MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jul 24 2015, 10:01 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John Emry Gregory F. Zoeller
Franklin, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Graham T. Youngs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kenneth Eugene Million, July 24, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
41A05-1411-MI-530
v. Appeal from the Johnson Superior
Court;
The Honorable K. Mark Loyd,
Sheriff of Johnson County, Judge;
Indiana; Indiana Department of The Honorable Richard Tandy,
Correction; Indiana State Police; Magistrate;
41D03-1404-MI-73
and State of Indiana,
Appellees-Respondents.
May, Judge.
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[1] Keith Eugene Million appeals the denial of his request to be released from the
requirement that he register as a sex offender in Indiana. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On January 1, 1989, Million pled guilty in Florida to lewd and lascivious
conduct with a minor under the age of fourteen. On June 15, 1990, he was
sentenced to four years and six months imprisonment. He served fourteen
months incarcerated and was released to parole for six years.
[3] On September 14, 2004, Million moved to Indiana. On April 7, 2005, he
registered with the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office as a sex offender. On April
22, 2014, Million filed a “Verified Petition to Be Released From Sex Offender
Registration Requirement,” (App. at 6), asking for relief from the burden of
registering as a sex offender in Indiana. He filed an amended petition on May
19, and the trial court held a hearing June 26.
[4] On August 7, 2014, the trial court denied Million’s petition. Million filed a
motion to correct error, which the trial court denied.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Million requested relief under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22, which allows a sex
offender to petition the court to remove the requirement that he register as a sex
offender. We review the trial court’s denial for an abuse of discretion. Lucas v.
McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). An abuse of discretion
occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
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circumstances supporting the petition for relief. Id. The burden is on the
movant to demonstrate that relief is necessary and just. Id.
[6] Million argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition
for relief because the Indiana Sex Offender Registry Act (INSORA) as applied
to him violates the ex post facto prohibition of the Indiana constitution. 1 When
the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we begin with the presumption
the statute is constitutional. Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ind. 2007).
The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the heavy burden of
rebutting that presumption. Id. All reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the statute’s constitutionality. State v. Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind.
2000).
[7] The Indiana Constitution provides “[n]o ex post facto law . . . shall ever be
passed.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 24. 2 “The ex post facto clause forbids the Congress
and the States to enact any law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which
was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional
punishment to that then prescribed.’” Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind.
1
Million filed a Motion to Correct Error, but he does not argue the trial court erred when it denied it. We
review the denial of a motion to correct error for abuse of discretion, and to determine whether the court
erred, we consider the propriety of the court’s decision on the underlying order, here the denial of his petition
for relief. See In re Paternity of H.H., 879 N.E.2d 1175, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (review of motion to correct
error includes review of underlying order).
2
Million does not challenge INSORA under the United States Constitution; nevertheless, our Indiana
Supreme Court noted an ex post facto claim under the Indiana Constitution should be evaluated using “the
same analytical framework the Supreme Court [of the United States] employed to evaluate ex post facto claims
under the federal constitution.” Hevner, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2010).
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2010) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)). “The underlying
purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle
that persons have the right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise
to criminal penalties.” Id.
[8] In 1994, Indiana enacted INSORA, codified in Indiana Code chapter 11-8-8,
which requires certain sex offenders to register specified information with the
State. Two parts of INSORA require Indiana residents who committed sexual
offenses outside of Indiana to register as sex offenders in Indiana. First, in
2001, Indiana extended INSORA to require those convicted in another
jurisdiction of a crime “substantially similar” 3 to a sex crime in Indiana to
register in Indiana as well. Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4 (2001). 4 Second, under Ind.
Code § 11-8-8-19(f), a person who is “required to register as a sex or violent
offender in any jurisdiction” is required to register as a sex offender in Indiana
for the time required by the other jurisdiction or the time required by INSORA,
“whichever is longer.” Id.
“Substantially Similar” Clause
[9] Million argues he should not have to register under the “substantially similar”
clause because the facts in his case are like those in Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d
371 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. Wallace was charged with and convicted of Class
3
Million does not argue the crime of which he was convicted in Florida is not “substantially similar” to a
crime in Indiana for which one would be required to register under INSORA.
4
This section is now codified as Ind. Code §§ 11-8-8-4.5(a)(22) and 11-8-8-5(A)(22).
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C felony child molesting in Indiana in 1989. Wallace completed his sentence,
including probation, in 1992, before INSORA went into effect. In 2001,
Indiana amended INSORA to require certain sex offenders to register
regardless of their conviction date. In 2003, Wallace’s ex-wife reported to
police that he had not properly registered as a sex offender, and he was arrested
for Class D felony failing to register as a sex offender.
[10] Wallace filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him, which was denied.
We accepted the issue on interlocutory appeal. Our Indiana Supreme Court
held INSORA violated ex post facto laws as applied to Wallace because he “was
charged, convicted, and served the sentence for his crime before the statutes . . .
were enacted.” Id. at 384. Even though Wallace was convicted of a sex offense
in Indiana, our court has extended the holding in Wallace to defendants who
committed sex offenses in other states and then relocated to Indiana in cases
such as Burton v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and State v.
Hough, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[11] In Burton, we held Burton, who was convicted of a sex offense in Illinois in
1987, was not required to register as a sex offender in Indiana after he moved
here around 2009 because “it is the date of the commission of the crime and the
law in place at the time that is relevant to the ex post facto analysis.” 977 N.E.2d
at 1009. In Hough, we held Hough, who had been convicted of a sex offense in
Pennsylvania in 1993, could not be required to register as a sex offender in
Indiana despite the fact Hough might have been required to register as a sex
offender in Pennsylvania had he remained in that state “[b]ecause he was
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convicted of a sex offense before Indiana enacted INSORA.” 978 N.E.2d at
510.
[12] The same is true in the instant case: Million committed his crime in 1989,
before Indiana enacted INSORA in 1994. Therefore, like in Burton and Hough,
the imposition of a requirement that he register as a sex offender in Indiana
violates our constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
Required to Register in Another Jurisdiction
[13] Under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f), an Indiana resident who is “required to register
as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction” is required to register as a sex
offender in Indiana for the time required by the other jurisdiction or the time
required by INSORA, “whichever is longer.” Id. Million was not required to
register as a sex offender in Florida. Therefore, he is not required to register as
a sex offender in Indiana under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f). See Andrews v. State,
978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (Andrews, who was convicted of multiple
sex offenses in Massachusetts in 1984, was not required to register as a sex
offender after moving to Indiana because he was not required to register as a
sex offender under Massachusetts law). 5
5
The State relies on our recent holding in Tyson v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh’g denied,
however, Tyson is easily distinguishable. Tyson committed a sexual offense in Texas in 2002. Under Texas
law, Tyson was required to register as a sex offender until 2014. When Tyson moved to Indiana in 2009, he
did not register as a sex offender and was charged with Class D felony failure to register. Tyson moved to
dismiss, and we affirmed based on the plain language of Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f). As Million had no
requirement to register in Florida, Tyson is inapposite.
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Conclusion
[14] The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Million’s request to be
relieved of the burden of registering as a sex offender in Indiana. Accordingly,
we reverse.
[15] Reversed.
Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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