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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 KERRY KRUSKAL,
3 Plaintiff-Appellant,
4 v. NO. 34,229
5 MIKE MELLIGER AND
6 SABROSO RESTAURANT,
7 d/b/a SABROSO L.L.C.,
8 Defendants-Appellees.
9 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY
10 Sarah C. Backus, District Judge
11 Kerry Kruskal
12 Arroyo Seco, NM
13 Pro Se Appellant
14 Walcott & Henry P.C.
15 Charles V. Henry, IV
16 Santa Fe, NM
17 for Appellees
18 MEMORANDUM OPINION
1 WECHSLER, Judge.
2 {1} Plaintiff Kerry Kruskal (Plaintiff), in a self-represented capacity, appeals from
3 the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice his complaint against Defendants
4 Mike Mellinger and Sabroso Restaurant (Defendants). [RP 38] This Court issued a
5 calendar notice proposing to affirm. Plaintiff has filed a “response to proposed
6 disposition,” which we duly considered. Unpersuaded, we affirm.
7 {2} In this Court’s calendar notice, we noted that the New Mexico Human Rights
8 Act (NMHRA) does not provide for de novo trial in district court where a person has
9 not first exercised the process available through the NMHRA. See NMSA 1978, § 28-
10 1-10 (2005) (providing for trial de novo in district court in lieu of a hearing before the
11 division); NMSA 1978, § 28-1-13 (2005) (providing for trial de novo in district court
12 on an appeal from an order of the division). [CN 2] This Court further noted that the
13 district court does not have jurisdiction of a NMHRA matter until Plaintiff has
14 exercised the administrative remedies available to him under the NMHRA. See
15 Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 282, 980 P.2d 65
16 (providing that under the NMHRA, a plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative
17 remedies against a party before bringing an action in district court against that party);
18 see also In re Application of Angel Fire Corp., 1981-NMSC-095, ¶ 5, 96 N.M. 651,
2
1 634 P.2d 202 (“Jurisdiction of the matters in dispute does not lie in the courts until the
2 statutorily required administrative procedures are fully complied with.”). [CN 2–3]
3 {3} In response, Plaintiff asserts that he has filed a complaint with an administrative
4 agency other than the Human Rights Commission (Commission). [Response 1]
5 Plaintiff does not, however, assert that he filed a complaint with the Commission and
6 either completed the procedure to waive a hearing before the Commission in favor of
7 a trial de novo in district court pursuant to Section 28-1-10, or sought a trial de novo
8 in district court on appeal from an unfavorable decision by the Commission as
9 permitted by Section 28-1-13. Plaintiff thus has not shown that he exhausted his
10 administrative remedies and that the district court had jurisdiction of his claim.
11 {4} For the reasons set forth in our notice and above, we affirm.
12 {5} IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 ________________________________
14 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
15 WE CONCUR:
16 ________________________________
17 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
18 ________________________________
19 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge
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