NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 1 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAMON LAMAR CAMPBELL, No. 12-17820
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00532-RCJ-VPC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MANUEL PORTILLO; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 22, 2015**
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Damon Lamar Campbell appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
excessive use of force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Campbell’s
deliberate indifference claim because Campbell failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants Clark and Beun were deliberately indifferent
to Campbell’s injuries resulting from the altercation. See id. at 1057-60 (a prison
official acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health; negligence and a mere difference in
medical opinion are insufficient).
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to defendants Baca
and Lindsay because Campbell failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether Baca and Lindsay were personally involved in any constitutional
violation or whether there was a causal connection between their conduct and any
such violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011)
(requirements for establishing supervisory liability).
However, in granting summary judgment on Campbell’s excessive force
claim, the district court improperly disregarded the factual allegations contained in
Campbell’s verified complaint. See Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 784 F.3d
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495, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2015) (district court cannot disregard evidence at the
summary judgment stage solely based on its self-serving nature even if it is
uncorroborated); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing
that verified pleadings are admissible to oppose summary judgment). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Campbell, Campbell raised a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendants maliciously and sadistically used
force against him. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (holding that
“the core judicial inquiry” in resolving an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”); Furnace v. Sullivan,
705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) (a court reviewing a summary judgment
motion must “assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party”).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings as to this claim.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Campbell’s motion
for default judgment as a discovery sanction because the record supports the
district court’s conclusion that defendants proceeded with discovery in good faith
and were unable to locate the videotape. See Goodman v. Staples The Office
Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
3 12-17820
review). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Campbell’s
request to extend discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir.
2002) (describing trial court’s broad discretion in discovery matters).
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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