legal consideration to support their post nuptial agreement); see Berge v.
Fredericks, 95 Nev. 183, 187, 591 P.2d 246, 248 (1979) (explaining that
although marriage may constitute valuable consideration for the transfer
of property, when the marriage is consummated prior to the agreement to
transfer property, the marriage is not valuable consideration).
Appellant next contends that the district court abused its
discretion when it awarded a Fidelity financial account to appellant as
separate property but awarded to respondent a community interest in
certain stock that appellant, in a post-divorce decree motion, asserted was
held in the Fidelity account. Because neither party sought to admit into
evidence the proposed exhibit that appellant now relies on, no evidence
supported a finding that the stock was separate property, and thus the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the stock
was community property. See Burroughs Corp. v. Century Steel, Inc., 99
Nev. 464, 470, 664 P.2d 354, 358 (1983) (holding that a district court
determination which was based upon an exhibit not admitted into
evidence was clearly erroneous). Additionally, the district court properly
determined that post-judgment relief was not warranted by the proposed
exhibit, as the failure of appellant's trial counsel to present evidence on
the matter at trial is not grounds for post-judgment relief. Achrem, 112
Nev. at 742, 917 P.2d at 450.
Appellant also argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it attributed financial waste to appellant because it did
not specifically find that appellant had intended that her sister take the
money at issue. The district court did not abuse its discretion, however,
because it may make an unequal division of community property without
finding that a party intentionally wasted community property. Putterman
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v. Putterman, 113 Nev. 606, 608, 939 P.2d 1047, 1048(1997) (providing
that negligent loss of community property is grounds for an unequal
distribution of community property). Additionally, substantial evidence
supports the district court's determination that appellant's sister's
withdrawals did not represent repayments on community debt owed to the
sister.
Finally, appellant challenges the valuation of the community
catering business. Appellant argues that the district court should have
ordered the business sold and the proceeds split between the parties, but
provides no portion of the record requesting this relief in the district court.
Thus, appellant has waived this request for relief. See NRCP 7(b) (request
for order to be made by motion). Additionally, appellant's reliance on post-
divorce decree "evidence" questioning the district court's valuation of the
business is unavailing, as appellant had a duty to present this testimony
at the time of the hearing on the matter. See Drespel v. Drespel, 56 Nev.
368, 45 P.2d 792, 793 (1935) (providing that litigants must be active and
diligent in procuring the testimony upon which they rely to maintain their
cause and that available evidence must be presented at the initial trial on
the matter). We conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate that
the district court's valuation method was an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Saitta
J.
Gibboirs Pickering
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cc: Hon. Bridget Robb Peck, District Judge
Margaret M. Crowley, Settlement Judge
Richard F. Cornell
Attorney Marilyn D. York, Inc.
Washoe District Court Clerk
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