STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A14-0427
Dakota County Gildea, C.J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: June 24, 2015
Office of Appellate Courts
Roger Earl Holland,
Appellant.
________________________
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Phillip D. Prokopowicz, Chief Deputy
Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Special
Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1. Because it was immediately apparent to police who saw text messages on
appellant’s cell phone that the text messages might provide evidence of a crime, the
district court did not err in concluding that police properly seized appellant’s phone
pursuant to the plain-view exception.
1
2. Because the search warrants were supported by probable cause, the district
court did not err in denying appellant’s motions to suppress evidence obtained from
execution of the warrants.
3. Because the district court examined the juror twice on the record, the juror
gave inconsistent testimony in response to questions posed during voir dire, and the juror
told court staff that she felt intimidated by the judge, it was not an abuse of discretion for
the district court to strike the juror for cause without examining the juror a third time.
Affirmed.
OPINION
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
Appellant Roger Earl Holland was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder
for the deaths of Margorie Holland and her unborn child. 1 On appeal, Holland raises
three arguments. First, Holland argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence
from his cell phone, which he contends police illegally seized. Second, Holland argues
that the district court erred in admitting evidence obtained from the execution of
numerous search warrants, because the warrant applications lacked probable cause.
Third, Holland argues that the district court improperly dismissed a juror for cause.
Because we conclude that police properly seized the cell phone under the plain-view
1
The jury also found Holland guilty of two counts of second-degree murder under
Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2014), but, consistent with Minn. Stat. § 609.035,
subd. 1 (2014), he was not sentenced on those counts.
2
exception, the search warrants were supported by probable cause, and the district court
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror, we affirm Holland’s conviction.
On March 7, 2013, Apple Valley police responded to a report of a pregnant
woman in cardiac arrest. The caller, appellant Roger Earl Holland, told dispatch that the
woman was unconscious, not breathing, and cold. Police were dispatched to an
apartment and arrived at approximately 10 a.m. Police met Holland, who yelled, “She is
in here, please help.” Police found Margorie Holland (“Margorie”) lying on her back at
the bottom of a set of stairs inside the apartment.
Officers noticed several red scratches on the left side of Holland’s face and neck.
In statements to police, Holland said that Margorie had been suffering from abdominal
cramps that morning and that he had rubbed her back to relieve the pain. Holland
claimed that Margorie had sat in front of him and that during a cramping episode, she had
accidentally scratched him. He said Margorie then told him she was hungry and he went
to Taco Bell to get her food. On his way, he said, he received a text message from
Margorie asking for McDonald’s instead, so Holland said he went to McDonald’s.
Holland stated that when he returned home, he found Margorie face down on the floor,
wrapped in a blanket, and nonresponsive. Holland said he rolled her over and started
CPR before calling 911.
Police undertook resuscitation efforts until paramedics arrived. Police noticed that
Margorie’s hands were darker in color than the rest of her body, and that she had dried
blood in both nostrils and on her upper lip and face. Margorie’s pants were cut away as
part of the life-saving efforts, and police noticed dark bruises on both knees and an
3
abrasion on Margorie’s left knee. Margorie also had abrasions that appeared to be
friction burns on both elbows and a bruise and scratch on one arm. Officers noticed
small reddish-purple dots on Margorie’s face that appeared to be petechiae. 2
Officer Valerie Holes was one of the first police officers to arrive at the Hollands’
apartment. She asked Holland about the text messages he said that he had received from
Margorie so that she could determine how long Margorie had been unresponsive. As
Holland tried to show Officer Holes the messages, his hand was shaking so badly that
Officer Holes could not read the display on the phone. Officer Holes asked to see
Holland’s phone, and Holland gave his phone to the officer. Officer Holes testified that
she did not intend to seize Holland’s phone at that time but was trying to gain information
that might be helpful for the paramedics. In looking at Holland’s phone, Officer Holes
saw that Margorie and Holland’s phones had exchanged text messages that morning that
were consistent with Holland’s statements. Officer Holes told the other officers and
paramedics that the last text message in the conversation was sent at 9:38 a.m.
Margorie was transported by ambulance to Fairview Ridges Hospital. After
attempting life-saving measures, the emergency room doctor pronounced Margorie dead.
Margorie’s death also caused the death of her unborn child. As part of the examination
of Margorie’s body, the doctor noticed a faint abrasion or irritation on the front part of
Margorie’s neck, but the doctor did not see any obvious head injuries.
2
Petechiae are “minute reddish or purplish spot[s] containing blood” that appear on
skin. Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 866 (10th ed. 2001).
4
The medical examiner concluded that Margorie’s manner of death was homicide,
and the cause was strangulation. The medical examiner concluded that Margorie’s
injuries, including fractures to the horns of the thyroid cartilage in her neck and the
petechiae on her face, were not consistent with a fall down the stairs.
Following an investigation, the State charged Holland with two counts of first-
degree murder under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1); 609.2661(1) (2014) and two counts of
second-degree murder under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 1(1); 609.2662(1) (2014) for
Margorie’s death and the death of her unborn child. On December 17, 2013, the jury
found Holland guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-
degree murder. The district court convicted Holland of two counts of first-degree murder
and sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole.
See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a); 609.2661. This appeal follows.
I.
We turn first to Holland’s contention that the district court erred in admitting
evidence obtained from the search of his cell phone. Specifically, Holland argues that
police seized his cell phone without a warrant and that the seizure therefore violated the
federal and state constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Because police illegally seized his
cell phone, Holland argues, the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of the
phone must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (stating that the exclusionary rule prohibits the use of
evidence that has been “come at by exploitation of [an] illegality” (citation omitted)
5
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The State concedes that police seized Holland’s cell
phone, but advances three exceptions to the warrant requirement to argue that the
warrantless seizure was lawful: the plain-view exception, consent, and the inevitable
discovery doctrine. Before addressing these arguments, we begin with a discussion of the
facts surrounding the seizure of Holland’s cell phone.
Holland moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone before trial.
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the State offered testimony
from Officer Holes and Detective Sean McKnight.
Officer Holes testified regarding her conversation with Holland, recounted above,
and the text messages between Holland and Margorie that she saw. Officer Holes said
that the messages were consistent with Holland’s description of his activity that morning
and related to his trip to “get food for Mar[g]orie, and . . . where the food was going to
come from.” After telling the other officers and paramedics that the last message was
sent at 9:38 a.m., Officer Holes handed Holland’s cell phone to Detective McKnight.
Detective McKnight said he came to the scene because of the suspicious nature of
Margorie’s death. He testified that, after observing the scene, he believed that Margorie’s
time of death might have been earlier than Holland’s statements indicated based on the
appearance and condition of her body. Specifically, Detective McKnight testified that,
based on his training and experience and the condition of her body, he thought Margorie
had been dead longer than 30 minutes. He explained that “the coloration” of Margorie’s
body was not consistent with “a Caucasian woman who was recently deceased.”
Detective McKnight also observed “injuries” on Margorie’s body that, based on his
6
training and experience, he did not think she had suffered within 30 minutes of police
arriving on the scene. Because of the condition and appearance of her body, Detective
McKnight explained “that the time line didn’t work that I had initially been told,” and
that “further investigation would be needed into” Margorie’s death. Detective McKnight
also noted that “Holland had scratches on him, . . . which he said came from Marjorie
Holland, which means that there was some type of altercation or something that went on
between them.” And Detective McKnight noted that the position of Margorie’s body did
not “really work for falling down the stairs because of where she was.” Detective
McKnight said that he believed a crime had been committed based on what he observed
and heard at the scene, “an assault at a minimum, homicide at the most.”
When Officer Holes gave Holland’s cell phone to Detective McKnight, Detective
McKnight explained that he put the phone in airplane mode to prevent it from sending or
receiving data, and placed it in his pocket until he could obtain a search warrant.
Detective McKnight found Margorie’s phone on the ground near where she had been
found and he also put her phone in airplane mode and into his pocket. 3
3
Detective McKnight testified that he secured Holland’s cell phone because he
“need[ed] to make sure that nothing is altered here until I can get a search warrant,” and
that his “mindset was the same as freezing a scene on a house.” The U.S. Supreme Court
has upheld temporary seizures when needed to preserve evidence until police are able to
obtain a warrant. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-32 (2001); Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 811 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701
(1983); see also Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487-88 (2014)
(noting that these principles are applicable to the seizure of cell phones). Our precedent
is in accord. State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Minn. 1990). The State does not
advance the temporary seizure rule discussed in these cases as a basis to uphold police
(Footnote continued on next page.)
7
Subsequently, Officer Holes and Holland were on the way to the hospital together,
and Holland stated that he wanted to contact Margorie’s family and needed some phone
numbers from his phone. Officer Holes received Holland’s permission for Detective
McKnight to get the numbers from Holland’s phone and Detective McKnight gave
Officer Holes the information. Other than a review of the text messages offered by
Holland at the scene and the retrieval of Margorie’s family’s phone numbers, police did
not obtain any information from Holland’s phone before obtaining a search warrant.
After obtaining the warrant, police recovered data, including additional text messages and
searches made over the internet from Holland’s phone. Holland contends that all of this
information should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal seizure of his cell
phone.
The State argues that the seizure was lawful based on the plain-view exception.
Under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, police may seize an object
without a warrant if three criteria are met. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 799 (Minn.
2012). First, the police must be lawfully in the position from which they have a view of
the object. Id. Second, the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object. Id.
And finally, the object’s incriminating nature must be “immediately apparent.” Id.
(quoting State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 631 (Minn. 1995)). Holland does not dispute
that the first two requirements are met in this case, but argues that the district court erred
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
action relative to Holland’s cell phone. Accordingly, we express no opinion on the
applicability of this rule to the circumstances presented here.
8
in determining that the incriminating nature of the cell phone was immediately apparent,
because the officers did not have probable cause to believe that Holland’s cell phone
contained incriminating evidence. Specifically, Holland faults the district court for
concluding that the seizure was justified under the plain view exception because the
police had only a “reasonable basis” to believe that a crime had been committed when
they seized his cell phone. Holland notes that the standard is not reasonableness, but
probable cause, and he contends that in seizing Holland’s phone, Detective McKnight
acted on mere suspicion.
We agree with Holland that police must have probable cause to believe the item
seized is of an incriminating nature in order to support a warrantless seizure under the
plain-view exception. See Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 631-32 (“A reasonable suspicion on the
part of police is insufficient to invoke the plain view exception.”). But our review of the
record establishes that police had probable cause.
Police have probable cause to seize an object in plain view if “ ‘the facts available
to the officer would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that certain
items may be . . . useful as evidence of crime.’ ” Id. at 632 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). To justify a warrantless seizure under the plain-view exception, probable cause
must be based on evidence “revealed in plain view” and cannot be obtained after
conducting some further search of the object. In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687,
693 (Minn. 1997) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words,
“the mere fact that the container itself is in plain view provides no basis for a warrantless
seizure and search of it, even assuming probable cause as to the contents.” Id. at 694
9
(quoting 1 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 401-02 (3d ed. 1996)). In
this case, police did not conduct a further search of the phone. When Officer Holes and
Detective McKnight looked at the phone, the text messages at issue were openly
displayed on the cell phone screen; no further examination of the phone was necessary.
Therefore if police had probable cause to believe the text messages may be evidence of a
crime, the cell phone was properly seized under the plain-view exception.
The police here had probable cause to believe that the text messages they saw in
plain view might be useful as evidence of a crime. The messages that described from
where Holland would be purchasing food for his wife, viewed in isolation, do not
evidence criminal activity. But the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that in order to
determine whether an object may be useful as evidence of a crime, the officer may
consider background information that casts light on the nature of the object. Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-43 (1983) (holding that an officer had probable cause to
believe a balloon contained an illegal substance based on his experience in narcotics
arrests and discussions with other officers); see also Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1,
3-4 (1980) (upholding the seizure of items fitting the description of recently stolen
property under the plain-view exception).
Our precedent likewise recognizes the validity of seizures under the plain-view
exception when background information has illuminated the incriminating nature of an
object. In State v. Zanter, for example, we upheld the seizure of several photographs
during a murder investigation that on their face did not appear to be incriminating.
535 N.W.2d at 632. We concluded that the officer’s background knowledge about the
10
murder, “when added to the facts observed during the search, would have led a
reasonable police officer to conclude that the photographs were incriminating.” Id.
Similarly, in State v. DeWald, the officer seized a package of unfiltered Camel
cigarettes that did not, from its appearance alone, appear incriminating. 463 N.W.2d 741,
747 (Minn. 1990). We upheld the seizure under the plain-view exception because the
officer knew that unfiltered Camel cigarettes had been observed at the scene of the crime,
and therefore police had probable cause to believe the cigarettes provided a connection to
the crime. Id. at 747-48; see also Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 801 (upholding the seizure of
shell casings when the officer “had been sent to [the scene] because the police believed
[the defendant] was a witness to a shooting homicide, which necessarily involved a gun
and therefore most likely involved shell casings”); State v. Streitz, 258 N.W.2d 768, 773
(Minn. 1977) (“Although at the time the officers converged at [the location] they had no
suspicions that they would find stolen property on the premises other than the speakers
[for which they had a warrant], what they found on the premises combined with the
background information . . . gave rise to a reasonable inference that they had stumbled
upon stolen goods.”).
We reach the same conclusion in this case. The text messages Holland showed to
Officer Holes, if considered alone, may have been innocuous. But when the timing of the
text messages was considered against the appearance and condition of Margorie’s body,
the potentially incriminating nature of the text messages displayed on Holland’s cell
phone was immediately apparent. As Detective McKnight said, the information police
gathered at the scene was not consistent with Holland’s statements and the timeline set
11
out in the text messages. Specifically, Detective McKnight testified that based on his
training, experience, and observations of Margorie’s body, he believed she had been dead
much longer than the 20 to 25 minutes indicated by the text messages. Because the
displayed text messages made it appear as though Margorie were alive when in fact she
was already dead, it was reasonable for Detective McKnight to believe that the displayed
text messages may have provided evidence that Margorie’s death was the result of a
crime and not an accident. Detective McKnight’s knowledge of the scene, when added to
his observation of the text messages, gave police probable cause to seize the phone under
the plain-view exception.
In sum, because the incriminating nature of the text messages was immediately
apparent, Detective McKnight properly seized Holland’s cell phone pursuant to the plain-
view exception. 4 We therefore hold that the district court did not err in denying
Holland’s motion to suppress evidence on the basis that police illegally seized Holland’s
phone. 5
II.
We turn next to Holland’s contention that numerous search warrants lacked
probable cause and relied on improper evidence, and therefore the district court erred in
4
The police did what the U.S. Supreme Court instructed them to do in Riley v.
California; they obtained a warrant before searching Holland’s phone. See ___ U.S. ___,
___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
5
Because we conclude that police properly seized Holland’s cell phone under the
plain-view exception, we do not reach the State’s alternative arguments that Holland
consented to the seizure or that the cell phone evidence would have inevitably been
discovered.
12
admitting evidence obtained from execution of these warrants. A warrant is supported by
probable cause if, on the totality of the circumstances, there is a “ ‘fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” State v. Fort,
768 N.W.2d 335, 342 (Minn. 2009) (quoting State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn.
1985)). On review, we must “determine whether there was a substantial basis to
conclude that probable cause existed.” State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 794 (Minn.
2000). We consider “the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent of the
suspect’s opportunity for concealment, and the normal inferences as to where the suspect
would keep the items.” State v. Pierce, 358 N.W.2d 672, 673 (Minn. 1984). Our inquiry
is limited to the information presented in the affidavit supporting the warrant. State v.
Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998). When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion
to suppress, we review the district court’s determination of probable cause de novo.
Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 798.
The police obtained numerous search warrants during their investigation. From
the first few searches, which included a search of Holland’s and Margorie’s cell phones
and the surveillance video from the Hollands’ apartment building, officers discovered
evidence that disputed Holland’s timeline from the morning of Margorie’s death.
Specifically, the message sent from Margorie’s phone regarding breakfast from
McDonald’s was sent at 9:29 a.m., but police determined that Holland did not leave the
apartment until 9:34 a.m. In addition, an examination of Holland’s phone revealed that
on March 6, the day before Margorie’s death, someone entered the following text into
13
Holland’s phone: “if you pass out and fall down a flight of stairs can you break your
neckcan [sic] your neck be broken if you are.”
The searches of the Hollands’ phones also revealed that the couple was having
financial trouble. Messages sent from Margorie’s phone showed that Margorie did not
trust Holland and was planning to leave him and to stay with her mother. The cell phones
also contained evidence that the couple had discussed divorce.
Before trial, Holland moved to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the
multiple warrants. Holland argued that his and Margorie’s cell phones had been illegally
seized and that the subsequent search warrants relied on evidence obtained from the
resulting illegal searches. Holland also generally argued that the affidavits submitted
with the warrant applications did not establish probable cause. In response, the State
argued that Holland did not have standing to challenge the seizure of Margorie’s cell
phone and, as discussed above, that the warrantless seizure of Holland’s phone was
lawful. The State also argued that the warrant applications established probable cause.
The district court denied the motions to suppress and held that Holland lacked standing to
challenge the seizure of Margorie’s cell phone, that his phone had been properly seized,
and that “the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed to support the warrants issued.” Holland argues that the district court erred in
admitting evidence obtained from the execution of these warrants. We address the
warrants at issue in turn.
14
A.
Holland first challenges the warrants authorizing searches of his cell phone, 6 his
apartment building’s surveillance videos and key logs, his body, his apartment, both of
his vehicles, and a variety of computer hardware and documents found in his apartment.
Holland argues that these warrant applications lacked probable cause because “there was
no honest and strong suspicion that a crime had been committed.” We disagree.
Opportunity to commit a crime can support a finding of probable cause. For
example, in State v. Harris, we concluded that an affidavit was sufficient to establish
probable cause, in part because the defendant had been seen in the victim’s apartment the
night of the murder. 589 N.W.2d 782, 789 (Minn. 1999).
The affidavits here establish the suspicious nature of Margorie’s death and that
Holland had the opportunity to harm her. In addition to Holland’s claims about leaving
the apartment to get food for Margorie, the affidavits include observations from the
officers at the scene about Holland’s injuries, which were consistent with fingernail
scratches, and Margorie’s injuries, which did not appear to have resulted from a single
fall down the stairs. Because the officers’ observations of Margorie’s body contradicted
Holland’s statements to police and the timing of the text messages police saw on
Holland’s cell phone, we conclude there was probable cause to believe evidence of a
6
Holland also argues that the warrant application did not state sufficient facts to
establish probable cause for the search of Margorie’s cell phone. But the district court
held that Holland did not have standing to challenge a search of Margorie’s phone.
Holland does not contest that legal conclusion on appeal. Accordingly, we do not discuss
further the search of Margorie’s phone. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20
(Minn. 1982) (stating that an issue “not argued in the briefs” is forfeited).
15
crime would be found in searches of Holland’s phone, body, apartment, vehicle,
computer and documents, and the apartment building’s surveillance and logs.
In addition to challenging the district court’s findings of probable cause to support
the warrants, Holland argues that the affidavit supporting the search of his computer
hardware relied on improper evidence. The affidavit supporting the computer hardware
warrant recounted the suspicious nature of Margorie’s death and went on to list
information found on Holland’s and Margorie’s phones, including that Holland and
Margorie were having an “ongoing argument about money,” that Margorie had
researched how late into her pregnancy she could get an abortion, and that Holland had
researched “can a person break their neck falling down the stairs.” Because we conclude,
as explained above, that police properly seized Holland’s phone under the plain-view
exception, and searched his phone pursuant to a valid search warrant, Holland’s argument
that the warrant to search his computer relied on improper evidence fails.
B.
Holland next challenges the warrants authorizing the searches of multiple other
electronic devices. Police searched devices found in Holland’s apartment and vehicles,
including laptops, old cell phones, iPads, thumb drives, and hard drives. Holland argues
that the warrants authorizing those searches lacked probable cause connecting Holland to
Margorie’s death or showing that the devices would contain evidence relevant to the crime. 7
7
The State argues that Holland lacks standing to challenge the warrants authorizing
searches of an iPad, a computer, and an iPhone, because the devices belonged to
Margorie and Holland lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items. Because
(Footnote continued on next page.)
16
We conclude that these warrant applications established probable cause and
contained sufficient information to create a nexus between the criminal activity and the
devices. See Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 749 (“[T]here must be specific facts to establish a
direct connection between the alleged criminal activity and the site to be searched.”).
The affidavits supporting the searches of the electronic devices established that a crime
had been committed by describing Holland’s 911 call, the medical examiner’s report
about Margorie’s injuries, and the medical examiner’s conclusion that Margorie’s “death
was caused by an assault by another human being.” The affidavits connected Holland to
the crime by noting police observations of his injuries and that evidence from the
previously searched cell phones and video from the apartment complex contradicted
Holland’s statements to police. Finally, the affidavits connected the electronic devices to
be searched to the crime, by stating that Holland admitted to searching the phrase “can
you break your neck falling down the stairs” on his phone and iPad. Holland claimed he
was researching whether such an injury was possible because Margorie had a dream
about becoming paralyzed. The targeted devices could have contained documents or
other search terms that would confirm or dispute Holland’s statements about the research.
We therefore conclude that there was a substantial basis to determine that probable cause
existed and that the district court did not err in denying Holland’s motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from execution of these warrants.
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
we conclude the warrant applications established probable cause, we do not reach this
argument.
17
C.
Finally, Holland challenges warrants that authorized the searches of bank accounts
and financial records. Holland argues that these warrants were issued without probable
cause, relied on improper evidence from prior illegal searches, and contained no
indication that reviewing the financial records of the couple would lead to evidence of a
crime. The State responds that the applications established probable cause. 8 We agree
with the State.
The affidavits supporting the search of Holland’s financial records included
information about the initial response to Holland’s 911 call, Margorie’s injuries,
Holland’s injuries, and the results of the autopsy. The affidavits also established
concerns with Holland’s credibility. The affidavits first stated that previous searches had
revealed a timeline of events from the morning of March 7 that contradicted Holland’s
claims and that Holland had researched someone breaking his or her neck in a fall down
the stairs. Then, the affidavits noted that prior searches had revealed text-message
conversations between Margorie and Holland regarding financial problems, despite
“statements made by [Holland] in which he painted their relationship as very good and
without issues.” Finally, the affidavits stated that Holland’s rent check for the month had
been returned for insufficient funds and that Holland’s bank accounts were closed on
8
The State also argues that Holland lacks standing to challenge searches of
Margorie’s bank accounts and financial records. Because we conclude that the
applications established probable cause, we do not reach this argument.
18
March 6, the day before Margorie’s death. 9 Based on the information in the affidavits,
there was probable cause for the warrants to search Holland’s financial records.
In sum, the challenged affidavits established probable cause and did not rely on
improper evidence. We therefore hold that the district court did not err in denying
Holland’s motions to suppress. 10
III.
Finally, we turn to Holland’s argument that the district court erred in dismissing a
juror for cause. Jury selection began on November 19, 2013. During voir dire on
November 22, 2013, a potential juror (“the juror”) told the court that she had plans to
travel to Australia on December 9, 2013. The juror said the ticket cost her $1,700, but
that she would accept the loss on the ticket and continue to serve jury duty. The juror
indicated that she would not hold it against the parties if she were unable to go on her
9
The warrant authorizing the search of Holland’s briefcase contained some
additional information, including that police obtained the briefcase from Margorie’s
parents and that Margorie’s parents suspected that Holland was committing check fraud.
The application also noted that a preliminary review of the financial documents from
other searches showed that Holland “was facing a great deal of debt.” The State argues
that a warrant for the briefcase was unnecessary because officers obtained it from private
individuals, Margorie’s parents. The Fourth Amendment constrains government
searches, but not searches conducted by private individuals. State v. Buswell,
460 N.W.2d 614, 617 (Minn. 1990). Police obtained a valid warrant before searching the
briefcase, however, and therefore the legality of a warrantless search is not before us in
this case.
10
In Holland’s brief, he challenges the warrant authorizing a second search of his
cell phone and a warrant authorizing the search of two Hotmail accounts. But the State
did not offer any evidence obtained from execution of these warrants. Accordingly, it is
not necessary for us to review whether these warrants were issued upon a showing of
probable cause.
19
vacation. The judge asked whether the parties wanted to excuse her and the State made
no objection to the juror being excused. Holland’s attorney stated that he opposed a
motion to excuse the juror for cause because the parties did not have sufficient
information to make the motion. After questioning, both parties accepted the juror and
she was selected as a juror on the case.
On November 27, 2013, the court questioned the juror again, after she contacted
one of the jury managers because she was upset about an additional cost associated with
her trip. The court conducted a hearing during which the juror was again examined on
the record. The juror told the judge that she had determined how much it would cost to
move her flight and that she could not afford it. Contrary to her earlier statements, the
juror stated that if she served on the jury, she would be distracted by thoughts of her
missed trip. After additional questions from the judge, however, the juror stated that
missing the trip would not affect her ability to serve as a juror. Neither party objected to
the juror staying on the jury, and the judge decided that she would remain on the case.
Later that same day, the juror went to the clerk’s office and told court staff that she
felt intimidated by the judge and the process. The staff person with whom the juror
spoke told the judge that the juror was “very emotional” and “kind of a wreck.” The
juror indicated that she would contact the media about missing her trip to serve on the
jury.
On a conference call with the attorneys that afternoon, the judge informed the
attorneys about the juror’s behavior based on the description the judge had received from
court staff. The prosecutor then moved to strike the juror for cause due to questions
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about her ability to be fair and impartial. The prosecutor noted that although the judge is
neutral, “the judge is still in most people’s eyes a representative of the state,” and
therefore the juror’s feelings of intimidation concerned the prosecutor. Holland’s
attorneys asked the court to question the juror on the record again before making a
decision. The judge declined to question the juror further and struck her for cause “from
the standpoint of, if nothing else, emotional stability.”
A court reporter transcribed the conference call, and the parties made a record of
the motion to strike for cause the following Monday, December 2, 2013. The judge noted
that he would normally honor Holland’s request to bring the juror back for further
questioning, but under the circumstances the court was concerned that she could taint
other jurors while waiting to be called, and it was clear to the court that the juror did not
have the stability to serve on the case. A previously chosen alternate replaced the juror
and the jury was sworn later that day.
Holland argues that the district court erred because it dismissed the juror after the
completion of voir dire, the dismissal did not meet the requirements for a dismissal for
cause under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 5(1)4, and the court relied on statements from
court staff outside of the record. The State responds that the district court properly
dismissed the juror pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02.
We begin with a review of the requirements of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 5.
We interpret procedural rules de novo. State v. Barrett, 694 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn.
2005).
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Under Rule 26.02, a challenge for cause must generally be made “before the juror
is sworn to try the case, but the court for good cause may permit it to be made after the
juror is sworn but before all the jurors constituting the jury are sworn.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.02, subd. 5(2). A party may challenge a juror for cause if the “juror’s state of
mind—in reference to the case or to either party—satisfies the court that the juror cannot
try the case impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the challenging
party.” Id., subd. 5(1)1; see also State v. Ames, 91 Minn. 365, 372, 98 N.W. 190, 192
(1904) (holding that the district court properly allowed a challenge to a juror before the
jury was complete because “[t]he cause shown was sufficient, the state had come into
possession of new evidence bearing upon the juror’s suitability, [and] the defendant was
not prejudiced”).
The district court dismissed the juror on November 27, 2013. The court swore the
jury to try the case on December 2, 2013. The timing of the State’s motion to strike the
juror for cause, therefore, did not, as Holland argues, violate Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02,
subd. 5(2). In addition, the district court did not, as Holland suggests, cite Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 5(1)4, which allows a challenge based on a “physical or mental
disability that renders the juror incapable of performing the duties of a juror,” as the
ground to strike the juror.
The district court’s dismissal of the juror, however fits under another provision in
Rule 26.02—subdivision 5(1)1, which provides that a juror may be challenged for cause
if the “juror’s state of mind—in reference to the case or to either party—satisfies the
court that the juror cannot try the case impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
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rights of the challenging party.” Given the juror’s inconsistent statements as to the
impact her missed trip might have on her and her statement to court staff that she felt
intimidated by the judge, a sentiment that the parties do not suggest was anything other
than genuine in their briefs to this court, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the State’s motion to strike the juror for cause under
subdivision 5(1)1.
Finally, Holland argues that the district court erred in relying in part on the out-of-
court statements of court staff to strike the juror. 11 Holland cites Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.02, subd. 4(1), which states, “A verbatim record of the voir dire examination must be
made at any party’s request.” The district court did question the juror on the record on
two separate occasions and the court noted that firsthand observations of the juror played
a part in its decision to grant the State’s motion. Holland is therefore incorrect when he
argues that the “district court did not have an opportunity to observe [the juror’s]
demeanor and hear her testimony about her ability to serve as a juror.” It might have
been preferable for the court to examine the juror a third time on the record. But given
the juror’s conflicting statements and the concerns she raised with court staff about
feeling intimidated by the judge, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in
relying on the out-of-court statements from court staff.
Affirmed.
11
Despite Holland’s contention that the district court should not have relied on out-
of-court statements, Holland did not request that the court staff who spoke with the juror
testify on the record.
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