J-S34044-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
QUINTEZ DEVAR HALL
Appellant No. 1796 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed October 20, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0007930-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2015
Appellant, Quintez Devar Hall, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on October 20, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
following his conviction of two firearms violations. Appellant contends the
evidence was insufficient to support either conviction. We disagree and,
therefore, affirm.
On September 5, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of persons not to
possess firearms and for possessing a firearm not to be carried without a
license.1 On October 20, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five to
ten years in prison as a person not to possess a firearm and imposed a
concurrent sentence of three to six years for his second conviction.
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106, respectively.
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Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s
directive to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal, asserting
“[t]he evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient as a
matter of law to support the jury verdict of guilty for Carrying a Firearm
without a License and Person not to Possess a Firearm.” Statement of
[Errors] Complained of under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 11/6/14, at 1. The issue
Appellant asks this Court to consider is worded substantially identically to his
1925(b) statement.
Before addressing Appellant’s issue, we shall first address the
Commonwealth’s contention that Appellant has waived his issue for failure to
preserve it for appellate review. In support of this position, the
Commonwealth cites, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d
1252 (Pa. Super. 2008), for the proposition that an appellant asserting
insufficiency of evidence must specify the element or elements upon which
the evidence was insufficient. As this Court explained in Williams:
If [an a]ppellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence
was insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify
the element or elements upon which the evidence was
insufficient. This Court can then analyze the element or
elements on appeal. The instant 1925(b) statement simply does
not specify the allegedly unproven elements. Therefore, the
sufficiency issue is waived.
Id. at 1257 (emphasis deleted). However, waiver will not be found in all
instances. As this Court recognized in Williams:
We are cognizant of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Laboy, 594 Pa. 411, 936 A.2d 1058
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(2007)[,] in which the Court vacated this Court’s Order and
remanded the case for us to decide the merits of certain issues
the appellant had raised on appeal. The Supreme Court
determined a panel of this Court had erred in deciding the
appellant had failed to adequately develop his claim of
insufficient evidence to support his conviction in his statement of
matters complained of on appeal and noted that the case was a
“relatively straightforward drug case” though “in more complex
criminal matters the common pleas court may require a more
detailed statement to address the basis for a sufficiency
challenge.” Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1258 n.9.
We find that this case is a “relatively straightforward” firearms case,
especially in light of the stipulation at trial that Appellant “is a person not to
possess and has been since the year 2007. [Also, Appellant] did not have a
valid license to carry a concealed firearm on his person or within a vehicle.”
Notes of Testimony (N.T.) Trial, 9/4/14, at 82. As the trial judge instructed
the jury after counsel presented the stipulation:
Again you may accept that stipulation. The stipulation is that
[Appellant] did not have a license at the time the gun was
located and, secondly, that he is a person not to possess a
firearm. So those two facts may be accepted by you. There is
still obviously other issues that remain to determine whether or
not [Appellant] had the firearm in his possession.
Id. at 83. Under the circumstances of this case, we decline to find waiver
for Appellant’s failure to specify in the 1925(b) statement the elements upon
which he bases his insufficiency challenge.
The statutory provisions for the crimes in question provide that “a
person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b) .
. . shall not possess . . . a firearm in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
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6015(a)(1). Further, “any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or
any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except
in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully
issued license . . . commits a felony of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
6106. Because it was stipulated that Appellant was a person not to possess
under § 6105(a)(1) and was not licensed to carry a firearm under § 6106,
the only issue for the jury to determine was whether Appellant was in
possession of, or was carrying, a firearm.
The only witnesses at Appellant’s trial were three Commonwealth
witnesses from the York City Police Department: Officer Christopher Roosen,
Sergeant Nicholas Figge and Officer Derek Hartman. The trial court
summarized the officers’ testimony as follows:
In this case, the jury heard that on October 21, 2013, Officer
Christopher Roosen was on patrol around 11:00 p.m. Officer
Roosen saw a known male, Brandon Orr, for whom there were
outstanding warrants walking towards him. Officer Roosen then
testified that at this point Mr. Orr ran. Officer Roosen alerted
Sergeant Nicholas Figge that Mr. Orr was known to utilize or ride
in a silver [J]eep. Sergeant Figge testified that he saw and
pursued the sliver [J]eep in question. While attempting to flee,
the [J]eep crashed and Sergeant Figge testified that three
suspects ran from the vehicle. Sergeant Figge was able to
identify [Appellant], in blue jeans and a sweatshirt, as one of the
fleeing subjects.[2]
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2
Sergeant Figge testified that two of the three individuals ran in a southerly
direction while the third, Appellant, ran down an alleyway in a different
direction. N.T. Trial, 9/4/14, at 91.
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The jury heard Officer Derek Harman testify that he pursued an
individual dressed as Sergeant Figge described. Officers Roosen
and Hartman testified that upon apprehension of this person, a
firearm was located near the individual’s hands. Sergeant Figge
identified the individual as [Appellant], who was one of the three
individuals he had seen flee the crashed [J]eep. Officer Roosen
related to the jury that 9 mm ammunition was found in the
crashed [J]eep. The firearm [in] question is a 9 mm handgun. .
. . All of the officers who testified stated that they never saw
[Appellant] in physical possession of the firearm. And Officer
Roosen stated that the gun was not fingerprinted because there
was no question who the actor was in this case. The jury also
heard a stipulation that [Appellant] is a person not to possess
firearms and has been since 2007. . . . The jury was provided
with the stipulation that [Appellant] was a person not to possess.
Ergo, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), the Commonwealth
would only have needed to show the element of possession.
Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/29/15, at 3-4 (references to Notes of
Testimony omitted).
Again, the sole issue before this Court involves the sufficiency of
evidence. This Court has stated:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
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and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted). In Cruz, this Court explained:
Illegal possession of a firearm may be shown by constructive
possession. Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750
(Pa. Super. 2004).
Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic
construct to deal with the realities of criminal law
enforcement. Constructive possession is an inference
arising from a set of facts that possession of the
contraband was more likely than not. We have defined
constructive possession as “conscious dominion.” We
subsequently defined “conscious dominion” as “the power
to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that
control.” To aid application, we have held that
constructive possession may be established by the totality
of the circumstances.
Id. at 1253 (quoting Parker, 847 A.2d at 750) (additional citations
omitted).
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth must prove Appellant had
both the power to control the firearm and the intent to exercise control,
contending mere presence at the scene is insufficient. Appellant’s Brief at
11 (citing Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 453 A.2d 1058, 1059 (Pa.
Super. 1982), in turn citing Commonwealth v. Townsend, 237 A.2d 192
(Pa. Super. 1968); and Commonwealth v. Luddy, 422 A.2d 601 (Pa.
Super. 1980)). While we do not disagree with the premise Appellant
advances, we find the cases he has cited inapposite. Unlike the cases cited
by Appellant, Appellant was alone when he was apprehended. When he and
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the other subjects fled the Jeep, Appellant headed in a different direction
from his associates. Neither of the other individuals was noted to be
anywhere near Appellant when Appellant was taken into custody. Moreover,
the officers each testified that the handgun was within a few feet of
Appellant’s hand.3 As the trial court observed:
[Appellant] was apprehended with the firearm near his hands.
[Appellant] was identified as one of the individuals who fled the
crashed [J]eep which contained more ammunition of the sort
used in the firearm recovered. Taken together, these facts are
the strongest basis upon which to find possession. There is no
specific quantum of evidence that the Commonwealth must
produce in order for a court to find that sufficient evidence has
been presented; but, rather, we must evaluate whether the
evidence was so weak and inconclusive that no probability of fact
may be drawn from the combined circumstances. It strains
credulity to believe that [Appellant] was unlucky enough to be
apprehended within reach of a firearm for which there was
matching ammunition in the vehicle from which [he] fled.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/15, at 4-5. We agree. Viewing all the evidence—
including circumstantial evidence—in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, coupled with the stipulation that Appellant
was a person not to possess a firearm, we conclude the evidence was
sufficient to enable the jury to find every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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3
Appellant contends that testimony indicating multiple subjects exited the
Jeep and fled after it crashed suggests that “anyone from that Jeep could
have been in possession of that firearm and have dropped it while fleeing.”
Appellant’s Brief at 11. In light of the officers’ testimony, Appellant’s
proposition is without foundation.
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With respect to Appellant’s conviction of firearms not to be carried
without a license, we likewise conclude the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction. As the trial court noted, Officer Hartman testified
that he continually commanded Appellant to show his hands during his
pursuit and that Appellant failed to do so. “This evidence tends to show that
[Appellant] had concealed the weapon upon his person and would not show
his hands in order to maintain his grasp upon the firearm.” Id. at 6. When
the officers apprehended Appellant, the gun was observed on the ground
next to Appellant, “within his reach.” N.T. Trial, 9/4/14, at 75. Again, in
conjunction with the stipulation that Appellant did not have a license to carry
the firearm, we conclude the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth was sufficient to prove the elements of the crime
charged.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/21/2015
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