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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ARJUNA MASON A/K/A TONY MASON, : No. 507 EDA 2014
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, January 10, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0009930-2012,
CP-51-CR-0009933-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. DONOHUE AND LAZARUS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 10, 2015
Arjuna Mason a/k/a Tony Mason appeals the judgment of sentence of
January 10, 2014, following his conviction of first-degree murder,
aggravated assault, and related charges. After careful review, we affirm.
The charges related to two separate incidents the night of
October 21-22, 2011. In the first incident, at approximately 11:45 p.m.,
appellant attempted to rob the victim, Ronald Parrish (“Parrish”), outside a
Chinese store at 6605 Chew Avenue. The trial court has summarized the
facts related to this incident, in part, as follows:
Ronald Parrish testified that, on October 21,
2011, he left to go to a Chinese store located at
6605 Chew Avenue to purchase a cigar, commonly
referred to as a “Dutch.” Mr. Parrish admitted that
the cigar was purchased to smoke a joint.
Mr. Parrish testified that, at approximately
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11:45 pm, he arrived at the Chinese store, exited his
2001 Ford Taurus, entered the store, purchased the
cigar, and left the store to return to his vehicle.
Mr. Parrish estimated that he was in the store for
roughly two to three minutes before returning to his
vehicle. As Mr. Parrish exited the store, Mr. Parrish
noticed a person approaching him from the opposite
side of the street with a raised gun aimed at him.
Mr. Parrish immediately darted around his vehicle to
the driver’s side of his car and tried to start his
vehicle so that he could get away. As Mr. Parrish
was trying to escape, the person who had been
approaching Mr. Parrish was outside the closed
driver’s side window, displaying the weapon inches
from Mr. Parrish’s head and ordering Mr. Parrish to
get out of the car and to “give it up” or “give that
shit up.” Mr. Parrish was able to start his vehicle
and pull away, but the person fired several shots
[Footnote 2] at Mr. Parrish. Two of the shots hit
Mr. Parrish—one entered the middle of his back and
made contact with his right lumber [sic] spine and
the second shot hit his shoulder. Mr. Parrish, injured
and still bleeding, drove himself to Chestnut Hill
Hospital where medical professionals transferred
Mr. Parrish to Abington Hospital, the closest hospital
with a trauma unit.
[Footnote 2] The crime scene unit found
ten (10) fired cartridge casings
[(“FCC’s”)] at the scene.
Trial court opinion, 8/14/14 at 3-4 (citations to the transcript omitted).
Parrish described the shooter to police and subsequently picked appellant
out of a photo array as an individual who “looks like” the shooter. (Id. at
5.) Police also secured surveillance video from a neighboring business
depicting the perpetrator wearing a black leather jacket with white trim and
a distinctive design on the back, as described by Parrish. (Id. at 5-6.) Four
projectiles were retrieved from Parrish’s vehicle. (Id. at 6.)
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Later, at approximately 1:22 a.m. on October 22, 2011, appellant
fatally shot the victim/decedent, Anthony Mitchell (“Mitchell”), at 149 West
Sharpnack Street, only a few blocks away from the Chinese store. The facts
underlying this incident have been summarized, in pertinent part, as follows:
At approximately 1:22 am on October 22,
2011, a flash radio call indicated that a person with a
gun was holding a male against his will in the
first-floor residence at 149 West Sharpnack Street.
As would later be determined, four individuals were
within the residence—Sharda Frye, Ijanaya Clark,
Anthony Mitchell, and the Defendant. Sharda Frye,
Ijanaya Clark’s cousin, and Anthony Mitchell were
roommates in the first-floor unit. The flash radio
announcement came in response to information
received at the 911 call center. Sergeant Ayres
testified that he and Sergeant Kennedy, both of
whom were still at 6605 Chew Avenue and had just
finished processing that crime scene, proceeded to
149 West Sharpnack Street which was roughly four
blocks away from the Chinese store. Sergeant Ayres
testified that he, Sergeant Kennedy and
Officers McKeon and Bransfield, approached the front
door of the residence. Sergeant Ayres testified that
on about three occasions, a black female, roughly in
her twenties, came to the bay window in the
first-floor apartment which looked onto the front
porch and looked out the window only to be pulled
away from the window each time by another
occupant within the residence. After the female
peered through the window three times, the lights in
the first floor residence were shut off.
Sergeant Ayres testified that Officer McKeon checked
the front door and found that the door was locked.
Sergeant Ayres and Officer McKeon also banged on
the door multiple times while yelling “Police” and
demanding that the residents exit the property. In
response to what they observed and the failure of
the occupants to vacate the premises, Sergeant
Ayres and Sergeant Kennedy manned the front door,
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and Sergeant Ayres instructed Officers McKeon and
Bransfield to cover the back of the residence.
Sergeant Ayres testified that he then contacted
Lieutenant Overwise to apprise him of the situation.
Lieutenant Overwise contacted the 911 caller to get
more information and, based on what was told to
him, Lieutenant Overwise declared the situation a
barricade. Sergeant Ayres testified that between his
arrival on location and Lieutenant Overwise’s
determination that the situation be handled as a
barricade, 5 to 10 minutes had elapsed. As part of
barricade protocol, the SWAT team, the fire
department, and medical personnel were instructed
to come to the scene, and a staging area was setup
a distance away from the epicenter of the incident.
Sergeant Ayres testified that, shortly thereafter,
Officer Bransfield, who was located outside the rear
of the property, was yelling at an individual to lie
down, show his hands, and come downstairs. A
short time after the property had been secured by
police, Ms. Clark and Ms. Frye exited the property,
the police secured both females and escorted them
to the staging area. Both before and after the
females left the residence, Sergeant Ayres testified
that he heard loud noises emanating from the
residence as if someone was moving furniture or
running up and down stairs. Sergeant Ayres testified
that 5 to 10 more minutes passed after the two
females exited the property until the Defendant
came out, with his shirt off and in his hand and with
his hands above his head, as instructed by the
police.
Id. at 6-8 (footnote omitted) (citations to the transcript omitted).
Officer Bransfield saw appellant wearing a distinctive black jacket
which was later found abandoned on the third floor of the residence. (Id. at
8-9.) It matched the jacket described by Parrish. (Id. at 4.) The decedent,
Mitchell’s DNA was found on appellant’s T-shirt. (Id. at 11.) In addition,
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the ballistic evidence recovered from both crime scenes, including bullet
specimens and FCC’s, came from the same weapon, a .9 mm handgun found
at 149 West Sharpnack Street. (Id. at 10-11.) The forensic pathologist,
Sam Gulino, M.D., testified that Mitchell died from a gunshot wound to the
head, entering slightly above and behind the left ear and exiting through the
right side of the neck. (Id. at 12.) Ijanaya Clark testified that appellant and
Mitchell were in the back room talking when she heard a gunshot. (Id. at
13.) Afterwards, she saw appellant with a gun in his waistband. (Id.)
On November 26, 2013, following a jury trial, appellant was found
guilty of first-degree murder, aggravated assault by causing serious bodily
injury, and two counts each of possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”)
and carrying a firearm without a license. On January 10, 2014, appellant
was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for first-degree murder,
and a consecutive sentence of 10-20 years’ imprisonment for aggravated
assault. The remaining sentences were run concurrently. Post-sentence
motions were denied, and this timely appeal followed. Appellant complied
with Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A., and the trial court has filed an
opinion.
Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:
I. Is the Defendant entitled to a new trial as the
result of Court error when the Court wrongfully
determined that the key witness for the
Commonwealth was unavailable?
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II. Is the Defendant entitled to a new trial as the
result of Court error when the Court refused to
charge on alibi?
III. Is the Defendant entitled to an arrest of
judgment on all charges where the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the verdict?
Appellant’s brief at 3.1
First, appellant contends that the trial court erred in determining that
Ijanaya Clark (“Clark”) was unavailable, thus permitting the Commonwealth
to introduce her preliminary hearing testimony as well as her prior
statement to homicide detectives. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court found that the Commonwealth had made a good faith, reasonable
effort to secure Clark’s presence at trial. We agree.
Under both our federal and state constitutions a
criminal defendant has a right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him. However, it is
well established that an unavailable witness’ prior
recorded testimony from a preliminary hearing is
admissible at trial and will not offend the right of
confrontation, provided the defendant had counsel
and a full opportunity to cross-examine that witness
at the prior proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 614 A.2d 684, 685 (Pa. 1992) (citations
omitted). Where the Commonwealth seeks to admit the prior recorded
testimony of a missing witness, it must be established that the
Commonwealth made a “good faith” effort to locate the witness.
1
Appellant also raised a challenge to the weight of the evidence in his
Rule 1925(b) statement, which has been abandoned on appeal.
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Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 A.2d 842 (Pa. 1975). What constitutes a
“good faith” effort is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. Id.
See also Commonwealth v. Lebo, 795 A.2d 987, 990 (Pa.Super. 2002)
(“It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine what constitutes a
good faith effort to locate a missing witness, and the decision of the court
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” (citations omitted)).
“The length to which the prosecution must go to produce the testimony is a
question of reasonableness.” Commonwealth v. Melson, 637 A.2d 633,
638 (Pa.Super. 1994), appeal denied, 647 A.2d 509 (Pa. 1994) (citations
omitted).
The trial court details the substantial efforts the Commonwealth made
to locate Clark in its August 14, 2014 opinion. (Trial court opinion, 8/14/14
at 16-21.) Police spoke with family members including Clark’s sister,
mother, Ziakia Clark (“Ziakia”), and grandmother. (Id. at 17-18.) Clark
was listed as living at her mother’s home but police made several visits
there without success. Police were able to reach Clark using several
different cell phone numbers; each time, she provided police with a bogus
address and the number was subsequently disconnected. (Id. at 17-18,
39.) A bench warrant was issued for Clark; the Southwest Warrant Unit also
went to Ziakia’s residence on multiple occasions but received no response.
(Id. at 19.) Ziakia told a police detective that her daughter knew police
were looking for her regarding this matter and that she did not want to be
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found. (Id. at 21, 39.) Police conducted surveillance outside Ziakia’s house
and checked local hospitals and the medical examiner’s office. (Id. at 21,
40.) These efforts continued up to the day of trial. (Id. at 19.) In short,
the Commonwealth made a good faith, reasonable attempt to find Clark.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth should have taken extra
steps to locate Clark, including checking with the Department of Public
Welfare or medical clinics. (Appellant’s brief at 11-12.) Apparently, Clark
had recently given birth. Appellant also suggests that the Commonwealth
could have enlisted the assistance of the United States Marshals. (Id. at
12.) However, the test is one of reasonableness. Under the circumstances,
we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth made reasonable, good
faith efforts to locate the missing witness, who clearly did not wish to be
found. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Clark
“unavailable” and permitting the Commonwealth to introduce her prior
testimony.
In his second issue on appeal, appellant claims that he was entitled to
an alibi instruction. According to appellant, his own testimony, as well as
that of Sherille Haywood (“Haywood”), clearly placed him at a location other
than Chew Avenue at the time of the first shooting. (Appellant’s brief at
13.) In addition, appellant argues that because the ballistics evidence
matched for both shooting incidents, if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to
appellant’s involvement in the Chew Avenue incident due to the alibi
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testimony, they could also have had a reasonable doubt as to his
involvement in the murder of Mitchell at 149 West Sharpnack Street. (Id.)
Therefore, appellant demands a new trial on all charges. The trial court
agreed with appellant that he was entitled to an alibi instruction as to the
shooting at 6605 Chew Avenue, and found that its failure to give the
requested alibi instruction was reversible error. (Trial court opinion, 8/14/14
at 37.) We disagree.
An alibi is a defense that places a defendant at the
relevant time at a different place than the crime
scene and sufficiently removed from that location
such that it was impossible for him to be the
perpetrator. Where a defense rests on timing rather
than location, it is not considered an alibi.
Commonwealth v. Sileo, 32 A.3d 753, 767 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc),
appeal denied, 42 A.3d 1060 (Pa. 2012), citing Commonwealth v.
Collins, 702 A.2d 540 (Pa. 1997).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined alibi as
“a defense that places the defendant at the relevant
time in a different place than the scene involved and
so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for
him to be the guilty party.” Commonwealth v.
Roxberry, 529 Pa. 160, 163, 602 A.2d 826, 827
(1992); see Commonwealth v. Jones, 529 Pa.
149, 150-54, 602 A.2d 820, 821-22 (1992)
(acknowledging alibi charge to jury as accurately
stating the law: “whether the testimony given
covers the entire time the offense is shown to have
been committed and whether it precludes the
possibility of defendant’s presence at the scene.”);
Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621, 631, 417
A.2d 597, 602 (1980) (holding that the testimony of
the defendant which placed him at locations distinct
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from the vicinity of the crime at the time it was
committed was sufficient to raise an alibi defense).
Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 646 A.2d 1211, 1218 (Pa.Super. 1994),
appeal denied, 655 A.2d 512 (Pa. 1995).
An alibi instruction is required if the defendant
presents evidence which covers the time period
when the crime was committed and which puts him
at a different location than that of the crime scene.
Commonwealth v. Repaci, 419 Pa.Super. 591,
594-95, 615 A.2d 796, 798 (1992). It is not
necessary for an alibi defense to be corroborated in
order to constitute an alibi. See Roxberry, 529 Pa.
at 165, 602 A.2d at 828; Commonwealth v.
Saunders, 529 Pa. 140, 602 A.2d 816 (1991);
Commonwealth v. Willis, 520 Pa. 289, 553 A.2d
959 (1989) (all requiring an alibi instruction when
the alibi defense had been presented solely by the
unsupported testimony of the defendant). There is
no minimum or threshold quantum of physical
separation necessary for a defense to constitute an
alibi, so long as the separation makes it impossible
for the defendant to have committed the crime. Id.
Id.
Haywood testified that she was living with appellant at the time of the
incidents. (Notes of testimony, 11/25/13 at 68.) Haywood testified that on
the night of October 21, 2011, appellant left their residence at
approximately 11:00 p.m. (Id. at 70.) Neither appellant nor Haywood
owned a vehicle. (Id.) According to Haywood, it would take someone
approximately 30-40 minutes to walk from their residence to Chew Avenue.
(Id. at 71.) Haywood testified that appellant was gone for about an hour.
(Id.) When appellant returned, they talked for approximately
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15-20 minutes and then appellant left again. (Id. at 72.) Haywood
admitted that appellant’s cousin, James Newkirk (“Newkirk”), had a car and
would give appellant a ride from time to time. (Id. at 79-80.) Haywood
was not sure whether or not Newkirk gave appellant a ride that night. (Id.
at 80.) Haywood did not know whether appellant was walking or got a ride
from someone. (Id.)
Appellant testified that he left the house around 11:00 p.m. and
walked to the 7-11. (Id. at 94-95.) Appellant denied being in the vicinity of
6605 Chew Avenue on the night of October 21, 2011. (Id. at 99.)
According to appellant, he had never seen Parrish until the date of his first
court appearance. (Id. at 100.) Appellant admitted getting a ride to
Sharpnack Street with Newkirk a little after midnight, but denied shooting
Mitchell. (Id. at 98, 100, 113.)
Clearly, Haywood’s testimony did not establish an alibi for the Chew
Avenue incident, the assault on Parrish. Haywood admitted that her times
were approximations. Haywood did not know whether appellant was walking
or had gotten a ride from Newkirk. Even if appellant were on foot, he could
have left the house at 11:00 p.m. and arrived at Chew Avenue before
11:45 p.m. when the incident occurred. Haywood’s testimony, if believed by
the jury, did not preclude the possibility of appellant’s presence at the crime
scene.
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Although appellant did take the stand and testify that he was not at
6605 Chew Avenue that night, appellant’s request for an alibi instruction was
based solely on Haywood’s testimony. (Id. at 142-143; notes of testimony,
11/26/13 at 40.) Appellant never requested an alibi instruction based on his
own testimony, only that of Haywood. See Pa.R.A.P., Rule 302(a),
42 Pa.C.S.A. (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Corley, 638 A.2d
985, 990 (Pa.Super. 1994), appeal denied, 647 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1994) (“A
defendant must object to a jury charge at trial, lest his challenge to the
charge be precluded on appeal.” (citations omitted)). Since Haywood’s
testimony did not put appellant at a different location than that of the crime
scene, appellant was not entitled to an alibi instruction based on Haywood’s
testimony. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s request.2
Finally, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his convictions. According to appellant, the evidence was insufficient to
support the charge of aggravated assault where Parrish never positively
identified appellant and there was no other evidence linking him to the
crime. (Appellant’s brief at 15.) Appellant also claims that the evidence in
the murder of Mitchell was purely circumstantial and established only his
presence in the home at the time shots rang out. (Id.) Appellant argues
2
With regard to the murder of Mitchell, appellant admitted being inside the
house that night. There is no alibi issue with regard to the second incident.
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that no one actually saw him fire the fatal shot. (Id.) Appellant suggests
that the jury’s verdict was based on mere speculation and conjecture. (Id.
at 16.) We disagree.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the fact-finder. In addition,
we note that the facts and circumstances established
by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier of
fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 260, 262-263 (Pa.Super. 2003),
quoting Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014-1015
(Pa.Super. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
A person is guilty of first degree murder where the
Commonwealth proves: (1) a human being was
unlawfully killed; (2) the person accused is
responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted
with specific intent to kill. See 18 Pa.C.S. 2502(a)[].
An intentional killing is a “[k]illing by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of
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willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.”
18 Pa.C.S. 2502(d). “The Commonwealth may prove
that a killing was intentional solely through
circumstantial evidence. The finder of fact may infer
that the defendant had the specific intent to kill the
victim based on the defendant’s use of a deadly
weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.”
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 596 Pa. 510, 946
A.2d 645, 651 (2008) (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Brown, 987 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa. 2009), cert. denied,
562 U.S. 844 (2010) (additional citation omitted).
Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2702(a)(1), which provides as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of
aggravated assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily
injury to another, or causes such
injury intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life[.]
With regard to Mitchell’s murder, Clark testified that he and appellant
were arguing for ten minutes before the gunshot. While no one actually saw
appellant pull the trigger, Clark testified they were in the same room.
Mitchell’s blood was found on appellant’s shirt. The jury was free to discount
appellant’s self-serving testimony that he was using the bathroom when he
heard the gunshot. The jury could also infer consciousness of guilt from
appellant’s actions immediately following the shooting, including his refusal
to exit the premises upon police command and hiding the gun on a ledge
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outside the third-floor window. Mitchell was shot in the head, a vital part of
his body. Clearly, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that
appellant shot the decedent with specific intent to kill.
Turning to the first incident, the assault of Parrish outside the Chinese
store, while the victim was unable to positively identify appellant as his
assailant, he did pick his picture out of a photo array as a person who
“looks like” the shooter. (Trial court opinion, 8/14/14 at 5, citing notes of
testimony, 11/20/13 at 81, 114-120.) Parrish also accurately described
appellant’s physical appearance and the distinctive black leather jacket he
was wearing, with white trim and a decal on the back. (Id. at 5-6.)
Furthermore, the ballistics evidence from the Chew Avenue crime scene,
including the FCC’s and bullet specimens, matched the ballistics evidence
recovered from 149 Sharpnack Street. The FCC’s and bullets from both
crime scenes all came from the same weapon, the .9 mm handgun left at
149 West Sharpnack Street. In addition, the two crime scenes were close in
proximity, only a few blocks away. Police had just completed processing the
Chew Avenue crime scene when they were called to proceed to 149 West
Sharpnack Street. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as verdict winner, it was sufficient for the jury to conclude,
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beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was Parrish’s assailant.3
Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/10/2015
3
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
weapons convictions. In addition, although his sufficiency challenge to the
aggravated assault conviction is based on misidentification, obviously the
evidence was sufficient to make out all the elements of aggravated assault,
causing serious bodily injury, where the victim was shot several times.
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