NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
REGINALD KENDRICK, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D14-2913
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
___________________________________)
Opinion filed July 29, 2015.
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P.
9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for
Lee County; Bruce Kyle, Judge.
LaROSE, Judge.
Reginald Kendrick appeals the order denying his motion filed under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm but certify a question of great
public importance.
In his motion, Mr. Kendrick argued that because he was a juvenile at the
time he committed second-degree murder, his life sentence for the offense was illegal
under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for
juveniles who commit homicide). The postconviction court correctly denied Mr.
Kendrick's motion based on this court's opinion in Starks v. State, 128 So. 3d 91, 92
(Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding in a postconviction proceeding that because second-
degree murder with a firearm is a life felony punishable by life or by imprisonment for a
term of years not exceeding life, juvenile's life sentence was not unconstitutional under
Miller), disapproved of on other grounds, Lawton v. State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S195 (Fla.
Apr. 9, 2015).
In Landrum v. State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1178 (Fla. 2d DCA May 20,
2015), this court also found that a postconviction court correctly cited Starks when it
denied a motion to correct illegal sentence filed by a defendant convicted of committing
second-degree murder when she was a juvenile. Although we affirmed the
postconviction court's order, we recognized the sentencing incongruity that now exists in
this district since the legislature enacted chapter 2014-220, § 3, at 2873, Laws of
Florida, and the Florida Supreme Court decided Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla.
2015):
a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder enjoys the right to
eventual review of his or her sentence without regard to the
date of his or her offense while a juvenile convicted of
second-degree murder and sentenced to life before the
effective date of the new legislation does not. This
circumstance also raises the question whether those
juveniles convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment before July 1, 2014, are entitled to the
individualized sentencing hearing called for in Miller.
Landrum, 163 So. 3d 1261. As we did in Landrum, we answer this question in the
negative based on our decision in Starks. Also as we did in Landrum, we certify the
following question as one of great public importance:
BECAUSE THERE IS NO PAROLE FROM A LIFE
SENTENCE IN FLORIDA, DOES MILLER V. ALABAMA,
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132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF
THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN SECTIONS 775.082,
921.1401, and 921.1402, FLORIDA STATUTES (2014), TO
JUVENILES CONVICTED OF SECOND-DEGREE
MURDER AND SENTENCED TO A NONMANDATORY
SENTENCE OF LIFE IN PRISON BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CHAPTER 2014-220, LAWS OF
FLORIDA?
Affirmed; question certified.
WALLACE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
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