NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 22, 2015*
Decided July 27, 2015
Before
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐3417
MICHAEL COLEMAN, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
v.
No. 12 C 3842
PARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees. Edmond E. Chang,
Judge.
O R D E R
Michael Coleman, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the grant of summary judgment
for prison medical personnel in this deliberate‐indifference suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Coleman had experienced pain after knee surgery and a back injury, and he claimed that
the defendants did not effectively treat his pain or provide prescribed physical therapy.
But Coleman presented no evidence suggesting that the medical staff failed to exercise
their professional judgment in treating him, so we affirm the district court’s judgment.
* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP.
P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 14‐3417 Page 2
Except as noted, we recount the facts in the light most favorable to Coleman, as
the party opposing summary judgment. See Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir.
2014). In December 2010 Coleman had surgery to repair torn cartilage in his right knee.
Upon returning to the prison after his surgery, Coleman saw Dr. Parthasarathi Ghosh,
who approved the surgeon’s recommendation for physical therapy and issued medical
permits for crutches and a knee brace, a low bunk, and the use of handcuffs in the front
instead of the back (as they usually are applied). Dr. Ghosh also prescribed
over‐the‐counter pain medications and told Coleman to begin applying weight to his
knee as tolerated. The next day Coleman was discharged from the health center with no
complaints and only minimal swelling. He followed up with doctors in the weeks after
his surgery, both at the hospital and the prison, and was observed to be healing well and
walking without assistance. In March Coleman wrote a formal complaint saying that his
knee was bothering him and that he had not yet received physical therapy, and medical
personnel scheduled him to be seen later that month. Coleman saw physician’s assistant
LaTanya Williams and Dr. Ghosh in March, and told them that he had not yet started
physical therapy. Dr. Ghosh wrote another referral for therapy. During this visit,
Coleman tells us, he complained about knee pain, though no complaint of knee pain is
documented in Dr. Ghosh’s progress note for this visit.
Then in May 2011 Coleman hurt his back when he fell in a stairwell, an incident
he attributes to his injured knee giving way. A few days later, and three more times over
the next two months, he visited a physical therapist. During his first visit, Coleman
complained that he was experiencing too much back pain to do the exercises. The
physical therapist did not detect a medical basis for Coleman’s reported pain and thus
told him that he needed to see a doctor before therapy sessions could go forward.
Coleman saw Dr. Ronald Schaefer in June 2011 and complained about his knee pain, and
the doctor prescribed a narcotic pain killer. The doctor did not restrict him from doing
physical therapy. But at each following therapy appointment, Coleman said his back
hurt too much to do the exercises, and in July 2011 the physical therapist discharged him
because he refused to participate.
In response to Coleman’s continued complaints of knee pain, Dr. Imhotep Carter
ordered an X‐ray and prescribed steroid injections to help with inflammation and
encourage healing, and pain medication. Coleman made four more visits to Dr. Carter in
2011, during which the doctor, who suspected that Coleman was exaggerating his
symptoms, reviewed the X‐ray and examined Coleman’s knee and concluded that it was
normal and that the surgery site had healed and stabilized. At one of the visits, Coleman
told Dr. Carter that the steroid had helped but did not eliminate his knee pain, so
No. 14‐3417 Page 3
Dr. Carter ordered an MRI of the knee, renewed Coleman’s medical permits, and
scheduled a follow‐up appointment. The doctor met with Coleman once more before the
end of 2011; he prescribed narcotic pain killers and also suggested a physical‐therapy
regimen that Coleman could do on his own. Meanwhile, Coleman says, he had been
sending letters to medical personnel complaining about unresolved pain in his knee and
back. Those letters were screened by prison administrators, but there is no evidence that
they were forwarded to the medical staff. Coleman started seeing a different doctor in
2012, and the new physician diagnosed an irregular kneecap, scarring from the surgery,
and mild swelling in his knee. The doctor did not observe any inflammation in his back,
however, and more X‐rays showed that his knee and back were normal.
Coleman then sued physician’s assistant Williams; doctors Ghosh, Schaefer, and
Carter; and Wexford Health Sources, which employs all of them. Coleman claimed that
the defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing
to timely provide physical therapy and by failing to treat his knee and back pain. In
granting summary judgment for the defendants, the district judge concluded that
Coleman had not presented evidence that any defendant departed from accepted
professional norms by ordering X‐rays and MRIs and prescribing pain killers, injections,
crutches, and movement restrictions. And though Coleman alleged that doctors ignored
his complaints of pain, the district judge explained, he pointed to no evidence to show
that he saw doctors and complained of pain but was not treated. The judge also noted
that Coleman had never presented evidence that his written complaints about pain were
forwarded to the defendants. The district court finally concluded that Coleman lacked
evidence that Wexford had a policy or custom requiring doctors to limit their treatment
and therefore could not be liable under § 1983.
Coleman’s appellate brief is the same document he submitted in opposition to the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and does not comply with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28(a). Noncompliance with Rule 28, in particular its requirement
that an appellant make an argument, is ground for dismissal, see FED. R. APP. P. 28(a);
Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001), but the defendants have not
asserted that we should enforce this rule. At all events, our de novo review of the record
convinces us that the district court properly granted summary judgment for the
defendants.
We can easily dispose of Coleman’s contention about physical therapy. He asserts
that he fell on the stairs and injured his back because the lack of prompt physical therapy
after surgery had weakened his knee, but he presented no evidence tying his fall to the
No. 14‐3417 Page 4
delay in starting physical therapy. See Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013).
And Coleman’s refusal to participate in physical therapy contradicts his claim that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his needs. See Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494,
501 (7th Cir. 2000).
To survive summary judgment on his theory that the doctors denied
constitutionally adequate treatment for his knee and back pain, Coleman needed to
present evidence that “no minimally competent” doctor would have chosen that course
of treatment. See Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008). Federal courts will not
second‐guess a prison physician’s treatment decision unless that choice was so
“significant a departure from accepted professional standards or practices” that it’s
questionable whether the physician actually exercised professional judgment.
See Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, Coleman stated during his
deposition that he was in pain and that he told doctors at various times that his back was
“killing” him. That would constitute evidence that he was in pain, though he did not
point to this testimony in any of his submissions at summary judgment. See Sterk v.
Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that district courts
are not required to sift record for evidence helpful to opponent of motion for summary
judgment).
Still, his testimony changes nothing. Despite Coleman’s statements that he
complained to doctors about his pain, he also acknowledges that the defendants
provided a variety of treatments, including pain killers (both over‐the‐counter and
narcotic), exercise regimens, braces, movement restrictions, injections, X‐rays, and MRIs.
And he provided no evidence that he told the doctors the pain medication was not
working. While Coleman may think the medical attention he received was inadequate,
that disagreement with the defendants’ treatment plans is insufficient to overcome
summary judgment. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409; Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1012–13
(7th Cir. 2006).
Finally, because Coleman did not present evidence of an underlying
constitutional violation, the district court correctly concluded that Wexford cannot be
liable for deliberate indifference. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 412.
AFFIRMED.