2015 WI 53
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2012AP2782-CR
COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent,
v.
Andre M. Chamblis,
Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner.
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 622, 848 N.W.2d 903)
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished)
OPINION FILED: June 12, 2015
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: March 3, 2015
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: La Crosse
JUDGE: Elliott M. Levine
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED: ZIEGLER, J. concurs. (Opinion Filed.)
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant-petitioner,
there were briefs by Steven W. Zaleski and Zaleski Law Firm,
Madison, and oral argument by Steven W. Zaleski.
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent, the cause was
argued by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with
whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.
2015 WI 53
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2012AP2782-CR
(L.C. No. 2011CF644)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent,
v.
FILED
Andre M. Chamblis, JUN 12, 2015
Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant- Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Petitioner.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.
¶1 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. Andre Chamblis (Chamblis)
pleaded guilty to operating with a prohibited alcohol
concentration (PAC) as a sixth offense in violation of Wis.
Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) (2011-12).1 Prior to accepting the plea,
the circuit court2 informed Chamblis that the offense constituted
1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-
12 version unless otherwise indicated.
2
La Crosse County, the Honorable Elliott M. Levine,
presiding.
No. 2012AP2782-CR
a Class H felony which carried a minimum penalty of 6 months
imprisonment and a $600 fine and a maximum penalty of 6 years
imprisonment (three years confinement and three years extended
supervision) and a $10,000 fine. Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(am)5.,
939.50(3)(h)., 973.01(2)(b)8. The circuit court ultimately
sentenced Chamblis to four years imprisonment comprised of two
years confinement and two years extended supervision.
¶2 The State appealed the judgment of conviction. It
argued that the circuit court erred by excluding additional
evidence the State sought to submit to prove that Chamblis
possessed a sixth prior drunk-driving related conviction. Had
the circuit court admitted the evidence and found it sufficient
to establish the alleged prior conviction, Chamblis would have
faced the decision to plead guilty to the charge of operating
with a PAC as a seventh offense. That offense constituted a
Class G felony and would have subjected Chamblis to an increased
range of punishment. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6.
Specifically, the minimum penalty for a seventh offense was a
term of imprisonment that included three years confinement and a
period of extended supervision. Id. The maximum penalty was 10
years imprisonment (five years confinement and five years
extended supervision) and a $25,000 fine. Wis. Stat.
§§ 973.01(2)(b)7., 939.50(3)g.
¶3 The court of appeals agreed that the circuit court
erred in excluding the additional evidence. It further
determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove the alleged
prior conviction. As a result, the court of appeals reversed
2
No. 2012AP2782-CR
the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the circuit
court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of
conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and
impose sentence for a seventh offense.3
¶4 This case presents two issues for our review. The
first is whether the circuit court erred in excluding the
additional evidence the State sought to submit to enhance
Chamblis's punishment on the basis that the State offered the
evidence "too late." The second is whether the court of
appeals' remedy violates Chamblis's right to due process by
rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and
involuntary.
¶5 We assume, without deciding, that the circuit court
erred in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to
submit to enhance Chamblis's punishment.
¶6 Although we assume error, we hold that the court of
appeals' decision remanding the case to the circuit court with
instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for
operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and impose sentence
for a seventh offense violates Chamblis's right to due process.
Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty
plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a
seventh offense. Because a seventh offense carries a greater
range of punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of
3
State v. Chamblis, No. 2012AP2782-CR, unpublished order
(Wis. Ct. App. May 29, 2014).
3
No. 2012AP2782-CR
appeals' remedy renders Chamblis's plea unknowing,
unintelligent, and involuntary. We further conclude that a
remedy which requires Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea is
fundamentally unfair and thus violative of due process under the
facts of this case.
¶7 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals and uphold Chamblis's conviction.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶8 On November 22, 2011, Chamblis was arrested on
suspicion of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant (OWI) in La Crosse. The criminal complaint, dated
November 30, 2011, charged Chamblis with the following: (1) OWI
as a fifth or sixth offense and as a repeater contrary to Wis.
Stat. § 346.63(1)(a); (2) operating with a PAC as a fifth or
sixth offense and as a repeater contrary to Wis. Stat.
§ 346.63(1)(b); and (3) obstructing an officer as a repeater
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).4 The criminal complaint
alleged that Chamblis possessed five prior drunk-driving related
4
On April 10, 2012, Chamblis was also charged with battery
by prisoner contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1). The State filed
that charge in a separate action in La Crosse County.
4
No. 2012AP2782-CR
convictions from Minnesota for the purpose of penalty
enhancement under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am).5
¶9 In January 2012, the circuit court granted the State's
motion to amend the information6 to charge Chamblis with OWI as a
seventh, eighth, or ninth offense and as a repeater, and
operating with a PAC as a seventh, eighth, or ninth offense and
as a repeater. The State claimed that Chamblis had two prior
drunk-driving related convictions from Illinois in addition to
the five from Minnesota and submitted documentation to that
effect.
¶10 On August 6, 2012, Chamblis filed a motion challenging
the purported Illinois convictions on two grounds that are
relevant here. First, he argued that the two alleged
convictions should be counted as one conviction because they
stemmed from the same incident. Second, he contended that the
5
Under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am), repeated violations of
drunk-driving related offenses are subject to increasingly
severe penalties. "This graduated penalty structure is nothing
more than a penalty enhancer similar to a repeater statute which
does not in any way alter the nature of the substantive offense,
i.e., the prohibited conduct, but rather goes only to the
question of punishment." State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532,
535, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982). The penalty range for operating
with a PAC as a fifth or sixth offense is less severe than the
penalty range for a seventh offense. See Wis. Stat.
§ 346.65(2)(am)5.-6.
6
"The information is the accusatory pleading under our
criminal system to which the defendant must plead and stand
trial . . . ." Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 87, 93, 142
N.W.2d 187 (1966).
5
No. 2012AP2782-CR
State had offered insufficient documentation to prove the
purported convictions.
¶11 The circuit court held a hearing on Chamblis's motion
on September 12, 2012. The circuit court agreed that the two
alleged Illinois convictions should be treated as one
conviction. However, it determined that the State's proffered
evidence of the purported conviction——an Illinois driver's
abstract——was insufficient to establish that Chamblis had been
convicted of a drunk-driving related offense in Illinois. In
rendering its decision, the circuit court recognized that "we
are not at sentencing" and "there could be further proof that
comes up." It informed the prosecutor that if "more evidence is
supplied . . . we will review it at that point in time . . . ."
¶12 At the final pretrial hearing on September 14, 2012,
the parties informed the circuit court that Chamblis wished to
enter a guilty plea. Neither the parties nor the circuit court
raised the issue of the disputed Illinois conviction. Because
the State intended to request a presentence investigation
report, the circuit court did not schedule a sentencing hearing
to go along with the plea date.
¶13 Chamblis's plea hearing took place on September 19,
2012. The parties advised the circuit court that Chamblis
planned to enter a guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a
fourth offense "or greater" without a repeater.7 Chamblis was
7
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss
the charges of OWI as a repeater, obstructing an officer as a
repeater, and battery by prisoner (from the related case).
6
No. 2012AP2782-CR
willing to admit to the five prior convictions from Minnesota
but continued to dispute the alleged conviction from Illinois.
Accordingly, a question remained whether Chamblis would face the
penalty range for operating with a PAC as a sixth offense or as
a seventh offense upon conviction.
¶14 Recognizing the uncertainty regarding Chamblis's
potential punishment, defense counsel stated on the record the
minimum and maximum penalties for both offenses. Defense
counsel then expressed his confusion with handling the plea in
such a manner. This prompted the circuit court to inquire into
the status of the alleged Illinois conviction. The prosecutor
explained that he had obtained additional information from
Illinois and that he planned to submit an offer of proof prior
to sentencing. Defense counsel objected to the State offering
the new evidence at that point in the proceedings.
¶15 The circuit court determined that the State was
attempting to offer the additional evidence "too late." It
reasoned that Chamblis could not enter a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary guilty plea without understanding the precise
minimum and maximum penalties associated with the plea.
Determining that it was unfair to put off the plea date, the
circuit court declared that discovery was "done." It noted that
the case had "been set for trial a long time"; that the issue
concerning proof of the purported Illinois conviction "was
7
No. 2012AP2782-CR
flagged a long time ago"8; and that the issue prevented the
parties from resolving the case "in a way that would have made
more sense months ago . . . ." As a result of its decision, the
circuit court indicated that it would accept a plea only to the
lower charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense.
¶16 The State chose to go through with the plea agreement
anyway. The circuit court then personally addressed Chamblis to
ensure that he understood the nature of the charge and the
implications of the plea. It began by asking whether Chamblis
understood the plea agreement "at this point in time," to which
Chamblis responded "I do now, sir." The circuit court proceeded
to explain the minimum and maximum penalties commensurate with a
conviction for operating with a PAC as a sixth offense. Upon
accepting the plea, the circuit court sentenced Chamblis to four
years imprisonment comprised of two years confinement and two
years extended supervision.
¶17 The State appealed the judgment of conviction. The
court of appeals determined that the circuit court erred in
excluding the State's additional evidence for two reasons.
First, this court's decisions in State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.
2d 532, 539, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982), and State v. Wideman, 206
Wis. 2d 91, 104-05, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), provide a general
rule that prior drunk-driving related convictions must be proved
8
Although Chamblis did not file his motion challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence of the purported Illinois conviction
until August 6, 2012, the transcript from the plea hearing
indicates that defense counsel raised the issue with the State
months earlier.
8
No. 2012AP2782-CR
before sentencing. Second, the circuit court "explicitly
invited" the State to bring forth additional evidence of the
alleged Illinois conviction prior to sentencing. The court of
appeals further concluded that the additional evidence
sufficiently established that Chamblis had been convicted of a
drunk-driving related offense in Illinois.
¶18 Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the
judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the circuit
court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of
conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and
impose sentence for a seventh offense. In fashioning its
remedy, the court of appeals rejected Chamblis's contention that
such relief would violate his constitutional right to due
process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent,
and involuntary.9 The court of appeals reasoned that Chamblis
was "aware both of the 'specific penalty' he faced if convicted
of operating with a PAC as a seventh offense, and that he faced
this possible punishment if the State succeeded in proving the
purported Illinois conviction."
¶19 We granted Chamblis's petition for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶20 We are asked to decide whether the circuit court erred
in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to submit
9
The court of appeals also dismissed Chamblis's second
argument that the remedy violated his constitutional right to be
free from double jeopardy, reasoning that it was underdeveloped.
We did not accept Chamblis's petition for review on that issue.
9
No. 2012AP2782-CR
at Chamblis's plea hearing. We review that decision under the
erroneous exercise of discretion standard. Martindale v. Ripp,
2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698. "In making
evidentiary rulings, the circuit court has broad discretion."
Id. "As with other discretionary determinations, this court
will uphold a decision to admit or exclude evidence if the
circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper
legal standard, and, using a demonstrated rational process,
reached a reasonable conclusion." Id.
¶21 We are also asked to determine whether the court of
appeals' remedy in this case violates Chamblis's right to due
process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent,
and involuntary. This presents a question of constitutional
fact. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶13, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605
N.W.2d 199. "We will not upset the circuit court's findings of
historical or evidentiary facts unless they are clearly
erroneous." Id. "We review constitutional issues independently
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the
court of appeals." Id.
III. DISCUSSION
¶22 Both issues in this case require us to examine the
legal principles fundamental to guilty pleas. Accordingly, we
begin by discussing the constitutional standard that a guilty
plea be affirmatively shown to be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. We then proceed to consider whether the circuit
court erred in excluding the additional evidence the State
sought to submit to enhance Chamblis's punishment. We assume
10
No. 2012AP2782-CR
without deciding that the decision was error. We next address
whether the court of appeals' remedy violates Chamblis's right
to due process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing,
unintelligent, and involuntary, concluding that it does.
Finally, we explain why a remedy which requires Chamblis to
withdraw his guilty plea is fundamentally unfair and thus
violative of due process under the facts of this case.
A. Analytical Framework
¶23 Since "[s]everal federal constitutional rights are
involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is
entered in a state criminal trial," Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 243 (1969), fundamental due process requires that a plea be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Cross, 2010 WI
70, ¶16, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64. A defendant
contemplating a guilty plea must possess "sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Relevant
circumstances include the nature of both the charge to which the
defendant is pleading and the constitutional rights he or she is
waiving. State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 139-40, 569 N.W.2d
577 (1997). In this case, however, we are concerned with the
constitutional requirement that defendants understand the
"'direct consequences' of their pleas." Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d
561, ¶16 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 755).
¶24 "A direct consequence represents one that has a
definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range
of defendant's punishment." Id. "Matters concerning the nature
11
No. 2012AP2782-CR
of the sentence that could be imposed are most likely to be
viewed as direct consequences." 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal
Procedure § 21.4(d), 817 (3d ed. 2007). Accordingly, the
general practice is to advise defendants of the minimum and
maximum penalties associated with a plea. Id.; see also State
v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 479-80, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972)
(discussing the importance of informing the defendant of the
maximum penalty possible upon entry of a plea); State v. Mohr,
201 Wis. 2d 693, 700, 549 N.W.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that circuit courts must advise defendants of the presumptive
minimum sentence associated with a plea).
¶25 A defendant's failure to understand the precise
maximum punishment is not necessarily a due process violation.
Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶37 (holding that there is no due
process violation where the sentence communicated to the
defendant is higher, but not substantially higher, than that
authorized by law). However, "when the defendant is told the
sentence is lower than the amount allowed by law, a defendant's
due process rights are at greater risk . . . ." Id., ¶39.
Indeed, this court has previously recognized that "[c]oncepts of
fundamental fairness require that a defendant not receive a
greater sentence of imprisonment than that which he was told he
could receive on pleading guilty." Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d
62, 76, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977); accord Hart v. Marion Corr.
Inst., 927 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
defendant's due process rights were violated when he was given a
12
No. 2012AP2782-CR
sentence higher than that which he believed to be the maximum
when he pleaded guilty).
¶26 To ensure that a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary, Wis. Stat. § 971.08, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.
2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and subsequent cases impose
certain procedural duties on circuit courts. State v. Brown,
2006 WI 100, ¶23, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. In Brown, we
reiterated that one of those duties is to notify the defendant
of the direct consequences of his or her plea. Id., ¶35.
Relatedly, we explained that circuit courts must "[e]stablish
the defendant’s understanding of the . . . range of punishments
to which he is subjecting himself by entering a plea . . . ."
Id. (citing Bangert, 132 Wis. 2d at 262; Wis. Stat.
§ 971.08(1)(a)). However, a circuit court's failure to comply
with the above duties is not a per se due process violation, as
it is possible that the defendant may learn of the implications
of his or her plea from another source. See Bangert, 131 Wis.
2d at 272-76. That is why we consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining the knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary nature of a plea. Id. at 258.
¶27 The bottom line is that a plea made in ignorance of
its direct consequences is not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. In such situations, the plea "has been obtained in
violation of due process and is therefore void." McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
B. Error
13
No. 2012AP2782-CR
¶28 We now turn to consider whether the circuit court
erred in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to
submit to prove that Chamblis possessed a sixth prior drunk-
driving related conviction for the purpose of increasing his
punishment. As noted, the circuit court determined that the
additional evidence was untimely. Its reasoning was two-fold:
(1) Chamblis could not enter a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary guilty plea without understanding the precise minimum
and maximum penalties associated with the plea; and (2) it was
unfair to put off the plea date given the State's action in
delaying the proceedings by failing to obtain the evidence
sooner.
¶29 The parties focus their arguments on whether the
circuit court mistakenly believed it needed to determine the
number of prior convictions that would count toward sentencing
before accepting Chamblis's guilty plea.
¶30 Chamblis argues that in the context of a guilty plea a
circuit court must determine the number of prior convictions
that will count toward sentencing before accepting the plea.
According to Chamblis, this is to ensure that a defendant
understands the direct consequences of his or her plea. To
support his position, Chamblis notes that under Wis. Stat.
§ 346.65(2)(am), the number of prior convictions influences the
severity of a defendant's punishment for operating with a PAC.
¶31 The State contends that it has until sentencing to
prove the prior convictions, citing to our decisions in
McAllister and Wideman for support. It also argues that the
14
No. 2012AP2782-CR
statutory scheme governing the penalties for operating with a
PAC requires that a circuit court determine the number of prior
convictions at the time of sentencing, once a defendant has
pleaded guilty or no contest or been found guilty at trial.
Where a defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea and disputes the
number of prior convictions, the State maintains that a circuit
court could simply advise the defendant of the different ranges
of punishment that he or she might face depending on how the
issue is resolved. For example, in this case, the circuit court
could have informed Chamblis of the range of penalties for
operating with a PAC as a sixth offense and as a seventh
offense.
¶32 The circuit court correctly recognized that there are
situations in which a determination of prior convictions for
sentence enhancement should be made before accepting a guilty
plea in order to ensure the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
nature of the plea. In a case like this one, where the
defendant disputes the number of prior convictions and the issue
affects the range of punishment he faces upon conviction, the
better practice is to determine the number of prior convictions
before accepting the plea. This assures that a defendant
understands the direct consequences of his or her plea.
¶33 Our decisions in McAllister and Wideman do not compel
a different conclusion. In McAllister, we held that prior
violations of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) are not "elements of the
crime of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance, thereby
15
No. 2012AP2782-CR
requiring that the question of their existence be submitted to
the jury." McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 532-33. In Wideman, we
concluded that the requirements for establishing prior offenses
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), the general repeat offender
statute, are not applicable to establishing prior offenses under
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2), the OWI/PAC penalty enhancement statute.
Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 94-95. In both cases, we made general
statements supporting the proposition that the State may prove
prior drunk-driving related convictions for sentence enhancement
"before sentencing" or "at sentencing." See McAllister, 107
Wis. 2d at 539; Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 108. However, in both
McAllister and Wideman, the defendant was convicted after a
trial in which the State did not need to prove the prior drunk-
driving related convictions to meet the elements of the
substantive charge. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 532-33. Thus,
McAllister and Wideman are inapposite, as neither case dealt
with the constitutional considerations that are at stake where a
defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea and disputes the number
of prior convictions that will count toward enhancing his or her
punishment.
¶34 The statutory scheme governing the penalties for
operating with a PAC does not undermine our determination
either. The State argues that the plain language of Wis. Stat.
§§ 343.307(1)10 and 346.65(2)(am)611 provides that the time for
10
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307(1), entitled "Prior
convictions, suspensions, or revocations to be counted as
offenses," provides:
16
No. 2012AP2782-CR
(1) The court shall count the following to determine
the length of a revocation under s. 343.30(1q)(b) and
to determine the penalty under ss. 114.09(2) and
346.65(2):
(a) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63(1), or
a local ordinance in conformity with that section.
(b) Convictions for violations of a law of a federally
recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state
in conformity with s. 346.63(1).
(c) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63(2) or
940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense involved the
use of a vehicle.
(d) Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction
that prohibits a person from refusing chemical testing
or using a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under
the influence of a controlled substance or controlled
substance analog, or a combination thereof; with an
excess or specified range of alcohol concentration;
while under the influence of any drug to a degree that
renders the person incapable of safely driving; or
while having a detectable amount of a restricted
controlled substance in his or her blood, as those or
substantially similar terms are used in that
jurisdiction's laws.
(e) Operating privilege suspensions or revocations
under the law of another jurisdiction arising out of a
refusal to submit to chemical testing.
(f) Revocations under s. 343.305(10).
(g) Convictions for violations under s. 114.09(1)(b)1.
or 1m.
11
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6 provides that "any
person violating s. 346.63(1) . . . is guilty of a Class G
felony if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09(1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of
suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307(1), equals 7, 8, or 9 . . . ."
17
No. 2012AP2782-CR
counting the number of prior convictions for sentence
enhancement is at sentencing, once there has been a conviction
for the underlying offense. Under the State's interpretation,
there will be instances in which a defendant enters a guilty
plea without understanding the direct consequences of that
decision. Specifically, the State reasons, "[i]n a case in
which the court does not impose sentence immediately after
accepting the plea, the court cannot definitely tell the
defendant how many convictions will be counted because, the
court cannot know how many convictions the defendant will have
at the time of sentencing."
¶35 We see nothing in the plain language of Wis. Stat.
§§ 343.307(1) and 346.65(2)(am)6 that prevents a circuit court
from determining the number of prior convictions that will count
toward sentencing prior to accepting a plea in order to ensure
the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the plea. We
further note that the State's interpretation raises
constitutional concerns that we wish to avoid. See Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 222 Wis. 2d 650,
667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998) ("A cardinal rule of statutory
interpretation is that the legislature intended to adopt a
18
No. 2012AP2782-CR
constitutional statute and that a court should preserve a law
and hold it constitutional when possible.").12
¶36 We acknowledge the State's contention that in a case
like this one, a circuit court could ensure that a defendant
understands the direct consequences of his or her plea by
informing the defendant of the different ranges of punishment
that are possible depending on how many prior convictions the
State later establishes. While that approach may be
constitutionally permissible in a particular case, we note that
the penalty ranges could vary dramatically depending on the
number of prior convictions the defendant disputes. See Wis.
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)1.-7. For that reason, the better practice
in this type of situation is to determine the number of prior
convictions that will count toward sentencing prior to accepting
the plea.
¶37 Although we conclude that the circuit court correctly
recognized the need to determine the number of prior convictions
before accepting Chamblis's guilty plea, the question remains
whether the circuit court reasonably excluded the State's
additional evidence of the purported Illinois conviction after
explicitly welcoming the evidence a week earlier.
12
In apparent recognition of the constitutional problems
created by its statutory construction, the State suggests that
"any problem that result[s] from counting convictions after
entry of a guilty plea could be easily remedied by a motion to
withdraw the plea." But as discussed in section C(ii) below, a
defendant may not wish to withdraw his or her guilty plea, and
requiring the defendant to do so raises its own constitutional
concerns.
19
No. 2012AP2782-CR
¶38 At the motion hearing on September 12, 2012, the
circuit court made several statements indicating that it would
consider additional evidence of the alleged Illinois conviction
if the State came up with anything. Two days later, at the
final pre-trial hearing, the parties informed the circuit court
that Chamblis wished to enter a guilty plea. Notwithstanding
the circuit court's inclination to determine the number of prior
convictions that would count toward sentencing before accepting
the plea, there was no discussion of the status of the purported
Illinois conviction. Under these circumstances, we can see why
the prosecutor thought he had time to submit the additional
evidence.
¶39 That said, our review of the plea hearing transcript
indicates that the circuit court was extremely frustrated with
the manner in which the State prosecuted this case. As we
explained at the outset of this opinion, the issue of the
alleged Illinois conviction appeared to delay the resolution of
this matter. Given the situation presented, we understand the
circuit court's desire to move the case forward and accept
Chamblis's guilty plea at the September 19 hearing. Thus, we
assume, without deciding, that the circuit court erred in
excluding the State's additional evidence of the purported
Illinois conviction.
C. Remedy
i. The court of appeals' remedy
¶40 Assuming error, we proceed to consider whether the
court of appeals' remedy in this case——a remand to the circuit
20
No. 2012AP2782-CR
court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of
conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and
impose sentence for a seventh offense——violates Chamblis's right
to due process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing,
unintelligent, and involuntary.
¶41 Chamblis argues that the court of appeals' remedy
invalidates his guilty plea. He maintains that he entered a
guilty plea to the charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth
offense with an understanding that, as a direct consequence of
his decision, he faced a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment
and a $10,000 fine. He notes that the maximum penalty
commensurate with a conviction for operating with a PAC as a
seventh offense is more punitive: 10 years imprisonment and a
$25,000 fine. Thus, according to Chamblis, the court of
appeals' remedy renders his guilty plea unknowing,
unintelligent, and involuntary, thereby violating his right to
due process by subjecting him to a greater sentence of
imprisonment than that which he was told he could receive upon
pleading guilty. He further contends that it would be
fundamentally unfair to resentence him because he has already
served the confinement portion of his originally imposed
sentence.
¶42 The State argues that the court of appeals' remedy
does not invalidate Chamblis's guilty plea. According to the
State, the court of appeals correctly determined that Chamblis
understood that he could be sentenced for a seventh offense upon
pleading guilty. The State further submits that it would not be
21
No. 2012AP2782-CR
fundamentally unfair to resentence Chamblis consistent with a
seventh offense because he knew the State would be appealing the
circuit court's evidentiary ruling. Thus, the State maintains
that Chamblis cannot reasonably claim an expectation of finality
in his sentence.
¶43 We agree with Chamblis that the court of appeals'
remedy in this case violates his right to due process by
rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and
involuntary.
¶44 The record clearly establishes that Chamblis entered a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to the charge of
operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a seventh
offense. Initially, there was confusion regarding the direct
consequences of Chamblis's plea: it was unclear whether Chamblis
was pleading guilty to a sixth offense——a Class H felony
carrying a maximum punishment of 6 years imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine——or a seventh offense——a Class G felony carrying a
maximum punishment of 10 years imprisonment and a $25,000 fine.
However, the circuit court dispelled all confusion once it
engaged Chamblis in the plea colloquy mandated by Wis. Stat.
§ 971.08.
¶45 At the outset of the plea colloquy, the circuit court
clarified that it was proceeding with a plea to the charge of
operating with a PAC as a sixth offense. It then asked Chamblis
whether he understood the plea agreement. Chamblis responded "I
do now, sir." The circuit court informed Chamblis that the plea
carried a minimum penalty of 6 months imprisonment and a $600
22
No. 2012AP2782-CR
fine and a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000
fine. Chamblis stated that he understood the penalty range and
pleaded guilty.
¶46 Later in the plea colloquy, the circuit court ensured
that Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to
the charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense:
THE COURT: Is there anything about your case that you
don't understand at this point?
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't [understand] at first, but
now, no, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. You feel like you fully understand
everything?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And it's been sort of a complicated matter.
Do you feel you have a clear understanding of what
these issues are?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand the Court's not
bound by any sentencing recommendation or any other
plea agreement or any arguments made by any of the
attorneys at the time of sentencing? Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And in fact, upon your plea of guilty, the
court may impose a maximum penalty in spite of any
agreement?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Of course, the maximum penalty to which the circuit court
referred and Chamblis understood was that associated with a
sixth offense: 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The
plea colloquy therefore demonstrates that Chamblis entered a
23
No. 2012AP2782-CR
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to operating
with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a seventh offense.
¶47 However, as noted, we are not confined to the plea
colloquy in evaluating Chamblis's due process challenge.
Rather, we consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of
his plea. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 258. That means we consider
other portions of the record to determine if Chamblis understood
that, as a direct consequence of his plea, he could be sentenced
for a seventh offense.
¶48 The court of appeals found significance in the fact
that defense counsel had stated on the record the minimum and
maximum penalties associated with a conviction for operating
with a PAC as a seventh offense. But these statements occurred
prior to the circuit court's explicit determination that it
would accept a plea only to the lower charge of a sixth
offense. In fact, as we indicated above, the record clearly
establishes that Chamblis did not understand the direct
consequences of his plea at the time in which these statements
were made. That is precisely why we require the circuit court
to personally engage the defendant in ascertaining the knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary nature of a plea. See Brown, 293
Wis. 2d 594, ¶¶50-52. Given that the circuit court later
informed Chamblis that the minimum and maximum penalties he
faced were those commensurate with a sixth offense, it cannot
reasonably be argued that defense counsel's statements
24
No. 2012AP2782-CR
demonstrate that Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary to a seventh offense.
¶49 The court of appeals also found it important that the
"Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" form indicated a maximum
punishment consistent with a seventh offense: 10 years
imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. However, similar to defense
counsel's statements, the "Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights"
form is of marginal value to the present issue. Chamblis
executed the form a day before his plea hearing amid the
uncertainty regarding the direct consequences of his plea.13 We
further note that the form did not list the minimum penalty
corresponding to a seventh offense. This deficiency exemplifies
why a plea questionnaire is not a substitute for the circuit
court personally addressing the defendant to ensure that he or
she understands the implications the plea. See id., ¶52. Put
simply, the "Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" form, executed
prior to the plea colloquy in this case, does not establish that
Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to a
seventh offense.
¶50 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that Chamblis entered into a plea agreement with an
understanding that the minimum penalty he could face was 6
months imprisonment and a $600 fine and the maximum penalty he
could face was 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. That
13
The "Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" form is dated
September 18, 2012. Chamblis’s plea hearing took place on
September 19, 2012.
25
No. 2012AP2782-CR
means Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a
seventh offense. Thus, the court of appeals' remedy which
subjects Chamblis to a greater sentence of imprisonment than
that which he was told he could receive upon pleading guilty
violates his right to due process.
ii. The State's proposed remedy
¶51 In its brief and at oral argument, the State argued
that even if the court of appeals' remedy violates Chamblis's
right to due process, the proper remedy is to allow Chamblis to
withdraw his guilty plea. Drawing on Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at
283, the State maintains that plea withdrawal is the exclusive
remedy for a defendant's plea being unknowing, unintelligent,
and involuntary. While that may be true where a defendant
appeals his or her conviction seeking plea withdrawal, that is
hardly the situation we have here.
¶52 In Bangert, we set forth a burden-shifting procedure
for circuit courts to follow when faced with a defendant's
motion to withdraw his or her guilty or no contest plea on the
basis that it was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-76. That procedure is not
implicated in the instant action because Chamblis neither filed
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea nor appealed his
conviction. Indeed, defense counsel made clear at oral argument
that Chamblis does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶53 The State suggests that Chamblis should be required to
withdraw his plea anyway. According to the State, Chamblis is
26
No. 2012AP2782-CR
not entitled to conviction and sentence for a sixth offense
because the evidence shows that he already possessed six prior
drunk-driving related convictions when he entered his guilty
plea in this case.14 Colloquially speaking, the State argues
that Chamblis should not get a "free pass" on the circuit
court's purported mistake.
¶54 We find it fundamentally unfair and thus violative of
due process to require Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea in
this case.15 "[T]he concern of due process is fundamental
fairness." State ex rel. Lyons v. De Valk, 47 Wis. 2d 200, 205,
177 N.W.2d 106 (1970). "'[D]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.'" Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
¶55 Here, we can think of at least a couple reasons that
requiring Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea is fundamentally
unfair. First and foremost, forced plea withdrawal deprives
Chamblis of the benefit of his bargain. "A criminal defendant
has a constitutional right to the enforcement of a negotiated
plea agreement." State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 271, 558
14
Chamblis did not appeal the portion of the court of
appeals' decision that concluded the State had sufficiently
proved the prior Illinois conviction.
15
In response to a question at oral argument, defense
counsel maintained that Chamblis could not be required to
withdraw his guilty plea without violating his constitutional
right to be free from double jeopardy. We choose not to address
that argument because it was not briefed by the parties.
27
No. 2012AP2782-CR
N.W.2d 379 (1997). "'Although a defendant has no right to call
upon the prosecution to perform while the agreement is wholly
executory, once the defendant has given up his bargaining chip
by pleading guilty, due process requires that the defendant's
expectations be fulfilled.'" Id. (citation omitted).
¶56 A substantial number of plea bargains are "no doubt
motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser
penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict
after a trial to judge or jury." Brady, 397 U.S. at 752. This
case is no different. Chamblis entered into the plea agreement
with the hope that he would face a less severe penalty than if
he went to trial. As noted, the State agreed to dismiss charges
of OWI as a repeater, obstructing an officer as a repeater, and
battery by prisoner in exchange for Chamblis's plea and
voluntary waiver of constitutional rights. Thus, a forced plea
withdrawal in this case subjects Chamblis to greater punishment,
not just with respect to the charge of operating with a PAC, but
to these additional charges as well. That is fundamentally
unfair, particularly in light of the fact that Chamblis has
already served the 2 year confinement portion of his originally
imposed sentence and therefore has an expectation of finality in
that sentence.
¶57 Second, we note that the State was not without options
to avoid this dilemma. For example, the State could have
withdrawn its plea offer in response to the circuit court's
determination that it would accept a plea only to the lower
charge. In fact, the circuit court went out of its way to give
28
No. 2012AP2782-CR
the prosecutor and defense counsel an opportunity to discuss
whether the State wished to proceed with the plea given the
evidentiary ruling. The State then could have sought review of
the circuit court's decision by filing a petition for leave to
appeal a non-final order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2).16
However, the State chose to go through with the plea agreement
anyway, despite the constitutional implications, perhaps because
it too benefits from such a bargain. Id. ("For the State there
are also advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment after
an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives
of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial
and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in
which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or
in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain
its burden of proof.").
16
Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(2) provides:
Appeals by permission. A judgment or order not
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if
it determines that an appeal will:
(a) Materially advance the termination of the
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the
litigation;
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or
irreparable injury; or
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the
administration of justice.
29
No. 2012AP2782-CR
¶58 For these reasons, we reject the State's contention
that plea withdrawal is an appropriate remedy in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶59 We assume, without deciding, that the circuit court
erred in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to
submit to enhance Chamblis's punishment.
¶60 Although we assume error, we hold that the court of
appeals' decision remanding the case to the circuit court with
instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for
operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and impose sentence
for a seventh offense violates Chamblis's right to due process.
Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty
plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a
seventh offense. Because a seventh offense carries a greater
range of punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of
appeals' remedy renders Chamblis's plea unknowing,
unintelligent, and involuntary. We further conclude that a
remedy which requires Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea is
fundamentally unfair and thus violative of due process under the
facts of this case.
¶61 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals and uphold Chamblis's conviction.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is
reversed.
30
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
¶62 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (concurring).
Although I join the majority opinion, I depart from the majority
analysis because I would not assume without deciding that the
circuit court erred by excluding the State's proffered evidence
of two Illinois convictions. Instead, I would conclude that the
circuit court did not err because it did not erroneously
exercise its discretion.1 A circuit court's decision to admit or
exclude evidence is "'entitled to great deference.'" State v.
Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶45, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 791
(quoting State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶43, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648
N.W.2d 413). "'This court will not disturb a circuit court's
decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the circuit court
erroneously exercised its discretion.'" Id., ¶43 (quoting
Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816
N.W.2d 191).
1
It is unclear why the majority opinion does not explicitly
hold that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion. The court of appeals in the present case held "that
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when, at
the September 19 plea hearing, it excluded the additional
evidence of the purported Illinois conviction as 'too late.'"
State v. Chamblis, No. 2012AP2782-CR, unpublished order, ¶21
(Wis. Ct. App. May 29, 2014). The court of appeals reasoned
that the circuit court erred because, under State v. Wideman,
206 Wis. 2d 91, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), and State v. McAllister,
107 Wis. 2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982), the State was not
required to prove the number of Chamblis's prior convictions
until the sentencing hearing. Id. The majority opinion rejects
that view of Wideman and McAllister. Majority op., ¶¶31-33.
Thus, the majority opinion seems to implicitly conclude that the
circuit court did not err.
1
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
¶63 At the plea hearing, the circuit court denied the
State's request to submit additional evidence of Illinois
convictions at a later hearing, deeming this request "too late."
The State made that request seven days after the circuit court
held that the State's original evidence was insufficient, six
weeks after Chamblis filed a motion challenging the State's
evidence, and six months after the State learned that Chamblis
was going to challenge its evidence. Ultimately, the circuit
court reasoned that "this case has been set for trial a long
time," the State "had plenty of time" to prove the number of
Chamblis's prior convictions, and the court did not wish to
delay the case any longer. Under the facts of this case, the
circuit court's decision to exclude the proffered evidence was
well within its discretion. A contrary conclusion not only
raises concern regarding fairness and the ability of a defendant
to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead but also, it
neuters the court's ability to control the docket and calendar.
In the case at issue the court correctly determined that the
time had come for the parties to know the scope of the charges
and the potential penalties. While a court is endowed with the
ability to allow amendment of charges under appropriate
circumstances, a circuit court should likewise have the
discretion to say enough is enough, as the court did here.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶64 A discussion of the procedural history of this case
demonstrates why the circuit court appropriately exercised its
discretion when it excluded the State's after-the-fact, "last
2
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
second," proffer of evidence. On November 22, 2011, Chamblis
was arrested, he appeared at a bond hearing, and $5,000 cash
bail was set. Unable to post bail, he remained in custody
throughout this case. Eight days later, on November 30, the
State filed a complaint and Chamblis made his initial
appearance. The complaint charged Chamblis with operating while
intoxicated ("OWI") (fifth or sixth offense) and operating with
a prohibited alcohol concentration ("PAC") (fifth or sixth
offense). The complaint alleged that he had five prior drunk
driving convictions from Minnesota. On December 7, 2011, a
preliminary examination was held and Chamblis was bound over for
trial. At the end of the preliminary hearing, the State filed
an information and Chamblis pled not guilty. The information
contained the same charges as the complaint. Two days later, on
December 9, Chamblis filed a demand for a speedy trial.2
¶65 On December 12, 2011, the court scheduled jury
selection for February 27, 2012. Sometime in mid- to late-
December, the court scheduled a jury trial for March 2, 2012.3
On December 27 the State sent an e-mail to the circuit court,
requesting that the trial date be moved ahead one day to
March 1. The State made this request because its analyst
witness was unavailable to testify on March 2. On January 4,
2
Chamblis withdrew this demand on May 25, 2012.
3
The record does not indicate precisely when the court
scheduled the trial for March 2, 2012. The only reference that
the record makes to a trial date of March 2 is an e-mail from
the State to the circuit court, dated December 27, 2011, in
which the State requested moving the trial date from March 2 to
March 1.
3
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
2012, the court granted the State's request and rescheduled the
jury trial for March 1.
¶66 On January 12, 2012, the State filed an amended
information, which charged Chamblis with OWI (seventh, eighth,
or ninth offense) and operating with a PAC (seventh, eighth, or
ninth offense). The amended information alleged the same five
prior convictions from Minnesota that were alleged in the
complaint and original information and an additional two prior
convictions from Illinois.
¶67 On January 23, 2012, the circuit court moved the trial
date to March 8, 2012, because the State's analyst witness was
unavailable on the date for which the trial had been scheduled.
¶68 On January 30, 2012, Chamblis's attorney withdrew from
representation. On February 9 the State Public Defender's
Office assigned replacement counsel. On February 14 the circuit
court entered an order appointing the new counsel.
¶69 Sometime shortly after being appointed, Chamblis's new
attorney informed the State that Chamblis intended to challenge
the alleged Illinois convictions.4
¶70 On February 15, 2012, the circuit court held a hearing
that was scheduled to be a final pre-trial hearing. Chamblis's
4
As Chamblis's new attorney explained several months later
at the plea hearing on September 19, 2012, "I've been
complaining about [the sufficiency of the State's evidence of
Illinois convictions] for the last, over six months. [The
District Attorney's Office and I] have had numerous e-mails
going back and forth." The circuit court found Chamblis's
attorney credible, stating that "[t]he issue was flagged a long
time ago to the Court and I'm sure it was flagged, I trust
[Chamblis's counsel] is saying that he told the District
Attorney's office about this six months ago."
4
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
new attorney did not appear because he was unaware of this
hearing, as he was appointed counsel the previous day. In a
letter to the court dated February 15, Chamblis's attorney
stated that he has "not had a chance to review the file, let
alone decide whether to proceed to trial." He requested that
the court remove the case from the trial calendar and schedule
the case for a status conference. On February 17 the court
granted that request.
¶71 At a March 20 status conference, the circuit court
rescheduled jury selection for June 11, and the jury trial for
June 15, 2012.
¶72 On May 25, 2012, the circuit court held another final
pre-trial hearing. Chamblis's attorney informed the circuit
court that he had another trial scheduled for the same day as
the trial in this case. Accordingly, the court rescheduled jury
selection for September 24 and a jury trial for September 26,
2012.
¶73 On August 6, 2012, Chamblis filed a motion challenging
the Illinois convictions alleged in the amended information.
The State's deadline for filing a brief in response to the
motion was August 22. However, the State did not file a brief
until September 5, two weeks late.
¶74 Two weeks before trial, on Wednesday, September 12,
2012, the circuit court held a hearing on Chamblis's motion
challenging the alleged Illinois convictions. The court
determined that the State's evidence did not prove that Chamblis
was convicted in Illinois of a drunk driving-related offense.
5
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
The court stated that "if . . . more evidence is
supplied, . . . we will review it at that point in time . . . ."
¶75 Two days later, on September 14, the circuit court
held a final pre-trial hearing. This hearing was very brief,
and no one mentioned the status of the alleged Illinois
convictions. Chamblis's attorney informed the court that
Chamblis would like to plead guilty. He further informed the
court that a sentencing hearing should be held on a later date
than the plea hearing because the State would be requesting a
presentence investigation.
¶76 On Wednesday, September 19, 2012, the circuit court
held a plea hearing. Chamblis's attorney stated that, pursuant
to a plea agreement, Chamblis would plead guilty to operating
with a PAC as a fourth offense or greater. At that time, the
pending charges were still those alleged in the January 2012
amended information, namely OWI (seventh, eighth, or ninth
offense) and operating with a PAC (seventh, eighth, or ninth
offense). The State explained that it wished to make an offer
of proof regarding the alleged Illinois convictions at the
sentencing hearing, which would be held at a later date. An
Illinois conviction would have made Chamblis's PAC offense in
the present case a seventh, rather than sixth, offense.
¶77 The mandatory minimum and maximum penalties for
Chamblis's offense varied greatly depending on whether it was a
sixth or seventh offense. A person who is convicted of a fifth
or sixth OWI or PAC offense "shall be fined not less than $600
and imprisoned for not less than 6 months." Wis. Stat.
6
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
§ 346.65(2)(am)5. The maximum penalty for that offense is "a
fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6
years, or both." Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(h); see also
§ 346.65(2)(am)5. By contrast, a person who is convicted of a
seventh, eighth, or ninth OWI or PAC offense "shall [receive] a
bifurcated sentence . . . and the confinement portion of the
bifurcated sentence . . . shall be not less than 3 years." Wis.
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. (2013-14); see also State v. Williams,
2014 WI 64, ¶47, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467. The maximum
penalty for that offense is "a fine not to exceed $25,000 or
imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both." § 939.50(3)(g);
see also § 346.65(2)(am)6. Thus, if the State proved that
Chamblis had an Illinois conviction, his mandatory minimum
penalty would increase from six months of imprisonment to three
years of confinement. Similarly, his maximum penalty would
increase from six years of imprisonment to ten years of
imprisonment. Chamblis did not plead to charges that carried
the higher penalties.
¶78 At the plea hearing, the court stated that it was "not
going to consider the new evidence" because that evidence was
being offered "way too late." As Chamblis' attorney explained,
"I've been complaining about [the sufficiency of the State's
evidence of Illinois convictions] for the last, over six months.
[The District Attorney's Office and I] have had numerous e-mails
going back and forth." The circuit court found Chamblis's
attorney credible, stating that "[t]he issue was flagged a long
time ago to the Court and I'm sure it was flagged, I trust
7
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
[Chamblis's counsel] is saying that he told the District
Attorney's office about this six months ago." The court
explained how "frustrating" it was that the case had not been
resolved already. The court noted that "this case has been set
for trial a long time." The court explained that the dispute
over the alleged Illinois convictions had prevented "this case
[from being] resolved in a way that would have made more sense
months ago."
¶79 The court explained that the State contributed to the
delay of this case. According to the court, the State "had
plenty of time" to prove the number of Chamblis's prior
convictions and "did not take this [matter] seriously enough."
The court further noted that the State was two weeks late in
filing its response to Chamblis's motion challenging the
Illinois convictions.
¶80 The court refused to consider the State's proffered
evidence in part because doing so would further delay resolution
of this case. The court explained that "I don't think I can do
a plea without [the number of prior convictions] being
determined. It is not a trial with a sentencing at a later
date. This is a plea. It's a different type of procedure."
The court stated that it "want[ed] the determination
of . . . how many prior convictions [there] are before we
actually enter into the plea, so Mr. Chamblis knows what he's
pleading guilty to." The court expressed concern with further
delaying the case for a later plea hearing, stating that
"[d]iscovery requires discovery to be done in a timely fashion,
8
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
[and] to have this done last second like this . . . continues to
prolong the process . . . ." The court also stated that,
because Chamblis "sat in jail, days, months, waiting for [the
State to determine his number of prior convictions]," it would
not be "fair to him" to further delay the case by admitting the
State's proffered evidence. The court concluded that it "can't
justify extending things more" and that "discovery at some point
has to end. . . . The discovery is done."
¶81 The court stated that "[i]f we need to put [this case]
back on the trial calendar, we can." The court gave the parties
15 to 20 minutes to decide whether to proceed with a guilty plea
to operating with a PAC (fifth or sixth offense). The parties
then informed the court that they reached a new plea agreement.
Pursuant to that agreement, Chamblis pled guilty to operating
with a PAC as a sixth offense. As a result, Chamblis faced a
mandatory minimum penalty of six months' imprisonment and a
maximum penalty of six years' imprisonment.
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY
EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION
¶82 "'This court will not disturb a circuit court's
decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the circuit court
erroneously exercised its discretion.'" Jackson, 352
Wis. 2d 249, ¶43 (quoting Weborg, 341 Wis. 2d 668, ¶41). "'A
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies
an improper legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably
supported by the facts of record.'" Id. (quoting Weborg, 341
Wis. 2d 668, ¶41). "'[T]he circuit court's decisions to admit
9
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
or exclude evidence are entitled to great deference . . . .'"
Id., ¶45 (quoting Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶43).
¶83 In the present case, the circuit court's concerns with
fairness to the defendant and controlling the calendar by not
prolonging the case any further were reasonable.5 Chamblis had
initially requested a speedy trial. A jury trial was first
scheduled for March 2, which was approximately three months
after Chamblis was bound over for trial. The trial date was
delayed three months to June 15 and then delayed another three
months to September 26. Similarly, a final pre-trial hearing
had been scheduled for February, was moved to May, and was then
moved to September. The plea hearing was held approximately ten
months after the State filed its complaint against Chamblis, and
he remained in custody that entire time awaiting trial. The
State learned more than six months before the plea hearing that
Chamblis believed that its evidence failed to prove that he had
Illinois convictions for drunk driving. Nevertheless, the State
did not obtain additional evidence of Illinois convictions until
September 14, which was five days before the plea hearing.
Further, the State was not prepared to present that additional
evidence at the plea hearing, but instead wished to offer it at
the sentencing hearing at a later date.6
¶84 As noted earlier, Chamblis had initially requested a
speedy trial. At the time of that request there was no
5
The majority opinion implicitly recognizes that the
circuit court did not make a mistake of law. See supra note 1.
6
The sentencing hearing was held on November 5, 2012.
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No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
indication that the State wished to amend the charges. Had the
case been tried, it appears that the charges would have remained
the charges to which he ultimately pled. This is not to say
that the State's hands were tied, but under the facts of this
case the circuit court was not incorrect to conclude that the
State was barred from essentially amending the charges and
penalties post-plea.
¶85 Under these facts, the circuit court did not
erroneously exercise its discretion. A circuit court may
exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed . . . by considerations of undue
delay . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 904.03.7 See also Wis. Stat.
§ 802.10(3)(d), (5)(d) (stating that a circuit court may control
its calendar and speedily dispose of actions by setting a time
limit for discovery and ruling on the admissibility of evidence
pre-trial). Further, "[c]ircuit courts possess inherent
discretionary authority to control their dockets with economy of
time and effort." State ex rel. Collins v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 153 Wis. 2d 477, 483, 451 N.W.2d 429 (1990) (citing Rupert
v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 138 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 405 N.W.2d 661 (Ct.
App. 1987)). See also Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶31,
312 Wis. 2d 530, 752 N.W.2d 820 ("Wisconsin circuit courts have
discretion to control their dockets. This power is inherent to
their function."); Schopper v. Gehring, 210 Wis. 2d 208, 215,
565 N.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted) ("The trial
7
The circuit court's explicit concerns with undue delay
"tacitly invoked" Wis. Stat. § 904.03. See State v. Smith, 2002
WI App 118, ¶16, 254 Wis. 2d 654, 648 N.W.2d 15.
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No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
court has the inherent power to control its calendar and
scheduling."). A circuit court's power to control its calendar
"is essential to the [circuit] courts' ability to function
because it provides the courts with the authority to control
their judicial business." Lentz v. Young, 195 Wis. 2d 457, 465-
66, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Neylan v. Vorwald,
124 Wis. 2d 85, 94, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985)).
¶86 Accordingly, the "courts cannot allow litigants to
control judicial calendars." Sherman v. Heiser, 85 Wis. 2d 246,
254, 270 N.W.2d 397 (1978). See also State v. Anthony, 2015 WI
20, ¶76, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10 ("'The trial process
would be a shambles if either party had an absolute right to
control the time and content of his witnesses' testimony.'"
(quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410–411 (1988))). If
we were to conclude that under these facts the circuit court
erroneously denied the State's request to introduce evidence at
a later date, we would impermissibly allow the parties to
control the circuit court's calendar and at the same time
endorse the idea that a defendant need not know the charges to
which he pleads or their penalties.
¶87 Chamblis pled guilty to a charge that had different
penalties than the charge in the amended information that
included the unproven prior offenses. Knowing the potential
penalties is fundamental to entering a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary plea. See State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶57, 237
Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477 (citation omitted) ("When a
defendant is not aware of the potential punishment, the plea is
12
No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently . . . .").
This case is not one where the circuit court denied the State's
attempt to amend charges to conform to the evidence or to timely
amend charges so that a defendant can be on notice. Rather,
this case is one where the State wished to essentially amend the
charges, after a guilty plea, and have the defendant be exposed
to greater penalties and mandatory minimums than those that were
associated with the charge to which he pled guilty. The court
did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying the
State's request. The defendant did not plead to the charges
that relied upon the Illinois prior offenses and thus, carried
higher mandatory minimums and greater exposure. Chamblis pled
guilty to the original charge because the court determined that
the State had not proven the Illinois prior convictions. The
court accepted Chamblis's plea for one offense with one set of
penalties. It would invoke fundamental principles of fairness
to allow that plea to morph into an amended conviction for an
offense to which he did not plead.
¶88 In sum, although I join the majority opinion, I would
explicitly conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion when it excluded the evidence that the
State attempted to submit "too late."
¶89 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
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No. 2012AP2782-CR.akz
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