FILED
AUGUST 20, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 32270-0-III
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
JOSHUA JOHN EDWARDS, )
)
Appellant. )
LA WRENCE-BERREY, J. - After the trial court denied Joshua Edwards's CrR 3.6
motion to dismiss, a jury found him guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful
possession of a dangerous weapon, and making a false or misleading statement to a public
servant. On appeal, Mr. Edwards contends that the trial court erred because the facts
establish that the vehicle's license plate was illuminated, and the officer's stop of the
vehicle was pretext. We defer to the factual findings of the trial court and affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of December 15,2013, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer
Wayne Walls of the Colville Police Department was in the Colmac Oil parking lot
completing some paperwork while on traffic and patrol duty. From the parking lot,
No. 32270-0-III
State v. Edwards
Officer Walls observed Mr. Edwards traveling northbound on Lincoln in a vehicle. Mr.
Edwards was a couple hundred feet away when Officer Walls first observed him. Officer
Walls stopped Mr. Edwards because he believed Mr. Edwards's license plate illumination
lights were not working.
Officer Walls executed the traffic stop at 10:08 p.m. He then walked up to the
vehicle and asked Mr. Edwards to identify himself. Mr. Edwards responded that he did
not have a driver's license. He then gave Officer Walls a false name. Because Officer
Walls was not able to make a positive identification based on this information, he arrested
Mr. Edwards for not having a valid operator's license. The vehicle Mr. Edwards was
driving, a 2004 Ford F-lSO pickup truck, is owned by Travis McDaniel, a friend of Mr.
Edwards.
After placing Mr. Edwards in handcuffs, Officer Walls searched Mr. Edwards's
pockets and discovered a .22 caliber North American Arms Derringer pistol and a folding
knife with metal knuckles. Officer Walls removed these items from Mr. Edwards's
person and then placed Mr. Edwards in the patrol car to transport him to the Stevens
County Jail.
Mr. Edwards was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful
possession of a dangerous weapon, and making a false or misleading statement to a public
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No. 32270-0-111
State v. Edwards
servant. He moved to suppress the evidence found during the search incident to arrest.
He contended that the license plate lights were functioning at the time of the traffic stop
and, thus, he was unlawfully seized because Officer Walls's stop was pretextual.
Officer Walls testified at the CrR 3.6 suppression hearing that the vehicle's license
plate illumination lights were not working as it passed the Colmac parking lot. He stated
he immediately pulled out of the parking lot and initiated a traffic stop based on this
observation. He admitted he never told Mr. Edwards why he initiated the traffic stop. He
said he often makes traffic stops for license plate illumination lights that are not working.
Additionally, he stated he did not recognize the vehicle or the driver before or during the
traffic stop. Finally, he indicated that the license plate lights were not working the entire
time he was following the vehicle.
To support Mr. Edwards's contentions on the motion to suppress, the defense
introduced evidence and provided testimony from four witnesses, including Mr. Edwards.
Daniel Edwards, Mr. Edwards's father, testified that he noticed the license plate
illumination lights working when he was a passenger in the truck until 8:30 or 9:00 p.m.
on December 15,2013. Daniel Edwards also stated that he always checks the lights on
vehicles.
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No. 32270-0-III
State v. Edwards
Mr. McDaniel testified that the license plate illumination lights were working on
his truck four days before Mr. Edwards's arrest. He stated they were also working one
and one-half days after the arrest when he recovered his truck from the parking lot it had
been in since the traffic stop. On cross-examination, Mr. McDaniel revealed that he had
spoken with Mr. Edwards while Mr. Edwards was in jail. Mr. McDaniel admitted that in
a call on December 21,2013, he told Mr. Edwards that he had forgotten the gun was in
the truck, he would testify on Mr. Edwards's behalf that it was his gun, and Mr. Edwards
did not know the gun was in the truck. He also admitted that he had talked with Mr.
Edwards again the night before the suppression hearing and discussed the issue of the
truck's lights, saying he had met with the defense investigator to check the lights at the
tow yard like Mr. Edwards had asked him to do.
Additionally, an investigator for the defense, Ronald Goodbrake, testified that he
examined the truck on January 30, 2014, in Davis Towing's holding lot where it had been
since being wrecked on January 26,2014. He stated the license plate lights were working
during his examination. While Mr. Goodbrake was on the witness stand, the defense also
introduced a video recording of the Wal-Mart parking lot in Colville on December 15,
2013. The video shows the truck that Mr. Edwards was driving the night of the traffic
stop entering the Wal-Mart parking lot at 8:07 p.m. and leaving at 8:38 p.m. The video
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No. 32270-0-II1
State v. Edwards
also shows the license plate illumination lights came on when the truck's headlights were
activated at 8:38 p.m.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court found that Officer Walls
was a credible witness. The court also found that none of the evidence presented by the
defense regarding the license plate lights being illuminated before and after the stop was
dispositive to prove that the lights were in fact illuminated at the time of the stop. The
court stated it was "incredible" and "somewhat unusual behavior" for Mr. Edwards and
his father to check the license plate lights several times the night of the traffic stop and
arrest. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 142. Instead, the court found that their statements
about checking the lights that night "seem!] to be a response to the basis for the stop,
rather than a-reasonable way of-oflooking at-at a vehicle." RP at 143. Finally, the
court found that Mr. McDaniel "has some sort of dog in this fight" based on the testimony
about his conversations with Mr. Edwards from jail about assuming responsibility for the
firearm and about the license plate lights. RP at 142. The court ultimately concluded the
traffic stop was not pretextual because "[t]here has to be another reason that the officer's
making the stop," and "without any knowledge of the individual or the vehicle, the entire
purpose of a pretext stop seems ... to be eviscerated." RP at 143-44.
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No. 32270-0-III
State v. Edwards
At trial, the jury convicted Mr. Edwards of the crimes charged. Mr. Edwards
appeals. He contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence
discovered as a result of an unlawful seizure and search.
ANALYSIS
"When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, an appellate court determines
whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact and whether the
findings support the conclusions of law." State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242,249,207 P.3d
1266 (2009). Substantial evidence is evidence that is "enough 'to persuade a fair-minded
person of the truth of the stated premise.'" Id. (quoting State v. Reid, 98 Wn. App. 152,
156, 988 P .2d 1038 (1999)). Conclusions of law from an order related to the suppression
of evidence are reviewed de novo. Id.
As a preliminary note, CrR 3 .6(b) requires a trial court to enter written findings if
an evidentiary hearing is conducted on a motion to suppress. However, generally, the
trial court's failure to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law is harmless if
the record is sufficient for appellate review. State v. Miller, 92 Wn. App. 693, 703, 964
P .2d 1196 (1998). Here, the trial court only entered oral findings, which are somewhat
confusing. However, Mr. Edwards only raised the issue in a footnote in his brief on
appeal to say that the record does not include any written findings as to the suppression
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No. 32270-0-II1
State v. Edwards
hearing. He did not argue the issue or request that this court remand for entry of written
findings. Additionally, while written findings certainly would have made it easier to
decipher the trial court's ruling, the oral findings were sufficient as to the necessary legal
Issues.
Turning to the substantive analysis, generally, "warrantless searches and seizures
are per se unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution." Garvin, 166 Wn.2d
at 249. However, a few narrowly drawn exceptions to this general rule exist, including
"exigent circumstances, searches incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, plain view
searches, and Terry[l] investigative stops." ld. The State bears the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that a warrantless seizure fits within one of these
categories of exceptions to the warrant requirement. ld. at 250.
Routine traffic stops have been categorized with investigative detentions, which
are subject to Terry's reasonableness requirements. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343,350,
979 P.2d 833 (1999). A law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless traffic stop
when he has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or
is occurring. ld. at 349.
I Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868,20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
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No. 32270-0-111
State v. Edwards
But where the asserted basis for a traffic stop is a pretext for a warrantless
investigation, the stop violates article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Id. at
358. A traffic stop is pretextual if "police are pulling over a citizen, not to enforce the
traffic code, but to conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the driving," for which
the police lack a warrant. Id. at 349. To determine whether a stop is pretextual, courts
consider the totality of the circumstances, including "the subjective intent of the officer
[and] the objective reasonableness of the officer's behavior." Id. at 359. "[C]oncems
that some police officers will simply misrepresent their reasons and motives for
conducting traffic stops ... only heightens the need for judicial review of traffic stops."
State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284,297,290 P.3d 983 (2012). If the court finds the stop is
pretextual, "all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and
must be suppressed." Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 359.
Here, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Officer Walls's stop of
Mr. Edwards was not pretextual. Officer Walls was actually motivated, both subjectively
and objectively, by the need to address the traffic violation rather than by some other
investigative purpose. The trial court did not err in concluding that the traffic stop ofMr.
Edwards was not a pretext and, therefore, was a lawful seizure.
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No. 32270-0-II1
State v. Edwards
The court's findings are supported by the evidence. At the suppression hearing,
Officer Walls testified that he was on traffic and patrol duty the evening of December 15,
2013. He testified that he first saw Mr. Edwards as Mr. Edwards drove by only a couple
hundred feet away from where he was parked. Officer Walls stated that he had never
seen Mr. Edwards or the vehicle Mr. Edwards was driving before that moment. He also
testified that the only reason he stopped Mr. Edwards was because he observed the
license plate lights were not working on the vehicle Mr. Edwards was driving. Finally,
Officer Walls testified that he often looks for license plate lights that are not working and
makes stops based on that traffic infraction. These facts are not the facts of a pretext
stop.
The trial judge had the opportunity to listen to and observe the demeanor of
Officer Walls and of the four defense witnesses at the erR 3.6 hearing. As detailed above
in the facts section, the trial court found that Officer Walls was a credible witness. The
court also found that the evidence presented by the defense was not dispositive to prove
that the lights were in fact illuminated at the time of the stop. The court stated it was
"incredible" and "somewhat unusual behavior" for the defendant and his father to check
the license plate lights several times the night of the traffic stop and arrest. RP at 142.
Finally, the court commented that Mr. McDaniel "has some sort of dog in this fight."
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No. 32270-0-II1
State v. Edwards
RP at 142. These findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The trial court concluded that no improper reason for the stop existed and,
therefore, there was no basis for finding the stop was pretextual. The court's findings
support this conclusion. Officer Walls conducted a warrantless traffic stop based on a
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edwards committed a traffic violation after he saw Mr.
Edwards driving a vehicle with license plate lights that were not illuminated. No other
improper reason for the stop was presented at the suppression hearing. Thus, the trial
court did not err in denying the defense's motion to suppress.
The trial court properly denied Mr. Edwards's motion to suppress evidence found
in the resulting search incident to arrest. The traffic stop of Mr. Edwards was not a
pretext and, therefore, was a lawful seizure.
Affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
~,At)r.
Brown, A.C.J.
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