May 19 2015, 5:47 am
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
James P. Fenton Christopher C. Myers
Daniel G. McNamara Christopher C. Myers & Associates
Eilbacher Fletcher, LLP Fort Wayne, Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
City of Fort Wayne, May 19, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
02A05-1408-CT-359
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior Court
Lower Court Cause No.
Katie Parrish, 02D02-0702-CT-47
The Honorable Craig Bobay, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Appellant/Defendant, City of Fort Wayne (“the City”), files an interlocutory
appeal of the trial court’s grant of Appellee/Plaintiff, Katie Parrish’s
(“Parrish”), motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence from her personal
injury/tort claim trial regarding the fact that she was not wearing a seatbelt
when a car in which she was a passenger was involved in an automobile
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accident. On appeal, the City argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it granted Parrish’s motion because evidence that she was not wearing a
seatbelt when she was involved in an accident involving a Fort Wayne police
officer was admissible to prove that she was guilty of contributory negligence
for her injuries. In support of this argument, the City claims that Parrish was
negligent per se for violating Indiana’s mandatory passenger restraint act
(“Seatbelt Act”). In response, Parrish argues that a violation of the Seatbelt Act
cannot be used as evidence to prove fault under a theory of contributory
negligence. Because we conclude that the Indiana Legislature did not clearly
intend to deviate from common law when it enacted the Seatbelt Act, we agree
that a violation of the Seatbelt Act may not be used to prove contributory
negligence, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
granted Parrish’s motion in limine.
We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Parrish’s
motion in limine.
Facts
[2] On February 6, 2005, a vehicle operated by a Fort Wayne Police Department
officer collided with a vehicle operated by Chad Reuille (“Reuille”). Parrish
was a front seat passenger in Reuille’s car and was not wearing a seatbelt at the
time of the collision, although the seat where she was sitting was equipped with
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a seatbelt meeting the applicable federal standards. As a result of the collision,
Parrish was thrown from the vehicle and sustained physical injuries.
[3] On February 2, 2007, Parrish filed a negligence action against the City, the
police officer’s employer, based on the motor vehicle collision. On February 7,
2014, prior to trial, she filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude from the trial
any evidence that she had not been wearing a seatbelt at the time of the
accident. In her motion, she argued this evidence was inadmissible to show
either her contributory negligence or her failure to mitigate damages. In
response, the City argued that evidence of her seatbelt usage was admissible
because Parrish had a duty to wear her seatbelt under the Seatbelt Act, and
evidence of her seatbelt usage was relevant to prove that she was guilty of
contributory negligence for her injuries. On May 30, 2014, the trial court
granted Parrish’s motion in limine. The City now files this interlocutory
appeal.
Decision
[4] On appeal, the City argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
granted Parrish’s motion in limine because, according to the City, evidence that
Parrish was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the collision was admissible to
prove her contributory negligence for her injuries. In response, Parrish argues
that the seatbelt defense may not be used under Indiana law to prove
contributory negligence in her tort claim action against the City. She also
asserts that, even if she was negligent, such negligence was not actionable
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because her lack of a seatbelt was not the proximate cause of the automobile
accident.
[5] The grant or denial of a motion in limine is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and is an adjunct of the power of trial courts to admit and exclude
evidence. Hopper v. Carey, 716 N.E.2d 566, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans.
denied. The objectionable occurrence in denying a motion in limine is the
improper admission of items into evidence. Id. Therefore, when reviewing a
grant or denial of a motion in limine, we apply the standard of review for the
admission of evidence, which is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
We will find that a trial court has abused its discretion when its decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court. Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1038, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007).
[6] This case revolves around the question of whether Parrish was contributorily
negligent because she was not wearing her seatbelt during the automobile
collision. Tort claims against governmental units such as the City are subject to
the common law principle of contributory negligence because Indiana’s
Comparative Fault Act does not apply to such entities. St. John Town Bd. v.
Lambert, 725 N.E.2d 507, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); IND. CODE § 34-51-2-2
(providing that the Comparative Fault Act does not apply “in any manner to
tort claims against governmental entities . . .”). Contributory negligence allows
a defendant to escape liability if he or she can show that the plaintiff was also
negligent and that the plaintiff’s negligence was a responsible cause of his or her
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injuries. See Hopper, 716 N.E.2d at 573. The plaintiff’s actions do not need to
be the sole cause of the injuries. Id. In fact, under common law principles, any
contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part, no matter how slight, will bar all
recovery provided that the plaintiff’s negligence actually caused his or her
injuries. St. John Town Bd., 725 N.E.2d at 516. As a result, the City hopes to
escape its alleged liability by arguing that Parrish’s failure to wear a seatbelt
was, in some way, the cause of the automobile accident.
[7] Specifically, the City asserts that Parrish was negligent per se because she
violated the duty of care established by the Seatbelt Act. Negligence per se is
the unexcused or unjustified violation of a duty prescribed by statute where the
statute is intended to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is
included and to protect against the type of harm which has occurred as a result
of the violation. Price v. Kuchaes, 950 N.E.2d 1218, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(citing Plesha v. Edmonds ex rel. Edmonds, 717 N.E.2d 981, 986 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999)), trans. denied. At the time of the collision in this case, the Seatbelt Act
provided that:
Each front seat occupant of a passenger motor vehicle that is
equipped with a safety belt meeting the standards stated in the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard Number 208 (49 CFR
571.208) shall have a safety belt properly fastened about the
occupant's body at all times when the vehicle is in forward
motion.
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IND. CODE § 9-19-10-2 (2005).1 However, the statute also provided that:
(a) Failure to comply with section 1, 2, 3, or 4 of this chapter
does not constitute fault under [INDIANA CODE §] 34-51-2, [the
Indiana Comparative Fault Act,] and does not limit the liability
of an insurer.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), evidence of the failure to
comply with section 1, 2, 3, or 4 of this chapter may not be
admitted in a civil action to mitigate damages.
(c) Evidence of a failure to comply with this chapter may be
admitted in a civil action as to mitigation of damages in a
product liability action involving a motor vehicle restraint or
supplemental restraint system. The defendant in such an action
has the burden of proving noncompliance with this chapter and
that compliance with this chapter would have reduced injuries,
and the extent of the reduction.
I.C. § 9-19-10-7 (2005). Both parties acknowledge, in light of section 7(a) of the
Seatbelt Act, a person’s failure to wear a seatbelt or noncompliance with the
Seatbelt Act cannot be used to prove the negligence of parties that are subject to
the Comparative Fault Act. However, the City argues that, because it is not
subject to the Comparative Fault Act, it may use the Seatbelt Act to prove that
Parrish had a statutory duty to wear her seatbelt and, thus, was negligent per se
under common law.
1
The legislature has since amended the language of this provision, but its substance has not changed in any
respect that is relevant to this case.
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[8] The question of whether seatbelt usage may be used as evidence to support
contributory negligence has been addressed extensively, although not
conclusively, by Indiana courts. See Hopper, 716 N.E.2d at 571-73 (discussing
the history of the seatbelt defense in contributory negligence claims). Most
recently, our Indiana Supreme Court addressed the issue in State v. Ingram, 427
N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1981), and we addressed the issue in Hopper.
[9] In Ingram, our supreme court considered a slightly different issue—whether a
defendant could use the seatbelt defense to limit a plaintiff’s recovery. There,
the defendant had tendered a jury instruction that read, in part: “If you find
from a consideration of all the evidence that the using and fastening of seatbelts
would have avoided or minimized the resulting damage, then the person
wronged cannot recover for any item of damage which could have been
avoided or minimized.” Ingram, 427 N.E.2d at 447. Our supreme court held
that the trial court’s refusal of this instruction had been proper because evidence
that a plaintiff had not worn a seatbelt in an automobile accident could not be
used to limit that plaintiff’s damages on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to
mitigate his or her injuries. Id. at 448. The Court’s reasoning was that “[t]he
act of buckling a [seatbelt] is an act the injured party must perform before the
injury causing the act occurs” and “the question of whether mitigation of
damages has occurred looks to the acts of the injured party only after the injury
has occurred.” Id.
[10] Significantly, the Ingram Court noted that the Indiana Legislature had not
enacted a provision requiring automobile passengers to wear seatbelts. The
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Court stated that “[a]bsent a clear mandate from the legislature to require
Indiana automobile riders to wear [seatbelts], [it was] not prepared to step into
the breach and judicially mandate such conduct.” Id.
[11] Subsequently, in Hopper, we addressed a situation more analogous to the instant
case. The plaintiff there, Hopper, filed a personal injury claim based on injuries
he and his son received as a result of an accident while Hopper was driving a
fire truck water tanker with his son for the Johnson Township Volunteer Fire
Department. Hopper, 716 N.E.2d at 569. The run was a non-emergency run,
and the accident occurred when one of the defendants passed the truck in a car,
causing the fire truck to run off the road and overturn. Id. In his claim, Hopper
named multiple defendants, including the Scott County Highway Department.
Id. Prior to the trial on the claim, these defendants filed a motion requesting an
order stating that evidence that Hopper and his son had not been wearing their
seatbelts at the time of the accident was admissible to demonstrate their fault.
Id. The trial court granted the motion, and Hopper filed an interlocutory
appeal. Id.
[12] On appeal, this Court analyzed Ingram and the history of the seatbelt defense in
the context of contributory negligence in Indiana. Id. at 571-73. Because the
Highway Department was a governmental entity, common law applied to the
Hoppers’ claim, as in the instant case. Id. at 573. Based on our analysis of the
seatbelt defense, we concluded that under common law alone, automobile
occupants did not have a duty to wear seatbelts. Id. at 573-74. Our reasoning
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for this conclusion was based on the principle that under the common law, a
plaintiff does not have a duty to anticipate the negligence of another. Id. at 573.
[13] However, the defendants in Hopper also noted that, after Ingram, the Indiana
Legislature had enacted the Seatbelt Act. Id. at 574. They argued that the
Seatbelt Act was the requisite statutory mandate contemplated by the Ingram
Court. Id. Ultimately, we determined that the Seatbelt Act did not apply to the
Hoppers because trucks were not included within the definition of “passenger
motor vehicle” governed by the Act. Id. Nevertheless, in dicta we noted that,
although the legislature had enacted the Seatbelt Act, it had also provided that
the Act could not be used to determine fault under the Comparative Fault Act.
Id. As a result, we reasoned:
We are presented with an interesting dilemma. The legislature
has spoken on a passenger’s duty to wear a seatbelt, however,
that duty cannot be used to demonstrate fault and does not apply
to Hopper. Based on the language of Ingram, we must conclude
that the Indiana Legislature has not altered the common law.
Our supreme court stated that no duty to wear a seatbelt would
be recognized absent “a clear mandate from the legislature.” The
legislative enactments since Ingram are anything but clear. Not
only does the requirement to wear seatbelts not apply to the
present case, but where the legislature so required, it specifically
stated that such evidence cannot be used to demonstrate fault.
Accordingly, we find the state of the law with regard to the
seatbelt defense today as the supreme court found it in Ingram:
there is no duty, common law or otherwise, for an occupant of a
truck to wear a seatbelt.
Id. at 574-75 (internal citations omitted).
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[14] As the City notes, our decision in Hopper was dicta with respect to vehicles that
are governed by the Seatbelt Act. See id. Still, we find the same analysis
persuasive here. Like we noted in Hopper, our Indiana Supreme Court held in
Ingram that it would not recognize a duty to wear a seatbelt absent “a clear
mandate from the legislature.” Ingram, 427 N.E.2d at 448. The Seatbelt Act
established a clear mandate from the legislature for passengers in passenger
motor vehicles to wear seatbelts, but it also stated that its mandate should not
be used to demonstrate fault. While this provision does not apply to the City as
it is exempt from the Comparative Fault Act, the Seatbelt Act did not expressly
establish that its provisions could be used to establish fault outside of the
Comparative Fault Act. In contrast, in the same section of the Seatbelt Act the
legislature was clear in establishing that seatbelt evidence could be used to
mitigate damages in a products liability action involving a seatbelt system. I.C.
§ 9-19-10-7.
[15] It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that where a statute is
in derogation of the common law, we must construe it strictly against the
expansion of liability. See Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int’l, 745
N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. 2001) (discussing this principle of statutory interpretation
in the context of the Wrongful Death Act), reh’g denied. Accordingly, as there
has not been a clear mandate from the legislature stating that seatbelt usage
may be used to prove fault under the common law, we conclude that the
legislature has not altered common law. Therefore, we also conclude that the
trial court here did not abuse its discretion in granting Parrish’s motion in
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limine, because her failure to use her seatbelt could not be used to prove her
contributory negligence.2
Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and May, J., concur.
2
Because we have found that the Seatbelt Act may not be used to prove negligence per se, we need not
address Parrish’s argument that her lack of a seatbelt was not the proximate cause of her injuries.
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