J-S32042-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
RANDOLPH J. SCOTT, II, :
:
Appellant : No. 116 WDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on December 11, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-43-CR-0001847-2010
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 24, 2015
Randolph J. Scott, II, (“Scott”) appeals, pro se, from the Order
dismissing his second Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On December 4, 2010, Scott was arrested after forcing his way into a
residence and firing a semi-automatic weapon. He was charged with
attempted criminal homicide, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering
another person, terroristic threats, possession of an instrument of crime,
possession of a firearm prohibited, discharge of a firearm into an occupied
structure and firearm not to be carried without a license. On May 3, 2011,
Scott pled guilty to possession of a firearm prohibited and firearm not to be
carried without a license, in exchange for the Commonwealth nolle prossing
the remaining charges against him. Because the parties did not agree to a
J-S32042-15
sentence as part of the plea, Scott was notified that the court would decide
whether his sentences would run concurrently or consecutively.
Subsequently, on June 1, 2011, the trial court sentenced Scott to a
prison term of five to ten years on the possession of a firearm prohibited
conviction and a consecutive prison term of two and one-half to five years
on the firearm not to be carried without a license conviction. Scott filed a
timely Notice of Appeal, which was discontinued on July 18, 2011.
On July 20, 2011, Scott filed his first PCRA Petition. The PCRA court
appointed Scott counsel. Notwithstanding being informed of the
consequences of withdrawal, Scott withdrew his first PCRA Petition.
Scott filed the instant PCRA Petition, pro se, on October 29, 2014.
After filing a Notice of Intention to Dismiss, the PCRA court dismissed Scott’s
Petition as untimely filed. Thereafter, Scott filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
Our standard and scope of review of a PCRA court’s denial of PCRA
relief is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the evidence of record and its conclusions are without legal
error. Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Under the PCRA, a petition, “including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
-2-
J-S32042-15
expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). Timeliness of
a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requirement. Commonwealth v. Abu-
Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Pa. 2008).
In this case, Scott’s judgment of sentence became final when Scott
discontinued his direct appeal on July 18, 2011. See Commonwealth v.
Conway, 706 A.2d 1243, 1244 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating that “[a]ppellant’s
judgment of sentence became final when his direct appeal was discontinued
at his request.”). Thus, Scott had until July 18, 2012, to file a timely PCRA
petition. Scott’s October 29, 2014 Petition was facially untimely.
However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition
if the appellant can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions: (i)
interference by government officials in violation of the appellant’s
constitutional rights; (ii) the discovery of facts unknown to the appellant,
which could not have been previously ascertained with due diligence; or (iii)
the assertion of a constitutional right recognized by the United States
Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where the Court’s
decision was rendered after the appellant’s deadline for a timely petition,
and was held to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A
petition invoking one or more of these exceptions must be filed within sixty
days of the date the claim could first have been presented. Id.
§ 9545(b)(2).
-3-
J-S32042-15
Scott presents various claims of ineffectiveness of counsel for our
review. Such allegations do not meet the statutory requirements for an
exception to the PCRA’s timeliness bar. See Commonwealth v. Wharton,
886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the
jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.”). Moreover, Scott’s
claim regarding the withdrawal of his guilty plea due to the imposition of
consecutive sentences does not assert an exception to the PCRA’s timeliness
requirements. Due to Scott’s failure to overcome the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of his
claims. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1267-68.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/24/2015
-4-