In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13‐3767
PARASHU GIRI,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney
General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A078‐872‐597
____________________
ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2014 — DECIDED JULY 17, 2015
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and TINDER, Cir‐
cuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Parashu Giri, a citizen of Nepal,
was living in the United States as a conditional permanent
resident based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, Tammy Giri,
until the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”) terminated his conditional resident status after
finding that his marriage was entered into for the purpose of
2 No. 13‐3767
remaining in the United States. Removal proceedings com‐
menced shortly thereafter. On the day of his merits hear‐
ing—after the court granted his request to advance the date
of his merits hearing—Parashu1 sought a continuance on the
grounds that he had not been fingerprinted, as required, and
was not able to timely submit documentation to support the
validity of his marriage to his U.S. citizen spouse. The immi‐
gration judge (“IJ”) denied the request finding that Parashu
had ample time to get fingerprinted and submit his petition
for relief and evidence supporting the bona fides of his mar‐
riage, but he was not diligent in completing these tasks. Be‐
cause the IJ previously had found that Parashu conceded
removability, and there were no additional matters pending
before the IJ, the IJ ordered Parashu removed to Nepal. The
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upheld the IJ’s ruling.
Parashu petitioned this court for review. Because the immi‐
gration courts provided a reasoned explanation for the IJ’s
decision not to grant a continuance that did not depart from
established policies or rest on an impermissible basis and
because the record indicates that Parashu conceded remova‐
bility and was removable to Nepal, we deny the petition for
review.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 29, 1998, Parashu Giri, a citizen of Nepal, law‐
fully entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor. In
2001, he married a U.S. citizen, Tammy Giri, and gained
conditional permanent residence based on his marriage to
Tammy. This was Parashu’s second marriage.
1 To avoid confusion, we will refer to Parashu and Tammy Giri by
their first names throughout this opinion.
No. 13‐3767 3
In May 2003, Parashu and Tammy submitted a joint I‐751
petition to remove the conditions of his permanent resi‐
dence. USCIS denied the petition in February 2007 based on
Parashu’s and Tammy’s failure to appear for the I‐751 inter‐
view and a letter Tammy sent to USCIS in July 2003 with‐
drawing her support of the I‐751 petition. In April 2007, Pa‐
rashu and Tammy filed a second joint I‐751 petition. On Jan‐
uary 29, 2010, USCIS denied the petition finding that Para‐
shu maintained a relationship with his first wife after their
purported divorce in 1998, lived and had a child with his
first wife during his marriage to Tammy, Parashu did not
consistently live with his U.S. citizen spouse, and other evi‐
dence led to the conclusion that Parashu entered into the
marriage with Tammy to avoid immigration laws. In Febru‐
ary 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
served Parashu with a notice to appear, which commenced
removal proceedings.
Sakina Carbide, Parashu’s counsel, refiled a motion for
an individual hearing on October 21, 2010. (The immigration
court rejected the initial motion packet, filed on September 8,
2010, because of a missing signature.) The motion packet
contained the motion and a response to the notice to appear,
among other documents. The motion for an individual hear‐
ing informed the court that Parashu and Tammy wished to
renew their I‐751 petition. But a copy of an I‐751 petition was
not included. The motion requested that the IJ schedule a
merits hearing regarding the same as soon as possible. The
response to the notice to appear, signed by Parashu, admit‐
ted almost all of the allegations in the notice to appear, spe‐
cifically, that he: (1) is not a U.S. citizen, (2) is a citizen of
Nepal, (3) was admitted to the United States on or about
April 29, 1998, and (4) became a permanent resident on a
4 No. 13‐3767
conditional basis on July 31, 2001. He also admitted that his
conditional status was terminated, but he denied that he was
removable.
On October 21, 2010, by written order, the immigration
court granted the motion for a merits hearing, finding that
Parashu conceded removability. The order also stated that
“The application(s) for relief must be filed by 45 days before
next hearing”; and Parashu must be fingerprinted “by 60
days before next hearing.” The next day the immigration
court issued a notice of hearing stating that Parashu’s merits
hearing would take place on July 25, 2012. On February 17,
2012 the court issued another notice rescheduling the merits
hearing to August 23, 2012.
The immigration court held the merits hearing on August
23, 2012. Parashu appeared at the hearing with his counsel,
Carbide, who had not yet entered an official appearance
even though she had been representing Parashu in this mat‐
ter since at least August 2010. She acknowledged that she
failed to enter an appearance.
After discussing her failure to enter an appearance, coun‐
sel asked for a continuance based on the fact that Parashu
had not been fingerprinted and that counsel was unable to
timely submit the documentary evidence supporting the bo‐
na fides of Parashu’s marriage, which was over 800 pages of
documents illustrating the couple’s twelve‐year relationship
and included a copy of the I‐751 petition dated March 1,
2007. She stated that she had trouble getting an appointment
for USCIS to fingerprint Parashu. She stated that over the
past two years there had been difficulty trying to obtain the
documentary evidence from Parashu to support the bona
fides of the marriage, and that she just received the docu‐
No. 13‐3767 5
ments the previous afternoon. She admitted that her first
meeting with Parashu to prepare his case occurred two days
before the hearing. Though not stated at the merits hearing,
Carbide said at oral argument that she tried to meet with Pa‐
rashu several times prior to the merits hearing, but he would
cancel each meeting.
The IJ noted that her previous order indicated that Para‐
shu had to be fingerprinted sixty days before the merits
hearing and that he had to submit his application forty‐five
days before the merits hearing. The IJ also noted that Para‐
shu requested an early hearing date but did nothing to pre‐
pare for the hearing for two years. Ultimately, the IJ deter‐
mined that a continuance was not warranted because Para‐
shu had ample time to prepare for the hearing and failed to
do so and failed to present a reason why he was not ready
for the hearing. Since there was nothing further pending be‐
fore the court and Parashu had already conceded removabil‐
ity, the court ordered Parashu removed to Nepal.
Parashu appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA. On Novem‐
ber 15, 2013, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling in an order rely‐
ing on the IJ’s determination of fact and law and supple‐
menting the ruling with its own analysis.
II. ANALYSIS
Parashu petitions the court for review. He raises two
main issues, whether (1) the IJ abused her discretion by
denying his motion for a continuance, and (2) the IJ erred by
finding that he conceded removability and ordering him re‐
moved to Nepal. Since the BIA adopted the findings of the IJ
and added its own analysis, we review the IJ’s decision as
6 No. 13‐3767
supplemented by the BIA. Palma‐Martinez v. Lynch, 785 F.3d
1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2015).
A. The IJ Did Not Err by Denying Parashu’s Motion for
Continuance.
The court reviews a denial of a motion for a continuance
for an abuse of discretion. See Calma v. Holder, 663 F.3d 868,
875 (7th Cir. 2011). “[A]s long as the immigration judge gives
a reason for his decision, this court will uphold the decision
unless it was made without a rational explanation, inexpli‐
cably departed from established policies, or rested on an im‐
permissible basis.” Id. The court reviews constitutional
claims de novo. Alvarado‐Fonseca v. Holder, 631 F.3d 385, 389
(7th Cir. 2011).
Parashu argues that a continuance was warranted be‐
cause he did not seek one for purposes of delay, had never
requested a continuance, and was unaware of the deadline
for filing supplemental evidence. He further argues that he
had good cause for his delay in filing, but the court never
allowed him to explain that because his abusive and control‐
ling wife was withholding documents from him, he was un‐
able to file the supplemental evidence earlier. He suggests
that he should receive a reprieve from the consequences of
his actions because he was pro se until the hearing.
An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good
cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Further an IJ “may set and
extend time limits for the filing of applications and related
documents and responses thereto, if any. If an application or
document is not filed within the time set by the Immigration
Judge, the opportunity to file that application or document
shall be deemed waived.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c).
No. 13‐3767 7
The IJ denied the continuance because Parashu had over
a year and a half to prepare for the merits hearing, which Pa‐
rashu requested accelerated; he had been warned of the
deadlines for filing his application and completing finger‐
printing and failed to comply; he did not give a reason for
his lack of compliance; and he did not request a continuance
in advance of the merits hearing. This explanation is rational
and neither inexplicably departs from established policies
nor rests on an impermissible basis. Also, it was within the
IJ’s discretion to refuse to give Parashu more time to file the
supporting documents. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c). Therefore,
the IJ’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. See Umezurike
v. Holder, 610 F.3d 997, 1003–04 (7th Cir. 2010). At the hear‐
ing, Parashu’s counsel seemed to acknowledge that under
the circumstances of this case, a hearing typically does not
go forward. Shortly after the IJ’s comments about how she
was troubled by Parashu’s insincere continuance request and
his attempt to tender a voluminous submission on the day of
the merits hearing, counsel said to the IJ, “I understand that
this is absolutely against protocol, this is absolutely against
the rules and procedures, and you know, … you’re correct.”
Additionally, there is no evidence on the record of good
cause supporting a continuance. There might have been
good cause if Parashu’s inability to file the supporting doc‐
uments earlier was because of spousal abuse. However, Pa‐
rashu never submitted any evidence supporting this and
failed to raise the argument to the IJ. Even on the record be‐
fore the court now, there is still no evidence that Tammy
abused or controlled Parashu, that she threatened to with‐
draw her sponsorship of Parashu’s visa petition, or that she
used his financial and emotional dependency on her to con‐
trol him by threatening to abandon him or have him deport‐
8 No. 13‐3767
ed. The IJ could not have found good cause due to spousal
abuse when Parashu did not present the argument or evi‐
dence supporting the argument to her. Counsel did have the
opportunity to present this argument at the hearing, but
failed to do so. Further, to the extent Parashu or his counsel
had trouble collecting supporting documents due to Tam‐
my’s failure to produce them, Parashu could have requested
that the immigration court issue a subpoena for the records.
See Reyes‐Cornejo v. Holder, 734 F.3d 636, 646 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1)) (recognizing the immigration
court’s subpoena power); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.35(b).
Parashu’s counsel disingenuously argues for leniency be‐
cause Parashu was appearing pro se until the day of the mer‐
its hearing. At the merits hearing, Parashu’s counsel present‐
ed a notice of entry of appearance of counsel (an “E‐28”) for
this matter dated August 2010 and admits that she did not
file it because “it fell through the cracks” at her office. She
also admits that she received the October 2010 order that ad‐
vised her that she needed to file an E‐28. She acknowledged
that she has represented Parashu since 2010 and believed
that she was his attorney of record all along. Therefore, Para‐
shu was pro se on the record, but she admits to representing
him, so his pro se status was merely technical due to her fail‐
ure to properly file an E‐28. She stated at oral argument that
immigration law has been her primary practice for twenty‐
one years. Her experience makes her familiar with the pro‐
cedural requirements of the immigration court. So her ar‐
gument that the court should be more lenient to Parashu be‐
cause he was pro se at the time is not only troubling, but in‐
sincere and misleading.
No. 13‐3767 9
Finally, Parashu asserts that the denial of the motion to
continue violates due process. Proceedings in immigration
court “satisfy due process so long as they conform to the ap‐
plicable statutory and regulatory standards” and impose
reasonable deadlines that afford the petitioner “a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence.” Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d
560, 566 (7th Cir. 2010). The proceedings conformed to statu‐
tory and regulatory standards. Also, Parashu had, at least,
from October 2010 until approximately June 2012 (sixty days
before his merits hearing) to present his evidence to the
court. That was a reasonable amount of time. See id. (finding
that providing a petitioner over a year to comply with the
fingerprinting requirement and sixty days to file an applica‐
tion was “plenty of time”). The immigration court did not
violate due process. Therefore, the IJ did not abuse her dis‐
cretion by denying Parashu’s request for a continuance.
B. The IJ Did Not Err by Finding Parashu Removable
and Ordering Him Removed.
Parashu argues that because he did not concede remova‐
bility and the government did not present evidence to meet
its burden to establish removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227,
the IJ should not have found that he conceded removability
or that he was removable. We review findings of fact for
substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Antia‐
Perea v. Holder, 768 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2014).
“Any alien with permanent resident status on a condi‐
tional basis … who has such status terminated … is deporta‐
ble.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). Thus to establish that Para‐
shu was removable, the government only needed to estab‐
lish that: (1) Parashu was a conditional permanent resident;
10 No. 13‐3767
and (2) his status as a conditional permanent residence was
terminated.
Although Parashu denied that he is removable, he admit‐
ted the key facts in the notice to appear that provided the
basis for removability. Specifically, Parashu admitted that he
is not a U.S. citizen, that he is a citizen of Nepal, that he ob‐
tained conditional permanent residence status in July 2001,
and that his status was terminated. These admissions have
the effect of withdrawing the issues from controversy. See
Selimi v. I.N.S., 312 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2002). By admitting
these facts, Parashu waived any objection to the IJ’s finding
of removability. Qureshi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 985, 990 (7th Cir.
2006). Therefore, the immigration court did not err by find‐
ing that Parashu conceded removability and finding him
removable.
Parashu contends that he filed a petition for relief from
removal and the IJ erroneously failed to consider it, and then
improperly dismissed the case for failure to file a petition for
relief. This argument is not supported by the record. Neither
Parashu’s petition for relief nor his supporting documents
appear in the administrative record until after the merits
hearing. He submitted the petition to the BIA but not the IJ;
therefore, this argument is without merit.
Parashu also argues that the immigration court erred by
ordering him removed because neither he nor the IJ desig‐
nated a country of removal. While Parashu did not designate
a country of removal, the IJ did. In the IJ’s August 23, 2012
order, the IJ ordered Parashu removed to Nepal. There was
no error. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543
U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (finding under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) that
an alien must be removed to the country of his choice, if that
No. 13‐3767 11
is not possible, then the alien is removed to the country of
which the alien is a citizen).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is
DENIED.