IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1127
Filed June 24, 2015
MARSHALL RAY ADCOCK,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David F.
Staudt, Judge.
Marshall Adcock appeals the district court’s dismissal of his third
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Darrell G. Meyer, Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kim Griffith, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, J.
Marshall Adcock appeals the district court’s dismissal of his third
application for postconviction relief.
On October 22, 2007, Adcock pleaded guilty to one count of criminal
mischief in the second degree as an habitual offender. See Iowa Code §§ 716.4,
902.8 (2007). Because he had two prior felony convictions in Illinois, he was
sentenced to the habitual-offender maximum sentence of fifteen years and
minimum of three years in confinement. See id. § 902.8. He appealed his
sentence, and the appeal was dismissed as frivolous. He filed an application for
postconviction relief asserting various grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel and claiming his plea was not knowing and voluntary. The district court
dismissed the application. Adcock appealed, and this court affirmed, finding,
“The record before us belies Adcock’s claims his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered into.” See Adcock v. State (Adcock I), No 09-0657, 2010 WL
446513, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2010). Adcock filed a second application
for postconviction relief. The application was dismissed, Adcock appealed, and
the appeal was dismissed as frivolous.
Adcock filed a third application for postconviction relief. The application
was dismissed, and Adcock appealed. This court held the dismissal was proper
as to all but one issue: whether Adcock’s sentence was illegal because it
constituted an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. See Adcock v.
State (Adcock II), No. 11-1703, 2013 WL 5743649, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct.
23, 2013). We remanded for a determination on that issue alone. See id. at *4.
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On remand, the district court considered and dismissed the illegal-sentence
claim. Adcock appeals.
First, in a pro se supplemental brief, Adcock asks us to address an
additional ineffective-assistance claim, which asserts his trial counsel was
ineffective for allowing him to enter his guilty plea because the plea was not
voluntary and knowing. The claim is not properly before us and has no merit.
Our previous remand was expressly limited to the illegal-sentence claim; this
ineffective-assistance claim was not within the scope of the district court’s ruling
from which Adcock now appeals. Further, as in Adcock’s previous appeal, this
ineffective-assistance claim is no more than a “restated argument[] on the same
issues that have already been adjudicated” in the multitude of prior proceedings.
Id. at *2. Finally, it has already been established Adcock’s plea was entered
knowingly and voluntarily, so an ineffective-assistance claim on that ground is
meritless. See Adcock I, 2010 WL 446513, at *1.
Second, Adcock’s constitutional claim is also without merit. We review the
matter de novo. See State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009). Both
the United States and Iowa Constitutions prohibit the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Iowa Const. art. I, § 17.
Adcock has not alleged any distinction between the functions of the state and
federal constitutions, and we therefore “apply the general principles as outlined
by the United States Supreme Court for addressing a cruel-and-unusual-
punishment challenge . . . .” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 883.
Adcock asserts his “fifteen year sentence with a three year minimum is
grossly disproportionate to [his] property crime involving damage as low as
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$1000, merely because [he] has two prior felonies.” The language of Adcock’s
brief indicates his challenge is an as-applied attack to our legislature’s habitual-
offender sentencing enhancements. See id. at 884; Iowa Code § 902.8.
We first determine whether we infer gross disproportionality in Adcock’s
sentence—a threshold determination in an as-applied attack. See Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010). We consider four general principles. State v.
Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 650 (Iowa 2012). First, we give “substantial deference”
to the penalties prescribed by our legislature. Id. Second, it is rare that a
sentence rises to the level of gross disproportionality. Id. Third, “a recidivist
offender is more culpable and thus more deserving of a longer sentence than a
first-time offender.” Id. Lastly, a case’s unique circumstances can converge and
together “generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality.” Id. at 651.
None of these general principles weigh in Adcock’s favor. Our legislature
has determined habitual felons are subject to longer sentences than first-time
offenders, and we defer to its determination. There are no unique or particular
circumstances that generate a high risk of potential disproportionality. This is not
one of the rare cases of a grossly disproportionate sentence.
Adcock had two prior felonies and caused over $1000 in property damage
resulting in a three-year minimum confinement. In a United States Supreme
Court case, Ewing v. California, the defendant stole merchandise worth
approximately $1200 and, as a result of having at least two prior felony
convictions, was sentenced to twenty-five years to life. 538 U.S. 11, 19–20
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(2003). The sentence as applied in Ewing was not unconstitutional, and neither
is the sentence in the case before us.
AFFIRMED.