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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13649
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00041-BAE-GRS
CAROL WILKERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF GEORGIA,
STATESBORO, GEORGIA,
BULLOCH COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(July 16, 2015)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Carol Wilkerson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal without prejudice of her complaint, which named the State of Georgia,
Bulloch County, and the City of Statesboro as defendants and sought $5 million in
damages from each defendant, with a public apology. In her fee-paid complaint,
Wilkerson alleged that several named and unnamed Bulloch County and City of
Statesboro employees mistreated her at various times and in various circumstances.
Before any of the defendants responded, the district court dismissed the complaint
sua sponte on the ground that it was “facially frivolous.”
Wilkerson’s appellate brief lists four issues for appeal, namely, that the
district court (1) failed to conduct a de novo review of the record after she objected
to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation; (2) ignored her proffered
evidence; (3) erred in implying that she is mentally imbalanced; and (4) erred in
finding that her lawsuits were “abusively frivolous.”
We generally review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint
for abuse of discretion. See Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1335-37 (11th
Cir. 2011). We likewise generally review a district court’s dismissal for frivolity
for abuse of discretion. Cf. Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)
(concerning frivolity review of an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)). And we assume without deciding that a district court has the inherent
authority to dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when, as here, the
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plaintiff has paid the required filing fee. 1 See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St.
Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that district courts
have such sua sponte authority); cf. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1821 (1989) (“Section 1915(d), for
example, authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is
little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory
provision.”).
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
Wilkerson’s complaint as “facially frivolous.” A complaint “is frivolous where it
lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Cf. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831-32 (1989) (concerning frivolity for in forma
pauperis actions under § 1915). Among other allegations in the complaint,
Wilkerson alleged that, when she attended a bond-revocation hearing in state court
in December 2013, a courtroom officer and a county deputy used excessive force
to make her comply with their directions. Specifically, Wilkerson alleged that the
county deputy “threw her into a chair in a room of the courthouse while twisting
her arm viciously” and that the courtroom officer “hit plaintiff in her chest with his
fist.” (Doc. 1 at 6).
1
This Court has not held in a published opinion that district courts have inherent
authority to dismiss frivolous fee-paid complaints sua sponte, but we have expressly declined to
hold “that cases cannot, if proper procedures are followed, be dismissed when they are so
patently lacking in merit as to be frivolous.” Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto
Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983).
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In short, Wilkerson’s complaint facially alleged that two state employees
used excessive force against her, either to detain her or while she was already
detained. Such a claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., West v.
Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1070 (11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing an excessive-force claim
under § 1983 based on an allegedly unreasonable seizure); Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559
F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a jailor’s use of force against a
pretrial detainee is excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment if it “was applied
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”).
Although Wilkerson did not specifically cite § 1983 in her complaint,
federal courts generally “must look beyond the labels of [filings] by pro se
[plaintiffs] to interpret them under whatever statute would provide relief.” See
Means v. Alabama, 209 F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (concerning pro se
inmates); cf. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)
(“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Likewise,
the fact that Wilkerson did not specifically name the courtroom officer or the
deputy is not fatal in light of Wilkerson’s pro se status. See Wilger v. Dep’t of
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Pensions & Sec. for State of Ala., 593 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1979). 2 In her
complaint, Wilkerson “made allegations which indicate that there may be
individuals (whether state officials or others) who are amenable to suit in federal
court.” Id. Therefore, Wilkerson should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
amend her complaint “to add such parties-defendant as [she] choose[s] to name.”
Id.; cf. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (pro se plaintiffs must be
given at least one chance to amend their complaint before dismissal, at least where
a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim), overruled in part by
Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (counseled parties are not entitled to leave to amend sua sponte).
Whether Wilkerson has filed frivolous complaints in the past does not
answer the question of whether her current complaint is abusive or frivolous.
While the magistrate judge noted that Wilkerson had been given a “warning” in the
past about filing frivolous lawsuits, the magistrate judge did not reference, and it
does not otherwise appear, that Wilkerson was subject to any filing restrictions at
the time that she filed the instant complaint. Given that our review of Wilkerson’s
complaint indicates that she has alleged at least one claim with an arguable basis in
law or fact, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in sua sponte
dismissing her complaint as facially frivolous.
2
This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1,
1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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The judgment of the district court is therefore VACATED, and this case is
REMANDED for further proceedings. 3
3
Because we vacate and remand, we do not address Wilkerson’s other contentions on
appeal.
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