . . is rife with

potential for coercion”); Quezada v. Schneider Logistics

Transloading & Distrib., No. CV 12-2188 CAS, 2013 WL 1296761, at

*5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2013) (finding in a class action context

discrimination in promotions decisions in the affidavits that
Nucor itself obtained, as previously described.

42
that “[f]ailing to inform the employees of the evidence-

gathering purpose of the interviews rendered the communications

fundamentally misleading and deceptive because the employees

were unaware that the interview was taking place in an

adversarial context, and that the employees’ statements could be

used to limit their right to relief”); Longcrier v. HL-A Co.,

595 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1228 (S.D. Ala. 2008); Mevorah v. Wells

Fargo Home Mort., Inc., No. C 05-1175 MHP, 2005 WL 4813532, at

*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2005). Of course, companies may

investigate allegations of discrimination and take statements

from employees. But when it comes to assessing the probative

value of those statements – when weighed against the numerous

declarations of employees who took the often grave risk of

accusing an employer of a workplace violation - courts should

proceed with eyes open to the imbalance of power and competing

interests. 20 Moreover, as previously observed, the company-

obtained affidavits still contain numerous allegations of

discrimination in promotions decisions - allegations that carry

significant weight given the circumstances in which they were

made. See J.A. 5992-95, 6143-46, 6174, 6370, 6506, 7036.

20
The dissent is thus mistaken when it asserts that we are
articulating a new rule that courts categorically may not
consider the affidavits obtained by companies as part of an
investigation into allegations of discrimination. See post at
141. Instead, our analysis concerns the weight that should be
given to such affidavits in these circumstances.

43
 Of course, a plaintiff need not “offer evidence that each

person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of

the employer’s discriminatory policy.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at

360; see also EEOC v. Korn Indus., Inc., 662 F.2d 256, 260 (4th

Cir. 1981). Instead, a bifurcated class action proceeding

allows for a “liability” stage to first determine whether an

employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory

conduct. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360; Korn, 662 F.2d at 260.

Upon a finding of liability, a second damages stage allows for

the consideration of which individuals were specifically harmed

by the policy. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361; Korn, 662 F.2d at

260.

4.

Here, for a liability determination in a disparate

treatment claim, the workers’ statistical and anecdotal

evidence, especially when combined, thus provide precisely the

‘glue’ of commonality that Wal-Mart demands. See Brown I, 576

F.3d at 156. Such a claim requires proof of a “systemwide

pattern or practice” of discrimination such that the

discrimination is “the regular rather than the unusual

practice.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336; Cooper, 467 U.S. at 875-

76; see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.7. The required

discriminatory intent may be inferred upon such a showing. See

Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308-09

44
(observing that “[w]here gross statistical disparities can be

shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie

proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination”).

Whereas there may have been many answers in Wal–Mart to the

question of why any individual employee was disfavored, the

workers here have sufficiently alleged that there is only one

answer to the question of why Nucor’s black workers were

consistently disfavored. 21 Unlike a disparate impact claim, a

showing of disparate treatment does not require the

identification of a specific employment policy responsible for

the discrimination. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.16

(discussing the legislative history of Title VII and concluding

that the words “pattern or practice” should be interpreted

according to their plain meaning). A pattern of discrimination,

revealed through statistics and anecdotal evidence, can alone

support a disparate treatment claim, even where the pattern is

the result of discretionary decision-making.

To hold otherwise would dramatically undermine Title VII’s

prophylactic powers. As the Supreme Court observed in Griggs, a

central purpose of Title VII is “to achieve equality of

21
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we do not find “in
the first instance” that the worker’s allegation is correct.
Instead, we conclude that the district court clearly erred in
finding that the allegation was not sufficiently supported by
the record.

45
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated

in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees

over other employees.” 401 U.S. at 429-30; see also Albemarle

Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (stressing Title

VII’s prophylactic goals in addition to its purpose “to make

persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful

employment discrimination”). Here, where substantial evidence

suggests a pattern of engrained discriminatory decision-making

that consistently disadvantaged black workers at Nucor, to deny

class certification would significantly weaken Title VII as a

bulwark against discrimination.

C.

Statistics and anecdotes suggesting a pattern of

discrimination, however, are not enough alone to sustain a

disparate impact claim. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555;

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).

Disparate impact liability requires the identification of a

specific employment practice that caused racially disparate

results. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-

87; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. Unlike disparate treatment, the

disparate impact theory does not require proof of improper

intent to sustain a Title VII violation. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at

349; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31 (finding the use of standardized

46
tests resulted in a disparate impact). Instead, liability is

premised on facially neutral policies. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.

Under Wal-Mart, a mere showing that a “policy of discretion

has produced an overall . . . disparity does not suffice.” Wal-

Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556. Instead, plaintiffs who allege such a

policy of discretion must demonstrate that a “common mode of

exercising discretion” actually existed throughout a company.

Id. at 2554; see also Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1229

(10th Cir. 2013) (observing that “after Wal-Mart, federal courts

. . . have generally denied certification when allegedly

discriminatory policies are highly discretionary and the

plaintiffs do not point to a common mode of exercising

discretion that pervades the entire company” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Given that standard, the district court here

found that the workers “failed to identify any factor that

unites the manner in which the various decision makers

throughout the Berkeley plant exercised their discretion.” J.A.

10955.

Wal-Mart recognizes that in certain cases, “giving

discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis of Title

VII liability under a disparate-impact theory,” 131 S. Ct. at

2554, because “an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective

decisionmaking [can have] precisely the same effects as a system

pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination.” Id.

47
(alteration in original) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 990). For

a nationwide class, Wal-Mart found that proving a consistent

exercise of discretion will be difficult, if not impossible in

some circumstances. Id.; see also Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717

F.3d 476, 488 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting the difficulties Wal-Mart

presents for parties seeking to certify a nationwide class).

But for a localized, circumscribed class of workers at a

single facility, a policy of subjective, discretionary decision-

making can more easily form the basis of Title VII liability,

particularly when paired with a clear showing of pervasive

racial hostility. In such cases, the underlying animus may help

establish a consistently discriminatory exercise of discretion.

This Court’s recent opinion in Scott v. Family Dollar

Stores, Inc. specifically provides several ways that such a

disparate impact claim may satisfy Rule 23 after Wal-Mart,

including: (1) when the exercise of discretion is “tied to a

specific employment practice” that “affected the class in a

uniform manner”; (2) when there is “also an allegation of a

company-wide policy of discrimination” that affected employment

decisions; and (3) “when high-level personnel exercise” the

discretion at issue. Scott, 733 F.3d at 113-14.

The first and second of Scott’s alternatives are most

relevant to this case. A specific employment practice or policy

can comprise affirmative acts or inaction. Cf. Ellison v.

48
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining an

employer’s responsibility to act to rectify a hostile or

offensive work environment under Title VII). Regarding

affirmative acts, the district court has established that

Nucor’s promotions practice provides that “[e]mployees in each

of the production departments may bid on positions available in

other departments,” and that in order to promote one of the

bidders, “the supervisor, the department manager, and the

general manager must approve a written change of status and then

submit the change of status form to the personnel office.” J.A.

477-78.

For purposes of class certification, the workers have

provided sufficient evidence that such a policy, paired with the

exercise of discretion by supervisors acting within it, created

or exacerbated racially disparate results. The promotions

system, requiring approvals from different levels of management,

created an environment in which the discriminatory exercise of

discretion by one department head harmed the promotions

opportunities for all black workers at the plant by foreclosing

on opportunities in that department and generally impeding

upward mobility. Moreover, the disproportionate promotions of

white workers had to be ratified by the general manager, Ladd

Hall, who was thus on notice, or should have been on notice,

that there were pronounced racial disparities in department-

49
level promotion practices, as indicated by the statistical and

anecdotal evidence presented.

The workers have also presented sufficient evidence of a

practice of inaction by the general manager who ignored the

evidence of, and complaints regarding, discrimination in

promotions at the plant. See, e.g., J.A. 996-97, 1016, 1056,

1087, 1104. Such managerial inaction occurred despite Nucor’s

status as an “Equal Opportunity Employer” and its claim to have

a “plantwide policy barring racial discrimination.” Resp’ts’

Br. 6. One black worker, Ray Roane, has testified that he

complained directly to Hall about discrimination in promotions.

J.A. 996-97. Hall threatened his job. J.A. 997. Consistent

with that evidence, the workers observe in the context of their

hostile work environment claim that despite a policy of

investigating complaints of racial harassment, “[n]ot even one

of the five department managers has been shown to have lifted a

finger to redress the racially hostile work environment found to

exist both plant-wide and in each department.” Appellants’ Br.

25. The workers have sufficiently alleged that such a uniform

policy of managerial inaction also contributed to racial

disparities in promotions decisions.

Consistent with Scott, the workers have further

demonstrated that the exercise of discretion at Nucor was joined

by “a company-wide policy of discrimination” that was

50
encouraged, or at least tolerated, by supervisors and managers.

See Scott, 733 F.3d at 114. In addition to the evidence of a

hostile work environment previously described in detail, one

white supervisor has expressly stated in a deposition that he

heard the head of the Beam Mill declare, “I don’t think we’ll

ever have a black supervisor while I’m here.” J.A. 1885-86.

Such facts provide a critical nexus between the racial animus at

the plant and promotions decisions that impacted all black

workers by foreclosing opportunities for them. Or, using Wal-

Mart’s language, the evidence of pervasive racial hostility in

the working environment provides a “common mode of exercising

discretion that pervade[d] the entire company.” Wal-Mart, 131

S. Ct. at 2554-55.

In the end, Wal-Mart simply “found it unlikely” that

thousands of managers across different regions “would exercise

their discretion in a common way without some common direction.”

Tabor, 703 F.3d at 1222. Here, however, the workers have

provided ample evidence supporting their allegation of a common,

racially-biased exercise of discretion throughout the plant –

demonstrated through alleged incidents of specific

discrimination in promotions decisions, statistical disparities,

and facts suggesting pervasive plant-wide racism. The district

court abused its discretion in finding that such evidence was

insufficient to meet the burden that Wal-Mart imposes.

51
 IV.

Nucor further argues that the workers have failed to

contest the district court’s independent finding that the

putative class failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). As the company

observes, the district court specifically held that the class

failed to meet the rule’s requirements for a class action

seeking individualized money damages, namely, that common

questions predominate over individualized inquiries and that the

class action is “superior to other available methods for fairly

and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(3). The court remarked that “even if the Fourth Circuit

subsequently concludes that the plaintiffs have identified a

common issue that satisfies Rule 23(a)(2), this Court

nonetheless finds that ‘common issues,’ as that term is defined

by Wal-Mart, do not predominate over individual issues with

regard to the plaintiffs’ promotions claims.” 22 J.A. 10956.

Nucor contends that nowhere in the workers’ opening brief

is the Rule 23(b)(3) ruling addressed, and that any challenge to

22
This Court has previously observed that “[i]n a class
action brought under Rule 23(b)(3), the ‘commonality’
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is ‘subsumed under, or superseded
by, the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that questions
common to the class predominate over’ other questions.”
Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 146 n.4 (4th Cir.
2001) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 609). But as Wal-Mart made
clear, the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement and the Rule
23(b)(3) predominance requirement remain separate inquiries.
Wal–Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.

52
that decision has thus been waived. The doctrine of waiver

derives from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which

require that the argument section of an appellant’s opening

brief contain the “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for

them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record

on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A);

see also Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing,

Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2012). “Failure of a party

in its opening brief to challenge an alternate ground for a

district court’s ruling . . . waives that challenge.” United

States ex rel. Ubl v. IIF Data Solutions, 650 F.3d 445, 456 (4th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1118 n.6

(9th Cir. 2010))).

The workers contend first, and we agree, that no waiver

occurred because their arguments in the opening brief extended

to the district court’s discussion of both predominance and

commonality. The single issue identified by the workers on

appeal did not differentiate between the court’s findings on

either question. The issue, as presented, was this:

Was it error or an abuse of discretion for the
district court not to follow this Circuit’s mandate
holding that sufficient statistical and non-
statistical evidence has been presented to certify a
pattern-or-practice and disparate impact class
covering all six production departments of the
defendants’ manufacturing plant in Huger, South
Carolina?

53
Consistent with that framing, the workers’ opening brief

describes the district court’s decision in equally broad terms

without distinguishing between commonality and predominance.

See Appellants’ Br. 28-29 (“The district court erred as a matter

of law by declining to follow this Court’s mandate that held

there is sufficient statistical and non-statistical evidence to

certify a class covering all six production departments.”);

Appellants’ Br. 3 (citing to the portion of the district court

opinion where predominance is discussed).

Although more explicit separation of the predominance and

commonality inquiries would no doubt have been wise, the

workers’ arguments throughout their brief directly respond to

the issues the district court raised in both contexts (issues

that, as discussed below, were intertwined by the court). The

workers, for instance, specifically cite cases discussing

predominance when arguing about the extent to which a court may

look to merits in deciding certification. See Appellants’ Br.

34-35. Elsewhere, in discussing the sufficiency of the

anecdotal evidence presented, the workers argued in favor of our

holding in Brown I that “[t]his evidence alone establishes

common claims of discrimination worthy of class certification.”

Appellants’ Br. 42 (citing Brown I, 576 F.2d at 153).

Certification of the workers’ class required a finding that Rule

23(b) was satisfied, in addition to a finding of commonality

54
under Rule 23(a)(2). More generally, without limiting its

analysis to the question of commonality, the workers’ opening

brief observes that “[t]he district court’s finding that there

is no pattern-or-practice evidence in the non-Beam Mill

departments is directly contrary to the evidence and [the Fourth

Circuit’s] mandate.” Appellants’ Br. 42-43.

It is true that the workers arguments often focus expressly

on the question of commonality, as Wal-Mart focused its

analysis. In that regard, however, the workers have merely

followed the district court’s lead insofar as the court itself

raised the same arguments under Rule 23(b)(3) as it did

regarding commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). 23 See J.A. 10958-59;

see also United States v. Goforth, 465 F.3d 730, 737 (6th Cir.

2006) (observing that “where an argument advanced in an

appellant’s opening brief applies to and essentially subsumes an

alternative basis for affirmance not separately argued therein,

the appellant does not waive that alternative basis for

affirmance”). The district court based its conclusion that

common issues did not predominate on the observation that

because the workers’ evidence disproportionately concerns the

Beam Mill, “there is no ‘glue’ connecting the promotions

23
Even superficially, the district court includes its
predominance analysis under the heading of “Subjectivity as a
Policy,” dovetailing a discussion of commonality, instead of as
a separate section of analysis. See J.A. 10954, 10956.

55
decisions in the Beam Mill to the decisions in the other

departments.” J.A. 10959. That is exactly the same argument

raised, and responded to by the workers, in the context of Rule

23(a)(2) commonality. See J.A. 10950-54; Appellants’ Br. 42-47.

Elsewhere in its Rule 23(b)(3) discussion, the court observes

that “[a]lthough there are, to varying degrees, a few

allegations of discrimination in promotions in departments other

than the Beam Mill, there is nothing to link these allegations

to the pattern of behavior alleged in the Beam Mill.” J.A.

10959. Again, this argument is also made in the Rule 23(a)(2)

context and responded to in detail by the workers there.

Indeed, the district court itself acknowledged that it

“employ[ed] the language of Wal-Mart” regarding Rule 23(a)(2) in

discussing the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). J.A. 10958-59.

In responding directly to the reasons given by the district

court for its predominance determination, the workers have thus

done far more than take a mere “passing shot at the issue.” See

Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., 679 F.3d 146, 152 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012)

(finding that an issue was waived after a party mentioned the

issue in a heading but failed to further develop the argument);

see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 587 n.5 (9th Cir.

2002) (concluding that an appellant preserved a claim for review

even though the argument consisted of “eight sentences in a

footnote,” where the argument identified the basis of

56
disagreement with the district court, the requested relief, and

relevant citations to case law and the record).

Nonetheless, the dissent argues that “many different

reasons underlay [the district court’s] predominance finding,

including several individual questions that could ‘overwhelm’

common ones.” Post at 69. But a plain reading of the district

court’s opinion belies the idea that it made any predominance

arguments that were not responded to by the workers. The only

specific argument cited by the dissent as unaddressed contends

that because of the workers’ reliance on anecdotal evidence, a

jury “would have to delve into the merits of each individual

promotion decision.” J.A. 10959; post at 69. Yet, as observed

above, the workers specifically argued that the anecdotal

evidence establishes “common claims of discrimination” that

merit certification, not merely a finding of commonality.

Appellants’ Br. 42 (quoting Brown I, 576 F.2d at 153). Indeed,

such an argument is consistent with the workers’ fundamental

contention throughout their brief that plant-wide discrimination

existed.

As this Court has observed, the purpose of the waiver

doctrine is to avoid unfairness to an appellee and minimize the

“risk of an improvident or ill-advised opinion being issued on

an unbriefed issue.” United States v. Leeson, 453 F.3d 631, 638

n.4 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharm.,

57
Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Given the briefing

presented, the fully developed record below, and the lack of any

showing of unfairness or prejudice, there is simply no reason

why we should exercise our discretion to discard years of

litigation on appeal because of an inartful opening brief. See

A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cnty., Md., 515 F.3d 356, 369

(4th Cir. 2008) (observing that even when an argument has been

waived, this Court may nonetheless consider it if a “miscarriage

of justice would otherwise result” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); cf. In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 217 F.3d 1161, 1165

(9th Cir. 2000) (observing that a court may refuse to find

waiver and consider an argument raised for the first time on

appeal when the issue “is one of law and either does not depend

on the factual record, or the record has been fully developed”).

Independent of the adequacy of the workers’ opening brief,

the district court had no grounds to revisit the question of

predominance in the first place given this Court’s remand

instructions and mandate in Brown I. Unlike the requirement of

commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) discussed above, Wal-Mart did

not change, nor purport to change, the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis.

Indeed, any impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the question

of whether common questions predominate is only incidental

insofar as Wal-Mart recalibrated what constitutes a common

question in the first place. The majority in Wal-Mart only

58
invoked Rule 23(b)(3) to argue that the rule’s well-established

procedural protections should apply to the plaintiffs’ claims

for backpay. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.

Following our instructions in Brown I for the district

court to “certify the appellants’ class action,” the court found

that “the putative class satisfied both the predominance and

superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).” J.A. 10930. The

court then certified the class for those employed in all six

Nucor operations departments. The district court cites no new

facts or legal precedent after Brown I to justify revisiting

that determination once the underlying question of commonality

has been resolved.

Nonetheless, the dissent insists that our decision in Brown

I “did not prevent the district court in any way from

considering predominance because our prior decision did not say

anything about predominance.” Post at 75-76 (emphasis added).

Such a conclusion misconstrues both the plain language of our

original mandate and ignores the district court’s equally plain

understanding of it. The pivotal question in determining the

scope of the mandate is whether the district court was free on

remand to find that the workers had not satisfied the

predominance requirement. If so, then our mandate did not reach

the issue and the district court was free to reconsider it. But

if the court did not have such liberty, then we must ask whether

59
“controlling legal authority has changed dramatically” regarding

Rule 23(b)(3) such that the court could reconsider the question.

See Bell, 5 F.3d at 67. If no such change has occurred, then

the district court could not revisit it.

As for the first question, the district court had no

discretion to find that the workers’ class failed to satisfy

Rule 23(b)(3), after we expressly told it “to certify the

appellants’ class action and to engage in further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.” Brown I, 576 F.3d at 160; see

also Bell, 5 F.3d at 66 (requiring that a district court

“implement both the letter and spirit of the . . . mandate,

taking into account [our] opinion and the circumstances it

embraces” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));

United States v. Pileggi, 703 F.3d 675, 679 (4th Cir. 2013)

(observing that the mandate rule “forecloses relitigation of

issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court”

(quoting Bell, 5 F.3d at 66)); S. Atl. Ltd., 356 F.3d at 583

(observing that a mandate must be “scrupulously and fully

carried out” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Indeed, the district court itself recognized that we had

“dictate[d] the general outcome to be reached (class

certification) while leaving [the district court] to fill in the

details.” J.A. 9886 (Order Den. Mot. for Recons. 8 n.2). Of

course, the court could have, and did, evaluate whether

60
certification was best under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). But it

had no discretion to then find that the prerequisites of either

rule were not met. As the court observed, Nucor’s argument on

remand that the workers had failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)

“overlook[ed] the Fourth Circuit’s prior holding in this case.”

J.A. 9704 (Certification Order). 24 Thus, the dissent misstates

the record when it maintains that our original decision did not

“in any way” prevent the district court from considering

predominance. Post at 75-76. Indeed, following our

instructions and findings in Brown I, the court proceeded to

make the only finding it could under Rule 23(b)(3), namely, that

“common issues predominate and that a class action is superior

to any other method for adjudication of the claims in this

case.” The dissent is thus also misinformed when it states we

are now certifying “a Rule 23(b)(3) class action without any

court ever finding that the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements are

satisfied.” Post at 78.

Given the fact that our prior ruling foreclosed the denial

of certification on the basis of Rule 23(b)(3), the district

24
The dissent also maintains that our mandate did not reach
the question of predominance because we amended our original
opinion in Brown I to delete a specific reference to Rule
23(b)(3). Post at 77. Such a deletion, however, did not change
either our mandate to certify – a mandate that required the
court to find the workers had met Rule 23(b) – or the district
court’s express understanding of that mandate.

61
court needed some compelling reason to reconsider the question.

Bell, F.3d at 67 (describing the “extraordinary” exception to

the mandate rule when there is “a show[ing] that controlling

legal authority has changed dramatically”). But the court cited

no such reason and, unlike the question of commonality, Wal-Mart

provided none. Indeed, as the district court itself

acknowledged, Wal-Mart only incidentally narrowed an inquiry

into whether common questions predominate by clarifying what

constitutes a common question in the first place under Rule

23(a)(2). J.A. 10971-72.

V.

More than seven years have now elapsed since the workers

first filed their class certification motion, and the district

court twice has refused to certify the class. The nature of the

allegations, the evidentiary support buttressing them, and the

inherent cohesiveness of the class all demonstrate that the

court’s failure to certify was an error. Rule 23 provides wide

discretion to district courts, in part, to promote the systemic

class action virtues of efficiency and flexibility. The

realization of such benefits, however, requires that a district

court exercise its judgment in a reasoned and expeditious

manner.

62
 The dissent rightly observes that the majority presses

forward “[o]n the road to its desired result.” Post at 152.

And that result is simple justice. At bottom, the workers seek

nothing more than the chance to speak with one voice about the

promotions discrimination they allegedly suffered as one class

on account of one uniting feature: the color of their skin.

The dissent would deny them that chance while leading this Court

down a different road – a road that would further weaken the

class action as a tool to realize Title VII’s core promise of

equality.

We vacate the district court’s decertification of the

workers’ promotions class and remand the case to the district

court with instructions to certify the class.

VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

63
AGEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

We typically tread lightly when reviewing a class

certification decision, affording “substantial deference” to the

district court, especially when it provides “well-supported

factual findings.” Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d

164, 179 (4th Cir. 2010). Class certification proceedings often

call for fact-intensive choices requiring intimate knowledge of

the peculiarities of complex litigation. Id. We usually trust

that the district court has the better eye for these sorts of

questions.

The majority today declines to follow that path. It

instead takes issue with almost every aspect of the district

court’s decision to decertify, reversing that court’s

determination because of newfound facts on appeal and different

notions about the nature of this case. In doing so, the

majority creates a split between this Court and another, see

Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2011), overlooks

a plain and decisive waiver from the appellants, and drains a

critical Supreme Court decision of much of its meaning, see Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). I

respectfully dissent.

64
 I. Predominance

A.

The district court decertified Plaintiffs’ promotions

classes for two distinct reasons. First, the court found that

Plaintiffs had not identified a “question[] of law or fact

common to the class,” as Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure requires. Second, it held that any questions

common to the class members did not “predominate over any

questions affecting only individual members,” so the class could

not be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Each of these separate

reasons -- commonality or predominance -- provide an independent

ground to decertify the class. See, e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-

Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2006).

Because the district court provided two different bases for

its decision, Plaintiffs were required to contest both. They

did not. Plaintiffs’ opening brief nowhere mentions the topic

of predominance. Neither does it refer to Rule 23(b). And even

though “the main concern in the predominance inquiry” is “the

balance between individual and common issues,” Myers v. Hertz

Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 549 (2d Cir. 2010), a reader searches in

vain for any mention of such a “balancing” in Plaintiffs’

submissions. Instead, Plaintiffs’ opening brief focuses solely

on Rule 23(a) commonality. The brief does not even contain a

simple statement that the district court erred as to

65
predominance for the same reasons that it purportedly erred as

to commonality -- not to say that such a statement would be

sufficient, either. See Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d

1161, 1165 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “cursory statements

that the district court’s order also incorrectly applied Rule

23(b)(3)’s [predominance] requirement” are “not enough to

preserve the issue for appeal”).

An appellant must raise every issue that he wishes to press

in his opening brief. If the appellant fails to address an

issue there, then we will deem the issue waived or abandoned.

We have repeated this rule so often that it might rightfully be

termed the best-established rule in appellate procedure. See,

e.g., Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network,

722 F.3d 591, 602 n.13 (4th Cir. 2013); Kensington Volunteer

Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 684 F.3d 462, 472 n.4 (4th

Cir. 2012); Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing,

Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 376 (4th Cir. 2012); A Helping Hand, LLC v.

Balt. Cnty., 515 F.3d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 2008); French v.

Assurance Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 693, 699 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006). As

a rule that “all the federal courts of appeals employ,” waiver

“makes excellent sense.” Joseph v. United States, 135 S. Ct.

705, 705 (2014) (Kagan, J., respecting denial of certiorari).

In past cases, we have endeavored to apply our waiver rule

consistently, finding waiver whenever a party fails to “develop

66
[his] argument” -- even if his brief takes a passing shot at the

issue. Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., 679 F.3d 146, 152 n.4 (4th

Cir. 2012). We have further found arguments waived even though

they might have had merit. See IGEN Int’l, Inc. v. Roche

Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 303, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2003);

Pleasurecraft Marine Engine Co. v. Thermo Power Corp., 272 F.3d

654, 657 (4th Cir. 2001). And we have applied the doctrine

despite its potentially significant impact. See, e.g., Carter

v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 252 n.11 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying the

doctrine in a death penalty case).

Given that Plaintiffs failed to challenge the district

court’s ruling on predominance, the plain and consistent waiver

rule defeats their appeal. “[T]o obtain reversal of a district

court judgment based on multiple, independent grounds, an

appellant must convince us that every stated ground for the

judgment against him is incorrect.” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d

276, 289 (4th Cir. 2014); accord Maher v. City of Chi., 547 F.3d

817, 821 (7th Cir. 2008); Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494

F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Appellate courts have

repeatedly affirmed district court decisions denying class

certification where plaintiffs failed to contest a predominance

finding. See, e.g., Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d

1302, 1306-08 (11th Cir. 2012); Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d

1241, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by

67
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008);

Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 573-74 (5th

Cir. 1995). Nothing calls for a different result here.

B.

In view of their failure to raise the predominance issue,

Plaintiffs now suggest that “[p]redominance and commonality

. . . are [both] part of Rule 23(b)(3),” such that a challenge

concerning one should be treated as a challenge to both.

Appellant’s Reply Br. 2. They are mistaken.

Commonality, found in Rule 23(a)(2), asks whether the

proposed class will “resolve an issue that is central to the

validity of each of one of the claims in one stroke.” EQT Prod.

Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 360 (4th Cir. 2014). Predominance,

found in Rule 23(b)(3), presents a “far more demanding” inquiry,

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997), namely

whether any common questions “pre-dominate over any questions

affecting only individual members,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Thus, while a “common issue” will establish commonality, that

common issue only goes to one part of the predominance inquiry.

Consequently, courts and parties must address these requirements

separately, rather than muddle them together. See Vega v. T-

Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268-70 (11th Cir. 2009); In re

Ins. Brokerage Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 277 (3d Cir. 2009); accord

Ealy v. Pinkerton Gov’t Servs., Inc., 514 F. App’x 299, 305 (4th

68
Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Rule 23(a) commonality requirement[] and the

Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement remain separate inquiries

and the inquiries should not be ‘blended.’”).

The majority excuses Plaintiffs’ waiver because it believes

that Plaintiffs “followed the district court’s lead” in

combining the two issues. Maj. op. at 55. Thus, even though

commonality and predominance are legally distinct, the majority

speculates that the district court did not treat them as such

here. The majority’s analysis mischaracterizes the district

court’s opinion.

The district court did not just repeat back its commonality

findings in determining that Plaintiffs’ class failed as to

predominance. To the contrary, the court expressly held that it

could not find the required predominance “even if the Fourth

Circuit subsequently conclude[d] that plaintiffs have identified

a common issue that satisfies Rule 23(a)(2).” J.A. 10956. The

court then explained -- over several pages -- that many

different reasons underlay its predominance finding, including

several individual questions that could “overwhelm” common ones.

Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184,

1196 (2013). Because Plaintiffs heavily rely on anecdotal

evidence, for instance, the district court correctly concluded

that a jury “would have to delve into the merits of each

individual promotion decision” to determine whether each

69
decision evidenced discrimination. J.A. 10959. Thus, a trial

meant to resolve class-wide issues would likely devolve into a

series of mini-trials examining each promotion decision made in

the Nucor plant. The court further acknowledged that

“individual damages determinations,” like those that would be

required here, can “cut against class certification.” J.A.

10956. Although it concluded that such damages determinations

did not, standing alone, compel decertification in this case,

J.A. 10958, they did provide the district court an additional

basis for caution in making its predominance finding. See,

e.g., Cooper v. So. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 722—23 (11th Cir. 2004),

overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S.

454 (2006) (noting that individualized damage issues could swamp

the advantages coming from an initial, class-wide liability

determination); accord Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151

F.3d 402, 421—22 (5th Cir. 1998), cited with approval in

Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 445 n.18 (4th

Cir. 2003); see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426,

1433 (2013) (explaining that individual damage-related questions

might destroy predominance); Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565

F.2d 59, 71—72 (4th Cir. 1977).

The district court appropriately resolved predominance

separately from commonality. Plaintiffs’ failure to address the

predominance finding in any way ends their appeal.

70
 C.

The majority at least recognizes that Plaintiffs should

have been “more explicit” in addressing predominance. Maj. op.

at 54; see also id. at 55 (acknowledging that Plaintiffs’

“express[]” arguments largely concern commonality). Even so, it

concludes that certain oblique references in Plaintiffs’ briefs

preserved a predominance-related challenge on appeal. They do

not.

Plaintiffs’ statement of the issue on appeal, for instance,

does not help them. See maj. op. at 53. The statement asks

only whether “it [was] error or an abuse of discretion for the

district court not to follow this Circuit’s mandate” when it

decertified the class. See Appellant’s Br. 1. Here again,

Plaintiffs never mention predominance, and the statement does

not otherwise indicate any specific complaint with the district

court’s predominance holding. Even if it had, that reference

would not have been enough without some further argument on the

matter -- an argument that Plaintiffs wholly failed to provide.

See Belk, Inc., 679 F.3d at 153 n.6; 11126 Balt. Blvd., Inc. v.

Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 58 F.3d 988, 993 n.7 (4th Cir.

1995).

The majority also ignores Plaintiffs’ waiver because their

brief contains some broadly stated attacks on the district

court’s decertification decision -- attacks purportedly not

71
“limit[ed] to the question of commonality.” Maj. op. at 55.

But in the usual case, a generalized attack on the lower court’s

decision does not preserve the specific arguments that might be

subsumed within the broader one. Quite the opposite: a

“generalized assertion of error” will not suffice to preserve

anything. MMG Fin. Corp. v. Midwest Amusements Park, LLC, 630

F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 2011); see also, e.g., Garrett v. Selby

Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005);

Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1091 n.5 (Fed. Cir.

2005). Preservation would have little to recommend it if

litigants could make nebulous, broadly worded arguments and

trust appellate courts to work out the details once the opposing

party points out the default.

In much the same way, Plaintiffs did not preserve their

predominance challenge by citing a few cases that happen to

touch upon the concept. See maj. op. at 54. The traditional

rule provides that citations to the “occasional case,” without

any fuller discussion, do not preserve an argument. Pike v.

Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 78 n.9 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Am.

Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“A

fleeting statement in the parenthetical of a citation is no more

sufficient to raise a claim than a cursory remark in a

footnote[.]”). Similarly, “[m]ere notation of the applicable

law, without any argumentation as to how it applies to [this]

72
case, does not raise the issue of its application on appeal.”

Sou v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1, 6 n.11 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted here and throughout);

accord Johnson v. United States, 734 F.3d 352, 360 (4th Cir.

2013).

The majority’s analysis casts an inappropriate role for an

appellate court. Now, a court must review each decision that an

appellant cites and independently consider whether any part of

it might undermine the district court’s judgment for some reason

that the appellant never raised. That concept reconceives the

appellate courts’ role, as those “courts do not sit as self-

directed boards of legal inquiry and research.” Nat’l

Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147 n.10

(2011); see also Walker v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 575 F.3d

426, 429 n.* (4th Cir. 2009) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting

for truffles buried in briefs.”). In addition, using the

majority’s new rule, appellants may now launch late-in-the-day

challenges to any part of a district court’s certification

decision so long as they serendipitously cited a case canvassing

Rule 23 in their opening brief. This “preservation-by-citation”

approach renders the waiver rule a nullity.

D.

In the end, the majority declares itself unwilling to

exercise its “discretion” to “discard years of litigation on

73
appeal because of an inartful brief.” Maj. op. at 58. That

approach seems to give pro se litigant treatment to a brief

crafted by experienced class counsel -- counsel that has

appeared in our court before. Surely it does not expect too

much from veteran counsel to ask them to make their arguments

straight up and square. All the more so when these counsel have

been specifically cautioned about waiver on previous occasions.

See, e.g., Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d

955, 972-73 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that party represented by

same counsel had “abandoned” claim by failing to raise it in his

opening brief); see also Angles v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 494

F. App’x 326, 330 n.6 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); cf. Bennett, 656

F.3d at 821 (holding that party represented by same counsel had

“essentially abandoned” argument by making only a “conclusory

challenge”); Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 959 (11th

Cir. 2007) (same).

The “purpose” of the preservation rule is also not served

by overlooking Plaintiffs’ waiver. See maj. op. at 57-58. The

rule “ensures that the opposing party has an opportunity to

reflect upon and respond in writing to the arguments that his

adversary is raising.” Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch.,

Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012); see also United

States v. Leeson, 453 F.3d 631, 638 n.4 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting

that late arguments are “unfair to the appellee”); Pignons S.A.

74
de Mecanique v. Polaroid Corp., 701 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983)

(“In preparing briefs and arguments, an appellee is entitled to

rely on the content of an appellant’s brief for the scope of the

issues appealed[.]”). Nucor never had a chance to address

Plaintiffs’ predominance arguments directly, as Plaintiffs

waited until their reply brief to make them. Plaintiffs argued

in their reply brief, for example, that no “heightened”

predominance standard applies after Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011), and the majority agrees,

see maj. op. at 62. There might very well be reason to believe

otherwise, though Nucor has never had a chance to make that

argument. See, e.g., Andrey Spektor, The Death Knell of Issue

Certification and Why That Matters After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 26

St. Thomas L. Rev. 165, 172 (2014) (suggesting that Wal-Mart

rendered it harder for issues to predominate). It must be cold

comfort to Nucor, then, to hear that it was not “prejudice[d]”

by these and other unanswerable arguments. Maj. op. at 58.

E.

The majority goes on to hold that the mandate rule barred

the district court from examining Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.

See maj. op. at 58-62. That view is factually and legally

incorrect. The decision in the prior appeal in this case did

not prevent the district court in any way from considering

75
predominance because our prior decision did not say anything

about predominance.

In its original class certification decision in 2007, the

district court held that Plaintiffs did not satisfy three of

Rule 23(a)’s four requirements. It expressly declined to

consider “the remaining requirements of Rule 23(b).” J.A. 8997.

On appeal, the parties’ submissions focused solely on Rule

23(a). A majority of the Court then reviewed these “Rule 23(a)

factors” and found them “satisfied.” Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576

F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Brown I”). The Brown I majority

initially went on to hold, in a single sentence at the end of

the opinion, that “the requirements of [Rule] 23(b)(3) ha[d]

also been satisfied for these claims.” See Brown v. Nucor

Corp., No. 08-1247, slip op. at 19 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 2009).

Nucor then petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing, among

other things, that neither the lower court nor the parties had

previously analyzed the Rule 23(b) issue. See Nucor Pet. for

Reh’g at 9, Brown I, 576 F.3d 149 (No. 08-1247), ECF No. 53. In

response, the Brown I panel amended its opinion and excised any

mention of Rule 23(b)(3). See Order, Brown v. Nucor Corp., No.

08-1247 (4th Cir. Oct. 8, 2009). One can easily discern why the

opinion was amended: Brown I could not decide a fact-intensive

issue -- that is, the predominance issue under Rule 23(b)(3) --

when the parties had not yet argued it and the district court

76
had not yet addressed it. See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v.

Instit. of London Underwriters, 430 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir.

2005) (explaining that the mandate rule and the broader law of

the case doctrine “cannot apply when the issue in question was

outside the scope of the prior appeal”). In fact, up to that

point, Plaintiffs had never even sought certification under Rule

23(b)(3); they sought to certify only a Rule 23(b)(2) class or,

in the alternative, a so-called “hybrid” action.

By removing any reference to Rule 23(b), Brown I left it to

the district court to determine in the first instance whether

Plaintiffs’ class met that provision’s requirements. The

district court complied with both the letter and the spirit of

Brown I, and it correctly took “into account [the] opinion and

the circumstances it embrace[d].” United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d

64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen

Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming

district court’s decision not to order accounting or damages,

despite appellate court’s instructions to “order an accounting

and to award damages,” where district court acted in line with

the “spirit” of the mandate). An appellate mandate “does not

reach questions which might have been decided but were not.”

United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 528 (4th Cir. 2008). And

“[w]hile a mandate is controlling as to matters within its

compass, on the remand a lower court is free as to other

77
issues.” Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168

(1939). Simply put, the Brown I mandate did not apply to Rule

23(b)(3), nor could it.

On remand after Brown I, the district court initially

certified the two promotions classes under Rule 23(b)(3). The

court later reconsidered, as it was entitled to do under Rule

23, which provides that “[a]n order that grants or denies class

certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

“[C]ertifications are not frozen once made,” Amgen, Inc., 133 S.

Ct. at 1202 n.9, and a district court has “considerable

discretion to decertify the class,” Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R.

Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 189 (4th Cir. 1993). See also Prado-

Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1273 (11th Cir.

2000). The district court could revisit its interlocutory

decision regardless of whether, as the majority puts it, “new

facts or legal precedent [arose] after Brown I.” Maj. op. at

59.

In effect, the majority today certifies a Rule 23(b)(3)

class action without any court ever finding that the Rule

23(b)(3) requirements are satisfied. It cannot genuinely

contend that Brown I did the work, as “the Fourth Circuit has

never allowed the rigorous Rule 23 analysis to be accomplished

implicitly.” Partington v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co.,

78
443 F.3d 334, 341 (4th Cir. 2006). And the district court

ultimately did not make such a finding either. The majority’s

decision to certify in part on this illusory mandate, then,

substantially damages Rule 23(b)(3)’s “vital prescription.”

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. The Supreme Court recently reminded us

that “plaintiffs wishing to proceed through a class action must

actually prove -- not simply plead -- that their proposed class

satisfies each requirement of Rule 23, including . . . the

predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).” Halliburton Co. v.

Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014). At

least as to predominance, Plaintiffs have yet to prove anything.

* * * *

Plaintiffs did not challenge the district court’s

predominance ruling and do not credibly explain why they failed

to do so. The district court’s decision should therefore be

affirmed on that basis alone.

II. Relevant Standards

Even ignoring Plaintiffs’ waiver of the predominance issue,

they have not established that the district court abused its

discretion in finding insufficient commonality. To see why, it

is first necessary to recognize the standard that appellate

courts use in reviewing a district court’s class-certification

decision. Then, the standard that the district court used in

79
evaluating the evidence at the certification stage must be

considered.

A.

1.

A district court’s ultimate class-certification decision --

that is, how it applied the Rule 23 factors -- is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., EQT Prod. Co., 764 F.3d at

357; Ward, 595 F.3d at 179; Monroe v. City of Charlottesville,

Va., 579 F.3d 380, 384 (4th Cir. 2009); Gregory v. Finova

Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 2006). But reciting

the standard is not enough; there must be genuine respect and

adherence paid to the limits that it imposes.

The abuse-of-discretion standard does establish some

substantial limits, representing “one of the most deferential

standards of review.” Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co.,

240 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2001). Under it, the appellate court

may reverse only when “the [trial] court’s exercise of

discretion, considering the law and the facts, was arbitrary and

capricious.” United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th

Cir. 1995). We act only when the decision could not “have been

reached by a reasonable jurist,” or when we may call it

“fundamentally wrong,” “clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or

fanciful.” Bluestein v. Cent. Wis. Anesthesiology, S.C., 769

F.3d 944, 957 (7th Cir. 2014); accord Am. Copper & Brass, Inc.

80
v. Lake City Indus. Prods., Inc., 757 F.3d 540, 543 (6th Cir.

2014) (characterizing review of a class certification decision

as “very limited”).

Of course, deference does not equal blind acceptance. If,

for instance, the district court entirely fails to undertake

some part of the requisite analysis, then it may be appropriate

to reverse. See, e.g., EQT Prod., 764 F.3d at 371 (vacating and

remanding a certification order where the district court failed

to conduct an appropriately rigorous analysis of Rule 23’s

requirements). But when our review ventures into intensely

factual matters or areas of practical concern, then our

deference must be at its greatest -- indeed, we must stand aside

in those circumstances unless the lower court was “clearly

wrong.” Windham, 565 F.2d at 65; accord CGC Holding Co., LLC v.

Broad & Cassel, 773 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[A]s long

as the district court applies the proper Rule 23 standard, we

will defer to its class certification ruling provided that

decision falls within the bounds of rationally available choices

given the facts and law involved in the matter at hand.”).

We do not then reverse anytime we disagree with the result

that the district court reaches. See First Penn-Pac. Life Ins.

Co. v. Evans, 304 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2002). Rather, “the

[abuse-of-discretion] standard draws a line . . . between the

unsupportable and the merely mistaken, between the legal error,

81
disorder of reason, severe lapse of judgment, and procedural

failure that a reviewing court may always correct, and the

simple disagreement that, on this standard, it may not.” Evans

v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 322 (4th

Cir. 2008); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.

384, 405 (1990) (holding that the district court did not abuse

its discretion where it “applied the correct legal standard and

offered substantial justification for its finding”).

These principles might strike some as truisms, but they

carry special force in the class-certification context.

“Granting or denying class certification is a highly fact-

intensive matter of practicality,” Monreal v. Potter, 367 F.3d

1224, 1238 (10th Cir. 2004), so much so that “[h]ighly fact-

based, complex, difficult matters” arise as a matter of routine,

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 630 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). Unsurprisingly, then, we give district

courts “broad discretion in deciding whether to allow the

maintenance of a class action.” Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d

1343, 1348 (4th Cir. 1976); see also Lowery v. Circuit City

Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 757-58 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated 527

U.S. 1031 (1999), reaff’d in relevant part, 206 F.3d 431 (4th

Cir. 2000). As with any other decision that appellate courts

review for abuse of discretion, we should affirm a certification

decision even if we are convinced that “reasons clearly existed

82
for taking the other course.” Lewis v. Bloomberg Mills, Inc.,

773 F.2d 561, 564 (4th Cir. 1985); accord Simmons v. Poe, 47

F.3d 1370, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995).

2.

An appellate court must be even more careful in reviewing

any factual findings underlying the district court’s decision,

as we review those only for clear error. Thorn, 445 F.3d at

317-18; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). “The clear error

standard . . . protects district courts’ primacy as triers of

fact.” Evans, 514 F.3d at 321. Our opinions have repeatedly

emphasized that clear-error review is “narrow,” Walker v. Kelly,

593 F.3d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 2010), “highly deferential,” Green

v. Johnson, 515 F.3d 290, 301 (4th Cir. 2008), and “particularly

circumscribed,” Jimenez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369,

378 (4th Cir. 1995). We may reverse findings reviewed under

this standard only when, having reviewed the entire record, we

are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” United States v. Heyer, 740 F.3d 284, 292

(4th Cir. 2014). If the district court chose between “two

permissible views of the evidence,” or if it otherwise offered a

“plausible” account of that evidence, Anderson v. City of

Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985), then its factual

findings are “conclusive,” Walker, 594 F.3d at 323. And as with

the abuse-of-discretion standard, we cannot reverse merely

83
because we would have decided the matter differently. See

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.

3.

Despite these deferential standards of review, the majority

identifies reversible error in virtually every legal and factual

judgment that the district court rendered. Yet in searching the

majority’s opinion for any of the hallmarks of deference --

explanations as to how the district court clearly erred, or full

analysis of how the district court abused its discretion -- we

find very little.

In truth, the majority seems to apply just about every

standard of review but a deferential one. For the most part,

the majority offers bare statements that the district court

erred, apparently because the district court decided things

differently than the majority would have. For instance, it

insists that Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is simply “less

precise” and rejects out-of-hand the district court’s view that

the evidence was “fundamentally unreliable.” Maj. op. at 18,

23. Likewise, it draws its own conclusions about the anecdotal

evidence, reciting certain portions of certain affidavits and

declaring them enough. It makes credibility determinations,

categorically rejecting Nucor’s evidence as “self-serving,” id.

at 25, or “coercive,” id. at 42, while embracing contrary

statements from Plaintiffs because the majority finds them

84
“credible,” id. at 41. And it offers its own notions about what

is “plain,” id. at 29, “elementary,” id. at 39, or “common

sense,” id. at 42. The majority does so even while decrying the

dangers of “cherry pick[ing] facts from an 11,000 page record.”

Id. at 41. In short, the majority opinion shows little respect

for a district court that is far more familiar with each page of

the record than we are.

Contravening our “axiomatic” rule against factual findings

on appeal, Core Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Md. LLC, 744 F.3d 310,

324 (4th Cir. 2014), the majority eventually finds in the first

instance that “there is only one answer to the question of why

Nucor’s black workers were consistently disfavored,” maj. op. at

45. This adventuresome approach is rather jarring when placed

against the more measured methods found in some of our other

class certification decisions. See, e.g., EQT Prod., 764 F.3d

at 371 (remanding for further consideration of class

certification after determining that district court misapplied

the relevant standards); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368

F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (same). Making matters worse, the

majority offers no good reason for it. Instead, it engages in a

rather extended discussion of the Brown I dissent and then

declares any attack on the majority’s factfinding today

“iron[ic].” Maj. op. at 21.

85
 Too often, we fail to give standards of review the

attention that they deserve. We see them recited in boilerplate

and then dispensed with when the perceived exigencies of a case

seem to call for it. But “[s]tandards of review are . . . an

elemental expression of judicial restraint, which, in their

deferential varieties, safeguard the superior vantage points of

those entrusted with primary decisional responsibility.” Evans,

514 F.3d at 320-21. An appellate court should not be so quick

to ignore them.

B.

We must next consider the district court’s role in deciding

the certification motion in the first place. The majority

implies that the district court too readily dismissed

Plaintiffs’ efforts to certify. But the district court was not

just permitted to take a hard look at Plaintiffs’ submissions --

it was required to.

1.

Although plaintiffs shoulder the burden of demonstrating

that a proposed class complies with Rule 23, the district court

has an “independent obligation to perform a rigorous analysis to

ensure that all of the prerequisites have been satisfied.” EQT

Prod., 764 F.3d at 358. Among other things, this “rigorous

analysis” requires the district court “to resolve a genuine

legal or factual dispute relevant to determining the

86
requirements.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552

F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008).

“[C]areful attention to the requirements of [Rule] 23

remains . . . indispensable” even in cases “alleging racial or

ethnic discrimination.” E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.

Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). Thus, “a Title VII class

action, like any other class action, may only be certified if

the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that

the prerequisites of [the Rule] have been satisfied.” Gen. Tel.

Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); see also Desert

Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (noting the

“conventional rule[s] of civil litigation . . . generally

appl[y] in Title VII cases”). And there is no “entitlement to

class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights,” Am.

Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309

(2013), Title VII included. Thus, the Court must be careful not

to bend and twist the “rigorous analysis” that Rule 23 compels

merely for the sake of abstract notions of Title VII’s

objectives and purposes. Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,

442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (“[G]eneralized references to the

‘remedial purposes’ of [a statute] will not justify reading a

provision more broadly than its language and the statutory

scheme reasonably permit.”). To do so would not only ignore the

87
Supreme Court’s warnings; it might also have unforeseen effects

in the many other areas of law in which Rule 23 is implicated.

In basic terms, the rigorous-analysis standard tests

whether plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence of

compliance with Rule 23. Plaintiffs may “not simply plead” that

the relevant requirements have been met, but must “actually

prove” it. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2412; accord Monroe, 579

F.3d at 384. To meet that standard, plaintiffs must summon

“evidentiary proof,” Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432, and

“affirmatively demonstrate [their] compliance with the Rule,”

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. “[S]ome evidence” is not enough.

In re Initial Pub. Offerings [“IPO”] Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24,

33 (2d Cir. 2006).

Before certifying a class action, courts will require a

plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that

the action complies with each part of Rule 23. See In re U.S.

Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir.

2013); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2013);

Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th

Cir. 2012); Ala. Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d

221, 228 (5th Cir. 2008), abrogated in other respects by

Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. 2398; accord In re Titanium Dioxide

Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 328, 336 (D. Md. 2012); In re Mills

Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 101, 104 (E.D. Va. 2009); In re

88
Safety-Kleen Corp. Bondholders Litig., No. 3:00-1145-17, 2004 WL

3115870, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2004); see also Anthony F. Fata,

Doomsday Delayed: How the Court’s Party-Neutral Clarification of

Class Certification Standards in Wal-Mart v. Dukes Actually

Helps Plaintiffs, 62 DePaul L. Rev. 675, 681 (2013) (reading

Wal-Mart to apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard).

2.

“[T]he factors spelled out in Rule 23 must be addressed

through findings, even if they overlap with issues on the

merits.” Gariety, 368 F.3d at 366; accord In re Rail Freight

Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 249 (D.C. Cir.

2013) (recognizing that certification will sometimes “resemble[]

an appraisal on the merits”). Obviously, “[a] court may not say

something like ‘let’s resolve the merits first and worry about

the class later’ . . . or ‘I’m not going to certify a class

unless I think that the plaintiffs will prevail.’” Szabo v.

Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001),

cited with approval in Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552. But

overlap “cannot be helped,” as certification “generally involves

considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues

comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Wal-Mart, 131 S.

Ct. at 2551—52. Compare Brown I, 576 F.3d at 156 (citing Eisen

v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974), and refusing

to inquire into Plaintiffs’ statistics because it would be an

89
impermissibly “in-depth assessment of the merits”), with Wal-

Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 & n.6 (admonishing courts not to

“mistakenly cite[]” Eisen for the incorrect idea that merits

inquiries are barred).

3.

Contrast these well-defined and rigorous standards with the

ambiguous and limitless ones found in the majority opinion. The

majority acknowledges the “rigorous analysis” that lower courts

must perform, but abandons that standard soon after mentioning

it. Instead, it treats the evidentiary standard for

certification as one different from that required for a party to

prevail on the merits, never acknowledging that this view breaks

from the many courts (including those in our Circuit) that apply

the preponderance standard. Nor does it even tell us what a

“rigorous analysis” might consist of. Instead, it merely

invokes Amgen, a case that addresses what questions may be

considered on class certification, not what evidence will

suffice to answer them. 133 S. Ct. at 1194-95. Having rendered

the rigorous analysis less rigorous than other courts’ (though

to what degree, one does not know), the majority then proceeds

to apply its weakened test, repeatedly using mere allegations --

or, sometimes, allegations “proven” by allegations -- to justify

certification. See, e.g., maj. op. at 25, 33, 34, 39, 43, 45,

90
50, 51, 62. The necessary implication is that the majority’s

“rigorous analysis” consists of very little.

One finds a further hint at the level of proof that the

majority means to apply when it embraces Brown I’s metric. Maj.

op. at 16-17. Brown I held that “allegations” of disparate

treatment were enough to establish commonality, a conclusion at

odds with Wal-Mart. Compare Brown I, 576 F.3d at 153, with Wal-

Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (distinguishing between an “otherwise

unsupported allegation” and the “significant proof” required to

establish a common policy). The majority in Brown I also said

that anecdotes from three employees concentrated in a single

department proved a common policy of discrimination. 576 F.3d

at 153. And it held that statistical evidence of “relatively

weak probative value” was enough, even though problems in that

evidence -- the statistical evidence seen here -- might “very

well discredit” it at some later stage. Id. at 156 & n.10. In

short, Brown I required the plaintiffs to summon an

exceptionally low, almost non-existent level of proof at the

class-certification stage.

The majority’s decision to reanimate Brown I’s negligible

evidentiary standard leaves this circuit alone on an island.

The Brown I majority suggested that its lenient view of the

necessary evidence aligned with the Second Circuit’s decision in

Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir.

91
1999). See Brown I, 576 F.3d at 157 (citing Caridad, 191 F.3d

at 293). But by the time Brown I was issued, the Second Circuit

had already repudiated any part of Caridad suggesting a lesser

burden of proof than a preponderance of the evidence. See In re

IPO, 471 F.3d at 42 (“[O]ur conclusions necessarily preclude the

use of a ‘some showing’ standard, and to whatever extent Caridad

might have implied such a standard for a Rule 23 requirement,

that implication is disavowed.”). Only one circuit followed

Brown I’s lead and accepted such a low degree of proof: the

Ninth Circuit, in its now-reversed decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. See 603 F.3d 571, 595-96 & n.17 (9th Cir. 2010).

(citing Brown I, 576 F.3d at 156). In the meantime, another

circuit rejected Brown I outright. See Bennett, 656 F.3d at 816

n.2 (declining to “follow” Brown I’s finding that sufficient

evidence established commonality, as “Brown[ I] was decided

without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in

Dukes”).

All in all, despite assurances otherwise, the majority

treats Rule 23 as something akin to a pleading standard. It is

not. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Were the rule written

as the majority envisions it, district courts would get to “duck

hard questions.” West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935,

938 (7th Cir. 2002). But framing class certification as a mere

pleading standard “amounts to a delegation of judicial power to

92
the plaintiffs.” Id. “[A] district court’s certification order

often bestows upon plaintiffs extraordinary leverage, and its

bite should dictate the process that precedes it.” Oscar

Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,

267 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogated in other respects by Erica P.

John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).

III. Commonality

With the proper standards in mind, it becomes evident that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

Plaintiffs failed to establish commonality.

“In this case, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps

with [Plaintiffs’] merits contention that [Nucor] engages in a

pattern or practice of discrimination.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at

2552. Plaintiffs must establish a unifying policy of

discrimination at certification, or “it will be impossible to

say that examination of all the class members’ claims for relief

will produce a common answer to the crucial question [of] why

was I disfavored.” Id. In other words, Plaintiffs cannot

simply identify a group of people who they allege have suffered

some type of Title VII injury. Id. To certify the class,

Plaintiffs must be able to trace that injury to a single, common

source. Id.; accord Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d

970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011); see also William B. Rubenstein,

93
Newberg on Class Actions § 3:19 (5th ed. 2014) (citing Brown I

as an example of a case that approached commonality “loosely”

and explaining that Wal-Mart articulated “a more explicit

definition of commonality”). Plaintiffs here must identify a

common policy with common injury to members of a class spanning

more than a decade, covering Nucor’s entire South Carolina

production facility, and touching upon dozens of relevant

decisionmakers. That task can be decidedly difficult,

especially given that Plaintiffs premise their class in part on

a disparate treatment theory. See Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. &

Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274 n.10 (4th Cir. 1980); see also

Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(“Establishing commonality for a disparate treatment class is

particularly difficult where, as here, multiple decisionmakers

with significant local autonomy exist.”).

A plaintiff who brings a class-wide charge of

discrimination must traverse a “wide gap” between his claim of

individual mistreatment and a class-wide harm. Falcon, 457 U.S.

at 157. The plaintiff could do so in one of two ways. See Wal-

Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553. First, he might identify a “biased

testing procedure” that is used to evaluate applicants and

employees. Id. By all accounts, Plaintiffs do not identify

that sort of procedure here. Second, a plaintiff might offer

“significant proof” that an employer “operated under a general

94
policy of discrimination . . . [that] manifested itself in

hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion.”

Id. This second route forms the focus of this case.

Plaintiffs offer two types of evidence that they say bridge

the gap between individual and class-wide claims: statistical

evidence and anecdotal evidence. Whether examining these two

categories of evidence separately or together, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in deeming the Plaintiffs’

case insufficient.

A. Statistical Evidence

1.

Plaintiffs first present a statistical study comparing a

hypothesized, weighted benchmark of black bidders for promotions

to the number of black employees that they assumed Nucor

promoted during the relevant period. This evidence performs a

double duty, as it goes to Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim

and their disparate treatment claim.

As to the disparate impact claim, this sort of statistical

evidence should identify disparities that are “sufficiently

substantial” to raise “an inference of causation.” Anderson v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 281 (4th Cir.

2005). Without “substantial” disparities, we cannot be

confident that a challenged policy produced an injury common to

the class. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.

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 As to the disparate treatment claim, “gross statistical

disparities” “may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof

of a pattern or practice of discrimination.” Hazelwood Sch.

Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); accord

Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 683 (4th Cir.

1986). But see Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746,

753 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[S]tatistics cannot alone prove the

existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination[.]”). But

not every case will present the truly egregious and unexplained

disparities that leave no room for any inference other than

intentional discrimination. Moreover, “[i]nferring past

discrimination from statistics alone assumes the most dubious of

conclusions: that the true measure of racial equality is always

to be found in numeric proportionality.” Md. Trooper Ass’n,

Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir. 1993).

2.

The majority observes that Plaintiffs’ evidence is

“statistically significant at 2.54 standard deviations from what

would be expected if race were a neutral factor.” Maj. op. at

28. Statistical significance, however, is a necessary but not

sufficient condition to finding a discriminatory practice or

policy; statistical significance does not axiomatically equate

with legal significance. See EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of

Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 648 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[S]tatistical

96
significance as measured by the standards of acceptable

statistical principles will not necessarily be legally

significant[.]”), rev’d sub nom on other grounds, Cooper v. Fed.

Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984). High statistical

significance levels might lack practical and legal significance,

for instance, because “a high significance level may be a

misleading artifact of the study’s design.” Kadas v. MCI

Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus,

determining what is legally significant -- as opposed to

statistically significant -- “is a legal determination properly

made by the court and not by an expert.” Fed. Reserve Bank of

Richmond, 698 F.2d at 648; cf. United States v. Philip Morris

USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 706 n.29 (D.D.C. 2006)

(criticizing one of Plaintiffs’ experts for his undue reliance

on statistical significance).

Nevertheless, the majority seems to defer to Plaintiffs’

experts and assume legal significance because the statistical

evidence crosses the two-standard-deviation threshold, the

threshold for statistical significance at a 95% confidence

level. Yet “courts of law should be extremely cautious in

drawing any conclusions from standard deviations in the range of

one to three.” EEOC v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1192 (4th

Cir. 1981); see also Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of

Discrimination: Beyond “Damned Lies”, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 477, 503

97
(1993) (“Random disparities of this magnitude are pervasive in

the workplace and are not suggestive of a nonrandom cause, let

alone an illegal one.”). In specific cases, even higher numbers

may not be enough. EEOC v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 713 F.2d

1011 (4th Cir. 1983), provides one example. There, we held that

a district court clearly erred in finding a policy or practice

of discrimination, even though statistics showed overall

disparities of 4.7955 and 5.883 standard deviations. Id. at

1018-19.

Similarly, other courts have rejected statistical evidence

even though the evidence met the two-standard-deviation

threshold. See, e.g., Carpenter, 456 F.3d at 1201 (7.95 and

38.03 standard deviations); Lopez v. Laborers Int’l Union Local

No. 18, 987 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1993) (3.26 and 3.01

standard deviations); Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948

F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991) (2.68 standard deviations); EEOC

v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 300 (7th Cir. 1991)

(20.1 standard deviations); Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s

Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 1982) (2.45

standard deviations). In short, “there is nothing magical about

two or three standard deviations.” Ramona L. Paetzold & Steve

L. Willborn, The Statistics of Discrimination § 4:13 (2014).

98
 3.

Instead of assuming “that any particular number of

‘standard deviations’” establishes a discriminatory policy,

courts must evaluate statistical evidence on a “case-by-case

basis.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995

n.3 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters

v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977). Neither “courts

[n]or defendants [are] obliged to assume that plaintiffs’

statistical evidence is reliable.” Watson, 487 U.S. at 996.

And we must always keep in mind that we are looking for reliable

indications of “gross” or “substantial” disparities that amount

to “significant proof.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, 2553;

Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08.

The duty to test the relevant statistical evidence attaches

at the class certification stage, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433,

as “reliance on unverifiable evidence is hardly better than

relying on bare allegations,” Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d

316, 324 (5th Cir. 2005). District courts must probe the

validity of statistical evidence, as “any method of measurement”

would otherwise become “acceptable so long as it c[ould] be

applied classwide, no matter how arbitrary the measurements may

be.” Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433; accord Rail Freight Fuel

Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d at 254; Am. Honda Motor

Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2010).

99
 In this case, the district court evaluated Plaintiffs’

statistical evidence, reasonably found it wanting, and explained

in detail why that was so. It should not then be said that the

district court clearly erred by refusing to give weight to

unconvincing evidence. And when one takes a closer look,

Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence truly is fundamentally

unconvincing, not just -- as the majority calls it -- “less

precise.” Maj. op. at 18.

4.

“[T]rial judges may evaluate the data offered to support an

expert’s bottom-line opinions to determine if that data provides

adequate support to mark the expert’s testimony as reliable.”

Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 15

(1st Cir. 2011). And in any case involving expert testimony, “a

court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical

gap between the data and the opinion offered.” Gen. Elec. Co.

v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).

Plaintiffs’ own experts conceded that they used problematic

data. In support of a motion to compel, one of Plaintiffs’

experts affirmed under oath that the information he had received

thus far was “incomplete in a number of important ways that

ma[d]e it impossible to calculate reliable statistics.” J.A.

399. Because of this “inadequate” data, the expert opined that

he could not calculate “proper statistics” or perform “any of

100
th[e] three standard forms of statistical analysis.” J.A. 403,

409. Without additional data, it was concededly “impossible to

calculate . . . statistical patterns that might show whether or

not a common issue of fact exists in this case.” J.A. 403-04.

Ultimately, the expert did not receive any of the additional

data that he professed to need for a scientifically valid

analysis. But, despite his sworn statements that the task was

“impossible,” he and another expert nevertheless produced

statistical analyses based on the “incomplete” and “inadequate”

data.

Plaintiffs’ experts’ report confirms that they used

incomplete data to support and reach their conclusions. For

instance, even though the experts drew conclusions about

positions throughout the Nucor plant, they did not employ any

data from either the shipping or maintenance departments. J.A.

1154. They used only a “limited amount of data” for the

remaining departments. J.A. 1153. And although Plaintiffs’

experts chose to use bidding data to determine an expected

number of black promotions, they conceded that incomplete data

“undermined” their “ability to use posting and bidding records

to analyze [those] promotions.” J.A. 1161. Nucor’s expert

identified other basic issues in Plaintiffs’ experts’ data that

the majority opinion ignores. See J.A. 5892. For instance,

Plaintiffs’ experts included a promotion won by an external

101
candidate in their pool -- even though this case only concerns

internally filled promotions. They further overlooked seven

selections of black employees for promotions. See J.A. 5891.

The district court did not clearly err in discrediting this

incomplete work and deeming it unworthy of evidentiary weight.

5.

a.

To further understand why Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence

is problematic, it helps to consider how it came about. In

discovery, Nucor produced bidding packets and other promotion-

related applicant data covering certain promotions from January

2001 to February 2006. Plaintiffs’ analysis of the 2001-2006

data indicated that the black selection rate fell only 0.84

standard deviations from the mean -- a statistically

insignificant result. See J.A. 5872. Fortunately for

Plaintiffs, the district court limited the use of the actual

data to the January 2001 to December 2003 period. But an

analysis of that period’s data did not produce a statistically

significant disparity, either. At best, analysis of the 2001-

2003 data produced disparities falling only 1.53 standard

deviations from the mean. See J.A. 1449.

Left with no results from actual records that suggested

discrimination, Plaintiffs’ experts set about creating

extrapolated “benchmark” figures for promotions bidding between

102
December 1999 and January 2001. They began by using so-called

“change-of-status” forms plucked from personnel records to

identify 27 purported promotions during the period. The experts

then constructed a hypothetical bidding pool by essentially

guessing that bidders in early years were racially identical to

bidders in later ones. See J.A. 1162. With their theoretical

promotion and bid figures established, Plaintiffs’ experts then

calculated an expected black promotion rate and compared it to

the “actual” black promotion rate for the same period. Tied

with the actual promotions figures from 2001 through 2003,

Plaintiffs’ extrapolated figures produced the number on which

the majority now relies -- 2.54 standard deviations.

b.

Plaintiffs’ experts, however, based their extrapolations on

several erroneous assumptions that render their model

unreliable.

It begins with the change-of-status forms, which Nucor used

to record any change of employee status. Because the forms also

recorded demotions, pay increases, reassignments, and transfers,

one cannot and should not assume that every form reflects a

posted promotion. But up to the time that the district court

decertified the promotions classes, Plaintiffs had never

provided the 27 relevant change-of-status forms to the district

court. Quite understandably, the district court wanted more

103
concrete assurance that Plaintiffs’ selected forms showed actual

promotions. The district court never got that assurance, and it

was “not inclined” to “take [Plaintiffs’] word for it.” J.A.

10943. Plaintiffs did eventually submit the 27 relevant change-

of-status forms -- but only after the district court decertified

the promotions classes. As it turns out, those forms do little

to dispel the concern that Plaintiffs misidentified promotions.

For example, two forms seem to show transfers, not promotions,

J.A. 11006 (Reynolds), 11028 (Forsell), while another just

reflects training, J.A. 11029 (Green). Others do not involve

pay raises, suggesting no promotion occurred. See J.A. 11006

(Haselden), 11030 (Cooper). Certain other forms are ambiguous,

failing to indicate whether pay rates changed or what the nature

of the position change was. See, e.g., J.A. 11022 (Anderson),

11024 (Proskine), 11025 (Pope). Most of the forms fail to

indicate whether Nucor posted the relevant opening for bidding.

See, e.g., J.A. 11006-15, 11019-21, 11023, 11026-32. So, the

district court was reasonably concerned that the 27 purported

promotions -- representing nearly half of the promotions in

Plaintiffs’ statistical analysis -- were suspect and

statistically useless.

The problems with Plaintiffs’ experts’ model continue to

mount when the hypothesized bidding pools for the purported

promotions are examined. Plaintiffs’ experts hypothesized that

104
at least one black employee bid on each of the 27 assumed

promotion opportunities. But that approach rejects the prospect

of an all-white bidding pool during the projected period,

something likely to randomly happen from time to time given

Nucor’s 11% black workforce. Consequently, Nucor’s expert

concluded that Plaintiffs’ experts’ model “overstat[ed] the

expected number of African American selections” between December

1999 and January 2001, as the model very likely inflated the

number of black bidders. J.A. 5912. And indeed, Plaintiffs’

experts calculated that black workers applied to jobs at a

substantially higher pace than their actual percentage of the

workforce, further suggesting some degree of inflation. Compare

J.A. 1157 (noting that workforce was “11.3% African-American”),

with J.A. 1162 (“The racial composition of the bidders . . . was

19.24% African-American.”).

An “inflated pool” like the one that Plaintiffs used “can

undermine the validity of a statistical study to determine

imbalances.” Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 677

(4th Cir. 1996). When a statistical model overestimates the

number of black bidders, for instance, then black bidding rates

artificially rise and black selection rates artificially fall.

These effects might explain, for instance, why the black bidder

selection rate for January 2001 to December 2003 -- when actual

data was available -- was three times higher than the calculated

105
selection rate for December 1999 to January 2001 -- when

projected data was used. If, during the projected period, the

hypothesized number of black bidders in the pool (artificially)

rose while the number of black bidder selections stayed the

same, then the hypothesized black selection rate would be

(artificially) driven down during the projected period.

c.

The majority nevertheless dubs the extrapolated data

“sound.” Maj. op. at 17. That conclusion, however, reflects an

unwillingness to confront genuine concerns over statistical

validity.

For instance, although admitting that the change-of-status

forms are ambiguous, the majority blames Nucor for not

explaining how these ambiguities would affect Plaintiffs’

statistical accuracy. Maj. op. at 22. That burden was not

Nucor’s. Cf. Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199

(4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the “proponent of the testimony”

bears the burden of proving that it is reliable). Recently, for

example, the Court affirmed a district court’s refusal to

consider statistical evidence offered to show disparate impact

because the evidence contained a number of “mistakes and

omissions” in its analysis. EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 467

(4th Cir. 2015). The Court did so even though the plaintiff

there raised the very same argument that the majority now

106
embraces: that the employer never “show[ed] that correcting the

errors would negate the disparate impact.” Brief for Appellant

at 26, Freeman, 778 F.3d 463 (No. 13-2365), 2014 WL 320746. The

Court appropriately rejected that argument then; it should have

done the same now.

Rather than focusing on the reliability of the extrapolated

statistics, the majority prefers to revisit the Brown I dissent.

See maj. op. at 20-21. That dissent noted some of the concerns

mentioned here: not all change-of-status forms used to

extrapolate openings reflect promotions, many forms are unclear,

and few forms indicate whether positions were posted. See Brown

I, 576 F.3d at 168 (Agee, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part). To illustrate these concerns, the dissent examined

“the change-of-status forms found in the record for 2000.” Id.

Bear in mind that, at least up to that point, Plaintiffs had

never produced the particular change-of-status forms that they

relied upon to guesstimate their statistics. Nor had they

informed the Court that the forms in the record were not those

upon which they based their statistical evidence. So, the Brown

I dissent used the only change-of-status forms that were

available to assess whether they could credibly support

Plaintiffs’ alleged statistical disparities. Id. Although the

majority labels this exercise “sua sponte fact-finding,” maj.

107
op. at 21, the discussion in the Brown I dissent consisted of

nothing more than explication by example.

The majority then attempts to tie the district court’s

decertification decision to the “error” that the majority

mistakenly identifies in the Brown I dissent. According to the

majority, the district court committed “clear factual error” by

assuming that the change-of-status forms discussed in the Brown

I dissent were those that Plaintiffs relied upon to build their

statistical model. But here’s the rub: the district court

expressly disclaimed that very assumption. The district court

noted that, at the time of decertification, Plaintiffs still had

not produced the relevant forms. So, it had “never seen the 27

change-of-status forms upon which [Plaintiffs’] experts

apparently relied.” J.A. 10943. Thus, the district court cited

the Brown I dissent only to emphasize the potential problems

inherent in using the forms and why it needed to see them. See

J.A. 10942-43. The majority’s protracted discussion of the

Brown I dissent therefore does nothing to rehabilitate

Plaintiffs’ evidence, resting as it does on a twofold misreading

of the Brown I dissent and the district court’s decertification

decision.

Nor does the majority explain why inflated black bidding

rates can be excused. Rather than address that obstacle, the

majority assures the reader that the problem causes only “an

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incremental reduction in probative value” that does not “fatally

undermine the probativeness of the experts’ findings.” Maj. op.

at 23. But it is hard to minimize these defects so quickly when

Plaintiffs’ experts offered few explanations for their

assumptions or any assessment of the expected impact of those

assumptions. The experts did not say, for instance, whether

black bidding rates varied during the years for which data was

available. If they had shown that the rates remained steady,

then one might assume that those same rates applied to the

extrapolated years. But if the rates varied, then Plaintiffs’

experts’ assumptions are not sustainable. Oddly, the majority

again blames Nucor for not summoning any evidence going to

variation, but that tack once more reverses the burden of proof.

“It is the plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate compliance with

Rule 23,” not Nucor’s. EQT Prod., 764 F.3d at 358. The

majority further finds that Plaintiffs’ experts reasonably

assumed that “every” position was posted for bidding. But

Plaintiffs themselves submitted testimony identifying several

unposted positions. See, e.g., J.A. 1010, 1051, 1091, 1110.

Nucor’s stated policies also indicated that, at least for a

time, “[v]acant supervisory positions [were] not [to] be posted

for bidding.” J.A. 257.

The majority stresses that, as a general matter, plaintiffs

may employ extrapolated data to prove discrimination. Maj. op.

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at 18-19. That can be true in some cases, but extrapolated data

must still be statistically valid. And the majority ignores a

significant and telling distinction between this case and past

ones: Plaintiffs’ experts extrapolated two data points -- the

composition of the applicant pool and the success rates -–

whereas experts in our prior cases only extrapolated one data

point. See Lewis, 773 F.2d at 568; United States v. Cnty. of

Fairfax, Va., 629 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1980).

The majority’s cited cases also involved defendants who

wrongfully destroyed relevant evidence. See Lewis, 773 F.2d at

568 (noting that the defendant “improperly disposed” of

applicant records); Cnty. of Fairfax, 629 F.2d at 936 n.4

(noting that the defendant destroyed applicant data “[i]n

violation of the record keeping regulations of [two statutes]”).

In a situation involving spoliation of evidence, the Court

commonly draws adverse inferences against the spoliators. But

this record contains no evidence of spoliation.

Regardless, no authority requires the district court to

find extrapolated data convincing in every case. Our precedent

holds just the opposite. In Allen v. Prince George’s County,

737 F.2d 1299, 1306 (4th Cir. 1984), for example, the district

court relied solely upon actual applicant flow data “to the

exclusion of all [other] statistical evidence,” including

evidence crafted from alternative benchmarks. We affirmed,

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emphasizing that we could not “second-guess” a fact-bound

decision concerning “the relative weights to be accorded to the

parties’ respective evidence.” Id. The district court here did

essentially the same thing as the district court in Allen,

giving weight for good reason to the actual data available to

the exclusion of the speculative extrapolation evidence. As in

Allen, we should not say that the district court clearly erred

in doing so.

6.

a.

Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence also does not apply

controls for non-discriminatory factors that could very well

have caused any observed disparities. See Lowery, 158 F.3d at

764. Seniority, for instance, influences promotions decisions

at Nucor. See, e.g., J.A. 257. Disciplinary issues also led

Nucor to reject certain applicants for promotion -- including

frequent bidder Jason Guy, who is black. See J.A. 659-67; see

also Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 544 n.20 (“[A]n

employee’s prior discipline record seems likely to be a major,

if not the most important, factor in [an employment]

decision.”). But Plaintiffs’ experts admitted that they did not

control for these or any other “additional factors beyond the

control for each job posting.” J.A. 1164. The majority would

wish these considerations away, reasoning that Nucor never

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raised them. But Nucor’s expert noted the need to “control for

characteristics that would seem to affect the chance of

selection,” which would include matters like seniority and

discipline. See J.A. 5893. Anyway, we could have affirmed the

district court’s decision here on “any basis supported by the

record.” Defenders of Wildlife v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 762

F.3d 374, 392 (4th Cir. 2014).

The majority also tries to summon its own justifications

for these omissions, implying that records were not available to

control for matters like discipline. Maj. op. at 25. Even

Plaintiffs’ experts conceded that they were. See J.A. 1165

(acknowledging that Nucor had maintained and produced “bidders’

training, discipline, and bidding records”); see also J.A. 5893

(Nucor’s expert observing that “separate discipline and training

files [were] provided to Drs. Bradley and Fox and [him]”). And,

based on allegations and personal assessments from Plaintiffs

themselves, the majority assumes that potential explanatory

variables are themselves racially biased. See maj. op. at 25-

26. Yet here again, Plaintiffs’ experts do not assume so,

perhaps because there is no concrete evidence of such taint in

the record. See Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz,

875 F.2d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that district court

correctly required the plaintiffs to account for potential

explanatory variable where the plaintiffs alleged but did not

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prove that the variable was biased). And even if one were to

indulge the majority’s assumption that discipline at Nucor was

itself biased, that outcome would not justify excluding the

variable from the statistical model completely. “[T]ainted

variables should not be routinely excluded from the regression

equation. Instead, the effects of the inclusion of a tainted

variable must be assessed and minimized.” Paetzold & Willborn,

supra, § 6:13. The majority’s reasons, then, do not fill the

gaps in Plaintiffs’ experts’ work.

The failure to control for non-race-related explanatory

variables “is sufficiently serious so as to weaken the

statistical study’s probativeness.” Lowery, 158 F.3d at 764;

see also Smith, 84 F.3d at 676; accord Rodriguez v. Nat’l City

Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 384-85 (3d Cir. 2013); Morgan v. United

Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 380 F.3d 459, 468 (8th Cir. 2004);

Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Sheehan v.

Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997); Penk

v. Or. St. Bd. of Higher Educ., 816 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir.

1987). A trier of fact must determine whether racial

discrimination -- rather than chance or some other “confounding

factor[]” -- caused an alleged disparity. In re Navy

Chaplaincy, 738 F.3d 425, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Only a

controlled model can provide that answer, and Plaintiffs’

experts’ evidentiary model did not meet that definition.

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 b.

In most every employment case, a valid statistical model

must account for one particularly important explanatory

variable: the applicant pool’s qualifications. “[T]he relevant

comparison is between the percentage of minority employees and

the percentage of potential minority applicants in the qualified

labor pool.” Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 456 (4th Cir. 1994);

see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501-

02 (1989); McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir.

1991). If courts were to accept statistical models containing

unqualified applicants, then employers could be punished merely

because of a “dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for

reasons that are not [the employers’] fault).” Wards Cove

Packaging Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651 (1989). Thus,

“statistics based on an applicant pool containing individuals

lacking minimal qualifications for the job [are] of little

probative value.” Watson, 487 U.S. at 997; see also Paetzold &

Willborn, supra, § 4:3 (“[W]hen considering potential

discrimination in promotions within an organization, only

employees qualified for promotion should be considered in the

proxy pool.”). Furthermore, “[n]o rational enterprise that has

several qualified candidates for a position selects among them

by lot; it picks the best qualified.” Mason v. Cont’l Ill.

Nat’l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 1983). So, a truly

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effective statistical model will not just account for minimum

qualifications, but should control for the variations in skills

even among minimally qualified applicants.

By this point, Plaintiffs and their experts should have

known better than to ignore other explanatory factors. In a

related case challenging promotions practices at a different

Nucor facility, the Eighth Circuit found that similarly

substandard work from the same expert did not create a triable

question of fact on summary judgment. See Bennett, 656 F.3d at

812. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that the

expert’s statistics had “little force” because they “assumed

that all applicants were qualified for promotion to each

available position.” Id. at 818. The Eighth Circuit is not

alone. Other courts have criticized Plaintiffs’ principal

expert for employing his “warm body hypothesis,” which “assumes

that every person is just as qualified and skilled and

experienced as everyone else.” Davis v. Ala. Dep’t of Educ.

Dep’t of Disability Determination Serv., 768 F. Supp. 1471, 1477

(N.D. Ala. 1991); accord Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., No.

08–00155–KD–N, 2011 WL 1558790, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 25, 2011);

Rollins v. Ala. Cmty. Coll. Sys., No. 2:09cv636–WHA, 2010 WL

4269133, at *8-9 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 2010); Bennett v. Nucor

Corp., No. 3:04CV00291 SWW, 2007 WL 2333193, at *3 (E.D. Ark.

Aug. 13, 2007); Yapp v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 229 F.R.D. 608, 619

115
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 5, 2005); Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country

Store, Inc., No. Civ.A. 4:99–CV–217–H, 2002 WL 32058462, at *65

(N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2002). We even affirmed a district court’s

choice to exclude work from the same expert precisely because he

did not incorporate adequate controls. See Anderson, 406 F.3d

at 262-63 (agreeing with the district court’s view that the

expert had ignored “actual job performance or job requirements”

even though he “conceded” that he could have “use[d] a control

factor that would control for the actual job title or the job

duties”).

Plaintiffs’ experts assumed that all persons in each

bidding pool were equally qualified because “only persons who

decided to bid based on the posted qualifications were

included.” J.A. 1162. This opaque language obscures another

faulty assumption built into the model: the experts assumed that

only qualified persons applied for each promotion opportunity.

It takes no expertise to comprehend that some people “might be

discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized inability

to meet the [opening’s] standards.” Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433

U.S. 321, 330 (1977). But one could hardly assume that every

job applicant is so discerning, and even the majority seems

unwilling to make that assumption. See maj. op. at 25. The

majority prefers to guess that the number of unqualified

applicants will be so trivially small as to be statistically

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irrelevant, and it makes that guess simply because the job

announcement includes job requirements. In practical effect,

the majority has read the “qualified applicants” limitation

found in our prior cases out of the law, as most every job

opening provides some minimal description of what skills are

required.

“A statistical study that fails to correct for explanatory

variables, or even to make the most elementary comparisons, has

no value as causal explanation[.]” People Who Care v. Rockford

Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 537 (7th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs

presented just such a study here, and the district court did not

clearly err in rejecting it.

7.

Lastly, Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence improperly

aggregates data in a way that distorts the results.

a.

The objective in a class action -- even in a proceeding

that alleges disparate treatment -- is to identify a common,

uniform policy. “While in a case alleging intentional

discrimination, such as this one, a plaintiff need not isolate

the particular practice and prove that such practice caused the

discrimination, plaintiffs must make a significant showing to

permit the court to infer that members of the class suffered

from a common policy of discrimination that pervaded all of the

117
employer’s challenged employment decisions.” Love v. Johanns,

439 F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Thus, if the class challenges a policy implemented at the

nationwide level, then plaintiffs might use applicable

statistics showing nationwide disparities to establish the

policy’s effects. Conversely, if the class challenges policies

implemented on a plant-by-plant or department-by-department

basis, then the class must summon statistics showing disparities

at that level. Otherwise, non-uniform decisions made by one

discriminatory decisionmaker might create disparities that, when

aggregated with other, neutral decisions, misleadingly indicate

discrimination across the whole group of decisionmakers.

Wal-Mart demonstrates these concepts well. There, the

plaintiffs offered statistics purporting to show regional and

national disparities in employment decisions at Wal-Mart. Wal-

Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555. Those decisions, however, were made

at the store level. Id. at 2547. Because of that disconnect,

the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs’ statistics did not

establish a common policy. Once again, the broader disparities

might have been “attributable only to a small set of Wal-Mart

stores” and did not “establish the uniform, store-by-store

disparity upon which plaintiffs’ theory of commonality

depend[ed].” Id. at 2555. In essence, Wal-Mart agreed with our

own, earlier cases indicating that statistics should not be

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aggregated together to create disparities that are not actually

representative of the class as a whole. Compare Stastny, 628

F.2d 279-80 (requiring the plaintiffs’ statistics to focus on

the “locus of autonomy”), with Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a

Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases

Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 Hofstra Lab. &

Emp. L.J. 433, 447 (2012), cited with approval by Scott v.

Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 113 (4th Cir. 2013)

(explaining that Wal-Mart requires that plaintiffs’ statistics

focus on “the locus of the subjective decision-making”).

In requiring the plaintiffs’ statistics to be centered at

the level of relevant decisionmaking, Wal-Mart did not

distinguish between nationwide and other class actions. Rather,

Wal-Mart asked whether the plaintiffs there were too dissimilar

to bring their claims together, regardless of how many claims

there might be. Thus, courts have applied principles from Wal-

Mart in cases involving classes of roughly the same size as the

class at issue here. See, e.g., Wang v. Chinese Daily News,

Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 544 (9th Cir. 2013) (200 class members);

Ealy, 514 F. App’x at 304-08 (150 class members). Even

statisticians agree that Wal-Mart reaches classes big and small.

See, e.g., Dr. Mary Dunn Baker, Class Certification Statistical

Analysis Post-Dukes, 27 ABA J. Lab. & Empl. L. 471, 479 (2012)

(“[T]he size of the putative class or the number of

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establishments the defendant operates will have little to do

with whether the Dukes commonality approach is applicable.”).

So, even though Plaintiffs here challenge practices in one

plant, they still must offer statistics showing disparities

among all the relevant decisionmakers, regardless of that one-

plant focus. See Rubenstein, supra, § 24:40 (“Courts have

certified [only] limited classes when the facts show that no

uniform personnel policies are applied among the various plants,

departments, or levels of employees.”).

b.

Here, as the Brown I majority agreed, the evidence

indicates “that each department manager” in each of Nucor’s six

production departments “has unbridled discretion to make

promotions within his department utilizing whatever objective or

subjective factors he wishes.” Brown I, 576 F.3d at 151.

Department managers took full advantage of that discretion,

developing processes that they recurrently characterized as

unique and independent. See J.A. 7887, 7894-95, 7900, 7906-07.

Indeed, these processes were so varied that one supervisor

declared that he had “no idea what other departments d[id].”

J.A. 8109. Even the decisionmakers varied. In some

departments, such as the hot mill and shipping departments,

supervisors and the department managers made promotion

decisions. In other departments, such as maintenance and the

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cold mill, promotions decisions were a more collaborative effort

involving even lower-level lead men. These different

decisionmakers then applied different standards. In the beam

mill, for example, the process centered upon interviews alone.

In contrast, the melt shop looked to applicants’ work history,

safety record, psychological interview, job skills, training,

attendance, and scores on a job-specific aptitude test. Nucor’s

general manager quite reasonably described the promotions

processes when he said that “each department ha[d] their own way

of doing [promotions].” J.A. 1723.

Plaintiffs’ own expert found that each department had its

own procedures, and at least eight different criteria -- not

including “numerous other idiosyncratic factors” -- might or

might not be considered in making any employment decision. J.A.

1518-19. “Different supervisors,” he explained, “utilized

different criteria weighting schemes with little consistency

among the selection officials and among the different

hiring/promotion/transfer opportunities.” J.A. 1525. Taking

all this dissimilarity together, the expert concluded that

Nucor’s selection process was only “consistent in its

inconsistency.” J.A. 1519.

Yet Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence incorrectly assumed

the exact opposite: perfect, plant-wide consistency as to

promotions. Given that promotions decisions were made at the

121
department or supervisor level using different and independent

criteria, we cannot rightfully assume that a plant-wide

disparity resulted from a uniform problem arising in the same

way in each Nucor department. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.

Put differently, the district court reasonably found that the

“locus of autonomy” rested at the departmental level, not a

plant-wide one. We cannot then assume that department decisions

were made in lockstep, such that plant-wide disparities

necessarily reflect common, departmental ones. See Bolden v.

Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting

aggregate data because it did not necessarily imply that “all 25

superintendents behaved similarly, so it would not demonstrate

commonality”).

We have already seen these concepts play out in another

employment discrimination action involving a similar Nucor

facility. Applying Wal-Mart, the Eighth Circuit rejected

statistics -- from the same expert -- that reflected plant-wide

disparities in promotions at an Arkansas Nucor plant. Bennett,

656 F.3d at 815-16. Just as in this case, the statistical

evidence there indicated that different departments in the plant

applied different criteria for promotions decisions. Id. at

815. The plant-wide evidence therefore “ha[d] little value in

the commonality analysis” because it “did not differentiate

between the hiring and promotion decisions made in each

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department.” Id. The Eighth Circuit found that, in those sorts

of circumstances, “a bottom-line analysis [wa]s insufficient to

demonstrate that any disparate treatment or disparate impact

present in one department was also common to all others.” Id.

at 815-16.

As in Bennett, Nucor here provided its own analysis that

demonstrated how the statistical disparities varied among the

different departments in the plant. Nucor’s expert measured how

selection rates varied between white and black applicants on a

department-by-department basis over the period for which bidding

information was available. With proper controls applied, the

expert found that race differences between departments could

vary by as much as 2.44 standard deviations. J.A. 5894. In

other words, some departments experienced decidedly smaller

disparities in selection rates, undermining any inference of

uniformity and commonality among all departments.

Given the wide variance in promotions practices at the

Nucor facility, the district court did not clearly err in

rejecting a statistical study that failed to account for that

variance.

c.

The majority finds, however, that Nucor’s entire plant

should be treated “as a single entity” when it comes to

promotions decisions. Maj. op. at 35-36 (alluding to Brown I,

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576 F.3d at 158). Although the majority suggests otherwise,

Brown I did not decide this issue. Brown I held that the

district court should treat Nucor’s various production

departments as a single facility only for purposes of

Plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claim. 576 F.3d at 158

(“[T]he affidavits of employees in one department are admissible

to prove a plant-wide hostile environment that affected

employees in other departments, and the plaintiffs have

satisfied the commonality requirement for their hostile work

environment claim.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 157

(discussing how a “hostile environment determination” must be

made in the context of discussing Plaintiffs’ “single entity”

argument). It said nothing about the uniformity of promotions

decisions across the plant. Id. The Brown I majority did so

because Plaintiffs likewise focused their “single entity”

argument on only the hostile work environment claim. See Brief

for Appellant at 25-35, Brown I, 576 F.3d 149 (No. 08-1247),

2008 WL 2307453. Thus, as with predominance, the district court

was not constrained in deciding the “single facility” issue, as

no Brown I mandate existed as to that issue.

Nonetheless, the majority concludes that facts establishing

a single hostile work environment claim also establish a common

promotions policy. Maj. op. at 37. Yet “[d]isparate treatment

. . . is inherently different from hostile work environment.

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The federal courts treat the two types of cases differently for

good reason.” See Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 213

F.3d 933, 943 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S.

843 (2001). And no court has held that a common hostile work

environment establishes that a facility must be treated as a

single entity for purposes of every other kind of employment

discrimination claim.

In finding a common environment, Brown I focused on shared

locker rooms and spaces, plant-wide email, and plant-wide radio

systems. 576 F.3d at 158. When it comes to a hostile work

environment claim, those facts may matter: racial slurs and

“monkey noises” uttered in a common space or transmitted via

plant-wide radio can affect whoever hears them. See Burlington

Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (“[A]nyone who

has regular contact with an employee can inflict psychological

injuries by his or her offensive conduct.”). But locker rooms

and radios bear no relationship to promotions decisions;

certainly nothing in the record supports such a concept. Only

supervisors can inflict the “pain” of a denied promotion, and

they can do so only when empowered by company structure, not

common spaces. We should not assume that dozens of supervisors

acted in concert merely because their employees might have

changed clothes in the same room. Nor should we assume -- in

the face of expressly different criteria applied to different

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groups of employees -- that applicants in each department

nevertheless suffer the same injury merely because of their

physical proximity to one another at some point during a

workday. Though the majority insists that “centralized,

circumscribed environments” will “generally” increase

“consistency” in managerial decisionmaking, maj. op. at 33,

Plaintiffs’ own expert made clear that this hypothesized general

rule cannot apply here, see J.A. 1519 (“The best sentiment I can

muster in favor of the [Nucor] selection procedure is that it is

consistent in its inconsistency.”). See also, e.g., Tabor v.

Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (affirming

denial of class certification where “Plaintiffs challenge[d] a

highly discretionary policy for granting promotions”).

The majority also notes that the general manager formally

approved promotions in the plant. Maj. op. at 50. Without

saying so explicitly, the majority seems to propose that the

general manager provided some common, plant-wide direction that

drove common, plant-wide disparities. Yet even the Brown I

majority recognized that the general manager played no genuine

role in the promotions decisionmaking process. 576 F.3d at 152

(“Although, by policy, the plant’s general manager approves all

promotions and handles discrimination and harassment

investigations, the record suggests that each department manager

has unbridled discretion to make promotions within his

126
department utilizing whatever objective or subjective factors he

wishes.”). The evidence confirms that proposition. Promotions,

the general manager explained, were “not [his] area of

responsibility,” as he had “department managers that ma[d]e

those decisions.” J.A. 8163. Nucor instead trained its

department managers to make promotions decisions and implement

the anti-discrimination policy.

The majority nevertheless says the general manager engaged

in “inaction.” Maj. op. at 48, 50. The majority’s theory --

premised on an assumed culture of “odious racism” and passive

enabling -- resembles a theory that Wal-Mart out-and-out

rejected. See 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (refusing to credit

evidence asserting that a “strong corporate culture,” enabled by

policies of discretion, permitted bias in pay decisions); accord

Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 489 (6th Cir. 2013).

Even if one assumes that such a theory were viable and

relevant here, it would not prove commonality. “Inaction” --

letting supervisors do as they wish -- is just discretion by

another name. “[I]t is a policy against having uniform

employment practices.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. “Wal-Mart

tells us that local discretion cannot support a company-wide

class no matter how cleverly lawyers” (or judges) “may try to

repackage local variability as uniformity.” Bolden, 688 F.3d at

898; accord In re Navy Chaplaincy, No. 1:07–mc–269 (GK), 2014 WL

127
4378781, at *15 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2014). Were it otherwise, one

could find a common policy in most every case, as most every

company has a management head at the top that could be accused

of not doing enough. Beyond that, Plaintiffs’ experts never

traced their identified disparities to the general manager, and

their reports never even mention him. For good reason.

Individual acts of discretion, not the general manager’s

purported acquiescence, would have caused any disparities and

the injuries that they reflect. Thus, the not-very-common

common policy does not present a common injury.

Nucor also used a plant-wide “dual-approval” scheme, under

which promotions required approval from both “originating” and

“destination” department heads. The majority sees this as a

case of potential “cat’s paw” liability, wherein a non-

decisionmaker influences the ultimate decisionmaker’s choice in

a discriminatory way. Maj. op. at 36-37 (citing Smith v. Bray,

681 F.3d 888, 897 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2012)). But nothing other

than speculation indicates that dual approval was used to effect

discrimination in any common way, and any cat’s paw must be the

“proximate cause” of the discriminatory harm to be actionable.

Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011). Not even

Plaintiffs’ statistical experts attempt to tie their disparities

to a dual-approval policy.

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 The majority surmises that a discriminatory supervisor in

one department could have theoretically used dual approval to

inflict his animus upon employees outside his own department.

But if a racist department head had tried to use the dual-

approval scheme to disadvantage black workers, he would not have

been able to reach all or even most of the promotions decisions

in the plant, dual approval notwithstanding. A discriminatory

department head in the beam mill, for instance, would have had

no say when it came to a cold mill employee seeking a higher

position within the cold mill, hot mill, melt shop, maintenance

department, or shipping department. Perhaps, then, the

majority’s concept -- if properly supported with evidence --

might justify a class of persons applying in and out of a

particularly problematic department. In fact, the district

court proposed certifying just such a class as to the beam mill.

See J.A. 10953-54 & n.16. But it would not justify the plant-

wide class action that Plaintiffs now mean to bring. Cf. Ellis,

657 F.3d at 983 (“A disparity in only 25% of the regions,

however, would not show that discrimination manifested in

promotions practices in the same general fashion.”).

* * * *

In sum, the district court did not clearly err in choosing

not to rely on Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence. Faced with

evidence based on questionable data, uncontrolled explanatory

129
variables, and poorly structured methodologies, the district

court did not act irrationally in determining that such evidence

was of negligible credence. The “troubling effects of

statistical inferences require thoughtful consideration in each

case,” Mister v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 832 F.2d 1427, 1437

(7th Cir. 1987), and that consideration is sorely lacking from

the work of Plaintiffs’ experts. Thus, Plaintiffs’ evidence,

with its many deficiencies, does not establish the common policy

necessary for class certification. The district court did not

abuse its discretion in making that finding.

B. Anecdotal Evidence

Plaintiffs also present affidavits from sixteen employees

in support of certifying the promotions classes. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify

Plaintiffs’ proposed class based on this limited evidence.

1.

In their original class certification motion, Plaintiffs

never argued that anecdotal evidence, standing alone, could

establish a common policy of discrimination. Rather, Plaintiffs

presented the anecdotal evidence only to supplement their

statistical evidence. See Brown I, 576 F.3d at 164 (Agee, J.,

dissenting). The Brown I majority constructed its own theory of

the case, finding that Plaintiffs could in fact advance their

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case on anecdotal evidence “alone.” Id. at 153. Plaintiffs now

take up the Brown I majority’s theory in this appeal.

Plaintiffs made the better choice in their initial

offering, as anecdotes only help tell the story. They are meant

to bring “the cold numbers convincingly to life,” Teamsters, 431

U.S. at 339, providing “texture” for statistical evidence.

Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 168 (2d

Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.

at 2560-62. But standing alone, “anecdotal evidence . . .

[will] rarely, if ever, . . . show a systemic pattern of

discrimination.” O’Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia,

963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992); accord Briggs v. Anderson,

796 F.2d 1009, 1019 (8th Cir. 1986) (observing that plaintiffs

“punished themselves” by choosing to rely on anecdotal

evidence); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 470-71 &

n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases); see also Michael Selmi,

Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v.

Dukes, 32 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 477, 501 (2011)

(“[A]necdotal evidence is always of marginal significance in a

pattern or practice claim.”).

In discrimination cases, courts move anecdotal evidence to

the background because such evidence does not prove much.

“Anecdotal reports . . . are ordinarily more helpful in

generating lines of inquiry than in proving causation.”

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Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence

217 (2011). Individual stories say little, for instance, about

the frequency of an event’s occurrence or the reasons for that

occurrence. Without knowing at least those two items, it can

hardly be assumed that the stories reflect a broader trend

flowing directly from intentional discrimination. See Wessman

v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 805-06 (1st Cir. 1998); Coral Constr.

Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Anecdotes

are also more susceptible to mistaken perception, leading to

erroneous conclusions -- especially when collections of stories

are treated as quasi-statistics. See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70

F.3d 1420, 1444-45 (2d Cir. 1995). And bias can skew anecdotal

evidence, as when only those who feel most strongly about an

issue offer anecdotes or when the soliciting party has a

particular objective in mind. Cf. United States v. Local 560 of

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of

Am., 780 F.2d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that a survey

that was meant to show the “reputation” of a particular

organization should have been excluded when it only surveyed

persons known “to be hostile” to the organization). Because

“anecdotes provide no mechanism for assessing truthfulness,

typicality, or frequency,” courts can and should question their

usefulness, just as “[s]cientists and medical researchers” have

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done for many years. David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and

Narrative, 73 Ind. L. J. 797, 803 (1998).

2.

The majority finds Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence

sufficient principally because the ratio reflecting the number

of affidavits alleging discrimination compared to the number of

class members is purportedly small. Maj. op. at 40-41. As of

2006, Plaintiffs’ experts determined that “approximately 150

African-Americans” comprised the class. J.A. 1154. Given that

the class period extends well into 2011, it is reasonable to

assume that Nucor hired additional black applicants since 2006,

conservatively setting the present class size at 160 black

employees or more. The sixteen affidavits that Plaintiffs

provide therefore represent roughly one affidavit for every ten

class members -- a weak sample from the entire class. “[A]

court must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is

better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the

foliage of countless free-standing trees.” Cooper, 467 U.S. at

879-80. When ten percent of a class (or less) complains of

mistreatment in a discrimination case, a district court does not

clearly err in finding that such complaints do not establish a

“standard operating procedure” of discrimination, Teamsters, 431

U.S. at 336, “significant adverse effects” on the relevant

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class, Watson, 487 U.S. at 986, or “significant proof” of class-

wide discrimination, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.

3.

What may matter more than the quantity of a plaintiff’s

evidence is its quality. If, for instance, the anecdotal

evidence is indirect and circumstantial, the district court

might justifiably probe whether that evidence truly gives rise

to a necessary inference of discrimination. After all, “a

district court may properly consider the quality of any

anecdotal evidence.” Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d

590, 604 (2d Cir. 1986); accord Eastland v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,

704 F.2d 613, 625 (11th Cir. 1983).

At least as to the promotions-related matters at issue in

this appeal, Plaintiffs do not present compelling anecdotal

evidence. Byron Turner, for instance, does not address

promotions at all. Neither does Walter Joseph Cook. In what

might be an employment law first, Kenneth Hubbard complains that

Nucor promoted him. See J.A. 1097; cf. Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd.

Comm’n v. Deleon, 135 S. Ct. 783, 784 (2015) (Alito, J.,

dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Respondent’s supervisors

did not violate federal law by granting him the transfer that he

sought and that they had no reason to believe he did not

want.”). And Earl Ravenell testifies about a time that he

applied for a promotion and was not selected -- because another

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black employee was selected for that opening. He also tells us

that he chose not to apply for any other positions because of

“the look on his [supervisor]’s face.” J.A. 1111. These and

other examples are not “cherry pick[ed],” maj. op. at 41, but

merely offer some insight into why the district court could

reasonably decide differently than the majority does.

Much of the anecdotal evidence also amounts to conclusory

and speculative statements of personal belief. For instance,

even those employees who do mention job qualifications rely

almost exclusively on their personal, subjective, and

unsubstantiated views of their own abilities. We usually do not

give such testimony much, if any, weight. See Williams v. Giant

Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 433 (4th Cir. 2004); Evans v. Techs.

Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996).

Other employees assume racism in the process without identifying

an objective fact to support that view. Named plaintiff Ramon

Roane declares, for example, that he applied for a position that

was “suddenly cancelled because Nucor was not ready for an

African American to hold a supervisory position.” J.A. 996.

Yet he does not explain how or why he came to that conclusion,

and “[a] plaintiff’s self-serving opinions, absent anything

more, are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination.” Mackey v. Shalala, 360 F.3d 463, 469-70 (4th

Cir. 2004).

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 In addition, Plaintiffs’ evidence is often so incomplete

that it lacks any probative value. For example, Bernard

Beaufort discusses a promotions decision that he believes “was

made unfairly.” J.A. 6008. But he does not know who eventually

received the job, what his or her race was, “what [the decision]

was based on,” or whether “it was based on [his] race.” J.A.

6008. Other employees testify about not receiving promotions,

but many of these declarants do not indicate whether they were

minimally qualified for the position or whether the selected

employee was of another race. Without these fundamental facts,

we cannot know whether particular promotions decisions raise

even a circumstantial inference of discrimination. See Cline v.

Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 485 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982);

accord Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981).

4.

The majority concentrates on one anecdotal comment from one

supervisor in the beam mill: “I don’t think we’ll ever have a

black supervisor while I’m here.” J.A. 1885-86; see also maj.

op. at 6, 51. That comment could be compelling evidence in a

case hinging on decisions made by that particular decisionmaker.

On the other hand, it might not be, as we have discounted “stray

or isolated” remarks, even at summary judgment. Brinkley v.

Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608 (4th Cir. 1999); see

136
also Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511-12 (4th

Cir. 1994) (finding that decisionmaker’s singular remark did not

evidence discriminatory practices at company).

In the end, the question proves academic. A class-wide

claim challenging decisions made by many different

decisionmakers plainly requires something more than a single

comment from just one of them. We see this rule -- that sparse

comments are not enough for class treatment -- illustrated in

cases like King v. General Electric Company, 960 F.2d 617 (7th

Cir. 1992). There, the Seventh Circuit found that the

plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence in an age-discrimination case was

not enough, even though the record contained testimony from a

higher manager that the company was “going to get rid of these

old farts and get some new blood in here.” Id. at 628 (Cudahy,

J., dissenting) (summarizing evidence rejected by the majority).

This Court, too, has rejected anecdotal evidence of a similarly

“damning character,” this time in a racial discrimination case.

See Coker v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 92-1589, 1993 WL

309580, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1993). We found that the

plaintiffs had not established a policy or practice of

discrimination despite testimony that a black principal was told

the community would not “accept” him at a predominantly white

school. Id. at *4. All this goes to illustrate that plaintiffs

likely cannot prove a class-wide policy with a single comment,

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no matter how bigoted the comment may be. One comment certainly

does not make the showing that Plaintiffs insist they make here:

a common, uniform policy of animus inflicted by 55 or more

independent supervisors upon more than 150 employees scattered

throughout a multi-department plant. Consequently, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify

Plaintiffs’ class based on a single comment.

5.

a.

The district court also gave “limited weight” to almost 80

affidavits from black employees at the Nucor plant. J.A. 10950.

The affidavits consistently rejected the idea of discrimination

in the promotions process, and the district court did not abuse

its discretion in affording them some minimal value.

Repeatedly, the affidavits suggest that the promotions process

was fair. See, e.g., J.A. 6024, 6042, 6052, 6069, 6078. One

such employee specifically remarked that “[n]ot all African-

Americans feel like they have been discriminated against at

Nucor.” J.A. 6109. The same employee was actually “upset by

this racial discrimination issue because it is not something

that has happened to me or is happening across the board here at

Nucor.” Id. Another employee explained that “the way things

are done . . . at Nucor are not influenced by race.” J.A. 6164.

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 The list goes on: black employees approved of management’s

handling of race-related issues in the plant, see, e.g., J.A.

6109, 6215, 6480-81, 6943, explained that they were treated

well, see, e.g., J.A. 6350, 6361, and often reasoned that

complaints of racism from other employees were unjustified, see,

e.g., J.A. 6566. Even those who felt that promotions were not

made fairly often blamed factors other than race, such as a

“buddy” system in which supervisors promoted friends. See,

e.g., J.A. 6258, 6299, 6438, 6494. Some affidavits also

directly contradicted the sixteen declarations that Plaintiffs

submitted. In fact, Jacob Ravenell, Kenneth Hubbard, Robyn

Spann, and Byron Turner all expressly denied that they had been

denied promotions because of their race, even though Plaintiffs

cite them as four of their sixteen key witnesses. See J.A.

6400, 6746, 6933, 6964. The district court had every right to

weigh such self-contradictory testimony and conclude as it did.

See Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 422

(4th Cir. 2014).

b.

Based on “[c]ommon sense and prudence,” however, the

majority finds yet again that the district court clearly erred -

- this time by finding that “potentially coercive” affidavits

supported Nucor to some small degree. Maj. op. at 42. The

majority’s naked credibility determination is exactly the sort

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of decision we are not meant to undertake on appellate review.

“[W]hen a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to

credit the testimony of [a witness who] . . . has told a

coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted

by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally

inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson,

470 U.S. at 575.

The majority nevertheless adopts a self-contradictory

credibility rule: statements made in support of an employer must

be rejected when the employer obtains them, while statements

made against the employer will be given “significant weight

given the circumstances in which they were made.” Maj. op. at

43. The majority draws this distinction by assuming that an

employer exercises coercive power in most any interaction with

its employees. “However, it is well settled that not every

interrogation of employees by Company officials constitutes

coercion[.]” NLRB v. Lexington Chair Co., 361 F.2d 283, 289

(4th Cir. 1966). And one must not lose sight of the practical

effect of the majority’s novel approach: employers now have no

incentive to investigate and remedy claims of discrimination.

Employers will well understand that investigations can no longer

benefit them -- at most, facts developed during an investigation

will only be used against the employer. Even an employer with a

supportive workforce will be unable to defend itself with

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beneficial employee testimony, lest it be accused of unproven

coercion. Informal resolution, Congress’ preferred course, will

therefore become even more difficult. See West v. Gibson, 527

U.S. 212, 218-19 (1999) (noting Congress’s intention that Title

VII claims would be resolved informally).

One is further left to wonder where the majority’s new

imagined-coercion-based rule comes from. Generally, the

purportedly “coercive nature of the employer-employee

relationship . . . is insufficient to demonstrate that . . .

[employer-employee] interviews were improper.” Slavinski v.

Columbia Ass’n, Inc., No. CCB–08–890, 2011 WL 1310256, at *4 (D.

Md. Mar. 30, 2011) (collecting cases); accord Maddock v. KB

Homes, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 229, 237 (C.D. Cal. 2007); McLaughlin v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 295, 298 (D. Mass. 2004); cf.

Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 (1981) (“[T]he mere

possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a

communications ban[.]”). Certainly it cannot be found in the

cases the majority cites, which all raised questions about

defendants who contacted putative class plaintiffs after a class

action had been filed. Here, Nucor investigated and obtained

affidavits before any lawsuit was filed, so it could not have

been attempting to break up the class -- the class did not even

exist yet. The majority’s cases also involved a level of

egregious misconduct not found in this case, suggesting that

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those cases were directed at a problem that does not exist here.

See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d

1193, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding unilateral contacts

improper where counsel violated direct court order and conducted

a vast “selling job” seeking class opt-outs in “[s]ecrecy and

haste” during “the district judge’s vacation”); see also Burrow

v. Sybaris Clubs Int’l, Inc., No. 13 C 2342, 2014 WL 5310525, at

*4-5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2014) (summarizing many of the same

cases and concluding that they “depict[ed] communications so

extreme that they actually cut against [the majority’s present]

position”).

We also need not speculate about “potential” coercion, as

the circumstances make plain that Nucor did not coerce its

employees into making positive statements. No employee has

claimed that the affidavits were coercive. No employee has

suggested that Nucor retaliated against employees who complained

of discrimination. And the contents of the affidavits do not

imply coercion either. Employees evidently felt free to speak

honestly, as the affidavits were not universally favorable to

Nucor. See, e.g., J.A. 10950 (district court noting that the

affidavits “actually bolstered the plaintiffs’ claims of a

common hostile work environment”). Some employees also chose

not to give statements at all. See, e.g., J.A. 6911. And still

other employees made handwritten corrections to their typed

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affidavits, indicating that the employees had complete control

over their statements. See, e.g., J.A. 6120.

What is more, Nucor gave each employee a written notice

explaining that the interview was voluntary, that the interviews

were being taken on behalf of the company, that employees could

decline to participate, and that they would not face any

retaliation for what they said. See, e.g., J.A. 6003. In other

contexts, the Court has said that disclosures like these prevent

coercion. See, e.g., Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 280 F.3d

417, 434 (4th Cir. 2002). Each employee who chose to

participate then signed an acknowledgement and noted in his or

her affidavit that Nucor did not coerce the employee. See,

e.g., J.A. 6003.

The majority nevertheless condemns Nucor for not informing

the employees that the company might use their statements in

litigation. This novel requirement -- a sort of “civil Miranda

rule” -- seems an odd one given that litigation had not been

filed. Instead, interviewees were accurately informed that

“[t]here ha[d] been a few charges of discrimination filed by

African-American employees at Nucor,” and the interview was

meant to “determine what happened.” J.A. 6003.

The district court did not clearly err in affording some

weight to these many contrary affidavits.

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 6.

In addition to the affidavits supporting Nucor’s view,

Plaintiffs’ affidavits must also be weighed against the

company’s announced anti-discrimination policy. In Wal-Mart,

the Supreme Court found that a “general policy of

discrimination” was harder to find given the company’s

“announced policy forbid[ding] . . . discrimination and . . .

impos[ing] penalties for denials of equal opportunity.” Id. at

2553. The same holds true here. Nucor is an equal-opportunity

employer with an express anti-discrimination policy that harshly

penalizes employees engaging in discriminatory conduct. Nucor

policies even punish supervisors who fail to put an end to their

subordinates’ discriminatory conduct. The record also contains

accounts of instances in which Nucor’s general manager condemned

discriminatory acts and punished employees for using offensive

language. This countervailing evidence supports the district

court’s conclusion that, as a whole, the anecdotal evidence

favored Nucor rather than Plaintiffs.

7.

a.

Aside from the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in

Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence, it also does not tell a plant-

wide story. In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence failed

in part because “[m]ore than half of the[] reports [we]re

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concentrated in only six States.” 131 S. Ct. at 2556. As a

result, even if one assumed that “every single one of these

accounts [were] true, that would not demonstrate that the entire

company operate[d] under a general policy of discrimination.”

Id.

The lack of dispersion that proved fatal to the class in

Wal-Mart presents itself here. Eleven of the sixteen

declarations -- again, more than half -- come from employees in

a single department: the beam mill. No cold mill or maintenance

employees are represented, while only one shipping employee and

one melt shop employee appear. And as the district court

recognized, when one examines the individual instances of

discrimination alleged in Plaintiffs’ declarations, most of them

concern just one manager and three supervisors who all worked in

the beam mill. See J.A. 10951. As one black employee put it,

“Whatever [wa]s happening in the beam mill [wa]s not a plant

wide problem.” J.A. 6109.

b.

The majority somehow finds clear error in the district

court’s finding that Plaintiffs’ accounts were concentrated in

the beam mill. But it proves easy to see why the district court

found what it did: Plaintiffs do not cite useful, relevant

evidence from outside the beam mill. Some anecdotes fall

outside the class period. See, e.g., J.A. 1085. Others involve

145
promotions that did in fact go to a black employee. See, e.g.,

J.A. 1110-11. Some involve transfers, not promotions. See,

e.g., J.A. 1063. Still others trace back to beam mill

supervisors, not supervisors in other departments. See, e.g.,

J.A. 1079-80. Plaintiffs count six other instances twice. See

Appellant’s Br. 9-10. And some of the cited “instances of

alleged promotions discrimination” amount to no evidence at all.

See, e.g., id. at 9 (citing J.A. 7237 -- an application for

transfer -- as one instance of “promotion discrimination”).

Most incredibly, Plaintiffs’ argument -- which the majority

appears to adopt -- assumes that one can find evidence of

discrimination in every single instance where a black employee

does not receive a promotion for which he applies. That concept

finds no support in any part of our jurisprudence. Indeed, it

turns the Teamsters framework into a circular absurdity.

Plaintiffs presume that each denied promotion evidences a

discriminatory policy or practice, even though -- under

Teamsters -- Plaintiffs must prove that a discriminatory policy

or practice existed before the court may presume that a

particular denied promotion was discriminatorily made. See

Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362.

The district court recognized, as it should have, that the

anecdotal evidence was more substantial when it came to the beam

mill. For that reason, the district court explained that it was

146
willing to certify a class of those applying out of and into the

beam mill. J.A. 10953-54 & n.16. Plaintiffs never accepted the

invitation, so they remain responsible for proving plant-wide

commonality. That effort requires a substantial showing beyond

a single department. See, e.g., Bennett, 656 F.3d at 816

(holding that the district court properly declined to certify a

hostile work environment class where anecdotal evidence was

concentrated in a single department).

Outside the beam mill, Plaintiffs at best present a few

scattered anecdotes in each department. That’s not enough.

“[A] class plaintiff’s attempt to prove the existence of . . . a

consistent practice within a given department[] may fail even

though discrimination against one or two individuals has been

proved.” Cooper, 467 U.S. at 878; accord Ste. Marie v. E. R.R.

Ass’n, 650 F.2d 395, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1981). The district court

might very well have clearly erred had it accepted such

evidence. One can hardly say that it clearly erred in doing

just the opposite.

8.

In a last effort to save their class-wide claim, Plaintiffs

make much of other facts that do not relate directly to

promotions. They seem to give special attention to the facts

underlying their already-certified hostile work environment

claim. The majority agrees that such evidence provides a

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“cultural backdrop” that renders an “equitable promotions

system” essentially impossible. Maj. op. at 38. Notably, that

view never appeared in Brown I, but references to Plaintiffs’

hostile work environment claims now appear at least a dozen

times in the majority opinion. The majority also finds evidence

of a “culture” in the alleged fact that Nucor hired only one

black supervisor before the EEOC investigation, even though

“[t]he mere absence of minority employees in upper-level

positions does not suffice to prove [even] a prima facie case of

discrimination without a comparison to the relevant labor pool.”

Carter, 33 F.3d at 457.

We have never held that class plaintiffs may establish a

common, classwide policy of discrimination with mere evidence of

company “culture.” Other decisions, including Wal-Mart, reject

the notion that “culture” is enough. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.

at 2553; Davis, 717 F.3d at 487-88. The majority would

nevertheless “sweep many individual plaintiffs and sets of facts

into one class on the premise that all reflect illegal conduct

by the defendant in practice and culture if not in policy” --

even though that is “precisely the sort of class that the

Supreme Court recently rejected in [Wal-Mart].” Jamie S. v.

Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 504 (7th Cir. 2012) (Rovner,

J., concurring in part). Furthermore, simply saying that a

company has a “cultural problem” does not identify any

148
particular employment policy or practice, McClain v. Lufkin

Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008), let alone a

common, uniform policy spanning the class.

We have also never held that facts establishing a hostile

work environment unavoidably relate to all other employment

decisions made in the same company. Such a connection would be

hard to justify, as acts giving rise to a hostile work

environment are only distantly related to the discrete acts that

underlie disparate treatment and impact claims. “The probative

value of other discriminatory acts depends . . . on the nature

of the discrimination charged.” Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,

Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1424 (7th Cir. 1986), abrogated on

other grounds by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164

(1989). And “[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind

from discrete acts.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 115 (2002). In contrast to acts creating a hostile

work environment, discriminatory employment decisions “inflict[]

direct economic harm.” Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 762.

They will often require “the imprimatur of the enterprise and

the use of its internal processes.” Id.

The “probativeness” of items like comments, jokes, and

other acts “is [also] circumscribed if they were made [or done]

in a situation temporally remote from the date of the employment

decision[s], or if they were not related to the employment

149
decision[s] in question or were made by nondecisionmakers.”

McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,

140 F.3d 288, 301 (1st Cir. 1998). Here, Plaintiffs’ evidence

suffers to some degree from all three of these defects. For

instance, Plaintiffs’ statements often do not tell us when the

offensive conduct occurred, so we have no way of assessing

temporal proximity. None of the “cultural” evidence pertains

specifically to promotions. And most all of the relevant

hostile-work-environment conduct came from non-decisionmakers,

even though it “is the perception of the decisionmaker that is

relevant” in claims like Plaintiffs’. Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d

1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1980); accord Mateu-Anderegg v. Sch. Dist.

of Whitefish Bay, 304 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2002)

(“[S]tatements are only relevant if they come from a

decisionmaker, someone involved in the adverse employment

decision[s].”). Lastly, to the limited extent that supervisors

did involve themselves in the incidents that Plaintiffs

described, those supervisors chiefly worked in the beam mill --

undermining any inference of a common, plant-wide policy.

At bottom, the majority concludes that we should permit

Plaintiffs to pursue two class claims pertaining to promotions

because they have successfully established their right to pursue

a separate, distinguishable hostile-work-environment claim.

Title VII does not work that way, and, rhetoric aside, the

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majority is unable to identify a single decision to support that

kind of proposition. “In the law, the absence of precedent is

no recommendation.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168,

1200 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Moreover, to

assume that a plaintiff establishes a right to class treatment

for his discrete-act class merely because he has established

such a right as to a hostile-work-environment class is to

reinstate a suspect revision of the “across-the-board” rule that

the Supreme Court rejected three decades ago. See Falcon, 457

U.S. at 153, 157-59 (rejecting the idea that “an employee

complaining of one employment practice” may automatically

“represent another complaining of another practice” merely

because both alleged discrimination based on the same protected

trait). The district court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to exhume that long-dead idea.

The district court did not clearly err in declining to give

dispositive weight to evidence going to Plaintiffs’ hostile-

work-environment claim when deciding whether to certify

Plaintiffs’ separate promotions-related classes.

* * * *

When closely examined, Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence

proves to be just as unconvincing as their statistical proof.

“Because [Plaintiffs] provide no convincing proof of a

companywide discriminatory . . . promotion policy, . . . they

151
have not established the existence of any common question.”

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57. The district court therefore

did not abuse its discretion in declining to certify the class

because of its lack of commonality.

IV.

On the road to its desired result, the majority undermines

well-established judicial processes, causes a rift between this

Court and a co-equal circuit court without explanation, and

brings substantial uncertainty to an area of law that begs for

clarity.

As to judicial processes, the majority opinion evidences

little respect for the role of the district court and the

standard of review. The district court has lived with this

matter for several years now, and it best understands how the

case has developed. Its actions bespeak a court striving to

scrupulously apply Rule 23’s requirements. The district court

complied with our mandate, rejected more than one request to

decertify from Nucor, and continually endeavored to respect

findings that this Court has (actually) made. Yet the majority

shows no concern for that effort. And it shows just as little

concern for this Court’s well-established waiver rule, which

should plainly apply here.

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 As to our sister circuits, the majority opinion begets a

circuit split. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of class

certification in a case involving the same claims, the same

experts, and the same defendant. As should be clear by now,

that decision cannot be reconciled with this one. The majority

never even tries to do so.

And as to cases to come, the majority’s decision will offer

far more questions than answers. What standard of review really

applies in this context? How much evidence must a plaintiff

summon to comply with Rule 23? Does appellate waiver matter?

Does class treatment of one cause of action necessarily warrant

class treatment for another? Must statistical evidence prove to

be reliable? Does Wal-Mart reach only nationwide class actions?

Can a sufficiently “common” policy result from inaction? These

are only some of the questions that the majority opinion leaves

unresolved.

We should hardly take this troubled road in the name of

“simple justice.” Maj. op. at 63. “‘Simple justice’ is

achieved when a complex body of law developed over a period of

years is evenhandedly applied.” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City &

Cnty. of San Fran., Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 345 (2005).

Evenhandedness is nowhere to be found here, so justice remains

unserved.

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 Perhaps the Supreme Court will act to rectify the problems

that are sure to follow from today’s opinion. One can only hope

that it will do so soon. In the meantime, I respectfully

dissent. The district court did not abuse its discretion, and

its judgment to decertify should be affirmed.

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