FLED
COURT OF APPEAL
DIVISION 11
S
2815 flA Y 12
11H 8: I ;2
STATE
WASHINGTON
BY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
MARIA KRAWIEC, No. 45776 -8 -II
Appellant, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
RED DOT CORPORATION; DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON,
Respondents.
BJORGEN, A.C. J. — After the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals ( Board) entered an
order affirming the decision by the Department of Labor & Industries ( Department) to close
Maria Krawiec' s worker' s compensation claim, Krawiec appealed the Board' s order to the
superior court. The superior court dismissed Krawiec' s appeal based on her failure to timely
serve the Board as required under RCW 51. 52. 110. Krawiec appeals, asserting that the superior
court erred by dismissing her appeal from the Board' s order. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 20, 2001, Krawiec sustained an industrial injury while working for Red Dot
Corporation, a self insured
- employer. In 2010, the Department entered an order closing
Krawiec' s worker' s compensation claim with benefits paid through August 11, 2010. Krawiec
No. 45776 -8 - II
appealed the Department' s order to the Board. On October 29, 2012, the Board entered a final
order affirming the Department' s decision to close Krawiec' s worker' s compensation claim.
Krawiec received a copy of the Board' s final order on October 31, 2012.
On November 19, 2012, Krawiec filed in the Pierce County Superior Court a notice of
appeal from the Board' s final order. On that same date, Krawiec served copies of her notice of
appeal on Red Dot, Red Dot' s attorney, and the Department' s attorney. Krawiec did not,
however, serve the Board with a copy of her notice of appeal until April 19, 2013.
On August 26, 2013, Red Dot filed a motion to dismiss Krawiec' s appeal for failing to
timely serve the Board with her notice of appeal. The trial court held a hearing on Red Dot' s
motion, at which hearing the trial court stated it was required to dismiss Krawiec' s appeal under
RCW 51. 52. 110. The trial court later entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law in support of its dismissal order:
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 1 Hearings were held at the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals ( Board).
Thereafter an Industrial Appeals Judge issued a Proposed Decision and
Order on August 24, 2012 from which Plaintiff filed a timely Petition for
Review on October 10, 2012. On October 29, 2012 the Board, having
considered Plaintiff' s Petition for Review, denied the same and adopted
the Proposed Decision and Order as the Board' s final order.
1. 2 The Plaintiff received her copy of the Board' s Final Order on October 31,
2012.
1. 3 On November 19, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal in Pierce
County Superior Court. Her affidavit of service did not include service
upon the Board.
1. 4 On April 19, 2013, the Plaintiff first served the Board with a copy of her
Notice of Appeal, and filed an amended notice of service indicating
service of the Board on that date.
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the
following:
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
2. 1 This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
2. 2 The Plaintiff did not timely serve the Board and therefore did not comply
with RCW 51. 52. 110. Because she did not comply with the service
requirements of RCW 51. 52. 110, she failed to perfect her appeal and her
appeal must be dismissed.
Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 505. Krawiec appeals the superior court order dismissing her appeal.
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
RCW 51. 52. 140 governs appeals for proceedings under Washington' s Industrial
Insurance Act, providing that "[ e] xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, the practice in civil
cases shall apply to appeals prescribed in this chapter. Appeal shall lie from the judgment of the
superior court as in other civil cases." Krawiec' s appeal requires us to construe the service
requirements of RCW 51. 52. 110, an issue of law that we review de novo. See Dep' t ofLabor &
Indus. v. Granger, 130 Wn. App. 489, 493, 123 P. 3d 858 ( 2005) ( " Statutory construction is a
question of law, which we review de novo. "). Krawiec does not assign error to any of the
superior court' s factual findings and, thus, we treat those findings as verities in this appeal.
Dep' t of Labor & Indus. v. Allen, 100 Wn. App. 526, 530, 997 P. 2d 977 ( 2000).
II. RCW 51. 52. 110
Krawiec first contends that the superior court erred in dismissing her appeal for failing to
comply with RCW 51. 52. 110' s service provisions because the statute makes a distinction
between " filing" and " perfecting" an appeal. She thus argues that her failure to timely serve the
Board under the perfection provision of the statute did not require dismissal of her appeal. We
disagree.
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No. 45776 -8 - II
RCW 51. 52. 110 provides in relevant part:
If such worker, beneficiary, employer or other person fails to file with the superior
court its appeal as provided in this section within said thirty days, the decision of
the board to deny the petition or petitions for review or the final decision and order
of the board shall become final.
Such appeal shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court a notice of appeal
and by serving a copy thereof by mail, or personally, on the director and on the
board. If the case is one involving a self -insurer, a copy of the notice of appeal
shall also be served by mail, or personally, on such self -insurer.
Although Krawiec is correct that this statutory provision does not explicitly state that the failure
to " perfect" an appeal will result in the finality of a board decision, our Supreme Court has
interpreted RCW 51. 52. 110 to require " a party appealing a decision of the Board of Industrial
Insurance Appeals [ to] file and serve notice of the appeal on the Director and the Board within
30 days after receiving notification of the Board' s decision." Fay v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 115
Wn.2d 194, 201, 796 P. 2d 412 ( 1990). Division Three of our court relied on the Fay court' s
interpretation of RCW 51. 52. 110 in rejecting the same argument Krawiec raises here, stating,
The perfection provision of the statute does not expressly provide that an appealing party must
both file and serve within 30 days in order to invoke the [ superior court' s appellate] jurisdiction.
But that has been the interpretation." Hernandez v. Dep' t of Labor & Indus., 107 Wn. App. 190,
196, 26 P. 3d 977 ( 2001) ( citing Fay, 115 Wn.2d at 198); see also Petta v. Dep' t ofLabor &
Indus., 68 Wn. App. 406, 410, 842 P. 2d 1006 ( 1992) ( RCW 51. 52. 110 requires dismissal of
appeal for failure to timely serve Board with notice). Because we are bound by our Supreme
Court' s interpretation of RCW 51. 52. 110, we must reject Krawiec' s claim that the statute
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No. 45776 -8 -II
distinguishes between filing and perfecting an appeal.
III. DISMISSAL REQUIRED UNDER RCW 51. 52. 110
Next, Krawiec contends that the superior court erred in dismissing her appeal, because it
failed to consider sanctions apart from dismissal. In raising this contention, Krawiec
acknowledges that Fay held that the failure to timely serve required parties under RCW
51. 52. 110 required dismissal, but she appears to argue that ZDI Gaming Inc. v. State ex rel.
Washington State Gambling Commission, 173 Wn.2d 608, 268 P. 3d 929 ( 2012), and Dougherty
v. Department of Labor and Industries, 150 Wn.2d 310, 76 P. 3d 1183 ( 2003), have called the
Fay holding into question. Krawiec' s argument fails for a number of reasons.
First, our Supreme Court has not announced its intention to overrule Fay, and our
Supreme Court has made clear that it does not " overrule ... binding precedent sub silentio."
State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 548, 973 P. 2d 1049 ( 1999). Accordingly, Fay' s holding that
dismissal is required for the appealing party' s failure to timely file and serve under RCW
51. 52. 110 remains good law and is binding on our court.
Second, neither ZDI nor Dougherty call into question Fay' s holding that a Board' s
decision is deemed final if an appealing party fails to both timely file and serve required parties
under RCW 51. 52. 110. In ZDI, our Supreme Court held that a statute cannot limit the original
jurisdiction of superior courts. 173 Wn.2d at 620. In so holding, the ZDI court distinguished
between a superior court' s original jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction, stating:
Our constitution suggests, and our cases have from time to time assumed, that the
legislature has greater power to sculpt the appellate jurisdiction of the individual
superior courts. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 ( " The superior court ... shall
have such appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justices' and other inferior courts
in their respective counties as may be prescribed by law. "). But whether or not the
appellate jurisdiction of the superior court can be limited county by county, the
simple fact is, original jurisdiction may not be.
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No. 45776 -8 -II
173 Wn.2d at 619 -20. In Fay, as here, the superior court was acting under its appellate
jurisdiction and not its original jurisdiction. 115 Wn.2d at 197. Accordingly, ZDI' s holding
regarding a superior court' s original jurisdiction has no bearing on Fay. Further, even if ZDI
stood for the proposition that a statute could not divest a superior court of its appellate
jurisdiction, it has no bearing on the statutory requirement that an appealing party timely file its
appeal and serve required parties.'
Dougherty similarly did not affect the holding in Fay. In Dougherty, our Supreme Court
did not address the service requirements of RCW 51. 52. 110. Instead, the court addressed the
statute' s venue requirement, holding that
RCW 51. 52. 110' s requirements regarding the location of the superior court where
appeals are to be filed are procedural and relate to venue, not subject matter
jurisdiction.Filing an appeal from a decision of the Board in the wrong county
does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction and can be cured by a change of venue.
150 Wn.2d at 320. Because Dougherty addressed only venue, it did not affect Fay 's holding that
dismissal is required for failure to comply with RCW 51. 52. 110' s service requirement.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Krawiec' s argument that a lesser sanction was available
to the superior court because the Board was not an interested party to the appeal. This argument
ignores RCW 51. 52. 110' s requirement that Krawiec timely serve the Board with her notice of
appeal and does not comport with the precedent of Fay.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
Last, Krawiec contends that the superior court erred in dismissing her appeal because she
1 We note that the superior court here dismissed Krawiec' s appeal based on her failure to comply
with the statutory service requirements under RCW 51. 52. 110 and not based on a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
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No. 45776 -8 -I1
substantially complied with the service requirements of RCW 51. 52. 110. Again, we disagree.
Substantial compliance is generally defined as actual compliance with the ` substance
essential to every reasonable objective' of a statute." Hernandez, 107 Wn. App. at 196 ( quoting
Cont' l Sports Corp. v. Dep' t of Labor & Indus., 128 Wn.2d 594, 602, 910 P. 2d 1284 ( 1996)).
The doctrine of substantial compliance, though, does not save the failure to comply with
statutory time limits, such as the 30 -day filing and service requirements of RCW 51. 52. 110. See,
e. g., Petta, 68 Wn. App. at 409 -10 ( holding that failure to serve required party under RCW
51. 52. 110 was not substantial compliance); see also Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay Street Assoc.,
LLC, 170 Wn.2d 495, 506, 242 P. 3d 846 ( 2010) ( " A six -month deferral of payment is not
substantial compliance' with a statute that unambiguously requires payment `within thirty
days.'"); City ofSeattle v. Pub. Emp. Relations Comm' n, 116 Wn.2d 923, 928 -29, 809 P. 2d 1377
1991) ( " It is impossible to substantially comply with a statutory time limit.... It is either
complied with or it is not. ").
Krawiec failed to comply with the statutory requirement that she timely serve the Board
with a copy of her notice of appeal. Under Petta, 68 Wn. App. at 409 -10, and the other decisions
just cited, that failure cannot constitute substantial compliance with the statute. Therefore, we
affirm the superior court' s order dismissing Krawiec' s appeal.
V. ATTORNEY FEES
Krawiec requests attorney fees under RAP 18. 1 and RCW 51. 52. 130. RAP 18. 1 provides
that a party may be awarded attorney fees on appeal if "applicable law grants to a party the right
to recover" such attorney fees. RCW 51. 52. 130 provides in relevant part that a worker who
succeeds in getting a Board order reversed on appeal is entitled to a reasonable attorney fees
award. Krawiec did not succeed in getting the Board order reversed on appeal and, thus, we
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No. 45776 -8 -II
deny her request for attorney fees.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
A.c.7
We concur:
LEE, J.