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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
BILAL LEE WATTS, :
:
Appellant : No. 1990 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on October 14, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-22-CR-0004106-2013
BEFORE: WECHT, STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2015
Bilal Lee Watts (“Watts”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of insurance fraud, criminal attempt (theft
by deception), and false reports to law enforcement. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 4117(a)(2), 901(a), 4906(b)(1). We affirm.
On February 29, 2012, Watts reported to the Pennsylvania State Police
that he had been involved in a hit-and-run accident on Interstate 81 in
Dauphin County. Pennsylvania State Trooper Ronald Charles (“Trooper
Charles”), responded to the scene and determined that the damage to the
car was not fresh, as the damage had already rusted. Nevertheless, on
March 12, 2012, Watts filed a claim with his insurance company, Geico
Insurance Company (“Geico”), relating to the accident. The estimated claim
payment for the damage was $976.98. Albert A. Tenuta (“Tenuta”), an
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investigator for Geico, determined that Watts had previously filed a claim
with Progressive Insurance Company (“Progressive”) for the same damage.
Watts was arrested and charged with various crimes. On August 24,
2014, a jury found Watts guilty of the above-mentioned charges. The trial
court sentenced Watts to serve nine to twenty-three months in work release
for each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. Watts filed a Post-
Sentence Motion, which the trial court denied.
Watts filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, Watts filed a court-
ordered 1925(b) Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal,
and the trial court issued an Opinion.1
On appeal, Watts raises the following questions for our review:
I. Was there insufficient evidence to conclude that [Watts] filed a
false claim?
II. Did the trial court err in denying [Watts’s] [P]ost[-S]entence
[M]otion because the jury’s verdict against [Watts] was so
against the weight of the evidence as presented at trial so as to
shock one’s sense of justice?
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing an unduly
harsh and unreasonable sentence because the trial court failed
to consider [Watts’s] rehabilitative needs versus the public’s
safety?
Brief for Appellant at 7.
1
We note that the trial court found the Concise Statement to be vague
regarding the sufficiency and weight of the evidence claims. See Trial Court
Opinion, 2/23/14, at 3. While the Concise Statement is vague, we decline to
find waiver on this basis.
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In his first claim, Watts alleges that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he had filed a false claim. Id. at 17. Watts argues that the
evidence clearly shows that the damage from the first and second claims
were different. Id. at 18. Also, Watts states that the testimony showed
that he received chiropractic care ten days after the alleged second accident.
Id. Watts contends that this evidence proves that he had been in two
separate accidents, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions. Id.2
The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is as
follows:
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate
court, viewing all of the evidence and reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
winner, must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to
enable the fact-finder to find that all elements of the offense
were established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 499 (Pa. 1997). Further, the
Commonwealth can sustain its burden of proving every element beyond a
reasonable doubt by using wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa. Super. 2003).
In order to sustain a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(2), the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant
2
Watts does not specifically cite to the convictions from which he is
appealing. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). While we may find waiver based upon
Watts’s vague argument, we decline to do so and will address his claim.
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[k]nowingly and with the intent to defraud any insurer or self-
insured, presents or causes to be presented to any insurer or
self-insured any statement forming a part of, or in support of, a
claim that contains any false, incomplete or misleading
information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(2).
In order to sustain a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a), the
Commonwealth must prove that “[w]ith intent to commit a specific crime,
[the defendant] does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the
commission of that crime.” Id. § 901(a). A person commits theft by
deception, the defendant “[i]ntentionally obtains or withholds property of
another by deception.” Id. § 3922(a)(1).
In order to sustain a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4906(b)(1), the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant “[r]eports to law
enforcement authorities an offense or other incident within their concern
knowing that it did not occur.” Id. § 4906(b)(1).
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the record reflects that on February 29, 2012, Watts told Trooper Charles
that he had been involved in a hit-and-run crash. N.T., 8/21/14, at 20.
Trooper Charles testified that, based on his years of experience doing crash
reports, the damage to the vehicle was not fresh because it had already
rusted. Id. at 25-26. Trooper Charles also testified that after explaining to
Watts that the damage was not fresh, Watts responded, saying, “[i]t just
happened. I swear.” Id. at 26.
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Tenuta testified that Watts filed a claim with Geico on February 29,
2014, the same day that his policy went into effect. Id. at 41-43. The
estimated claim payment was $976.98. Id. at 52. Tenuta further testified
that he discovered that Watts had also filed an identical claim with
Progressive. Id. at 57. When showed two pictures, one of the damage from
the night in question and one from the Progressive claim, Tenuta stated that
the damage was the same. Id. at 57-58. In viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to
support his convictions.
In his second claim, Watts argues that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence presented at trial. Brief for Appellant at 19. He
claims that the testimony of Tenuta and Trooper Charles was so inconsistent
that the jury’s verdict shocks one’s sense of justice. Id.
The standard of review for challenges to the weight of the evidence is
as follows:
A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial
court’s discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled
that the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a
new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is only
warranted where the fact-finder’s verdict is so contrary to the
evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice. In determining
whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited
to whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly exercised,
and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of
record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion.
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Commonwealth v. Karns, 50 A.3d 158, 165 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
and brackets omitted).
Initially, Watts incorporates by reference his sufficiency argument.
However, our appellate rules do not allow for incorporation by reference.
See Commonwealth v. Veon, 109 A.3d 754, 774 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(stating that an appellant waives any claim where he or she incorporates by
reference to prior arguments). In any event, from the verdict, it is
apparent that the jury found the testimony of both Trooper Charles and
Tenuta credible. See Karns, 50 A.3d at 165 (stating that the fact finder
determines the credibility of witnesses). Because the evidence supports the
jury’s verdict, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Watts’s weight of the evidence claim.
In his final claim, Watts challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence.
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of the
sentence must invoke this [C]ourt’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether the appellant’s brief has a
fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
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The determination of what constitutes a substantial question
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial
question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable
argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
sentencing process.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(quotation marks and some citations omitted).
Here, Watts filed a timely Notice of Appeal, raised his claims in a
timely Post-Sentence Motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) Statement in his
brief. Further, Watts’s claim that the trial court failed to consider the nature
and circumstances of the crimes and his rehabilitative needs raises a
substantial question. See Brief for Appellant at 11-12; see also
Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating
that failure “to consider relevant sentencing criteria, including the protection
of the public, the gravity of the underlying offense and the rehabilitative
needs” raises a substantial question). Thus, we will review Watts’s
sentencing claims.
Watts argues that the trial court did not consider his mental health
needs. Brief for Appellant at 20-21. Watts asserts that he has been
diagnosed as being schizophrenic and bipolar. Id. at 20.
Our standard of review is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
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Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,
exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias
or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 589 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citation omitted).
The trial court addressed Watts’s sentencing claim as follows:
[The trial court] carefully considered all of the factors including
[Watts’s] offense gravity score and prior record as well as the
Commonwealth’s sentence recommendation. Clearly, [Watts’s]
sentence is well below the aggregate that could have been
imposed. Further[,] review of the sentencing hearing transcript
reveals that th[e trial c]ourt also carefully considered the factors
raised by [Watts]: mental health treatment, the fact of his
employment and his desire to remain employed to support his
family and that any criminal history did not involve insurance
fraud. It is notable that this [c]ourt ordered that [Watts’s]
incarceration be served in a work release setting[,] which would
facilitate his continued efforts to remain employed. [Watts] was
also granted a deferred report date to permit him to get his
family’s affairs in order and ensure that he would have a job
while serving his sentence[,] which is indicative of the [c]ourt’s
consideration of his obligations with respect to his wife and
children.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/14, at 4 (citations omitted). We discern no abuse
of discretion in the trial court’s reasoning. Therefore, we cannot grant Watts
relief on this claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/16/2015
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