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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
KADEEM R. SMITH
Appellant No. 454 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000962-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 16, 2015
Kadeem R. Smith appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on
January 7, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
made final by the denial of post-sentence motions on February 26, 2014.
On November 18, 2013, a jury convicted Smith of carrying a firearm without
a license and carrying a firearm on public property in Philadelphia. 1 The
court sentenced Smith to an aggregate term of four to eight years’
imprisonment. On appeal, Smith raises the following three issues: (1)
whether Smith waived the merits of his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement
issue; (2) whether he failed to properly raise a motion for judgment of
acquittal; and (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to support his
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1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1) and 6108, respectively.
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firearm possession conviction. After a thorough review of the submissions
by the parties, the certified record, and relevant law, we affirm the judgment
of sentence.
The trial court set forth the facts as follows:
On December 3, 2010, at approximately 12:44 a.m., police
responded to a report about gunshots on the 3100 block of
Reach Street. There was no one at this location. However, upon
surveying the scene and responding to screams coming from
approximately two blocks away, police located Lamar Wilkins
lying on the ground at G and Allegheny Streets. Wilkins had two
gunshot wounds in his left leg. He reported to police that he had
withdrawn money from an ATM located at Kensington and
Allegheny Streets. As he was walking away, Wilkins was
approached from the side and from behind by two armed men
who demanded his money. They went through his pockets and
took his keys, a wallet containing five dollars ($5.00), a cell
phone, and an iPod. A struggle ensued, and Wilkins was struck
in the head with the butt of a gun and, ultimately, shot twice in
his left leg. The offenders fled northbound on the 3200 block of
G Street. Wilkins provided a description of both offenders.
These descriptions were dispatched over police radio.
Thereafter, he was taken by ambulance to Temple University
Hospital to be treated for the gunshot wounds.
Based upon the radio information, police located and
pursued [Smith] and his co-conspirator Julius Bailey. [Smith]
was pursued through an alley and apprehended near G and
Madison Streets. [Smith] was transported to Temple University
Hospital where he was positively identified by Wilkins as one of
the men who shot him.
Police searched the vicinity of G and Allegheny Streets for
evidence of a robbery. They found a .40 caliber Taurus
semiautomatic handgun in the backyard of a house in the alley
where [Smith] had been pursued by police. A DNA examination
of that handgun was performed, and it revealed that [Smith]’s
DNA was on the handgun.
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Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/2014, at 2-3 (footnote and record citations
omitted).
Smith was arrested on December 3, 2010, and charged with
aggravated assault, robbery, conspiracy, carrying a firearm without a
license, carrying a firearm on public property in Philadelphia, and possessing
an instrument of crime. Smith and Bailey were tried together, and their jury
trial began on November 12, 2013. On November 18, 2013, the jury
convicted Smith of carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a
firearm on public property in Philadelphia. The jury found Smith not guilty
of the remaining charges. On January 7, 2014, the court sentenced him to a
term of three-and-a-half to seven years’ incarceration for carrying a firearm
without a license and a consecutive term of six to 12 months’ incarceration,
followed by four years’ probation, for carrying a firearm on public property in
Philadelphia.
On January 16, 2014, Smith filed a motion for reconsideration of
sentence, requesting to modify and reduce the sentence. However, prior to
the resolution of the post-sentence motion, Smith filed a pro se notice of
appeal on February 5, 2014.2 Appellate counsel was appointed. On
February 12, 2014, the trial court ordered Smith to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Smith
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2
Because Smith filed the notice of appeal, the motion for reconsideration
was denied by operation of law on February 26, 2014.
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failed to file a concise statement. On June 19, 2014, the court sent a letter
to Smith’s counsel again requesting a concise statement.3 On August 18,
2014, Smith filed a statement.
Smith now raises the following issues on appeal:
A. Did [Smith] waive the merits of his [Rule] 1925(b) statement
issues, under the circumstances?
B. Did [Smith] waive, or fail to raise, a motion for judgment of
acquittal?
C. Did the Commonwealth submit sufficient evidence to prove
the necessary element of “concealment” beyond a reasonable
doubt, in its prosecution of the charge of violating 18
Pa.C.S.A. §6106(a)[, carrying a firearm without a license,]
against [Smith]?
Smith’s Brief at 2.
In his first issue, Smith asserts he did not waive the merits of his
concise statement issues for failure to timely file. Id. at 6. Specifically, he
states the trial court inadvertently sent the concise statement order to trial
counsel, but not to appellate counsel. Moreover, he avers that while a copy
of the order was sent to Smith, himself, “the Docket record does not show if
the document was ever actually received by [Smith] who was incarcerated
somewhere in the Pennsylvania prison system at that time.” Id.
Furthermore, he indicates appellate counsel was also having difficulty
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3
The court indicated that it considered a delay in receiving the notes of
testimony before making the second request for the concise statement.
N.T., 8/25/2014, at 2 n.4.
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locating and obtaining the trial transcripts and it was not until counsel
contacted the court requesting assistance to obtain those transcripts that
counsel was then informed of the Rule 1925(b) order.
We find this first issue moot as the trial court did not waive Smith’s
issues. Based on the procedural history, it appears there was a judicial
breakdown and/or clerical error when the court sent the Rule 1925(b) order
to trial counsel and not to appellate counsel. Nevertheless, the trial court
did send the order again to the proper counsel and permitted Smith to file a
concise statement. Furthermore, in its August 25, 2014, Rule 1925(a)
opinion, the court addressed the issues raised in Smith’s concise statement.
Therefore, we need not address this issue further.
In his second argument, Smith contends the court erred in finding that
he never submitted a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the
carrying a firearm without a license offense. Smith’s Brief at 9. He states
he did make an oral motion at trial, and the court denied that motion,
finding there was enough evidence for the case to go to the jury with respect
to all of the charges. Id.
With regard to this issue, the trial court stated:
After carefully reviewing the record, the Court finds that
[Smith]’s counsel never submitted a Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal. Therefore, the Court did not erroneously deny this
motion. However, even if the court had denied the defense’s
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, the Court’s decision would not
have constituted error in this case.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/2014, at 3.
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Our review of the record indicates that at the end of the
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Smith’s counsel did, indeed, make an oral
motion for judgment of acquittal. Trial counsel stated:
I would make a motion for judgment of acquittal for
Kahdeem Smith [sic] on all charges. My argument is brief in
that no reasonable jury, based on the evidence they have heard,
would be able to find beyond a reasonable doubt that my client
committed aggravated assault, robbery, conspiracy, and the
VUFA charge of possessing an instrument of crime.
N.T., 11/15/2013, at 67. The Commonwealth then requested the court deny
the motion. Id. The court responded, “Thank you. I recognize the two of
you have done your jobs by making the appropriate motion for judgment of
acquittal, but I think there is enough evidence for the case to go to the jury
with all those charges.” Id. at 68.
We conclude that while Smith did not make a specific argument as to
the proof of the element of concealment when he made the motion for
judgment of acquittal, his oral motion did encompass that issue.
Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the trial court properly denied the
motion.
In his third argument, Smith argues there was insufficient evidence for
the case to go to the jury on the charge of carrying a firearm without a
license because the Commonwealth did not prove the element of
“concealment.” Id. at 10. Smith admits that while the evidence
demonstrated he “was at some time and place in possession of the firearm”
that was found by police on the night in question, the evidence did not
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establish that he concealed the weapon. Therefore, he states there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction.
A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular
charge, and is granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth
has failed to carry its burden regarding that charge.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 926 A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007).
The crime of carrying a firearm without a license is defined as follows:
[A]ny person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person
who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except
in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid
and lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a felony
of the third degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a).
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Here, the record reveals the following: On the early morning of
December 3, 2010, the victim, Lamar Wilkins, testified he was coming from
an ATM machine, when two men came up to him and put a gun to his side,
asking for money. N.T., 11/12/2013, at 150-151. The victim stated both
men had guns, and he “believed” Smith and co-defendant Bailey removed
their guns from “inside their jackets” when they approached him. Id. at
151. Police Officer Patrick Keck responded to a radio dispatch regarding a
shooting, and saw two males walking in the vicinity of the incident that
matched the description of the perpetrators. Id. at 93. He indicated that
before he exited his vehicle, Smith and Bailey took off running in the
direction of an alleyway on G Street. Id. A foot chase ensued with Police
Officer Joseph Guinan responding to the scene. N.T., 11/14/2013, at 146.
Officer Guinan followed Smith while Officer Keck pursued Bailey. Officer
Guinan observed Smith come out of the G Street alley and then go into
another alley between Madison and Willard Streets. Id. at 148. The officer
ran behind Smith and told him to stop. Id. Smith stopped about half-way
up the alley. Id. Officer Guinan did not see Smith discard anything during
the chase. Id. at 159.
Later that morning, Detective Gilberto Ortiz recovered a loaded .40
caliber Taurus semiautomatic handgun from a rear yard of one the homes
that abutted the alleyway between the 800 block of Willard and Madison
Streets. See N.T., 11/14/2013, at 58-59. Forensic testing of the recovered
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gun was subsequently completed. Benjamin Sapir Levin, of the Philadelphia
Police Department DNA Laboratory, testified he analyzed DNA samples taken
from the gun as well as samples taken from Smith and Bailey. Smith was
found to be a contributor of DNA tested from swabs of the gun’s tripper
grips, trigger guard, and ammunition magazine. Id. at 81-98. Lastly, it was
stipulated at trial that Smith did not have a valid license to carry a firearm.
Id. at 49.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and drawing all reasonable inferences
therefrom, we conclude, as did the trial court, that there was sufficient
evidence to support Smith’s carrying a firearm without a license conviction.
The element of concealment was established circumstantially by the
Commonwealth, which is permissible. See Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d at 165.
The facts demonstrated that when Smith fled down the alleyway, the officer
did not observe him brandishing a gun. Nevertheless, a gun was recovered
from that same alleyway and Smith’s DNA was found on the weapon.
Additionally, the victim testified that he saw Smith and his co-defendant
remove the guns from inside their jackets. The jury could reasonably infer
that Smith concealed the weapon on his person before throwing it into a
backyard while fleeing down the alley. Therefore, we conclude the
Commonwealth presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to support
Smith’s firearm conviction under Section 6106(a), and the trial court did not
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err in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, Smith’s
final argument also fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/16/2015
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