Clyde W. Stuart v. Gary L. Johnson, Robert Quada, Denise Bunch, and Cynthia Popp

Opinion issued November 24, 2004







     







In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas





NO. 01-04-00143-CV





CLYDE STUART, Appellant


V.


GARY L. JOHNSON, CYNTHIA A. POPP, DENISE D. BUNCH, AND ROBERT H. QUADA, JR., Appellees





On Appeal from the 278th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 22299





MEMORANDUM OPINION

          This appeal involves a prison inmate’s pro-se in forma pauperis suit that was dismissed without prejudice by the trial court under Chapter Fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (“CPRC”). Appellant, Clyde Stuart, raises two issues on appeal challenging the trial court’s dismissal.

          We affirm the order of the trial court.

Background

          Appellant filed suit against four employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, asserting causes of action that arose out of the confiscation and destruction by prison officials of certain personal belongings. At the request of the trial court, the Texas Attorney General’s office (“the AG”) filed an “Amicus Curiae Advisory,” in which it contended that appellant had failed to comply with various CPRC provisions. Thirteen days after the AG’s office filed the advisory, and before the defendants filed an answer, the trial court signed an order dismissing the suit “as frivolous” on the basis that appellant had failed to comply with the requirements of Chapter 14 of the CPRC. After the trial court had signed the dismissal order, but before appellant had been apprised of the dismissal, appellant filed a “Motion for Extension of Time,” requesting that he be given 30 days to file “Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Amicus Curiae Advisory.”

          In two issues, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion (1) by failing to allow appellant to file a response to the AG’s amicus curiae advisory and (2) by dismissing appellant’s suit without conducting a hearing.

          We review a dismissal under Chapter 14 for an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Moreland v. Johnson, 95 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Court] 2002, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, and without reference to any guiding principles or rules. Id.

          CPRC section 14.004 contains certain filing requirements for the indigent inmate. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002). The purpose of these requirements is to assist the trial court in determining whether a suit is malicious or frivolous under section 14.003(a). Gowan v. Tex. Dep’t. of Crim. Justice, 99 S.W.3d 319, 321 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Of particular relevance to this suit is subsection 14.004(c), which requires that, when an inmate files an affidavit of inability to pay costs, the affidavit must be accompanied by a certified copy of the inmate’s trust account as required by CPRC subsection 14.006(f). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004(c). Subsection 14.006(f) provides that the certified trust account statement “must reflect the balance of the account at the time the claim is filed and activity in the account during the six months preceding the date on which the claim is filed.” Id. at 14.006(f) (Vernon 2002).

          In this case, appellant filed an affidavit of inability to pay costs. Although he attached a certified copy of his inmate trust account, the trust statement did not comply with the requirements of subsection 14.006(f). The statement had been obtained several months before appellant filed suit and reflected neither appellant’s account balance at the time he filed his claim nor the activity in the account for the entire six month period preceding the date on which the claim was filed.

          Dismissal is appropriate when, as here, a prisoner who files an affidavit of inability to pay costs in a suit fails to submit an accompanying certified trust account statement in compliance with the statutory requirements. See Thompson v. Rodriguez, 99 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Hughes v. Massey, 65 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.); Williams v. Brown, 33 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Here, that defect was determinative of appellant’s case and was wholly ascertainable from the record without the necessity of a hearing or a response from appellant. See Thomas v. Bilby, 40 S.W.3d 166, 169 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.). This Court has previously recognized that a trial court’s decision on whether to hold a hearing on the dismissal of inmate litigation for failure to comply with the statutes governing such litigation is discretionary; thus, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by failing to hold such hearing. Moreland, 95 S.W.3d at 394; Williams, 33 S.W.3d at 411; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(c) (Vernon 2002) (providing court may hold hearing to determine whether case should be dismissed).
          As stated, the purpose of section 14.004 is to aid the trial court in determining whether a suit is malicious or frivolous under section 14.003(a). Gowan, 99 S.W.3d at 321. Under subsection 14.003(a), a trial court may dismiss a suit filed by an indigent inmate either before or after service of process if it finds that the claim is frivolous or malicious. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a) (Vernon 2002). Thus, it follows that, because appellant’s filing was procedurally deficient, his suit was subject to dismissal without a hearing or allowing him to file a response to the AG’s advisory. Gowan, 99 S.W.3d at 323; see also Moreland, 95 S.W.3d at 394 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying inmate opportunity to supplement petition before dismissing case); Kendrick v. Lynaugh, 804 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (concluding that, because trial court may dismiss action as frivolous either before or after service of process, trial court is under no duty to suggest or recommend that appellant amend his pleading).

          We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not conducting a hearing or giving appellant an opportunity to file a response to the advisory.

          We overrule appellant’s issues one and two.

          We affirm the order of the trial court dismissing appellant’s suit cause without prejudice.





                                                             Laura Carter Higley

                                                             Justice


Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Hanks, and Higley.