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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TANIA SHADLE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SCOTT SHADLE
Appellant No. 1204 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order June 24, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
Civil Division at No(s): Civ No 1608-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 21, 2015
Appellant, Scott Shadle (“Husband”), appeals from the reconsidered
order in equitable distribution entered June 24, 2014. Husband argues that
the trial court erred in distributing the marital estate, awarding an excessive
period of alimony, and in awarding counsel fees to appellee, Tania Shadle
(“Wife”). After an extensive review of the record, we affirm in all respects
save the finding of contempt, which we reverse.
Husband and Wife were married in 1992, and the trial court found that
they separated on November 22, 2011, after having three children together.
At the time of the final divorce hearing, the following facts were established.
Husband was 49 years old; Wife was 44. Husband had a college degree in
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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metallurgical engineering; Wife had a high school diploma. She had worked
as a receptionist prior to becoming a stay-at-home mother in 1995.
Shortly thereafter, Husband became a licensed, registered engineer
and began offering his professional engineering services. During the course
of the marriage, Husband’s professional practice thrived. Husband’s average
annual earnings reached approximately $100,000 during the period of 2009-
2011. The parties accumulated several assets, including a mortgage free
marital residence.
Wife filed a complaint in divorce on December 22, 2011, alleging an
irretrievable breakdown in the marriage. During the pendency of this
proceeding, Wife was diagnosed with stage II breast cancer, and was
undergoing further testing. On November 14, 2013, the trial court entered
an order of equitable distribution, to which Husband timely moved for
reconsideration. Thereafter, on December 18, 2013, the trial court entered
a decree granting divorce, and granted reconsideration of its order in
equitable distribution. After receiving further testimony, the trial court
entered a reconsidered order on June 24, 2014. Husband then filed this
timely appeal.
On appeal, Husband raises five issues for our review. Husband’s first
three issues raise challenges to the trial court’s weighting of the equities in
distributing the marital estate. Our standard of review in equitable
distribution matters is as follows.
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It is well established that absent an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, we will not reverse an award
of equitable distribution. [In addition,] [w]hen reviewing
the record of the proceedings, we are guided by the fact
that trial courts have broad equitable powers to
effectuate [economic] justice and we will find an abuse of
discretion only if the trial court misapplied the laws or
failed to follow proper legal procedures. [Further,] [t]he
finder of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence and the Superior Court will not disturb the
credibility determinations of the court below.
Anzalone v. Anzalone, 835 A.2d 773, 780 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted).
There is no simple formula by which to divide marital property; the
method of distribution derives from the facts of the individual case. See
Gaydos v. Gaydos, 693 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Pa. Super. 1997). In fashioning
an equitable distribution award, the trial court must consider, at a minimum,
the eleven factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502, Equitable division of
marital property, (a) General rule. “The courts attempt to split property
equitably, instead of equally, taking into consideration such factors as length
of marriage, the contributions of both spouses, ages and health of each
spouse.” Taper v. Taper, 939 A.2d 969, 974 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
First, Husband contends that the trial court erred in awarding Wife an
excessive portion of the marital estate. According to Husband’s calculations,
Wife received 90% of the marital estate. See Appellant’s Brief, at 27.
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Husband argues that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors,
and therefore reached an unjust distribution of the estate.
The trial court acknowledges that Wife received “the lion’s share” of
the estate. Trial Court Opinion, 9/24/14, at 8. However, the trial court
points to Wife’s lack of education, marketable skills, and health as factors
indicating that Wife does not have a significant opportunity to acquire assets
and income in the future. See id., at 3. In contrast, the trial court found
that Husband had a significant opportunity for future income and
accumulation of assets. See id. The trial court also noted that Wife’s health
issues negatively impacted her ability to obtain future income or assets prior
to retirement age. See id., at 3-4. “The award of the net marital assets to
the wife [was] based on the totality of all circumstances as contemplated in
§ 3502 of the Divorce Code.” Id., at 9.
The trial court was also troubled with Husband’s priorities. See id., at
8. During the pendency of this action, Husband paid for a new Toyota
Tundra for his employee for a purchase price of approximately $35,000.
See N.T., Hearing, 5/15/13, at 66-69. Husband paid $10,000 up front and
financed the rest of the purchase price. See id., at 69. The employee
primarily used this vehicle to commute to work from his home. See N.T.,
Hearing, 5/20/13, at 15. In contrast, Husband accrued arrearages in his
alimony pendente lite (“APL”) obligations. See N.T., Hearing, 5/15/13, at
65.
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After reviewing the certified record, we are convinced that the trial
court’s factual findings are well supported. Furthermore, we conclude that
the trial court’s reasoning does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Regardless of the financial condition of Husband’s professional business, he
has a far greater capacity for future earnings than Wife does. The lopsided
award in distribution reflects this fundamental fact. We therefore conclude
that Husband’s first issue on appeal merits no relief.
In his second issue, Husband contends that the trial court erred in
failing to award him one-half of the rental value of the marital home during
the pendency of the divorce while Wife had exclusive possession. The award
of a rental credit under these situations is discretionary, not mandatory.
See Trembach v. Trembach, 615 A.2d 33, 37 (Pa. Super. 1992). Once
again, the trial court relied upon the relative current economic status of the
parties, among other considerations, in determining that an award of rental
value to Husband was not consistent with effectuating economic justice
between the parties. Based upon the previous discussion of Husband’s and
Wife’s future economic activities, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion on this issue. Consequently, Husband’s second issue
on appeal merits no relief.
Husband argues in his third issue that the trial court erred in awarding
Wife fifteen years of post-divorce alimony from Husband. Our standard of
review pertaining to an award of alimony is as follows.
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The role of an appellate court in reviewing alimony orders
is limited; we review only to determine whether there has
been an error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial
court. Absent an abuse of discretion or insufficient
evidence to sustain the support order, this Court will not
interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court.
Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). An
award of alimony aims to “ensure that the reasonable needs of the person
who is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment,
are met.” Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citation omitted). “Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance
with the lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during the
marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Pursuant to the Divorce Code, when determining the nature,
amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, the court must
consider all relevant factors, including those statutorily prescribed at 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3701, Alimony, (b) Relevant Factors (1)-(17). See Smith, 904
A.2d at 20; Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Husband references the lopsided distribution of marital assets, arguing
that the award of an extensive period of alimony in addition constitutes a
punitive action by the trial court. Initially, we note that by Husband’s own
calculations, Wife’s share of the marital estate was $77,500. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 27. While this is not an insignificant sum of money, it
pales in comparison to Husband’s prior earnings which averaged $100,000
annually over the period 2009-2011. Furthermore, as discussed above, the
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trial court found that Wife had limited opportunities for accumulating assets
and income during the remainder of her possible time in the workforce.
While the period of alimony of 15 years is lengthy, the monthly payment is
below the guidelines. After reviewing these circumstances, we cannot
conclude that the trial court’s award of alimony constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
In his final two issues, Husband asserts that the trial court erred in
assessing attorney’s fees in favor of Wife in separate amounts of $3,500 and
$2,500. The $3,500 payment was included in the equitable distribution
order, while the $2,500 payment was awarded as a sanction pursuant to a
finding of contempt. As each payment was awarded for separate purposes,
we address them separately.
Husband concedes that the trial court had the authority to award
counsel fees to Wife in the equitable distribution order. See Appellant’s
Brief, at 32-33. He argues that under the circumstances of the case, the
award was an abuse of discretion. Specifically, Husband contends that since
Wife received 90% of the marital estate, none of the debt, and that he
previously paid Wife $3,500 in interim counsel fees, the award was
manifestly unreasonable. For the same reasons that we affirm the trial
court’s equitable distribution scheme in general, we affirm the award of
$3,500 in counsel fees. While Wife received 90% of the marital estate, that
sum constitutes only $77,500, the bulk of which is represented by the
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marital home. Further, the trial court found, and this finding is supported by
the record, that Wife had minimal prospects for income or asset
accumulation due to her education, experience and health. The award of
counsel fees is consonant with an attempt to permit Wife to meet her basic
future needs.
In contrast, we conclude that the finding of contempt is not supported
by the record currently before us. “As each court is the exclusive judge of
contempts against its process, we will reverse an order of contempt only
upon a showing of a plain abuse of discretion.” In re Contempt of Cullen,
849 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). We further
explained in In re Contempt of Cullen the following.
To be punished for contempt, a party must not only have
violated a court order, but that order must have been definite,
clear, and specific—leaving no doubt or uncertainty in the mind
of the contemnor of the prohibited conduct. Because the order
forming the basis for civil contempt must be strictly construed,
any ambiguities or omissions in the order must be construed in
favor of the defendant. In such cases, a contradictory order or
an order whose specific terms have not been violated will not
serve as the basis for a finding of contempt. To sustain a finding
of civil contempt, the complainant must prove certain distinct
elements: (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order
or decree which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act
constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3)
that the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. A person may not
be held in contempt of court for failing to obey an order that is
too vague or that cannot be enforced.
Id., at 1210-1211 (internal citations, quotation marks, and emphasis
omitted).
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Here, the trial court found Husband in contempt for not paying APL to
Wife for several months. The original order establishing Husband’s liability
for APL provided that Husband would pay $1,212 per month to Wife. The
order further required Husband to “continue to pay the monthly premiums
for health insurance and to keep [Wife] on [Husband’s] health insurance.”
Order, 3/23/12, at 1. Husband, however, was awarded a credit for all such
insurance premiums. See id., at 1-2. The order does not reference any
obligation for real estate taxes.
Husband subsequently petitioned the trial court for a reduction of the
APL payment, asserting that due to a downturn in his business, he was no
longer able to afford the amount initially awarded. See Petition for
Modification, 10/26/12. In response, the trial court subsequently amended
the APL award, through agreement of the parties, reducing Husband’s
liability to $682 per month. All other provisions of the original order were
retained in full effect. See Order, 1/24/13, at 2.
Wife subsequently filed two contempt petitions against Husband,
alleging that he had failed to pay his monthly APL obligations. No answer
was filed to these petitions, and no hearings were held. On November 18,
2013, after the order in equitable distribution had been entered, Wife filed a
petition for contempt and special relief, alleging that Husband had failed to
honor his APL obligations for the 4 most recent months, and that, further,
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he had failed to pay the real estate taxes on the marital residence in
accordance with the APL order.
Husband filed a response to this petition asserting that he did not owe
Wife any further APL due to the outstanding credit he was due for health
insurance premiums. Furthermore, Husband alleged that neither of the APL
orders imposed an obligation upon him to pay the real estate taxes on the
marital residence. As such, Husband contended that he could not be found
in contempt of the APL orders.
The hearing on Wife’s contempt petition was consolidated with the
hearings held by the trial court during reconsideration of the equitable
distribution award. The trial court did not enter a separate order finding
Husband in contempt, but rather included the contempt finding in its
reconsidered equitable distribution award.
In the reconsidered order, the trial court found “that [Husband] has
repeatedly and significantly violated this Court’s order as he has not made
payments as directed for a significant period of time, … [and] he has not
paid the taxes on the marital residence[.]” Order, 6/24/14, at 3. As a
sanction, the trial court awarded Wife $2,500 in attorney’s fees. See id.
Interestingly, the trial court proceeded to add the $2,500 to the
outstanding APL balance, and applied this new balance against the credits
Husband was due for insurance premiums and repairs made to the marital
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residence while Wife was in exclusive possession. This calculation resulted
in an outstanding credit—in Husband’s favor. See id.
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Husband willfully
violated the APL order. First, the APL order explicitly provided him with a
credit for insurance payments, and the trial court provided other credits for
the repairs to the marital home. According to a calculation performed after
the entry of the decree in divorce, and which included the addition of the
$2,500 sanction, Husband was still entitled to a credit. In other words,
during the pendency of the divorce, Wife received a benefit in excess of the
amount awarded by the APL order. Thus, the trial court’s finding that
Husband willfully violated the APL order is unsupported by the record before
us.
Furthermore, the trial court does not identify where Husband was
ordered to pay the real estate taxes on the marital residence. Our
independent review of the record has revealed only that the trial court
ordered Husband to pay the outstanding balance on the real estate taxes in
the November 14, 2013 equitable distribution order, which was the same
order that was under reconsideration by the trial court. Accordingly, we find
no support in the record for the trial court’s finding that Husband willfully
violated the APL order by failing to pay the real estate taxes. We therefore
reverse the finding of contempt.
Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/21/2015
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