J-S49009-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.M.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
No. 296 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered January 23, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-50-JV-0000019-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2015
Appellant, N.M.P., a juvenile, appeals from the order of disposition,
entered following an adjudication of delinquency for the offense of terroristic
threats. Appellant raises several claims on appeal, including challenges to
the sufficiency and weight of the evidence to support his adjudication of
delinquency. After careful review, we reverse.
In May of 2014, Appellant was charged with the crime of terroristic
threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706, stemming from the following evidence, as
summarized by the juvenile court:
[T]he victim testified that he heard from his girlfriend
“again that [Appellant] was flirting with her” and he “knew she
was uncomfortable with him.” On the day of the incident, the
victim saw Appellant sitting at the same table as his girlfriend in
class. He later encountered Appellant in the hallway where he
told [Appellant] to “back off” his girlfriend before walking away
to his next class. As the victim walked away[,] Appellant went
into the bathroom where he met another student, [A.M.] [A.M.]
testified that when Appellant entered he began hitting things
such as the towel dispenser in anger. [A.M.] asked Appellant
what was wrong and Appellant replied that [the victim] told
[Appellant] to leave [the victim’s] girlfriend alone. Appellant
commented that he was mad and after [A.M.] told him to calm
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down, Appellant stated that he was going to bring a gun to
school and shoot an individual in the green jacket. [A.M.]
further testified that upon entering his seventh period [s]cience
class, he noticed that [the victim] was wearing a green jacket.
Upon further reflection, [A.M.] requested to go to the Office to
report the bathroom incident.
Juvenile Court Opinion (JCO), 4/9/15, at 2-3 (unpaginated; citations to the
record omitted).
On December 15, 2014, the juvenile court found, based on the above-
stated evidence, that Appellant committed the offense of terroristic threats.
On January 15, 2015, a second hearing was conducted to determine if
Appellant required treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation. After concluding
that Appellant did require further treatment, the juvenile court adjudicated
Appellant delinquent and imposed a disposition of probation and counseling
“until successfully discharged” by the designated counseling center. N.T.,
1/15/15, at 18-19. The court’s dispositional order was entered on the
docket on January 23, 2015.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Herein, he
states four issues for our review:
A. Did the lower court commit error in finding that Appellant
committed the act of Terroristic Threats where the evidence was
insufficient to support the [juvenile] [c]ourt’s finding?
B. Did the lower court commit error in adjudicating Appellant as
a Delinquent Child where the evidence was insufficient to
support the finding that Appellant is in need of treatment,
supervision, or rehabilitation?
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C. Did the lower court commit error in adjudicating Appellant
delinquent when such determination was against the weight of
the evidence?
D. Did the lower court err by entering its finding that Appellant
committed the act of Terroristic Threats [87] days after the
conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing?
Appellant’s Brief at 10.
Appellant’s first two issues present challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his adjudication of delinquency.
When a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is made, our
task is to determine whether the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, were
sufficient to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for the fact-finder. Moreover, we must defer to the
credibility determinations of the [juvenile] court, as these are
within the sole province of the finder of fact. The trier of fact,
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses, is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence.
In re J.M., 89 A.3d 688, 691 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
In Commonwealth v. M.W., 39 A.3d 958 (Pa. 2012), our Supreme
Court clarified that “the Juvenile Act requires a juvenile court to find that a
child has committed a delinquent act and that the child is in need of
treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation, before the court may enter an
adjudication of delinquency.” Id. at 964 (emphasis in original). If a court
determines the juvenile committed the delinquent act, but “is not in need of
treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation, it should dismiss the proceeding,
terminate jurisdiction, and discharge [the juvenile].” Id. at 966; see also
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42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(b) (“If the court finds that the child is not in need of
treatment, supervision or rehabilitation it shall dismiss the proceeding and
discharge the child….”).
Here, Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the juvenile court’s finding that he committed the offense of
terroristic threats. He also avers, in his second issue, that the evidence
failed to prove that he is in need of treatment, supervision, and/or
rehabilitation. Because, for the reasons stated infra, we agree with
Appellant’s second claim, we need not address his first issue.
After determining that Appellant committed the offense of terroristic
threats, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on January 15, 2015, to
assess whether he was in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.
At that proceeding, Appellant presented the testimony of Jacqueline
Spriggle, an outpatient therapist with Newport Counseling Center. N.T.,
1/15/15, at 6. Ms. Spriggle testified that she had an office at Appellant’s
school, and she began counseling Appellant in 2011 when he relocated to
Pennsylvania from West Virginia and “was having a difficult time
transitioning….” Id. at 7. Ms. Spriggle testified that Appellant also has been
diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome. Id. Ms. Spriggle counseled Appellant
weekly until 2013, when he “successfully completed treatment” and was
“discharged[.]” Id. at 7-8. However, approximately one month after the
incident in the present case, Ms. Spriggle began biweekly counseling for
Appellant. Id. at 8. Ms. Spriggle testified that she resumed counseling
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because “the school was pushing for [Appellant] to be in counseling, … and
he was having difficulty coping with the stress of being charged with this.”
Id.
Ms. Spriggle was then asked “whether or not [Appellant] has an anger
problem[,]” to which she replied, “I don’t believe that he does.” Id. While
Ms. Spriggle did state that Appellant seems “approximately two years
younger” than his “chronological age[,]” she indicated that she does not feel
Appellant “needs any type of special treatment.” Id. at 9. Additionally,
when asked if she feels that Appellant “is in need of any supervision[,]” Ms.
Spriggle stated, “no, I don’t.” Id. When asked if she feels Appellant “is in
need of any rehabilitation[,]” Ms. Spriggle answered, “No. He’s actually very
emotionally stable.” Id. at 9-10.
With this testimony, Appellant’s direct-examination of Ms. Spriggle
concluded. The Commonwealth elected not to cross-examine. Id. at 10.
However, the court then questioned Ms. Spriggle, as follows:
THE COURT: Okay. Well, if [Appellant] doesn’t need any
rehabilitation or treatment, why is he still counseling with you?
[Ms. Spriggle]: He was still experiencing stress related to this,
and his lawyer thought it would be a good idea to have him as
long as the Court would like him in counseling, but I don’t have
any behavioral concerns.
THE COURT: Okay. And was that as a result of your counseling
or is that from day one?
[Ms. Spriggle]: The result of counseling, and his family is very
active in helping any recommendations, and they kept up with it
after treatment.
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Id. at 10. After this questioning by the court, Ms. Spriggle’s testimony
concluded. Appellant’s parents were then permitted to speak to the court,
and they essentially explained why they believe their son did not make the
alleged threat heard by A.M.
At the close of the hearing, the court found that Appellant was “in
need of treatment, supervision, and/or rehabilitation….” Id. at 18. The
court explained its reasons for this finding, as follows:
THE COURT: I said the problem I see with the whole thing is
[that,] off and on[,] I think [Appellant] is going to need
counseling any time there’s stressful situations in his life, and it
gets better or not, and part of that is the Asperger’s. I mean,
there’s some special conditions here. I mean, that’s the case
that you’re going to have the rest of your life dealing with stress.
It’s going to be the tough part with you. But the problem I get
into, and that’s how this situation happens, you know, the issue
today, and this is what your parents completely just miss, is not
whether you are rightfully or wrongly confronted, it’s how you
handled that situation. And that is the whole reason you’re here.
Not whether they were wrong to begin with. They’re absolutely
wrong for confronting you, but that’s not a crime. The crime is
how you reacted to that.
I’m impressed [by] the fact that you’ve been in counseling,
you’re doing well. I think those situations can go up and down
as the counselor said due to stress, whether it’s from the
charges, whether it’s from kids accusing you of something,
whether it’s how you or your family feel the school is treating
you, those things are there. And that’s why I think there’s need
of further treatment, because it’s going to be an ongoing thing,
and I think that is clear today. Everything you’re asking for I
begged to happen before it got to this point, and it didn’t,
unfortunately for everybody involved.[1] But due to that ongoing
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1
It appears that this sentence refers to the fact that the court believed
Appellant should have entered a consent decree in this case. The following
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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need for treatment, I’m adjudicating you delinquent. [I] [f]ind
you’re in need of treatment, supervision and/or rehabilitation,
and, therefore, I adjudicate you a Delinquent Child.
Id. at 17-18.
On appeal, Appellant contends that the court erred in concluding that
he was in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation based on Ms.
Spriggle’s testimony, which directly contradicted the court’s conclusion. We
are compelled to agree. “While it is true that the question of credibility in
juvenile cases, as in all cases, is for the judge hearing the case to decide, …
the record of the proceeding before the juvenile court must be legally and
factually adequate to sustain the findings of fact and the order of the court.
A record lacking such legal or factual basis requires a reversal.” In Interest
of Helmen, 327 A.2d 163, 167 (Pa. Super. 1974) (emphasis added). Here,
in determining that Appellant was in need of further treatment, the juvenile
court found that: (1) Appellant is “going to need counseling any time there’s
stressful situations in his life,” (2) Appellant is going to have a difficult time
dealing with stress for “the rest of [his] life[,]” and (3) Appellant’s difficulty
dealing with stress is “going to be an ongoing thing….” N.T. at 17-18.
However, nothing in Ms. Spriggle’s testimony supports these findings by the
court. Indeed, Ms. Spriggle said that Appellant is “very emotionally
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
comment by the court, made at the hearing prior to Ms. Spriggle’s testifying,
demonstrates this point: “As far as a consent decree, I thought that was a
great idea to begin with in this case. I strongly recommended it. It was
refused.” N.T. at 5.
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stable[,]” and concluded that he is not in need of any supervision or
rehabilitation. Id. at 9-10. The Commonwealth did not present any
evidence to refute Ms. Spriggle’s testimony.
We also must point out that at the start of the January 15, 2015
hearing, prior to Ms. Spriggle’s taking the stand, the court stated:
THE COURT: I don’t plan on placing [Appellant] or anything
along those lines, What I want to make sure of in this case is
that he’s supervised in order to ensure that any counseling, all
those things continue, he continues doing that, and I don’t think
we’ll have any problems in this case. That’s what I look to do
today just to give you a heads-up.
Id. at 5. The court’s comments indicate that, even without hearing any
evidence, it had predetermined that Appellant required treatment, namely
continued counseling.
Based on this record, we agree with Appellant that there was
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination that he
was in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation. Accordingly, we
reverse the court’s order, entered January 23, 2015, adjudicating Appellant
delinquent and imposing a disposition of probation and counseling. Based
on this decision, we need not address Appellant’s remaining issues.
Order reversed.
Judge Olson joins this memorandum.
Judge Allen files a dissenting memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/25/2015
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