Opinion issued October 20, 2005
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NOS. 01-05-00164-CR
01-05-00165-CR
RAFAEL MARTELL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from 228th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 982036 and 982037
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a joint jury trial on two separate indictments, appellant, Rafael Martell, was convicted of two aggravated sexual assaults of N.A., the complainant, who was younger than 14 years of age. The jury assessed punishment at 60 years’ confinement in each cause. Raising one point of error for both offenses, appellant contends that the evidence was not factually sufficient to support his convictions.
We affirm.
Background
In 1988, “Rosa” and her infant daughter, N.A., moved to the United States from Honduras. Rosa soon met and then married appellant. Rosa gave birth to appellant’s son, C.M., after they married. In 1993, the family moved to a duplex in Houston.
Rosa worked from the late afternoon into the evening. Appellant was unemployed and stayed at home to care for N.A. and C.M. In 2000, appellant began sexual abusing N.A. on a routine basis while Rosa was at work. The first incident occurred on June 14, 2000. N.A. had taken a bath and was walking from the bathroom to her bedroom wearing a towel, when appellant confronted her. Appellant ordered N.A.’s brother, C.M., to take a bath and locked C.M. in the bathroom. After following her into her room, appellant told N.A. to remove her towel. When she refused, appellant pulled N.A.’s towel off and pushed her onto the bed. Appellant then vaginally penetrated N.A. with his penis. N.A. was 11 years old at the time. Before N.A. left her room, appellant warned her that she should not tell Rosa what had occurred or he would say that she had “provoked” him. Because she believed appellant’s threat and was scared, N.A. did not tell anyone about the sexual assault. After that incident, appellant continued to have vaginal intercourse with N.A. every time that she would take a bath.
In the fall of 2002, N.A.’s uncle, Ramon Andino, came to live with the family. N.A. spent a lot of time with her uncle and, at one point, confided in him regarding the abuse by appellant. Andino did nothing to stop appellant’s abuse. To the contrary, Andino also began sexually abusing N.A.
In December 2002, appellant forced N.A. to perform another sexual act. Appellant sent C.M. outside to play and then placed his penis in N.A.’s mouth. Appellant moved out of the family home on December 26, 2002.
After appellant left, Rosa moved her family several times for financial reasons. On March 16, 2004, Rosa was unpacking boxes following another move. While unpacking, Rosa discovered and read N.A.’s diary, which described the sexual abuse by Andino. After finding the diary, Rosa asked N.A. whether what was written in the diary was true. N.A. confirmed that she had been abused by her uncle; she also told Rosa that she had been “raped” repeatedly by appellant. Rosa immediately called the police.
Houston police officer Alejandro Gonzalez was dispatched to Rosa’s call. Officer Martell interviewed both N.A. and Rosa and instructed N.A. to go to Hermann Hospital, for a rape kit examination, and then to the Children’s Assessment Center.
Appellant was charged in two indictments with aggravated sexual assault, specifically relating to the incidents in June 2000 and December 2002. N.A. testified at trial regarding the details of the sexual assaults as stated above. Appellant testified in his own defense, denying that he had ever sexually assaulted N.A. The jury found appellant guilty as charged in the two indictments. Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, appellant raises one point of error, contending that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his convictions.
A. Standard of Review
A factual-sufficiency challenge requires that we view the evidence in a neutral light, and we will set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). We must defer to the fact-finder to avoid substituting our judgment for its judgment. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 481–82. In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we must discuss the evidence that, according to the appellant, most undermines the jury’s verdict. See Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
B. Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child
The indictments alleged that appellant committed the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child pursuant to Penal Code section 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) and 22.021(a)(2)(B). See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii), 22.021(a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005). The Penal Code provides, in relevant part, that a person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means or causes the penetration of the mouth of the child by the sexual organ of the actor and requires that the victim be younger than 14 years of age at the time of the assault. Id.
C. Analysis
Appellant frames his factual-sufficiency issue as follows: “The complainant’s testimony that Appellant sexually abused her was unsupported by any physical evidence and was not credible because of the long lapse of time between the alleged events and the trial.”
We address first appellant’s contention that the evidence was “so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly” unjust because no medical or expert testimony was presented that N.A. had been sexually assaulted. Because a child victim’s testimony alone is sufficient evidence to support a conviction of aggravated sexual assault, no physical evidence of sexual assault was required in this case. See Perez v. State, 113 S.W.3d 819, 838 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. ref’d); Empty v. State, 972 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet. ref’d). Rather, the lack of physical or forensic evidence is a factor for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence. See Johnson v. State, No. 01–03–00319–CR, 2004 WL 1472064, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 1, 2004, pet. ref’d) (designated for publication) (holding that differences in witness testimony and lack of physical evidence are factors for jury to consider in weighing evidence).
In addition, pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07, N.A.’s testimony did not need to be corroborated by either medical evidence or a witness to the act itself to support appellant’s conviction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(a),(b) (Vernon 2005). Moreover, the State presented testimony that physical evidence would not be expected in a case such as this. Officer Ben Morrow, a Houston police officer assigned to the Children’s Assessment Center to investigate juvenile sex crimes, testified that, when a sexual assault occurs years before it is reported to the police, it is “very unlikely” that physical evidence of the sexual assault would be recovered.
Appellant next points out that N.A. “made no outcry until four and two years after the respective offenses.” Again, this is but a factor to be weighed by the jury in assessing the weight of the evidence and, in particular, N.A.’s credibility. Significantly, article 38.07 allows for a lapse between the time that the assault occurred and the time the victim makes the outcry, provided that, as here, the victim was under the age of 17 when the sexual assault occurred. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(b)(1) (Vernon 2005).
Appellant also cites testimony by C.M. that he could not remember being locked in the bathroom at the time of the first sexual assault, as testified by N.A. Lastly, appellant points out that N.A. wrote in her diary of the sexual assault by her uncle, but did not write of appellant’s abuse. Despite appellant’s contentions, such evidence does not definitively favor the defense in this case. Instead, such facts bear on the credibility of the witnesses and whose testimony, if any, should be given more weight.
A jury’s decision is not manifestly unjust merely because it resolved conflicting views of the evidence in favor of the State. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). It was the jury’s role as fact finder to resolve any discrepancies or inconsistencies in the evidence, to determine the credibility and weight to be given the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Concomitantly, the jury may believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness’s testimony. Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
In sum, the jury could have correctly determined that (1) the lack of physical evidence, (2) the lapse in time between the sexual assaults and N.A.’s outcry, (3) C.M.’s inability to remember being locked in the bathroom, and (4) N.A.’s lack of mention in her diary of appellant’s assaults, while mentioning her uncle’s abuse, did not create a reasonable doubt about whether appellant committed aggravated sexual assault in June 2000 and December 2002. The jury, as trier of fact, chose to believe N.A.’s testimony that appellant sexually assaulted her as charged in the indictments. We must defer to the jury’s judgment of the witnesses’ credibility. Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
Appellant has not demonstrated that the evidence is so weak that a conviction is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or that, based on the contrary evidence, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof could not have been met. After reviewing it in a neutral light, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault.Conclusion
We overrule appellant’s sole point of error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Higley
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).