novo review." Paige v. State, 116 Nev. 206, 208, 995 P.2d 1020, 1021
(2000).
Here, it was established that the victim, who lived on a ranch
with Fields in Elko County and did not have access to a vehicle or a
private phone, was last seen in Elko County and was most likely dead
within 24 hours thereafter. There was testimony that Fields disclosed to
her sister-in-law that she hit a man in the head with a pipe after she
caught him performing a sexual act on her grandson in the shed and that
the body was taken to Salt Lake City and dumped. We conclude that
sufficient evidence was presented to establish jurisdiction within Nevada.
See Shannon, 105 Nev. at 792, 783 P.2d at 948 ("[NRS 171.020] does not
require that there be partial execution of the actual crime; it only requires
some carrying out of the criminal intent.").
Second, Fields contends that the district court erred by
excluding evidence of her polygraph exam. Fields asks us to reconsider
the law regarding the admissibility of polygraph exam results and to
establish safeguards and conditions for the admissibility of such evidence.
We conclude that reconsideration is unnecessary as we have established
proper conditions and safeguards for the admittance of polygraph exams.
See Jackson v. State, 116 Nev. 334, 335-36, 997 P.2d 121, 121-22 (2000);
Corbett v. State, 94 Nev. 643, 644-45, 584 P.2d 704, 705 (1978). Here,
there was no stipulation providing for Field's submission to the test or for
subsequent admission at trial. Moreover, all data from the exam, save for
the examiner's final, written report, had been destroyed and therefore was
not subject to independent examination. Therefore, the district court
properly excluded the polygraph evidence. See Corbett, 94 Nev. at 644-47,
584 P.2d at 705-06.
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Third, Fields claims that the district court erred by admitting
phone calls she had with her husband while she was in jail. Fields argues
that law enforcement was not authorized to intercept a jail inmate's
telephone conversations, that law enforcement failed to comply with the
notice requirement of NRS 209.419(1)(b), that the use of the recordings
should be prohibited in any criminal proceeding other than offenses
directly involving jail security, and that the conversations were privileged.
Initially, we note that the only objection made regarding this
evidence during Fields's retrial was a brief, oral renewal of the objection
made during the first trial. No transcripts from the first trial were
provided in the record currently before this court. In reviewing the record
provided, we conclude that Fields did not argue below that law
enforcement was not authorized to intercept a jail inmate's telephone
conversations, that law enforcement failed to comply with the notice
requirement of NRS 209.419(1)(b), or that the use of the recordings should
be prohibited in any criminal proceeding other than offenses directly
involving jail security. Therefore, we need not consider these arguments
in the first instance on appeal. See Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 600, 606, 817
P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Means v. State, 120
Nev. 1001, 1012-13, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004).
As to Fields's remaining contention, that the conversations
were privileged, a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ramet v. State, 125 Nev. 195, 198,
209 P.3d 268, 269 (2009). In its order admitting the jailhouse phone calls,
the district court determined that all calls out of the jail were recorded and
monitored for the purpose of jail security, a purpose within the ordinary
course of law enforcement's duties, and that the system verbally informed
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the parties that the conversation was being monitored and recorded. As
both parties were made aware that the call was being recorded, the
expectation of confidentiality required to sustain a claim of marital
privilege under NRS 49.295 was defeated. See Fields v. State, 125 Nev.
785, 796-97, 220 P.3d 709, 717 (2009). Additionally, we note that while
the unauthorized interception of wire or oral communications is
prohibited, see NRS 200.620; NRS 179.410 to 179.515, inclusive, "wire or
oral communications aurally acquired through use of regularly installed
telephone equipment by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the
ordinary course of his duties does not constitute an 'interception." State v.
Reyes, 107 Nev. 191, 197, 808 P.2d 544, 547 (1991) (emphasis added).
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting the jailhouse phone calls.
Having considered Fields's contentions and concluded that no
relief is warranted, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
J.
Gibbons Pickering
cc: Hon. Nancy L. Porter, District Judge
Brian D. Green
Attorney General/Carson City
Elko County District Attorney
Elko County Clerk
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