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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 71799-5-1
Respondent,
v.
ERIC MATTHEW HOPPER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: June 8, 2015
Verellen, A.C.J. — Eric Hopper was convicted of one count of commercial
sexual abuse of a minor. In a prosecution for commercial sexual abuse of a minor, it
is an affirmative defense "that at the time of the offense, the defendant made a
reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor by requiring
production of a driver's license, marriage license, birth certificate, or other
governmental or educational identification card or paper and did not rely solely on the
oral allegations or apparent age of the minor."1 The defendant's burden of proof is a
mere preponderance of the evidence.
During closing argument at trial here, the prosecutor argued that Hopper "has
to prove to you that it's more likely than not, 51%, that you believe that that's what
happened."2 Defense counsel neither objected nor requested a curative instruction.
1 RCW9.68A.110(3).
2 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 29, 2014) at 282.
No. 71799-5-1/2
Hopper first contends he was denied a fair trial because the more probably
than not true preponderance standard is satisfied by any evidence, however slight,
above 50 percent and the prosecutor overstated the burden of proof for his
affirmative defense. But in this setting, a prosecutor's passing reference to the more
probably than not true standard as 51 percent is not misconduct. Additionally,
Hopper did not object at trial and fails to show here that the prosecutor's conduct was
so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an instruction would not have remedied any
prejudice.
Hopper also raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for his counsel's
failure to object and request a curative instruction for the prosecutor's burden of proof
argument in closing. But his counsel's choice to address the prosecutor's argument
in closing rather than with an objection was tactical, and Hopper fails to show that an
objection would likely have been sustained.
Hopper contends, and the State concedes, that the sentencing condition that
he abide by a nighttime curfew is not crime related and is therefore improper. We
accept the State's concession.
We affirm Hopper's conviction, but remand to strike the improper sentencing
condition.
FACTS
Hopper responded to an online advertisement of a 19-year-old woman "with
the intent of setting up sex" and agreed to pay $250 for intercourse.3 The individual
3 RP (Jan. 28, 2014) at 240.
No. 71799-5-1/3
depicted in the advertisement was actually 16 years old. She arrived at Hopper's
house and had intercourse with Hopper. Shortly after, Hopper asked the victim how
old she was. Hopper appeared "[njonchalant" and "didn't mind it" when she told him
that she was 19 years old.4 The victim testified that Hopper did not ask her for any
identification and that she did not bring any identification with her to the sexual
encounter. Hopper paid the victim $250.
Hopper testified to his version of events. He met the victim near his
apartment. Because she appeared "young" and "inexperienced," he asked to see her
identification.5 The victim showed Hopper what appeared to be a Washington State
identification card. The victim's birthdate on the identification reflected that she was
21 years old. Hopper did not view the photograph or name on the identification card.
Hopper questioned the victim about the age discrepancy because the advertisement
listed her as 19 years old and her identification listed her as 21 years old. The victim
responded that "some guys like younger girls."6 Hopper believed that the website he
contacted "was required to collect identification for the people who advertised" and
had no reason to believe that the victim's identification was fake.7
The State charged Hopper with one count of commercial sexual abuse of a
minor. At trial, Hopper raised the affirmative defense that he had made a reasonable
4 Id at 166.
5 jd, at 232.
6 Id at 253.
7 Id. at 254.
No. 71799-5-1/4
bona fide attempt to ascertain the victim's true age by requiring the production of her
identification. The jury convicted Hopper as charged.
Hopper appeals.
ANALYSIS
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Hopper contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing by arguing
that the burden of proof for his affirmative defense was 51 percent. We disagree.
To prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, "a defendant must show the
conduct was both improper and prejudicial in the context of the entire record and
circumstances at trial."8 If a defendant fails to object at trial, we consider any error
waived "unless the prosecutor's misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an
instruction could not have cured" any resulting prejudice.9 The defendant must show
that "'no curative instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect on the jury'"
and "the misconduct resulted in prejudice that 'had a substantial likelihood of
affecting the jury verdict.'"10
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
[W]hat the legislature also said is that we don't want to punish those
people who are legitimately or affirmatively tricked into this. So it says
it's a defense if at the time of the offense, the Defendant made a
reasonable bona fide effort to determine the true age by requiring some
kind of document, and did not rely solely on the oral representations of
the girl or her apparent age.
8 State v. Thompson, 169 Wn. App. 436, 495, 290 P.3d 996 (2012).
9 State v. Emery. 174 Wn.2d 741, 760-61, 278 P.3d 653 (2012).
10 jd, at 761 (quoting State v. Thorqerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d 43
(2011)).
No. 71799-5-1/5
Now the interesting thing about this is that the legislature has
decided that this is his burden. Okay? It's my burden to prove the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. But once he raises this argument,
it's his burden. And he has to prove to you that it's more likely than not,
51%, thatyou believe that that's what happened^
Hopper did not object or request a curative instruction.
Defense counsel then addressed the preponderance of the evidence standard
in closing:
The narrow question is have we proven—[the prosecutor] had
this right. Have we proven, by a preponderance—by a preponderance
of the evidence, which is more likely than not—okay, so you have even
scales—any amount of evidence that changes the scales, that side
wins. Have we presented, by a preponderance of evidence, that an
[identification card] was shown?[12]
Defense counsel further argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard "is
a very low standard"13 and "even a feather's weight. . . tips the scales."14
The pertinent jury instruction stated:
Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be
persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that it is more
probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has
established this defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not
guilty as to the charge of commercial sexual abuse of a minor.[15]
The jury was also instructed to "disregard any remark, statement, or argument" by the
lawyers "not supported by the evidence or the law" in the instructions.16
11 RP (Jan. 29, 2014) at 282 (emphasis added).
12RP(Jan. 29, 2014) at 297.
13 Id, at 298.
14 jd at 300.
16 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 25 (emphasis added).
16 CP at 15.
No. 71799-5-1/6
Hopper does not apply the proper standard of review. We do not review the
prosecutor's comment "in isolation, but in the context of the total argument, the
issues in the case, the evidence, and the instructions given to the jury."17 The
context of the prosecutor's argument here reflects that the prosecutor did not attempt
to overstate Hopper's burden of proof or to mislead the jury. Immediately before the
prosecutor's 51 percent comment, the prosecutor emphasized that Hopper's
preponderance of the evidence standard required him to prove that it was more likely
than not that the victim showed him an identification card.
Hopper cites no compelling authority that the prosecutor here committed
misconduct when he articulated Hopper's burden of proof for his affirmative defense
as "more likely than not, 51 percent." Washington courts have not addressed
whether 51 percent properly expresses the mere preponderance standard for
affirmative defenses in the criminal arena. But other courts have endorsed this
formulation.18 In the context of the prosecutor's closing argument, we view the
17 State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 28, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).
18 In re OCA. Inc.. 551 F.3d 359, 372 n.41 (5th Cir. 2008) (defining the
preponderance of the evidence standard as 51 percent); Bittnerv. Borne Chem. Co.,
Inc., 691 F.2d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 1982) (same); Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency. 627 F.2d 416, 453 n.139 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[T]he standard of ordinary civil
litigation, a preponderance of the evidence, demands only 51% certainty."); United
States v. Banks. F. Supp. 3d , 2015 WL 751953, at *12 (D. Kan. 2015) ("[A]
party proves a fact by the preponderance if it establishes a 51% or greater likelihood
that the factual claim is true."); Swearinqen v. State. 303 S.W.3d 728, 736 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010) ("[A]ppellant cannot show by a preponderance of the evidence, or that
there is a 51% chance, that he would not have been convicted."); State v. Rizzo. 266
Conn. 171, 204, 833 A.2d 363 (2003) (defining the mere preponderance standard as
51 percent); Bianchi v. Kufov. 53 So.3d 530, 534 (La. Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he plaintiffs
burden is not to prove her case beyond all doubt or even beyond a reasonable doubt,
but merely by a preponderance of the evidence, or 51%."); Bryant v. State, 374 Md.
585, 614, 824 A.2d 60 (2003) ("[W]e view the use of '51 percent' by the sentencing
No. 71799-5-1/7
reference to 51 percent as a shorthand approximation of the more probably than not
true preponderance standard, not any quantitative assertion that 50.9 percent or less
would be deficient.
Even if the prosecutor's comment was improper here, Hopper has not
demonstrated that the misconduct was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an
instruction would not have cured any resulting prejudice. For example, in State v.
Warren, the prosecutor in closing argument "undermine[d] the State's burden of
proof'19 by arguing that "reasonable doubt does not mean . . . that you give the
defendant the benefit of the doubt."20 Because defense counsel objected and the
trial court gave a curative instruction, Warren concluded that even when a prosecutor
blatantly misstates the State's burden of proof, any resulting prejudice can be cured
by an instruction.21
Hopper relies on State v. Fleming to argue that a prosecutor's comment that
misstates the burden of proof may require reversal.22 But Fleming is distinguishable.
In Fleming, the prosecutor committed misconduct because the prosecutor's argument
in closing—that the jury could only acquit the defendant if it found the victim was lying
judge as merely illustrative of the slight tilt to one side of the scale that is required to
find that that side outweighs the other in a preponderance of the evidence analysis.");
see also Allison Morse, Social Science in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and
Battered Women, 21 Hamline L. Rev. 287, 317 (1998) ("[l]n a civil trial[,] the burden of
proof is merely the preponderance of the evidence, typically viewed as 51%
certainty.").
19 Warren. 165 Wn.2d at 27.
20 ]d at 25.
21 ]d at 28.
22 83 Wn. App. 209, 921 P.2d 1076 (1996).
No. 71799-5-1/8
or confused—"misstated the law and misrepresented both the role of the jury and the
burden of proof."23 Fleming determined that the prosecutor's argument was "flagrant
and ill-intentioned" because binding precedent, published before Fleming's trial,
clearly established the impropriety of such arguments.24 Additionally, the prosecutor
made comments that infringed directly on the defendant's right against self-
incrimination. Fleming thus reversed the defendant's convictions because the
prosecutor's misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
But here, the constitutional harmless error standard does not apply because
the prosecutor's comments did not misstate the burden of proof and did not directly
infringe upon a constitutional right. The proper test when a prosecutor's comment
misstates the burden of proof but does not infringe directly upon a constitutional right
is whether an instruction could have cured any prejudice.25 A timely objection and
instruction here could have cured any prejudice.
Finally, contrary to Hopper's contentions, the 51 percent mere preponderance
standard is not "more akin" to a "clear preponderance" standard. He provides no
compelling authority supporting this proposition. The prosecutor's statement was
consistent with the jury instructions and the law. Hopper must establish that the
23 ]d at 213.
24 Id at 214.
25 Emery. 174 Wn.2d at 757-59 (holding that a timely objection and instruction
could have cured any prejudice stemming from a prosecutor's improper comments);
Warren. 165 Wn.2d at 26-28 (holding that any error from the prosecutor's
misstatement of the burden of proof and presumption of innocence did not result in
incurable prejudice).
8
No. 71799-5-1/9
elements of his affirmative defense are "more probably true than not true."26
Therefore, Hopper fails to show that the prosecutor's comment was improper or there
is a substantial likelihood that it affected the verdict.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Hopper contends his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance when he
failed to object to the prosecutor's burden of proof argument in closing or request a
curative instruction. We disagree.
We review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo.27 To prevail,
the defendant must show that counsel's representation was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.28 We are highly deferential to
counsel's performance.29 We presume counsel is effective and give particular
deference to strategic or tactical decisions.30
"The decision of when or whether to object is a classic example of trial
tactics."31 Lawyers often fail to object during closing arguments, "'absent egregious
misstatements.'"32 Failing to object during closing is generally "within the wide range
26 Mohr v. Grant. 153 Wn.2d 812, 822, 108 P.3d 768 (2005); CP at 25
("Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all
the evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true.").
27 State v. Sutherbv. 165 Wn.2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009).
28 State v. Humphries. 181 Wn.2d 708, 719-20, 336 P.3d 1121 (2014).
29 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez. 180 Wn.2d 337, 348, 325 P.3d 142 (2014).
30 id at 348, 356.
31 State v. Madison. 53 Wn. App. 754, 763, 770 P.2d 662 (1989).
32 In re Pers. Restraint of Davis. 152 Wn.2d 647, 717, 101 P.3d 1 (2004)
(quoting United States v. Necoechea. 986 F.2d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1993)).
No. 71799-5-1/10
of permissible professional legal conduct."33 "Only in egregious circumstances ...
will the failure to object constitute incompetence of counsel justifying reversal."34
Hopper's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's
burden of proof argument in closing. Hopper's counsel chose to respond to the
prosecutor's argument rather than to object. In closing, Hopper's counsel urged the
jury to focus on the "narrow" or "central" question:
The narrow question is have we proven—[the prosecutor] had this right.
Have we proven, by a preponderance—by a preponderance of the
evidence, which is more likely than not—okay, so you have even
scales—any amount of evidence that changes the scales, that side
wins. Have we presented, by a preponderance of evidence, that an
[identification card] was shown? ....
But the central question is by a preponderance of the evidence,
have we proven that an [identification card] was shown[?][35]
Defense counsel further argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard "is
a very low standard"36 and "even a feather's weight. . . tips the scales."37 His
counsel's choice to address the State's argument in closing rather than with an
objection was tactical. His performance was not deficient.
Alternatively, "[w]here a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rests on trial
counsel's failure to object, a defendant must show that an objection would likely have
been sustained."38 Hopper fails to show that the prosecutor's argument was
33 id
34 State v. Madison. 53 Wn. App. 754, 763, 770 P.2d 662 (1989).
35RP(Jan. 29, 2014) at 297.
36 id at 298.
37 id at 300.
38 State v. Fortun-Cebada. 158 Wn. App. 158, 172, 241 P.3d 800 (2010).
10
No. 71799-5-1/11
improper and warranted an objection. The jury was also instructed to "disregard any
remark, statement, or argument" by the lawyers "not supported by the evidence or
the law" in the instructions.39 We presume the jury follows the trial court's
instructions.40 Consequently, Hopper's ineffective assistance claim fails.
Curfew Restriction
Lastly, Hopper contends, and the State concedes, that his sentencing
condition requiring him to abide by a nighttime curfew is not crime-related and
therefore improper. We accept the State's concession and remand to strike the
improper sentencing condition.
The trial court may require the defendant to "[cjomply with any crime-related
prohibitions."41 A crime-related prohibition is an order "prohibiting conduct that
directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been
convicted."42 No evidence suggests that the curfew restriction relates to the
circumstances of Hopper's offense. Therefore, we accept the State's concession and
remand to strike this sentencing condition.
Statement of Additional Grounds
Lastly, Hopper raises several arguments in his statement of additional grounds,
none of which have merit. He contends that text messages recovered from the
victim's pimp's phone used as evidence at trial violate Washington's Privacy Act,
39 CP at 15.
40 State v. Stein. 144 Wn.2d 236, 247, 27 P.3d 184 (2001).
41 RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f).
42RCW9.94A.030(10).
11
No. 71799-5-1/12
RCW 9.73.030. But the privacy act expressly permits the interception of conversations
as "part of a bona fide criminal investigation" for commercial sexual abuse of a minor.43
Hopper's facial challenge to the constitutionality of RCW 9.68A.110(3) and his
cruel and unusual punishment argument are both illogical and fail for lack of any
supporting authority.44
CONCLUSION
We affirm Hopper's conviction, but remand to strike the improper sentencing
condition.
WE CONCUR:
^gX.T.
43 RCW 9.73.230(1).
44 Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev. 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d
549(1992).
12