United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2551
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
LUIS DANIEL ORTIZ-RODRÍGUEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Lipez, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
José R. Olmo-Rodríguez on brief for appellant.
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, and Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United
States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
June 10, 2015
BARRON, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Luis D. Ortiz-
Rodríguez, received a 48-month prison term after entering a guilty
plea to one count of cocaine trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Ortiz now challenges the procedural reasonableness
of that sentence due to the District Court's upward variance from
the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines
with what Ortiz contends was insufficient justification. For the
reasons that follow, we vacate Ortiz's sentence and remand for re-
sentencing.
I.
At sentencing, the District Court reviewed the
guidelines calculation set forth in the pre-sentence investigation
report. The report stated that the base offense level for an
offense involving less than 25 grams of cocaine was 12. See
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(14) (2013). The report further stated that
Ortiz also was subject to a two-point enhancement for the use of
firearms, as well as a two-point deduction for acceptance of
responsibility in consequence of his plea. See id. § 2D1.1(b)(1);
id. § 3E1.1(a). Thus, the report set forth a guidelines
calculation that produced a recommended sentencing range of 10 to
16 months. The statutory maximum for the offense is 20 years.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
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The plea agreement, filed on July 24, 2013, contained an
alternate guidelines calculation. The plea agreement's
calculation yielded a sentencing range of 27 to 33 months. The
agreement then recommended a sentence of 33 months. That
recommendation was not binding, however, as the plea agreement
provided that Ortiz's sentence would be "left entirely to the sound
discretion" of the District Court. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(c)(3)(B). And, in any event, the plea agreement's guidelines
calculation was incorrect. The calculation included numerous
sentencing enhancements that the record did not support.1
1 The pre-sentence report diverged from the calculation in
the plea agreement and explained that:
The Plea Agreement contemplates several
guideline enhancements which are not
applicable in this case. For example, the
enhancement for use of violence (USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(2)) and for reckless endangerment
during flight (USSG § 3C1.2) are not supported
by the evidence on record. There is no
evidence that the defendant used violence in
the commission of the offense or that he
attempted to flee, let alone that he
recklessly created a substantial risk of death
or serious bodily injury to another person
during the flight. Furthermore, the plea
agreement contemplates a two level enhancement
under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(14)(E) [offense
committed as part of a pattern of criminal
conduct engaged in as a livelihood]. However,
in order for said enhancement to apply, it is
necessary that the defendant receives an
aggravating role adjustment under USSG
§ 3B1.2. In this case, an enhancement under
USSG § 3B1.2 is neither contemplated by the
plea agreement nor justified by the evidence
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The District Court followed neither the recommendation
in the pre-sentence report nor the recommendation in the plea
agreement. The District Court explained that "even though Mr.
Ortiz did not plead guilty to a weapons offense, the Court cannot
disregard the fact that he participated in an offense that involved
firearms and that those firearms were fired during the offense."2
In that regard, the District Court referenced the conduct of
Ortiz's co-defendants, who had fired guns into the air from a
different vehicle while Ortiz was driving nearby.
The District Court then proceeded to describe the
evidence found in Ortiz's car at the time of arrest. According to
that summation, there was a bullet on the floor of the driver's
side of Ortiz's car. Ortiz also had a fanny pack around his leg
that contained 18 rounds of .357-caliber ammunition and a sandwich
bag containing a leafy green substance that field-tested positive
for marijuana. A leafy green substance (that also field-tested
positive for marijuana) was also found on Ortiz in his front
pocket. In addition, there were two duffel bags in the trunk of
the car, which contained clothing, marijuana, four rifle
magazines, cocaine packaged for sale, a single drum magazine, a
on the record.
2Although a firearm count had been included in the original
indictment, Ortiz had entered a guilty plea on only one count of
drug trafficking.
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double drum magazine, and four pistol magazines containing
ammunition.
The District Court emphasized the firearms involved:
Once again, we find ourselves in a case
involving firearms in this District, involving
a young man with firearms or ammunition,
magazines, that sell pretty expensively on the
streets, and the person who possesses them,
like Mr. Ortiz, appears not to have the means
to purchase those type of things. Everybody
knows that gun crimes are pervasive throughout
the island, and I have to consider deterrence
as one of the 3553 factors, because it's
important to consider preventing criminal
behavior by the population at large and not
just by the defendant being sentenced.
The District Court then found that "the sentence to which the
parties agreed, as well as the guideline imprisonment range
reflected in the pre-sentence report, do[es] not reflect the
seriousness of the offense, does not promote respect for the law,
does not protect the public from further crimes by Mr. Ortiz and
does not address the issues of deterrence and punishment." At
that point, the District Court imposed the 48-month sentence.
II.
The government contends that Ortiz failed to raise his
challenge to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence below
and thus that we may review only for plain error. But the record
shows that defense counsel had no opportunity to raise a formal
objection to the sentence prior to the sentencing hearing, as it
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was only at the sentencing hearing that the District Court varied
upwards from the guidelines range described in the pre-sentence
investigation report. Furthermore, defense counsel's remarks both
before and after the imposition of the sentence, though cut short,
raised the same basic challenge to the reasonableness of the
sentence that Ortiz now makes on appeal. We thus review the
sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. King, 741 F.3d
305, 307-08 (1st Cir. 2014).
Ortiz argues that the "stated grounds for the imposition
of a sentence that so markedly exceeded the recommended guidelines
range were neither sufficiently particularized nor compelling to
survive the review for reasonableness." He relies on United States
v. Zapete-Garcia, where we found the district court had failed to
justify a 48-month sentence that was eight times greater than the
top of the guidelines range, but was well below the 10-year
statutory maximum. 447 F.3d 57, 59 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2006). And
Ortiz also relies on United States v. Ofray-Campos, where we
overturned a sentence that was two-and-one-half times greater than
the top of the recommended guidelines range, but at the statutory
maximum, because it, too, had not been adequately explained. 534
F.3d 1, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2008).
Here, as noted, Ortiz's sentence was well below the
statutory maximum but three times greater than the top of the
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advisory guidelines range. Under Zapete-Garcia and Ofray-Campos,
therefore, the District Court was obliged to explain how Ortiz's
situation was different from the ordinary situation covered by,
and accounted for, in the guidelines calculation and thus why such
a significant variance was justified. See United States v. Smith,
445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006) ("The sentence is not a modest
variance from the guideline range," and "[t]he farther the judge's
sentence departs from the guidelines sentence . . . the more
compelling the justification based on factors in section 3553(a)
that the judge must offer in order to enable the court of appeals
to assess the reasonableness of the sentence imposed." (omission
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But the District
Court failed to provide such an explanation.
The District Court did discuss the quantity of firearms
involved and the firing of the guns by the co-defendants. But
Ortiz rightly relies on Ofray-Campos for the proposition that
"[w]hen a factor is already included in the calculation of the
guidelines sentencing range, a judge who wishes to rely on that
same factor to impose a sentence above or below the range must
articulate specifically the reasons that this particular
defendant's situation is different from the ordinary situation
covered by the guidelines calculation." 534 F.3d at 43 (quoting
Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d at 60). And the District Court's
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description of the facts at the sentencing hearing does not explain
why this case is so substantially outside the heartland of the
guideline enhancement for the use of firearms that a variance of
this magnitude is justified. See Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d at 43
("The court’s reference to [Appellant's] possession of weapons as
a triggerman lacks compelling force, in part because firearm
possession had already been considered, and accounted for, in the
two-level enhancement applied in the calculation of Appellant’s
adjusted offense level" under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)).
Rather than offering any such explanation, if one were
possible on these facts, the District Court stated that "[o]nce
again, we find ourselves in a case involving firearms in this
District." The District Court also stated that "even though Mr.
Ortiz did not plead guilty to a weapons offense, the Court cannot
disregard the fact that he participated in an offense that involved
firearms and that those firearms were fired during the offense."
But the presence and use of firearms was accounted for in the two-
point enhancement for firearms the judge included in the guidelines
calculation, and so the reference to the mere presence or use of
the firearms cannot justify such a significant variance. See
Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d at 43 ("[T]hese factors [mentioned by the
District Court] were not so distinct from the firearm possession
that was incorporated into the guidelines calculation as to justify
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a variance of such magnitude."); Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d at 60
("[T]he two-level guideline enhancement . . . applies to any
unlawful alien defendant who has previously been deported at least
once . . . . [A]lthough some amount of increase for multiple
violations might be reasonable if supported by an explanation,
here there was no explanation for an increase of such magnitude.
In any event we cannot say that one additional prior deportation
reasonably warrants an eightfold increase in punishment.").
In further explaining the sentence, the District Court
did reference the pervasiveness of gun crime in Puerto Rico, the
need for deterrence, the need to adequately reflect the seriousness
of the offense, and the need to promote respect for the law and
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.
Geographic considerations can be relevant at sentencing, as "the
incidence of particular crimes in the relevant community
appropriately informs and contextualizes the relevant need for
deterrence." United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 23
(1st Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Rivera-González, 776
F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding "the high incidence of
violent crime in Puerto Rico" to be an appropriate consideration
at sentencing). Even still, "the section 3553(a) factors must be
assessed in case-specific terms," Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d at
23, and a sentencing court's "appraisal of community-based
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considerations does not relieve its obligation to ground its
sentencing determination in individual factors related to the
offender and the offense," Rivera-González, 776 F.3d at 50.
Here, the District Court's reference to the section 3553
factors and contextualizing comments about gun crime in Puerto
Rico do not explain why an upward variance of this magnitude was
warranted. Given the nature of this drug offense, and the fact
that the District Court did not explain how the enhancing conduct
involving firearms falls outside the heartland of the guideline
enhancement that had already been imposed, the District Court's
explanation of the defendant's conduct was not sufficiently
compelling to explain this upward variance. See Smith, 445 F.3d
at 6 ("We are hard-put to see any basis for finding this sentence
reasonable. This is equally true if one turns from the facts
relied upon by the district judge to the general considerations
provided by the statute."). "Although 'circumstances may make a
major variance reasonable,' no such circumstances are obvious from
the record in this case and no adequate explanation for such a
large variation has been provided." Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d at 61
(quoting Smith, 445 F.3d at 3).
III.
Because the sentencing rationale fails to adequately
explain the basis for this large variance from the guidelines
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range, we order the sentence to be vacated, and we remand for re-
sentencing.
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