UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4580
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN LOUIS LEWANDOWSKI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00330-D-1)
Submitted: June 26, 2015 Decided: July 2, 2015
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Louis Lewandowski appeals the within-Guidelines
sentence imposed by the district court after he pled guilty to
receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2) (2012), and possession of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2012). On appeal, he
contends that his 97-month sentence is substantively
unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Because Lewandowski asserts no
procedural error, we consider whether the sentence is
substantively reasonable, “tak[ing] into account the totality of
the circumstances” and giving due deference to the district
court’s decision. Id. at 51. We presume on appeal that a
sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
is substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014);
see United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295-96 (4th Cir.
2012) (rejecting argument that presumption of reasonableness
should not apply to sentences for child pornography offenses).
Lewandowski bears the burden of rebutting this presumption “by
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306.
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Here, the district court reasonably determined that a
sentence of 97 months was appropriate based on its thorough,
individualized assessment of Lewandowski’s case in light of his
arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. Based on the totality of
the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing the chosen sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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