Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC15-1071
____________
LAISHA L. LANDRUM,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[June 9, 2016]
PARIENTE, J.
Laisha L. Landrum was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole for a second-degree murder she committed when she was sixteen years old.
Landrum v. State, 163 So. 3d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). The Second District
Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence but expressed concerns about the
constitutionality of Landrum’s sentence and certified a question of great public
importance,1 which we rephrase as follows:
1. The following question was certified by the Second District:
BECAUSE THERE IS NO PAROLE FROM A LIFE SENTENCE IN
FLORIDA, DOES MILLER V. ALABAMA, 132 S. CT. 2455 (2012),
REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF THE PROCEDURES
DOES A NON-MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT
PAROLE IMPOSED FOR SECOND-DEGREE MURDER
VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PURSUANT TO
MILLER V. ALABAMA, 132 S. CT. 2455 (2012), AS A RESULT
OF A SENTENCING SCHEME THAT DID NOT REQUIRE THE
TRIAL COURT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS OF A
JUVENILE OFFENDER’S YOUTH?
We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
We answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative, and hold that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller applies to juvenile offenders whose
sentences of life imprisonment without parole were imposed pursuant to a
discretionary sentencing scheme when the sentencing court, in exercising that
discretion, was not required to, and did not take “into account how children are
different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to
a lifetime in prison.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
Even in a discretionary sentencing scheme, the sentencing court’s exercise
of discretion before imposing a life sentence must be informed by consideration of
the juvenile offender’s “youth and its attendant circumstances” as articulated in
OUTLINED IN SECTIONS 775.082, 921.1401, AND 921.1402
FLORIDA STATUTES (2014), TO JUVENILES CONVICTED OF
SECOND-DEGREE MURDER AND SENTENCED TO A NON-
MANDATORY SENTENCE OF LIFE IN PRISON BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CHAPTER 2014-220, LAWS OF FLORIDA?
Landrum, 163 So. 3d at 1263-64.
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Miller and now codified in section 921.1401, Florida Statutes (2014). See Horsley
v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 399 (Fla. 2015). The sentencing court’s discretion must
be guided by two overarching principles set forth in Miller and reaffirmed by
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016): The requirement that sentencing
courts give due weight to evidence that Miller deemed constitutionally significant
before determining that the most severe punishment possible for juvenile offenders
is appropriate; and that under Miller, sentencing juvenile offenders to life
imprisonment must be “rare” and “uncommon.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
Because the trial court was not required to, and did not take into account, the
Miller factors, Landrum’s life sentence without parole is unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the
Florida Constitution because it is “cruel and unusual” as explained by the United
States Supreme Court. Our conclusion that Landrum’s sentence is unconstitutional
is also compelled by the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59
(2010) (internal quotation omitted). Upholding Landrum’s sentence would violate
this precept, as a juvenile convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree murder
would receive a harsher sentence than a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder.
Just as we previously determined that Rebecca Lee Falcon, a fifteen year old
convicted of first-degree murder, must be resentenced under the new legislative
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sentencing scheme, see Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015), Laisha
Landrum, a sixteen year old convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree
murder, must also be resentenced and given opportunity for judicial review of that
sentence at the statutorily mandated period of twenty-five years. See §
921.1402(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014).
We therefore quash the Second District’s decision and remand this case for
resentencing in conformance with sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the
Florida Statutes, and disapprove Lightsey v. State, 182 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015), Kendrick v. State, 171 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), Lindsey v. State,
168 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), Lane v. State, 151 So. 3d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA
2014), Mason v. State, 134 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and Starks v. State,
128 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), to the extent that they are inconsistent with this
opinion.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Petitioner Laisha L. Landrum was sixteen years old when, in June 2004,
Landrum and her sixteen-year-old boyfriend, Rocky Almestica, Jr., murdered
Emily Clemmons.2 The sparse record before us does not reveal who was the more
culpable teenage defendant. Apparently, the motive for the killing was rooted in
2. Prior to Landrum’s trial, Almestica was separately tried and convicted of
second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison.
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jealousy: Clemmons was Almestica’s ex-girlfriend and was competing with
Landrum for his affection. At the time, Landrum had a daughter whose biological
father was co-perpetrator Almestica.
Landrum was convicted of second-degree murder with a weapon in violation
of sections 782.04(2) and 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), after the trial
court granted a judgment of acquittal on the first-degree murder count. Landrum,
163 So. 3d at 1261-62. The second-degree murder conviction was classified as a
life felony because Landrum used a weapon during the crime. § 775.087(1)(a),
Fla. Stat. (2004). Because Landrum was convicted of a life felony, she faced
punishment for “a term of imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of
years not exceeding life imprisonment.” § 775.082(3)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2004). Like
all life imprisonment sentences imposed after 1983, a life imprisonment sentence
under section 775.082(3)(a)3. is without parole. See § 921.001(10)(b), Fla. Stat.
(2004).
Under the sentencing guidelines then in place, for her second-degree murder
conviction3 Landrum faced at least a term-of-years sentence ranging from 22.3
years to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.4 A sentencing judge
3. Landrum was also convicted of the offense of tampering with physical
evidence. See § 918.13, Fla. Stat. (2004).
4. See § 921.0022, Fla. Stat. (2004) (classifying second-degree murder as a
“Level 10” offense); § 921.0024, Fla. Stat. (2004) (providing that “Level 10”
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could depart downward from the lowest permissible sentence if mitigating
circumstances or factors were present, although the judge would have to justify in
writing the reasons for the departure. § 921.00265(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2004).
However, under that same statute, the sentencing judge was not required to provide
any reasoning for imposing a life sentence.
At sentencing, Landrum’s counsel argued for a downward departure from a
life sentence based on two statutory mitigators: (1) The victim was the initiator,
willing participant, or the aggressor of the incident; and (2) the crime was
committed in an unsophisticated manner, was an isolated incident, and Landrum
showed remorse. See § 921.0026(2)(f) and (j), Fla. Stat. (2004). Additionally,
Landrum’s counsel made the following argument in opposition to a life sentence:
Judge, how much good does a 16-year old person, living for a
relatively short period of time in this world, how much good does that
person have to do to keep from spending the rest of their life, and most
probably dying, in a prison cell. Is it enough that she was a wonderful
mother to a five-month-old child who was her life? Is it enough that
she maintained employment on a regular basis until her arrest at 16? Is
it enough that she had virtually no contact with law enforcement? Is it
enough that she was a good daughter to her parents, that she got her
offenses that cause the second-degree murder death of one victim result in a
minimum sentence computation score of 22.3 years, before the defendant’s prior
criminal record and any statutory sentencing multipliers were taken into account).
As provided for in section 921.0024(2), the “permissible range for sentencing shall
be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as
defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before
the court for sentencing.”
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high school education on her own? I think it is. I think it is enough. I
think it is enough for the Court to consider her not to be a throw-away.
Unfortunately, regardless of the fact that punitive measures and
punishment is certainly the nature of the Court, if we impose the
maximum sentence, we have deemed her a throw-away. I believe that
she deserves a light at the end of the tunnel.
After Landrum’s counsel spoke, the family of the victim testified as to how
the murder impacted them and requested the trial court sentence Landrum to the
statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Various
members of Landrum’s family also testified during the hearing and requested a
lesser sentence than life imprisonment so that Landrum’s daughter would have a
chance to meet Landrum outside prison walls. One family member testified that
Landrum was still a child when she committed the murder: “She had a baby, but
she still was a little girl herself.” Landrum spoke briefly to apologize to the
victim’s family.
The trial court sentenced Landrum to life in prison without parole, providing
no reasons other than stating the following: “Miss Landrum, it’s the judgment,
order and sentence of the Court that you be adjudicated guilty of the offense of
murder in the second degree and confined in state prison for the remainder of your
natural life therefore. Any questions about that?” The trial court did not indicate
what findings of aggravating or mitigating circumstances warranted imposition of
the life-without-parole sentence as opposed to a term-of-years sentence, or why the
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trial court was not imposing a guidelines sentence of 22.3 years for the second-
degree murder conviction.
After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller, Landrum filed a
motion in circuit court for postconviction relief in the form of resentencing in
compliance with Miller. The circuit court denied the motion, and on appeal the
Second District accepted the State’s argument that because Landrum was
sentenced under a discretionary sentencing scheme, Miller was inapplicable to
Landrum’s life-without-parole sentence. Nevertheless, the Second District noted
that because of the concurrence of our decision in Horsley, which specified the
proper remedy for a Miller-deficient sentence, and decisions of the Second District
that held Miller inapplicable to life sentences imposed pursuant to a discretionary
sentencing scheme, a sentencing anomaly had arisen in the district where “a
juvenile convicted of first-degree murder enjoys the right to eventual review of his
or her sentence without regard to the date of his or her offense while a juvenile
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life before the effective date
of the new legislation does not.” Landrum, 163 So. 3d at 1263. Accordingly, the
Second District certified the question of great public importance to this Court, id.
at 1263-64, that we now address as rephrased.
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ANALYSIS
The issue presented by the certified question is whether a life sentence
without parole imposed upon a juvenile for second-degree murder is
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment based on Miller and its progeny,
where the trial court had the discretion to impose a term-of-years sentence but was
not required to consider, and did not take into account, the individualized attributes
of the juvenile offender’s youth when exercising this discretion. The issue
presented is a pure question of law, which we therefore review de novo. See
Gridine v. State, 175 So. 3d 672, 674 (Fla. 2015).
Under article I, section 17, of the Florida Constitution, this Court is required
to construe the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” in conformity
with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. We thus begin our analysis by
reviewing the United States Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions,
including Miller, which have all emphasized the constitutional difference between
adults and juveniles, and how that difference requires distinguishing at sentencing
between the juvenile whose crime reflects “transient immaturity,” and the rare
juvenile whose crime reflects “irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
Then, we review the recent decisions of this Court, the sentencing legislation
passed by the Legislature in 2014 that gave Miller effect, and contrast the 2014
legislation with the sentencing scheme under which Landrum was sentenced.
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Finally, we consider whether Landrum’s sentence of life imprisonment without
parole is violative of the Eighth Amendment as construed by Miller and in
accordance with subsequent juvenile sentencing precedent of this Court and the
United States Supreme Court.
I. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Recent Juvenile Sentencing Jurisprudence
In Graham, the Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids the
sentence of life without parole” for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide
offenses. 560 U.S. at 74. This holding built upon the Supreme Court’s previous
pronouncement in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005), that juvenile
offenders’ “diminished culpability” militated against imposing the death penalty
because the “penological justification for the death penalty” applies to juvenile
offenders “with lesser force than to adults.”
Both Roper and Graham emphasized that a juvenile offender’s lessened
culpability and greater capacity for change require a sentencing court to “consider
a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before determining that
life without parole is a proportionate sentence.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734
(citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471). In short, “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the
Eighth Amendment,” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462, and a sentencer must take the
juvenile offender’s age into account “before imposing a particular penalty.” Id. at
2471.
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In Miller, the Supreme Court considered the cases of two juvenile offenders
convicted of homicide offenses and sentenced to life in prison without parole
pursuant to sentencing schemes in their states that mandated the imposition of a
life-without-parole sentence. 132 S. Ct. at 2460. The juvenile offenders argued
that these mandatory sentencing schemes violated the Eighth Amendment by
running “afoul of Graham’s admonition that ‘[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the
Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’
youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.’ ” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).
The Supreme Court agreed, “reversed the sentences imposed and held that
‘mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual
punishments.’ ” Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 959 (quoting Miller, 130 S. Ct. at 2011).
The Court reasoned that “Roper and Graham establish that children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because
juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we
explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’ ” Miller, 132
S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
While Roper established a flat rule banning the death penalty for juvenile
offenders, and Graham established a flat rule banning the imposition of a life
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sentence without parole for juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide offenses,
Miller “set out a different [rule] (individualized sentencing) for homicide
offenses.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 n.6. Miller’s rule of individualized
sentencing for juvenile offenders is given effect through a “hearing where ‘youth
and its attendant characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors,” since such a
hearing “is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life
without parole from those who may not.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 (quoting
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460) (internal citation omitted). As the Supreme Court has
explained, “The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s
substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.” Id. (emphasis added).
Miller, then, requires that a sentencer consider the juvenile offender’s
“chronological age and its hallmark features” before imposing sentence. A
sentencer must “consider[] a juvenile’s lessened culpability and greater capacity
for change” as compared to an adult. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460 (internal quotation
omitted). The sentencer must consider the juvenile offender’s “lack of maturity
and [] underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” that lead to “recklessness,
impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” Id. at 2464 (internal quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court’s requirement of individualized sentencing for juvenile
offenders forbids a sentencer from “treat[ing] every child as an adult,” because
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doing so inevitably ignores the “incompetencies associated with youth,” and
“disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most
suggest it.” Id. at 2468. As the Supreme Court recently explained in Montgomery,
Miller:
[D]id more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s
youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the
penological justifications for life without parole collapse in light of “the
distinctive attributes of youth.” Id., at ––––, 132 S. Ct., at 2465. Even if
a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime
in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child
whose crime reflects “ ‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’ ” Id., at ––
––, 132 S. Ct., at 2469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 573, 125 S. Ct.
1183). Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without
parole is excessive for all but “ ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption,’ ” 567 U.S., at ––––, 132 S. Ct., at 2469
(quoting Roper, supra, at 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183), it rendered life without
parole an unconstitutional penalty for “a class of defendants because of
their status”—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the
transient immaturity of youth. Penry [v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330
(1989)].
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (emphasis supplied). In discussing the procedural
component of the Miller decision, the Montgomery Court noted that
“Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics before determining that life without parole is a proportionate
sentence.” Id. As the Court explained, just because “Miller did not impose a
formal factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a child whose
crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole. To the contrary, Miller
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established that this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.”
Id. at 735.
II. Giving Effect to Miller: This Court’s Recent Juvenile Sentencing Decisions
& Chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida
After Miller, we were confronted with two questions regarding the effect of
the decision in this State: First, whether the rule announced in Miller applied
retroactively; and second, what the proper remedy was for a Miller violation. As
to the first question, we concluded that “Miller constitute[ed] a ‘development of
fundamental significance’ and therefore must be given retroactive effect.” Falcon,
162 So. 3d at 956.
Regarding the proper remedy for a Miller violation, we unanimously
adopted the individualized sentencing approach that the Florida Legislature
provided during the 2014 Regular Session “to remedy the federal constitutional
infirmities in Florida’s juvenile sentencing laws, as identified by the Supreme
Court in Miller and Graham.” Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 401. As we explained, the
new sentencing legislation of Chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, “address[ed] the
concerns of Miller,” id. at 405, and provided explicit guidance for juvenile
offenders convicted of a life felony:
A similar sentencing structure applies to those juvenile offenders
convicted of life or first-degree felony homicide offenses. Life
imprisonment remains a possibility if the trial court conducts an
individualized sentencing proceeding, with mandatory subsequent
judicial review available for those juvenile offenders who “actually
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killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill” that are sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of more than twenty-five years. For those offenders in
this category who “did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill,”
the subsequent judicial review is available for a sentence of more than
fifteen years.
Id. at 404 (internal citations omitted). See §§ 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402,
Fla. Stat. (2014).
Unlike the statute Landrum was sentenced under—which did not provide for,
or much less suggest, factors a sentencing court should consider relating to the
juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics as described in Miller—
Section 921.1401 provides for the appropriate sentencing factors a trial court must
consider that are “relevant to the offense and the defendant’s youth and attendant
circumstances” when determining if a juvenile offender should be sentenced to life
imprisonment, including:
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the
defendant.
(b) The effect of the crime on the victim’s family and on the
community.
(c) The defendant’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and mental
and emotional health at the time of the offense.
(d) The defendant’s background, including his or her family, home,
and community environment.
(e) The effect, if any, of immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to
appreciate risks and consequences on the defendant’s participation in the
offense.
(f) The extent of the defendant’s participation in the offense.
(g) The effect, if any, of familial pressure or peer pressure on the
defendant’s actions.
(h) The nature and extent of the defendant’s prior criminal history.
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(i) The effect, if any, of characteristics attributable to the defendant’s
youth on the defendant’s judgment.
(j) The possibility of rehabilitating the defendant.
§ 921.1401(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). Section 921.1402 additionally provides the
relevant factors a court should consider during a “sentence review hearing to
determine whether the juvenile offender’s sentence should be modified.”
§ 921.1402(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). One of those factors is “Whether the juvenile
offender’s age, maturity, and psychological development at the time of the offense
affected his or her behavior.” § 921.1402(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2014).
None of the Miller factors as now codified in section 921.1401 existed in the
sentencing scheme under which Landrum was sentenced, and the sentencing
court’s discretion to impose a life sentence was without restriction. See §
775.082(3)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2004). The State, however, argues that because Miller
held unconstitutional sentences of life imprisonment without parole imposed upon
juveniles pursuant to mandatory sentencing schemes, and Landrum’s life
imprisonment without parole sentence was imposed pursuant to a discretionary
sentencing scheme, Miller does not apply.
We disagree with the State. The basis for the violation of the Eighth
Amendment and the prohibition in article I, section 17, of the Florida Constitution
against “Excessive Punishments,” does not emanate from the mandatory nature of
the sentence imposed. Rather, the violation emanates from the United States
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Supreme Court’s command that because children are “constitutionally different,”
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, the Eighth Amendment requires that sentencing of
juvenile offenders be individualized in order to separate the “rare” juvenile
offender whose crime reflects “irreparable corruption,” from the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects “transient immaturity.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
Indeed, Justice Sotomayor recently reemphasized that “lower courts must instead
ask the difficult but essential question whether [juvenile offenders before the court
for sentencing] are among the very ‘rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose
crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.’ ” Adams v. Alabama, 578 U.S., at––––,
2016 WL 2945697, at *4 (May 23, 2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734). As Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, recently explained of Miller, “[t]he relevance to sentencing of
‘children are different’ also cannot in logic depend on whether the legislature has
made the life sentence discretionary or mandatory; even discretionary sentences
must be guided by consideration of age-relevant factors.” McKinley v. Butler, 809
F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016).
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Montgomery clarified that
the Miller Court had no intention of limiting its rule of requiring individualized
sentencing for juvenile offenders only to mandatorily-imposed sentences of life
without parole, when a sentencing court’s exercise of discretion was not informed
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by Miller’s considerations. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. A contrary
interpretation of the Miller holding would mean that sentencing juveniles to life
imprisonment would not be, as the Supreme Court has stated in its juvenile
sentencing precedent, “rare” and “uncommon.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
We conclude that at the heart of Miller, as further amplified in Montgomery,
is the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of imposing certain punishments on
juvenile offenders that fail to consider a juvenile’s “lessened culpability and
greater capacity for change.” Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 396 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct.
at 2460) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, the exercise of a sentencing
court’s discretion when sentencing juvenile offenders must be informed by
consideration of the juvenile offender’s “youth and its attendant circumstances” as
articulated in Miller and now provided for in section 921.1401. Without this
individualized sentencing consideration, a sentencer is unable to distinguish
between juvenile offenders whose crimes “reflect transient immaturity” and those
whose crimes reflect “irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Failing
to make this distinction, otherwise, would mean life sentences for juveniles would
not be exceedingly rare, but possibly commonplace.
III. Landrum’s Sentence
This case dramatically demonstrates the Eighth Amendment problem of a
life-without-parole sentence imposed upon a juvenile offender when the
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sentencer’s discretion is not guided by the individualized sentencing factors
deemed constitutionally significant in Miller. As a sixteen year old convicted of
second-degree murder, Landrum faced a sentence of between 22.3 years and life
imprisonment for that offense. This was the same sentencing range she would
have been subject to if she had been an adult. Certainly, the sentencing court was
aware of Landrum’s age and that her family members still considered her “a
child,” but there is no indication that the court, when exercising its discretion to
sentence Landrum to life imprisonment as opposed to a term-of-years sentence,
considered the “distinctive attributes of youth” as articulated in Miller. In fact, it
appears just the opposite. When sentencing Landrum, a juvenile offender, the trial
court stated only the following: “Miss Landrum, it’s the judgment, order and
sentence of the Court that you be adjudicated guilty of the offense of murder in the
second degree and confined in state prison for the remainder of your natural life
therefore. Any questions about that?”
Without the benefit of Miller and its progeny, the sentencing court did not
indicate why Landrum’s crimes warranted imposition of a life-without-parole
sentence as opposed to a term-of-years sentence, nor did the court consider that the
juvenile offender was only sixteen years old at the time of the crimes. Although
the sentencing court recognized the circumstances of the crime did not warrant that
the jury consider first-degree murder, it did not consider whether the crime itself
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reflected “transient immaturity” rather than “irreparable corruption.” See Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2469. And most certainly, the sentencing court did not consider why,
although a life sentence for a juvenile offender should be exceedingly “rare” and
“uncommon,” Landrum should receive such an uncommon and exceedingly rare
life sentence, rather than a 22.3 year guideline sentence, or even one that departed
downward from the guideline sentence. Moreover, at the time the sentencing court
exercised its discretion in deciding that Landrum should never see the outside of
prison walls for a crime she committed at age sixteen, the only guidance the
sentencing court had in considering Landrum’s “youth and its attendant
characteristics” was the Legislature’s directive that a sentencing court could
consider as a mitigating circumstance when departing downward from the term-of-
years sentence that, “[a]t the time of the offense the defendant was too young to
appreciate the consequences of the offense.” § 921.0026(2)(k), Fla. Stat. (2004).
This cursory acknowledgement of a juvenile offender’s youth and how its
attendant characteristics counseled against sentencing the juvenile offender to a
lifetime of incarceration in the sentencing scheme Landrum was sentenced under is
vastly different from the sentencing factors Miller prescribes, and which are now
codified in section 921.1401(2), Florida Statutes (2014). These sentencing factors
include consideration of the “defendant’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and
mental and emotional health at the time of the offense,” section 921.1401(2)(c),
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and the “effect, if any, of familial pressure or peer pressure on the defendant’s
actions,” section 921.1401(2)(g), as well as the “effect, if any, of immaturity,
impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences on the defendant’s
participation in the offense.” § 921.1401(2)(e). Miller’s emphasis on the rarity of
life imprisonment sentences for juvenile offenders, coupled with absence of any
consideration of the distinctive attributes of youth by Landrum’s sentencing court,
render Landrum’s sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as
construed by Miller.
Further, permitting a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile offender
convicted of second-degree murder that was imposed without the sentencer
considering the “distinctive attributes of youth” would be grossly disproportionate
when juvenile offenders convicted of the more serious charge of first-degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment will receive the benefit of chapter
2014-220, Laws of Florida (2014). This sentencing legislation was “designed to
bring Florida’s juvenile sentencing statutes into compliance with the United States
Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.”
Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 39; §§ 775.082, 921.1401, 921.1402, Fla. Stat. (2014). As
the Second District explained, “a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder enjoys
the right to eventual review of his or her sentence without regard to the date of his
or her offense while a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced
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to life before the effective date of the new legislation does not.” Landrum, 163 So.
3d at 1263. Simply put, “[c]onsiderations of fairness and uniformity make it very
‘difficult to justify depriving a person of his liberty or his life, under process no
longer considered acceptable and no longer applied to indistinguishable cases.’ ”
Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 962 (quoting Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)).
The sentencing scheme under which Landrum was sentenced gave the trial
court unfettered discretion when choosing between sentencing a juvenile offender
convicted of second-degree murder to a term-of-years sentence or a life-without-
parole sentence. While we acknowledge the possibility that a sentencer could have
exercised discretion under this scheme in a manner that demonstrated the sentencer
considered the factors Miller has since deemed constitutionally significant—and
the resulting sentence would therefore not violate Miller—this did not happen in
Landrum’s case. The resulting, non-individualized sentence was the likely result
of a decision not informed by the “distinctive attributes of youth.” Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2465. A juvenile offender convicted of the same offense today, however,
will receive the benefit of the new sentencing legislation’s requirement of
individualized consideration that Miller requires, as well as the expression of this
Court and the United States Supreme Court that sentencing a juvenile offender to
life imprisonment without parole should be “rare” and “uncommon,” and that the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects “transient immaturity” must be given some
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“hope for some years of life outside prison walls.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736-
37.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s emphasis in Miller that the “distinctive attributes of
youth,” prohibit automatically sentencing juvenile offenders to life imprisonment
without first considering such attributes, coupled with the Supreme Court’s recent
characterization of Miller as prescribing a “hearing where ‘youth and its attendant
characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors,” in order “to separate those
juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not,”
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460), leads us to
conclude that Landrum’s sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.
At the heart of Miller, Montgomery, and indeed the entirety of this Court’s
and the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing jurisprudence interpreting the
Eighth Amendment, is the axiom that “youth matters for purposes of meting out
the law’s most serious punishments.” Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 399. Miller and
Montgomery, together with Roper and Graham, require a sentencer to consider
age-related evidence as mitigation, and permit the sentencing of a juvenile offender
to life imprisonment only in the most “uncommon” and “rare” case where the
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juvenile offender’s crime reflects “irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2469 (internal quotation omitted).
Landrum’s life sentence without parole for second-degree murder per
section 775.082(3)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2003), violated the Eighth Amendment.
The sentencing scheme, which predated Miller and its progeny, did not require the
trial court to consider the “distinctive attributes of youth” when exercising its
discretion in imposing a life sentence. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. Further, the
sentencing scheme did not take into account that life sentences for youth should be
“uncommon.” Id. at 2469. Landrum’s life-without-parole sentence for second-
degree murder was imposed without individualized consideration of her youth and
its attendant characteristics that is now necessary under Miller and this Court’s
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. This absence of individualized sentencing
consideration prevented Landrum from showing that her “crime did not reflect
irreparable corruption; and, if it did not,” that she must be given “hope for some
years of life outside prison walls.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736-37.
We therefore quash the Second District’s decision upholding Landrum’s
life-without-parole sentence and disapprove Lightsey v. State, 182 So. 3d 727 (Fla.
3d DCA 2015), Kendrick v. State, 171 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), Lindsey v.
State, 168 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), Lane v. State, 151 So. 3d 20 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2014), Mason v. State, 134 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and Starks v.
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State, 128 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), to the extent that they are inconsistent
with this opinion. We remand for resentencing in accordance with sections
775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statues (2014).
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
POLSTON, J., concurs in result.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance
Second District - Case No. 2D14-2842
(Hillsborough County)
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; John M. Klawikofsky,
Bureau Chief, Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter N.
Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent
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