Opinion issued June 8, 2006
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-05-00426-CV
__________
IN THE INTEREST OF M.G.
On Appeal from the 21st District Court
Washington County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 28,666
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this child support enforcement case, the Attorney General moved to confirm Jose Inez Garcia’s child support arrearage. Garcia appeals the trial court’s denial of his summary judgment. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Background
In August 2004, the Attorney General filed a motion to confirm child support arrearage asking for a judgment and wage withholding to liquidate the arrearage. Garcia filed a general denial and a motion for summary judgment. After the IV-D associate judge recommended granting the motion for summary judgment, the Attorney General appealed the recommendation to the referring district court. The district court reversed the recommendation of the associate judge and denied the motion for summary judgment. Garcia filed a “motion for new trial” seeking a reconsideration of the district court’s “judgment” denying Garcia’s motion for summary judgment.
Jurisdiction
Garcia appeals from a trial court order denying his summary judgment. Before considering the merits of the appeal, we first determine the extent of our jurisdiction over the ruling that Garcia appeals.
Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex. 1998). When a party attempts to appeal a non-appealable interlocutory order, appellate courts have no jurisdiction except to declare the interlocutory nature of the order and to dismiss the appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a); Yancey v. Jacob Stern & Sons, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
The denial of a summary judgment is interlocutory and unappealable unless a statute specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal. Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. 1980). Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code specifically provides for the appeal of certain interlocutory orders, including one denying a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity or arising under the free speech or free press clause of the First Amendment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(5), (6) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Garcia’s motion for summary judgment asserted neither claim.
Accordingly, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to reach Garcia’s issues concerning the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment.
Conclusion
We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
George C. Hanks, Jr.
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Keyes, and Hanks.