COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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THE STATE OF TEXAS, No. 08-14-00011-CR
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Appellant, Appeal from the
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v. County Court at Law No. 7
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ISELA DOMINGUEZ, of El Paso County, Texas
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Appellee. (TC# 20110C10845)
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OPINION
The State of Texas seeks reversal of a new trial order granted on legal sufficiency, Brady1
violation, and interest-of-justice grounds in favor of Isela Dominguez. In two issues, the State
contends it did not violate Brady by failing to affirmatively provide a photograph of
Dominguez’s injuries and the criminal history of a non-testifying complaining witness for
Dominguez’s use at her assault trial. The State further contends that Dominguez’s conviction
rested on legally sufficient evidence and that she failed to articulate valid interest-of-justice
grounds in her motion.
We agree that the trial court lacked adequate cause to grant a new trial. We reverse the
new trial grant and reinstate Dominguez’s conviction.
1
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
BACKGROUND
Factual History
In April 2011, Imelda Dominguez and her husband Robert were traveling by motorcycle
from El Paso to a wine festival in Las Cruces, New Mexico, when they stopped at a tobacco shop
in a shopping center located on Airway Boulevard. As Imelda and Robert Dominguez attempted
to leave the shopping center parking lot, a blue SUV raced between the motorcycles and almost
knocked them over. The three vehicles came to a stop. Imelda Dominguez testified that the
defendant, Isela Dominguez, exited the SUV and began screaming at and hitting Robert. The
record shows that Robert Dominguez was bigamously married to both women at that time.
Imelda testified that she was unaware of Robert’s pre-existing marriage until after she had
already married him, and that she had a previous run-in with Isela before.
When Robert attempted to drive away from Isela, she ran after him and grabbed the sissy
bar on the back of his motorcycle. Isela then tripped and was dragged about ten feet behind
Robert’s motorcycle. Imelda Dominguez testified she was about fifteen to twenty feet from
where Isela came to rest on the pavement. Imelda stated that she did not think Robert was aware
that Isela had been dragged, and that as soon as he saw her behind him, he made a U-turn and
returned to check on her. An off-duty paramedic also checked on Isela. Imelda further testified
that when she drove over to see what happened to Isela, that Isela jumped up from the pavement,
grabbed Imelda by the hair, and pulled her off her motorcycle into the street. The motorcycle
then fell on top of Imelda while still running and started to leak gasoline. Imelda testified that as
she lay on the ground pinned by her motorcycle, Isela—now joined by Isela’s mother—began
hitting and kicking Imelda, and at some point, Isela ripped one of Imelda’s earrings from out of
her ear, causing pain and bleeding. Robert Dominguez and the off-duty paramedic broke up the
fight and lifted the motorcycle off Imelda. Isela refused medical treatment for her injuries.
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After arguing in the parking lot, Robert and Imelda Dominguez left the parking lot to
return to their home. Isela followed them. According to Imelda, Isela was driving very
carelessly and almost ran them over. When the three converged at Imelda and Robert’s house,
Isela continued arguing with Robert and claimed that his motorcycle actually belonged to her.
Imelda told Robert to give Isela the motorcycle. Isela’s brother-in-law eventually came to
retrieve it. Later that day, police arrested Imelda for criminal mischief based on Isela’s
allegation that Imelda had cut the seat on her motorcycle. After Imelda was booked into jail,
authorities took her to the hospital for treatment of what was later determined to be a concussion.
Imelda suffered from vomiting, a severe headache, and a black eye. At trial, the State introduced
photographs of Imelda’s injuries, depicting Imelda’s black eye and arm bruising.
Procedural History
The State charged Isela Dominguez with one count of assault. On September 30, 2013,
the jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court, upon the recommendation of Dominguez
and the State, sentenced Dominguez to 365 days in jail, probated for twelve months, imposed a
$100 fine, and ordered restitution. On October 29, 2013, Dominguez moved for a new trial.
Dominguez alleged that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence, and that the State
violated Brady disclosure requirements by failing to disclose: (1) the District Attorney’s
subpoena request for Robert and Imelda Dominguez; (2) case information regarding Robert
Dominguez’s indictment for unauthorized use of a vehicle and aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon in Cause No. 20110D046452; and (3) photographs of her injuries “as a result of the
above Cause Numbers . . . .” Dominguez requested that the trial court grant her motion on Brady
violation grounds and in the interests of justice.
2
The records show that the unauthorized use of a vehicle charge was dismissed and that Robert Dominguez pleaded
guilty to one count of assault causing bodily injury. He was sentenced to time served.
3
At a hearing on her motion for new trial, Dominguez’s counsel attested to not receiving
or being able to access a picture depicting her injuries on the El Paso District Attorney’s Office
electronic portal.3 The State conceded that the photos of Dominguez’s injuries were not
accessible electronically through the El Paso District Attorney’s Office case portal in this matter
because those photos had been electronically assigned to the digital file for the assault case
against Robert Dominguez, in which Isela was listed as the victim. However, a prosecutor
maintained that the photos were available in the physical case file, and that counsel for
Dominguez was aware of their existence at the time of trial and could have used them. With
respect to Robert Dominguez’s criminal history, the State argued that it was not required to
provide that information to Isela Dominguez, given that Robert never showed up for trial to
testify for the State, and, alternatively, that his criminal history was public information.
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court reversed Dominguez’s
conviction and ordered a new trial. The State appealed. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art.
44.01(a)(2)-(3)(West Supp. 2014)(defining appellate jurisdiction over state appeals in criminal
actions).
DICUSSION
In two issues, the State maintains that the trial court erred by granting a new trial because
the evidence underpinning Dominguez’s conviction was legally sufficient, the State did not
violate Brady’s mandates, and because Dominguez essentially waived her interest-of-justice by
failing to point out any serious trial flaws that would cast doubt on the validity of her conviction.
Standard of Review
3
The 34th Judicial District Attorney’s Office employs an online portal allowing enrolled defense attorneys to have
electronic access to the State’s file on their clients, subject to certain terms and conditions. See generally 34th
Judicial Dist. Attorney’s Office, Conditions of District Attorney Portal Use by Defense Attorneys, EL PASO CNTY.,
http://www.epcounty.com/da/documents/caseportalterms.pdf (last visited July 7, 2015)(outlining system use policy).
4
We review the trial court’s new trial ruling for abuse of discretion. State v. Herndon, 215
S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). In reviewing a new trial grant, “we look to the grounds
pleaded by the movant in the motion and determine whether any of these grounds provide a basis
for granting the new trial.” State v. Fury, 186 S.W.3d 67, 73 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.]
2005, pet. ref’d). A trial judge “cannot grant a new trial on mere sympathy, an inarticulate
hunch, or simply because he personally believes that the defendant is innocent or received a raw
deal.” Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 907 [Internal quotation marks omitted]. Instead, even where a
defendant urges a new trial on interest of justice grounds, “[a] motion for a new trial, whether for
guilt or punishment, requires a valid legal claim.” State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 107
(Tex.Crim.App. 2014). “To grant a new trial for a non-legal or legally invalid reason is an abuse
of discretion.” Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 907.
The trial court must grant the defendant a new trial for any of the reasons articulated in
TEX.R.APP.P. 21.3, including “when the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.”
TEX.R.APP.P. 21.3(h). “The trial court retains the discretionary power to grant a new trial for
any legal reason not listed in TEX.R.APP.P. 21.3.” State v. Vigil, No. 08-13-00273-CR, 2015 WL
2353507, at *3 (Tex.App.--El Paso May 15, 2015, no pet.)(not designated for publication).
While “[t]he defendant need not establish reversible error as a matter of law before the trial court
may exercise its discretion in granting a motion for new trial[,] . . . trial courts do not have the
discretion to grant a new trial unless the defendant demonstrates that his first trial was seriously
flawed and that the flaws adversely affected his substantial rights to a fair trial.” Herndon, 215
S.W.3d at 909. The Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to set bright-line rules for the
appellate courts to use in assessing whether the trial court’s abused its discretion on a ground not
enumerated in TEX.R.APP.P. 21.3, but the Court has suggested “a trial court would not generally
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abuse its discretion in granting a motion for new trial if the defendant: (1) articulated a valid
legal claim in his motion for new trial; (2) produced evidence or pointed to evidence in the trial
record that substantiated his legal claim; and (3) showed prejudice to his substantial rights under
the standards in Rule 44.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at
909.
A.
Legal Sufficiency
As a threshold matter, we address the State’s legal sufficiency argument, subsumed in
State’s Issue One. In her motion for new trial, Dominguez maintained that the verdict was
contrary to the law and the facts, i.e., legally insufficient. She raises no sufficiency points in her
appellate reply brief. We address the issue because the State here bears the burden of proof on
its appeal. Further, it constitutes a ground the trial court ostensibly considered in rendering its
new trial order. We find the jury’s guilty verdict is legal sufficient.
Applicable Law
“In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a
reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact
finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lucio v.
State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “Our role on legal sufficiency review
is not to usurp the jury and replace its verdict with our own; instead, we serve as a procedural
safeguard, ensuring that whatever verdict the jury rendered comports with due process.” Urias v.
State, No. 08–12–00090–CR, 2014 WL 1259397, at *2 (Tex.App.--El Paso Mar. 26, 2014, no
pet.)(not designated for publication). “Our role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the
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rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally.” Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638
(Tex.Crim.App. 2010)[Internal quotation marks omitted]. “We do not overturn a verdict unless
it is irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Smallwood v. State, No. 08-
12-00215-CR, 2014 WL 4269155, at *3 (Tex.App.--El Paso Aug. 29, 2014, pet. ref’d)(not
designated for publication).
A person commits assault of she “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another . . . .” TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1)(West Supp. 2014).
Analysis
The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the jury, may be legally sufficient to
uphold a conviction. Shah v. State, 403 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.
ref’d). Here, the content of Imelda Dominguez’s testimony is sufficient to uphold the assault
charge. Bodily injury is defined in the Penal Code as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment
of physical condition.” TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8)(West Supp. 2014). Imelda testified
that Isela pulled her off her motorcycle by her hair, then kicked Imelda and ripped out her
earrings while she was still pinned down. If the jury believed this testimony, then it could have
found that Isela intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused Imelda bodily injury. The trial
court’s new trial order could not have rested on legal insufficiency grounds.
B.
Brady Violations
We next turn to the evidence suppression allegations. In the remainder of Issue One, the
State contends that a photograph of Dominguez’s injuries and a copy of a non-testifying
complaining witness’ criminal history did not constitute Brady materials.
Applicable Law
Due process requires prosecutorial disclosure of information material to guilt or
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innocence that is favorable to the defendant. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97.
This rule recognizes the reality that suppression of such evidence would give the State an unfair
advantage in “shap[ing] a trial that bears heavily on the defendant[;]” the affirmative disclosure
requirements imposed by Brady help to avoid “cast[ing] the prosecutor in the role of an architect
of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice[.]” Id. at 88, 83 S.Ct. at 1197.
“A Brady violation occurs when the state suppresses, willfully or inadvertently, evidence
favorable to” a defendant. Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) A
defendant states a proper Brady claim where: (1) “the State failed to disclose evidence,
regardless of the prosecution’s good faith or bad faith;” (2) “the withheld evidence is favorable
to him;” (3) “the evidence is material, that is, there is a reasonable probability that had the
evidence been disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been different[;]” and (4) “the
evidence central to the Brady claim [is] admissible in court.” Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797,
809 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). “[W]e will not hesitate to reverse a case for Brady violations[]
should we have doubts about the fairness of the resulting conviction.” Castaneda v. State, 28
S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2000, pet. ref’d).
“The state’s duty to reveal Brady material to the defense attaches when the information
comes into the state’s possession, whether or not the defense requested the information.” Harm,
183 S.W.3d at 407. “However, the state is not required to seek out exculpatory evidence
independently on appellant’s behalf, or furnish appellant with exculpatory or mitigating evidence
that is fully accessible to appellant from other sources.” Id. “Favorable evidence is any evidence
that, if disclosed and used effectively, may make the difference between conviction and
acquittal.” Little v. State, 991 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). “It includes both
exculpatory and impeachment evidence.” Id. “Exculpatory evidence is testimony or other
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evidence which tends to justify, excuse or clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt.” Id. at
866-67. “Impeachment evidence is that which is offered to dispute, disparage, deny, or
contradict.” Little, 991 S.W.2d at 867.
1.
Photographs of Defendant’s Injuries
We first turn out attention to the photographs. According to the allegations in her motion
for new trial, the photographs allegedly suppressed by the State depict the injuries she sustained
as the victim of Robert Dominguez, who was charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, assumedly out of this incident.
Dominguez’s related Brady claim would fail on the merits because the photograph is not
material to the case at bar. See Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 809 (before reversing for state suppression
of evidence, appellate court must determine there is reasonable probability of difference in trial
outcome in light of disclosure). In Ball v. State, 631 S.W.2d 809, 810-11 (Tex.App.--Eastland
1982, pet. ref’d), the Eastland Court of Appeals, in reviewing a murder conviction, ruled that a
photograph of an injury to the defendant’s eye constituted Brady material that the State should
have turned over to the defense. This case is distinguishable. In Ball, the defendant’s trial
testimony raised the issues of self-defense and heat of passion, which, if believed, either would
have exonerated him completely or else allowed the jury to convict on the lesser-included
offense of manslaughter. Because the photographs depicting the defendant’s injuries could be
used to bolster his claim that he acted in self-defense, they were material to the defense, and the
State had a duty to furnish them to the defendant.
By contrast, here, Isela Dominguez never makes clear in her brief how the injuries she
sustained when she grabbed on to the back of Robert’s motorcycle are material to this case,
which pertains to her assault of Imelda thereafter. Thus, even if the State did withhold these
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photographs, we do not believe there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would
have been different had the photographs been disclosed. The trial court’s judgment could not
have rested on this ground.
2.
Criminal History of Non-Testifying Witness
We next address whether the State was required, under Brady, to disclose Robert
Dominugez’s criminal history to Isela Dominguez. Although Isela repeatedly refers to Robert as
the complaining witness in her brief, Isela was actually charged with assault against Imelda
Dominguez, not Robert. The State attempted to subpoena Robert Dominguez and included him
on its witness list, but he did not show up for trial.
The State must disclose evidence that impeaches a State’s witness under Brady. United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380-81, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985);
Wilkerson v. State, No. 04-11-00391-CR, 2012 WL 1940650, at *2 (Tex.App.--San Antonio May
30, 2012, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Jones v. State, No. 06-11-
00085-CR, 2012 WL 1813465, at *1 (Tex.App.--Texarkana May 16, 2012, pet. ref’d)(mem. op.,
not designated for publication)(noting that a reversible Brady violation occurs from failure to
“disclose evidence that may impeach the credibility of a State’s witness where the witness’
credibility is material to the disposition of an accused’s guilt”).
The State concedes that if Robert had testified at trial, it would have had to disclose his
criminal history information as impeachment evidence under Brady. The crux of the State’s
argument on appeal is that because he did not testify, it had no obligation to turn over
impeachment evidence to Dominguez under Brady. We question whether the State can escape
its Brady obligations by simply failing to call a witness on its list, particularly in light of the fact
that the Rules of Evidence permit parties to attack a non-testifying hearsay declarant’s credibility
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“by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a
witness.” TEX.R.EVID. 806. The State points out that it never sought to admit any hearsay
statements Robert made, thereby mooting that question and rendering any impeachment evidence
inadmissible and thus outside the bounds of Brady. See Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 809 (suppressed
evidence must be admissible before court may reverse criminal conviction on Brady grounds).
While we agree the State’s argument fits within the letter of Brady on appellate review, we do
not believe the State’s after-the-fact justification—that is, that taint from failure to promptly
disclose impeachment evidence against a State’s witness who would have apparently testified but
for the State’s inability to secure his presence via subpoena is vitiated because his testimony was
never actually offered—strongly evinces compliance with the spirit of Brady.4 Cf. Harm, 183
4
THE COURT: Let me interrupt you a little bit with regard to – there is a list of the subpoena request. As I
understand the Defendant’s motion, part of what they are complaining about is that you do list
Robert Javier Dominguez as a victim, and that there – you did not provide the criminal
background information with regard to that victim.
MS. ROGNESS: Right.
THE COURT: You did provide criminal background information with regard to Imelda Dominguez in his Exhibit
No. 1.
MS. ROGNESS: Right.
THE COURT: But there was nothing comparable to that with regard to the other victim. [. . .] I understand that
he did not testify.
MS. ROGNESS: And that is the next thing I address in my response.
So the only Brady information that we are to give is when it’s exculpatory or impeachment.
And I kind of ran through this earlier. You can’t impeach someone who doesn’t testify. So we
knew the day of trial – the day before trial when preparing for this case, that he had not been
subpoenaed.
Had he miraculously shown up, like sometimes happens, we would have compiled Brady material.
We don’t go around giving out rap sheet information when it doesn’t apply. NCIC reports, they’re
very strict about who issues that information. And unless we’re required to disclose that
information – and we aren’t if a witness isn’t going to testify – then we can’t.
. . .
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S.W.3d at 407 (affirmative Brady duty of disclosure attaches at the time information comes into
the State’s possession, not on the eve of trial). Indeed, by engaging in this practice of compiling
and disclosing Brady information only in the event a State’s witness actually shows up for trial,
the State essentially forces a defendant to either ask for a surprise continuance mid-trial or else
risk waiving any Brady complaint on appeal. See Fury, 186 S.W.3d at 73-74 (describing a
defendant’s failure to ask for a continuance upon the disclosure of Brady material at trial as a
situation in which the defendant either waived any Brady error or essentially conceded that any
Brady error did not prejudice him). We hesitate to endorse this type of prosecutorial
brinksmanship as being consistent with the spirit of Brady, and our opinion should not be taken
as a tacit blessing of this strategy.
However, we need not delve into this fray. Here, we agree that impeachment information
against Robert would have been irrelevant and inadmissible under these circumstances, meaning
that even if the State violated its Brady disclosure duties, error was essentially harmless because
Dominguez could not have used this information at trial. Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 809. We also
note that Dominguez’s request regarding Robert’s criminal history information could have been
obtained in the exercise of due diligence. Although there is no general public records exception
to Brady, “[d]ocuments . . . that are a part of public records are not deemed suppressed by the
State if defense counsel should know of them and fails to obtain the records because of a lack of
MS. ROGNESS: Also, if the Defense had wanted Mr. Dominguez to testify, we would have provided that
impeachment information. They could have subpoenaed and called him as a witness as well – just
running all avenues.
THE COURT: Let me ask you about that. I mean, does he need to know about that criminal history in order to
make the decision that, Hey, I do want to bring this guy in to get that?
MS. ROGNESS: Well, he did know about the assault. He might – well, and the other thing, the first one I
mentioned, the fraudulent use of ID information, they were – the defendant and Mr. Dominugez
were married at that point. Under his jail information, he listed her as the contact. It would be
very strange that she was not actually aware of that as well. And so I argue that they do know.
They were aware. And if they weren’t, it was lack of due diligence.
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diligence in his own investigation.” Dalbosco v. State, 978 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex.App.--
Texarkana 1998, pet. ref’d). Based on these facts, we find no reversible Brady error and no
“serious flaws” affecting substantial trial rights that would justify the trial court’s exercise of
discretion on this ground. See Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 909.
In short, the trial court’s order could not have rested on the State’s failure to disclose
these materials. Issue One is sustained.
C.
Interest of Justice Grounds
Finally, in Issue Two, the State contends that the trial court could not have granted a new
trial on interest-of-justice grounds under these circumstances. We agree.
As stated previously, the defendant need not show reversible error per se before obtaining
a new trial in the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 909. However, the
trial court may only grant a new trial in the interest of justice where a defendant alleges serious
flaws that affected her right to a fair trial. Id. Here, Dominguez made no specific allegations as
to why she should receive a new trial in the interest of justice. Because the defendant did not
“allege sufficient grounds to appraise the trial judge and the State as to why [s]he believes” she
should receive a new trial in the interest of justice, the trial court could not have relied on
interest-of-justice grounds in reaching its ruling. See State v. Varkonyi, No. 08-06-00262-CR,
2008 WL 821580, at *3 (Tex.App.--El Paso Mar. 27, 2008, pet. dism’d)(not designated for
publication)[Internal citation and quotation marks omitted].
Issue Two is sustained.
CONCLUSION
We do not take allegations of Brady violations lightly. While we find the technological
and procedural issues raised by this case troubling, we find no legal violation of Brady under
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these facts. We find the evidence underpinning Dominguez’s conviction was legally
sufficient, that the prosecution technically complied with the letter of its Brady requirements, and
Dominguez failed to state adequate interest-of-justice grounds. Therefore, the trial court could
not have granted a new trial as based on Dominguez’s motion for new trial.
The State’s two appellate issues are sustained. We reverse the trial court’s order and
reinstate Dominguez’s conviction.
July 8, 2015
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice
Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)
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