MEMORANDUM DECISION
Aug 04 2015, 9:44 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Suzy St. John Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kobe Blake, August 4, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A04-1412-CR-572
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda E. Brown,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
The Honorable Marshelle D.
Broadwell, Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No. 49G10-
1409-CM-43539
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 49A04-1412-CR-572 | August 4, 2015 Page 1 of 5
[1] On September 9, 2014, Appellant-Defendant Kobe Blake was arrested after he
was alleged to have resisted law enforcement. Three days later, Appellee-
Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State”) charged Blake with Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement by flight. Blake was found guilty of the
Class A misdemeanor charge following a bench trial.
[2] On appeal, Blake contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction. The State concedes that under the reasoning employed by the
Indiana Supreme court in Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014), the
evidence presented to the trial court is insufficient to sustain Blake’s conviction.
In light of the State’s concession, we reverse Blake’s conviction for Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement by flight.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On September 9, 2014, Officer Adrienne Aurs of the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department (“IMPD”) was dispatched to the intersection of Tibbs and
North Streets in Haughville. According to dispatch, an anonymous caller had
reported a disturbance at the intersection with a suspicious black male standing
at the northwest corner of the intersection yelling at someone on his cellular
phone. The anonymous caller indicated that the suspicious individual had
claimed to be running from the police and to have had narcotics on him. The
anonymous caller indicated that the suspicious individual was wearing all
black.
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[4] When Officer Aurs arrived at the intersection, he saw Blake was standing on
the northwest corner of Tibbs and North Streets in Haughville, talking on his
cellular phone. Blake was wearing a black shirt with a red collar, blue jeans
with holes in them, red shorts under the jeans, a black belt, and a red bandana.
Blake also had a black pick in his hair.
[5] Officer Aurs approached Blake. Blake answered Officer Aurs’s initial questions
and took a pocket knife out of his pocket at Officer Aurs request. Blake reached
into his pockets to retrieve identification after being asked by Officer Aurs for
identification. Officer Aurs then told Blake not to reach into his pockets but to
keep his hands where Officer Aurs could see them.
[6] Not knowing whether Blake was armed and out of concern for officer safety,
Officer Aurs attempted to place Blake in handcuffs. Blake pulled away from
Officer Aurs and ran away. Officer Aurs yelled at Blake to stop, gave chase,
and deployed his taser. After tasing Blake, Officer Aurs handcuffed him and
arrested him for resisting law enforcement.
[7] On September 12, 2014, the State charged Blake with Class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement by flight. The trial court found Blake guilty following
a bench trial. The trial court subsequently sentenced Blake to a term of 180
days executed in the Marion County Jail. One day after sentencing Blake, the
trial court issued a sua sponte order reducing Blake’s sentence to time served.
Blake now appeals his conviction.
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Discussion and Decision
[8] Blake contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for
Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement by flight.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence
and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s
role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and
weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a
conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are
confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most
favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate courts affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not
necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably
be drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and
quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be
reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in
original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess
the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind.
2002).
[9] In order to prove that Blake committed the offense of Class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement by fleeing, the State was required to prove that Blake
(1) knowingly or intentionally (2) fled from Officer Aurs after Officer Aurs had
“by visible or audible means … identified himself … and ordered [Blake] to
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stop.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1. In Gaddie, the Indiana Supreme Court held
that in order to interpret Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) as
constitutional,
the statutory element “after the officer has ... ordered the person to
stop” must be understood to require that such order to stop rest on
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, that is, specific, articulable
facts that would lead the officer to reasonably suspect that criminal
activity is afoot. Absent proof that an officer’s order to stop meets
such requirements, the evidence will be insufficient to establish the
offense of Resisting Law Enforcement by fleeing.
10 N.E.3d at 1255 (footnote omitted).
[10] The State concedes in the instant matter that the record is devoid of any
specific, articulable facts that would have led Officer Aurs to reasonably suspect
that criminal activity was afoot. As such, the State concedes that the evidence
presented before the trial court is insufficient to establish the offense of resisting
law enforcement by fleeing. In light of the State’s concession of the issue on
appeal, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain Blake’s
conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement by fleeing.
Accordingly, we reverse Blake’s conviction.
[11] The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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