MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Jul 20 2015, 8:58 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jared Michel Thomas Gregory F. Zoeller
Evansville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William Eugene Slaton, July 20, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
82A05-1412-CR-589
v.
Appeal from the Vanderburgh
State of Indiana, Superior Court
The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff, Judge
Case No. 82D02-1307-FB-879
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a jury trial, William Slaton was convicted of attempted dealing in
methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and possession of methamphetamine, a
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Class D felony, and he was found to be an habitual substance offender. He
received an aggregate sentence of eighteen years imprisonment. Slaton appeals
his convictions and sentence, raising two issues for our review: (1) whether
evidence admitted at trial was obtained as a result of an illegal search of
Slaton’s curtilage and residence, and (2) whether his sentence is inappropriate
in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Concluding Slaton’s
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and that his sentence is not
inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 27, 2013, the Evansville Police Department received a report of
suspected methamphetamine manufacturing at Slaton’s address. Four officers
arrived at the address and smelled a chemical odor, which they associated with
the manufacture of methamphetamine, coming from the house. Officers Robert
Hahn and Nick Henderson approached the house, which was divided into two
apartments. The officers walked up onto the porch, which allowed access to
doors belonging to each apartment.
[3] The officers first knocked on the door to the rear apartment, and a woman
answered. The officers explained why they were at the house. The woman
informed them that the odor was coming from next door and pointed them to
the other apartment. The officers walked across the porch to the front
apartment. The door to that apartment was boarded up, but next to the door
was an open window. Officer Hahn looked through the window and into the
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apartment that belonged to Slaton. He saw Slaton inside, carrying a glass jar
toward the kitchen sink. Officer Hahn asked Slaton to stop. Slaton made eye
contact with Officer Hahn, but Slaton, still holding the jar, continued more
quickly toward the sink despite the officer’s repeated requests to stop. At that
point, Officer Henderson dove through the open window and grabbed Slaton.
[4] The police detained Slaton and two other individuals located in the house.
Once outside, Slaton consented to a search of the apartment. The search
produced a number of items associated with the manufacture of
methamphetamine, including: pseudoephedrine blister packs; lithium batteries;
ammonium nitrate cold packs; aluminum foil; lye; acid-based drain cleaner; a
glass jar with tubing attached to it; and several empty two-liter bottles.
Additionally, 0.69 grams of methamphetamine was found in Slaton’s bedroom.
[5] The State charged Slaton as follows: Count 1, dealing in methamphetamine, a
Class B felony; Count 2, maintaining a common nuisance, a Class D felony;
and Count 3, dealing in methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The State also
alleged that Slaton was an habitual substance offender. Slaton filed a pre-trial
motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. A jury trial was held in
September 2014, and the jury found Slaton guilty of attempted dealing in
methamphetamine, a lesser included offense of Count 1, and guilty of
possession of methamphetamine, a lesser included offense of Count 3. 1 Slaton
1
Count 2 was dismissed pursuant to the State’s motion.
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admitted to being an habitual substance offender. The trial court sentenced
Slaton to fifteen years on Count 1, enhanced by three years due to his habitual
substance offender status, and one and one-half years on Count 3, to be served
concurrently with Count 1. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Fourth Amendment
[6] Slaton argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence at trial that was
obtained by an illegal search of his curtilage and residence in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 The trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Young v. State, 980 N.E.2d 412, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. The
constitutionality of a search is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Kelly
v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013).
[7] The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
. . . .” A warrantless search of a person’s home or curtilage is presumptively
unreasonable. See J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But
2
Slaton does not raise a separate claim under the Indiana Constitution.
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because the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,”
the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. Kentucky v. King, 131
S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).
[8] Slaton first argues that the officers’ presence on his porch and act of looking
through his window was an impermissible search of his curtilage. There is no
question that Slaton’s porch is curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment.
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013) (“The front porch is the
classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of
home life extends.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, “law
enforcement officers are not strictly prohibited from entering a person’s
curtilage” without a warrant. J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 229. “[L]aw enforcement
officers enjoy a limited invitation to approach a home through ordinary routes
of ingress and egress open to visitors.” Id. An officer is permitted to “approach
the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and
then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Id. at 232 (quoting Jardines, 133
S.Ct. at 1415). A traditional “knock and talk” conducted within the parameters
described above does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 229.
[9] The officers’ actions in this case were within the limitations of a permissible
knock and talk. The officers approached the house using a walkway connected
to the street, and the porch provided access to a door belonging to each of the
two apartments located inside the house. It seems that the officers’ path was
through ordinary routes of ingress and egress, and that the porch is a place
where a visitor of Slaton’s apartment could be expected to go. The officers’
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entry onto Slaton’s porch and approach of his door and window did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
[10] Slaton also claims that Officer Hahn’s act of looking through his open window
and into the apartment was an unconstitutional search. Slaton is mistaken.
Officer Hahn was conducting a valid knock and talk and was able to see
through the open window while standing on Slaton’s porch. Officer Hahn
made his observations from a place where he was lawfully entitled to be, and
what he observed was in “open view” from his vantage point. See Justice v.
State, 765 N.E.2d 161, 164-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the open view
doctrine). Therefore, an illegal search did not occur when Officer Hahn looked
through Slaton’s window. Id.
[11] Finally, Slaton contests the officers’ warrantless entry into his residence. The
State asserts that the entry was justified by Officer Henderson’s belief that
immediate entry was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. Indeed,
warrantless entry into a residence is permissible when it is necessary to “prevent
the imminent destruction of evidence.” King, 131 S.Ct. at 1856 (citation
omitted). In this case, the officers visited Slaton’s residence due to a report of
possible methamphetamine manufacturing. Their suspicion was corroborated
by a chemical odor emanating from Slaton’s apartment. Officer Hahn and
Officer Henderson looked inside and saw Slaton carrying a glass jar. When
asked to stop, Slaton made eye contact with the officer, then moved more
quickly toward the kitchen sink. At that point, the officers had probable cause
to believe that Slaton was manufacturing methamphetamine and that
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destruction of evidence was imminent.3 Therefore, under the circumstances,
the officers’ warrantless entry was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.
II. Slaton’s Sentence
[12] Slaton requests that we reduce his eighteen year sentence. Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B) provides appellate courts with the authority to revise a defendant’s
sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” Generally, we defer to the trial court’s sentencing
discretion “unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive
light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and
lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous
traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d
111, 122 (Ind. 2015). It is the defendant’s burden to persuade the reviewing
court that the sentence is inappropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876
(Ind. 2012).
[13] “When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the
starting point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence.” Holloway v. State,
950 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). At the time of Slaton’s offenses, a
3
Officer Hahn testified that liquid precursors used in the manufacture of methamphetamine could be easily
disposed of by dumping them down the drain of a kitchen sink.
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Class B felony carried an advisory sentence of ten years, with a range of six to
twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(a). In addition, the habitual substance
offender statute provided that “[t]he court shall sentence a person found to be a
habitual substance offender to an additional fixed term of at least three (3) years
but not more than eight (8) years imprisonment.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-10(f)
(2013). Thus, Slaton’s habitual substance offender enhancement required him
to receive an additional term of at least three and as many as eight years. He
received fifteen years for his Class B felony and an additional three years for his
habitual offender enhancement.
[14] Admittedly, the nature of Slaton’s offenses seem, if anything, less egregious
than the typical case involving manufacturing or dealing in methamphetamine.
Slaton did not have an active methamphetamine lab, and less than one gram of
methamphetamine was found inside his apartment. That said, Slaton’s
criminal history belies any claim that he is deserving of a reduced sentence. At
forty-six years of age, Slaton has amassed ten prior felony convictions and
seventeen prior misdemeanor convictions. Moreover, lesser punishments doled
out in the past have apparently failed to deter Slaton from further criminal
behavior, as he admitted to manufacturing methamphetamine on other
occasions and to abusing methamphetamine on a daily basis.
[15] Slaton asks us to consider an alleged hardship that would befall his father if he
goes to prison, and that his crimes did not result in damage to another person or
property. However, we are not persuaded that either circumstance, even if true,
outweighs Slaton’s criminal history and renders his sentence inappropriate.
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Conclusion
[16] We conclude that the officers’ warrantless entry of Slaton’s curtilage and
residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We further conclude that
Slaton’s eighteen year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his
offenses and his character. Accordingly, we affirm.
[17] Affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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