IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1023
Filed August 5, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
AMY ERIN BOOTH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Annette J.
Scieszinski, Judge.
Amy Erin Booth appeals her conviction for possession of
pseudoephedrine with the intent it be used to manufacture methamphetamine.
AFFIRMED.
Christopher J. Foster of Foster Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin R. Cmelik and Kyle P. Hanson,
Assistant Attorneys General, and Larry J. Brock, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., McDonald, J., and Miller, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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MILLER, S.J.
Amy Erin Booth appeals her conviction following a jury’s verdict finding her
guilty of possessing pseudoephedrine with the intent it be used to manufacture
methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(4)(b) (2013). She
claims there was not sufficient evidence to prove she had the specific intent
required for the conviction. We find there is sufficient evidence to convict.
Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The Washington-Louisa Drug Task Force was investigating Mike Miller
and Jeff Marie for the manufacture of methamphetamine (meth). During the
investigation, Deputy Eric Weber (a member of the Washington-Louisa Drug
Task Force) received information Booth was providing pseudoephedrine, a base
ingredient of meth, to Miller and Marie. The “drug logs” kept at a local pharmacy
indicated Booth had purchased six boxes, 576 pills, of pseudoephedrine from
September 16, 2012 through February 26, 2013.
In March 2013, the task force executed a search warrant where Miller and
Marie lived, and they discovered a large meth lab. Investigators found, among
other items involved in the production of meth, boxes of pseudoephedrine pills
identical to those purchased by Booth. Investigators also seized Marie’s cell
phone during the search of the building and retrieved texts sent from Booth to
Marie but were not able to retrieve any sent from Marie to Booth. The text
messages retrieved from Booth’s phone stated, among many other similar
messages: “Will u smk w me,” “Feel like numbing my brain,” “Do you have any
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shit,” “It would be cool if u had white,” and “Do you have a quarter i can buy hun”
followed by “Not even w a box.”
Booth was charged with possession of pseudoephedrine with the intent it
be used to manufacture methamphetamine by trial information in early August
2013. Booth was tried March 25, 2014. At trial, a pharmacist testified this
amount of pseudoephedrine was not “medically necessary” as “under the correct
directions she would not need to take that quantity of pills in that time period.”
Deputy Weber testified, while relying on his Drug Task Force Training, that it is
common in these types of “meth rings” to have both the meth “cooks” and users
purchase pseudoephedrine in order to obtain a constant supply for continuous
manufacture. Weber also testified the texts in Booth’s phone contained
references to purchasing and using meth. Weber noted the texts referenced
Booth’s desire to buy meth with money or a box of pseudoephedrine.
The jury returned a verdict finding Booth guilty, and she was sentenced to
a suspended sentence of five years. She now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law.
State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2003). We will uphold a verdict if
substantial evidence supports it. Id. Evidence is considered substantial if it
would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. We review the evidence, including legitimate inferences and
presumptions that may fairly be deduced from the evidence, in the light most
favorable to the State. Id. In doing so, we consider all the evidence, not just the
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evidence that supports the verdict. Id. The State has the burden to prove every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. Id.
The evidence presented must raise a fair inference of guilt and do more than
create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture. Id.
III. Analysis
Booth claims there was not sufficient evidence to prove she had specific
intent for the pseudoephedrine she purchased to be used in the manufacture of
meth. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find a
reasonable juror could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, Booth had the
requisite specific intent. The charge against Booth required proof of only two
elements: first, between September 16, 2012 and February 26, 2013, in
Washington County, Iowa, Booth knowingly possessed pseudoephedrine; and
second, that she had the specific intent the pseudoephedrine be used to
manufacture methamphetamine. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(4)(b) (providing
that possession of pseudoephedrine with intent it be used to manufacture any
controlled substance is a class “D” felony); 124.101(5) (defining a “controlled
substance” as including a drug listed in schedules I thru V of division II of chapter
124); 124.206(4)(b) (listing methamphetamine as a schedule II drug). The jury
received instructions defining specific intent as:
“Specific intent” means not only being aware of doing an act
and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing with a specific
purpose in mind. Because determining the defendant’s specific
intent requires you to decide what she was thinking when an act
was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, you
should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to
determine the defendant’s specific intent. You may, but are not
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required to, conclude a person intends the natural results of her
acts.
Booth claims the State’s evidence did nothing more than show she
intended to pay for meth with a box of pseudoephedrine, and there is no proof
she intended the pseudoephedrine to be used to manufacture meth. In
sufficiency-of-evidence cases, we may use “all reasonable inferences that may
be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State v. Showens, 845 N.W.2d 436, 440
(Iowa 2014). We also consider both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v.
Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Iowa 2008). Intent is especially hard to prove
with direct evidence, and therefore, “proof of intent usually consists of
circumstantial evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from that
evidence.” State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Iowa 1996).
Here, evidence supporting the conviction includes: (1) Booth bought meth
from Marie, (2) a series of text messages revealed Booth offered to exchange a
box of pseudoephedrine for meth, (3) Booth had purchased a “medically
unnecessary” amount of pseudoephedrine, (4) testimony at trial demonstrated
Marie’s meth was made of a base of pseudoephedrine, and (5) testimony by
Deputy Weber informed the jury many meth users provide pseudoephedrine to
the meth “cook” in order to enable continued manufacture. We conclude
substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of Booth’s guilt. Therefore, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.