MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jul 27 2015, 5:58 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark A. Bates Gregory F. Zoeller
Office of the Lake County Public Attorney General of Indiana
Defender, Appellate Division
Cynthia L. Ploughe
Crown Point, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ahkeem Shakur Scott-Manna, July 27, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A03-1411-CR-391
v. Appeal from the
Lake Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Cause No. 45G03-1212-MR-8
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Ahkeem Shakur Scott-Manna was convicted after a jury trial of murder,1 a
felony, and was sentenced to sixty years executed. Scott-Manna appeals,
raising the following restated issues:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into
evidence the victim’s statement identifying Scott-Manna as her
assailant;
II. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to prove the mens rea
element and to support his conviction for murder; and
III. Whether Scott-Manna’s sixty-year sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] At approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 7, 2012, Gary police officers were
dispatched to an apartment regarding a report that a man was hitting a woman.
Officer LaRia Crews arrived at the apartment and knocked on the door. A
young woman answered, who appeared to have been woken up by the
knocking on the door. The woman told Officer Crews she had not called
police, but that there was another woman in the apartment. She took Officer
Crews to a bedroom door, and Dorothy Griffin exited the room. Griffin was
“disheveled,” “frazzled,” “excited,” “battered,” and “crying.” Tr. at 77-78.
Griffin was hurt, and her left eye was swollen. Griffin stated that “Twin” had
battered her. She said he had held her down in her bedroom and had beaten
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
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her, yelling that “he was not going to allow her to turn him in because they
were trying to kill him.” Id. at 83. When the police looked inside Griffin’s
bedroom, they found no one there. Griffin told them that the man who had
beaten her had jumped out the window when the police knocked on the door.
The officers noticed that the screen had been pushed out of the bedroom
window and was lying on the ground. Officer Crews called an ambulance for
Griffin at that time.
[4] Around the same time, other officers heard another dispatch concerning a man
“running and screaming that someone’s trying to kill him.” Id. at 123. The
man, later identified as Scott-Manna, entered a nearby McDonald’s restaurant,
jumped over the counter, and acted paranoid and frantic. The officers located
him about eight blocks from Griffin’s apartment. When they approached him,
Scott-Manna repeated that someone was trying to kill him. He then stated, “I
beat the old woman” and “Are you going to kill me?” Id. at 124. The officers
told him they were not going to kill him and took him into custody.
[5] The officers then drove Scott-Manna to the apartment complex where the crime
occurred. Griffin was being placed in an ambulance, and Officer Crews asked
Griffin, “Is that the man that beat you,” to which Griffin responded, “Yes,
that’s ‘Twin.’” Id. at 127. Scott-Manna apologized and then stated, “Yeah, I
beat that . . . bitch, bitch’s ass.” Id. He also said, “Yeah, I hit that old bitch. I
busted her in the face.” Id. at 144. Both Griffin and Scott-Manna were taken to
the hospital. While in the emergency room, Scott-Manna had an outburst and
again yelled, “Yeah, I hit that bitch.” Id. at 87.
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[6] Griffin died from her injuries a few days later on December 10, 2012. An
autopsy was performed, which revealed that Griffin had internal hemorrhaging
within her skull around the brain, between the layers covering the brain, and
within the spaces of the brain. There was also evidence of severe swelling of the
brain with parts of the brain beginning to be pushed outside of the skull
“following the spinal cord and other openings.” Id. at 109. The pathologist
determined that Griffin died as a result of the intracranial hemorrhages due to
blunt force injuries to her head, consistent with multiple blows to the head from
a fist. Id. at 114, 116-17. The manner of death was determined to be homicide.
[7] On December 13, 2012, the State charged Scott-Manna with murder. A jury
trial was held on March 3, 2014, which ended in a mistrial because of a hung
jury. Prior to his retrial, Scott-Manna filed a motion to exclude the statement
by Griffin, identifying Scott-Manna as her attacker, and the trial court denied
the motion. A second trial was held on September 2, 2014, at the conclusion of
which Scott-Manna was found guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced him
to sixty-years executed. Scott-Manna now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Evidence
[8] Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an
abuse of discretion. Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. We
reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
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and circumstances. Id. Even if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of
discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Id.
[9] Scott-Manna argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the
victim’s statement identifying him as her attacker to be admitted during the
trial. He asserts that the admission of this statement was a violation of the
Confrontation Clause because Griffin was unavailable to testify, he had no
opportunity to cross-examine her and her statement constituted a testimonial
statement. Scott-Manna contends that the statement by Griffin was testimonial
because she was describing a past event, and the statement was not necessary to
resolve an ongoing emergency.
[10] The Confrontation Clause is embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and prohibits the admission of an out-of-court statement if it
is testimonial, the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant had no prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Lane v. State, 997 N.E.2d 83, 92
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013), trans. denied), trans. denied.
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
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[11] McQuay v. State, 10 N.E.3d 593, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). In determining whether the primary
purpose of an interrogation is to address an ongoing emergency, we must
objectively evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the
statements and actions of the parties. Id.
[12] In the present case, when the police knocked on Griffin’s apartment door in
response to a dispatch of a man hitting a woman, they interrupted Scott-
Manna’s attack on Griffin, and Scott-Manna jumped out of the apartment
window and fled the scene. The police found Griffin battered, hysterical, and
crying. As they were responding to the initial dispatch, the police received
reports of a man in the area who was running and screaming that someone was
trying to kill him. As Griffin had told the police that Scott-Manna had also
stated that someone was trying to kill him, this second report indicated that
Griffin’s attacker was running around the neighborhood and was a present
danger. The police were, therefore, handling an ongoing emergency that they
needed to resolve to assure community safety. Griffin’s statement identifying
Scott-Manna verified that the police had arrested her attacker and was in
furtherance of assisting the police in their ongoing emergency. Therefore, the
statement was not testimonial in nature and did not violate the Confrontation
Clause.
[13] However, even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Griffin’s
statement, such error was merely harmless. If a trial court abused its discretion
by admitting the challenged evidence, we will only reverse for that error if the
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error is inconsistent with substantial justice or if a substantial right of the party
is affected. Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
denied. Any error caused by the admission of evidence is harmless error for
which we will not reverse a conviction if the erroneously admitted evidence was
cumulative of other evidence appropriately admitted. Id.
[14] Scott-Manna challenges the admission of Griffin’s statement identifying him as
her attacker, which was made as Griffin was being taken to the ambulance
shortly after the battery occurred. However, Scott-Manna’s identity as the man
who attacked Griffin was proven by other evidence. From his first interaction
with the police, Scott-Manna admitted multiple times that he had battered
Griffin. When the police initially approached him, he stated, “I beat the old
woman.” Id. at 124. He later repeated this admission when taken back to the
scene of the crime when he said, ““Yeah, I beat that . . . bitch, bitch’s ass.” Id.
at 127. He reiterated this admission at the scene and then again when taken to
the emergency room. We conclude that these repeated admissions by Scott-
Manna overshadow any prejudice that may have existed by the admission of
Griffin’s statement. The statement by Griffin was merely cumulative of the
admissions made by Scott-Manna that he battered Griffin, and any error in the
admission of the statement was harmless.
II. Sufficient Evidence
[15] The deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. This
court will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses.
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Tooley v. State, 911 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; Elisea v.
State, 777 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Rather, we will consider only
the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.
Elisea, 777 N.E.2d at 48. We will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could
find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tooley, 911
N.E.2d at 724-25. Thus, if there is sufficient evidence of probative value to
support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed.
Trimble v. State, 848 N.E.2d 278, 279 (Ind. 2006).
[16] Scott-Manna argues that insufficient evidence was presented to support his
conviction for murder. He specifically contends that the evidence presented
was not sufficient to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Griffin.
Scott-Manna asserts that there was no evidence presented to show that he had
problems with Griffin in the past, had threatened her previously, or used a
deadly weapon when he attacked her. He, therefore, claims the evidence was
only sufficient for the jury to determine that he knowingly and intentionally hit
Griffin, which only constituted a battery.
[17] In order to convict Scott-Manna of murder, the State was required to prove that
he knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-
1-1(1). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the
conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A
person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is
aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b).
“Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the
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defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both
the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has
the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Stokes v.
State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The intent to
commit murder may be inferred from the nature of the attack and the
circumstances surrounding the crime, and it is within the province of the jury to
draw an inference of knowledge or intent from the facts presented. Whatley v.
State, 908 N.E.2d 276, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
[18] The evidence presented at trial showed that Scott-Manna attacked Griffin in her
apartment and hit her several times on the left side of her head. Griffin told the
police that, as he battered her, Scott-Manna yelled that “he was not going to
allow her to turn him in because they were trying to kill him.” Id. at 83. A jury
could infer from such a statement that Scott-Manna intended to kill Griffin in
order to keep her from turning him in. In fact, Scott-Manna was interrupted in
his attack of Griffin by the police knocking on the door of the apartment; he,
therefore, only fled because the police arrived and not because he had
concluded his attack. Additionally, the evidence showed that Scott-Manna was
a young man, who was agile enough to jump out an apartment window to
escape the police. Griffin was a sixty-year-old woman, who was in “frail”
health and suffered from several health conditions. Therefore, the relative sizes
and strengths of Scott-Manna and Griffin suggest that Scott-Manna either
knowingly or intentionally killed Griffin. Further, Scott-Manna repeatedly
battered Griffin in the head and face area with sufficient force to cause
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substantial injuries. The multiple blows caused bruising to her left eye area and
actual eyeball as well as the intracranial hemorrhaging that was found within
her skull around the brain, between the layers covering the brain, and within the
spaces of the brain. The attack also resulted in severe brain swelling that had
begun to cause the brain to be pushed outside of the skull. Looking at the
evidence most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we are required to do, we
conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that, at the least, Scott-Manna
knowingly killed Griffin. The evidence was sufficient to support Scott-Manna’s
conviction for murder.
III. Inappropriate Sentence
[19] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), “we may revise any sentence authorized by
statute if we deem it to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
the character of the offender.” Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014). The question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another
sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence
imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). It is the defendant’s burden on appeal to persuade the reviewing court
that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Chappell v. State,
966 N.E.2d 124, 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[20] Scott-Manna argues that his sixty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender. He claims that, as to the
nature of the offense, he did not intend to kill Griffin and her cirrhosis
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contributed to her death, and therefore, his sentence was not appropriate.
Scott-Manna further asserts that, as to his character, his mental illness, remorse
for his actions, and minimal criminal history show that his sentence was
inappropriate.
[21] As to the nature of the case, the evidence shows that Scott-Manna attacked
Griffin in her apartment, hitting her multiple times in the head and face area,
and stopped when he was interrupted by the police knocking on the apartment
door. Griffin eventually died from her injuries, which include severe
hemorrhaging in her brain and swelling of the brain. Nothing in the record
shows that Griffin provoked Scott-Manna in any way; in fact, Scott-Manna
stated in a letter he wrote to Griffin before her death that he knew she was
trying to help him when he attacked her. State’s Ex. 28 D. Further, this was a
crime committed by a young man against an older woman who was in frail
health and not his physical equal.
[22] As to Scott-Manna’s character, although this is his first adult conviction, he was
only eighteen when he committed the instant crime and had juvenile
adjudications for auto theft and resisting law enforcement. He had been placed
on probation for one of his adjudications, which he did not successfully
complete, and had been made a ward of the State and ran away from
placement, eventually being placed in the Indiana Boys School. Scott-Manna
failed to utilize the repeated efforts of the juvenile justice system to steer him
away from a criminal path. Additionally, during his incarceration for this case,
Scott-Manna displayed repeated misconduct by allegedly battering a
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correctional officer and damaging jail property. Based on these allegations,
new criminal charges of battery and criminal mischief were filed against Scott-
Manna. Although the trial court acknowledged that Scott-Manna has some
mental health issues, that acknowledgement does not necessarily make his
sentence inappropriate. Based on the nature of the offense and the character of
the offender, we conclude that Scott-Manna’s sentence was not inappropriate.
[23] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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