FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMARA MANSARE, No. 13-70640
Petitioner, Agency No. A087-838-340
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 10, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Amara Mansare, a native and citizen of Guinea, petitions for review of the
BIA’s decision finding him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Mansare challenges
the BIA’s determination that his conviction for attempted sale of marijuana
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
constitutes a “particularly serious crime.” Mansare also challenges the BIA’s
denial of CAT relief, which the BIA denied on the merits, concluding that Mansare
failed to establish that it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to
Guinea.
1. Mansare does not contest that his 2010 conviction for attempted sale of
marijuana constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U).
Rather, Mansare argues that the particular facts underlying his conviction “fall[]
outside the grave conduct that encompasses a ‘particularly serious crime.’” To
overcome the presumption that his drug trafficking crime was a particularly serious
offense, Mansare was required to meet the six criteria set forth in Matter of Y–L–,
23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (AG 2002). The IJ and BIA concluded that Mansare failed to
demonstrate both that the drug transaction involved “a very modest amount of
money” and that Mansare was only peripherally involved in the crime. Because
Mansare does not raise a constitutional claim or question of law related to the
BIA’s “particularly serious crime” determination, we lack jurisdiction to review
the issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444, 448 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“[Section] 1252(a)(2)(D) cannot restore jurisdiction to review a
‘particularly serious crime’ determination where, as here, the only challenge to that
determination is that [the BIA] incorrectly assessed the facts.”).
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2. Because the BIA denied Mansare deferral of removal under CAT “on the
merits,” we have jurisdiction to consider whether substantial evidence supports the
BIA’s decision. See Brezilien v. Holder, 569 F.3d 403, 410 (9th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because the record
does not compel a conclusion that Mansare, if returned to Guinea, would more
likely than not be personally targeted for torture. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder,
755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014). Mansare testified about four specific
instances of harm he suffered in Guinea, but those events do not establish that
Mansare will be tortured if returned to Guinea. His past harm appears to be the
product of indiscriminate violence, rather than based on Mansare’s ethnicity or
profession. The country conditions evidence on which Mansare relies likewise
falls short of compelling a contrary conclusion. While the evidence indicates that
torture occurs in Guinea, the evidence does not indicate Mansare would be
personally targeted for torture in Guinea. See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044,
1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence of generalized violence insufficient to establish
the petitioner “would face [a] particular threat of torture beyond that of which all
citizens of [the country] are at risk”).
DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
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