Jason Gene Bankhead v. State



Opinion issued March 16, 2006














In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

 


 

 

NO. 01-04-00961-CR

 __________

 

JASON GENE BANKHEAD, Appellant

 

V.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 


 

 

On Appeal from the 174th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 959000

 


 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          A jury found appellant, Jason Gene Bankhead, guilty of murder and assessed punishment at imprisonment for life and a $10,000 fine. In two points of error, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, as a matter of law and as a matter of fact because the State’s evidence incriminating him was not credible. We affirm.

Background

          On July 31, 2003, appellant, Harlon Harris, Booker Harris, Tyrone Scott, and Courtney Murrell were standing in front of the Blue Mountain Café when appellant pulled out a .38 revolver and shot Murrell five times. Everyone standing in the parking lot ran for cover, and appellant ran to some nearby apartments to hide. When the police arrived, they were unable to locate any witnesses to the shooting.           Michelle Scott, who lived in one of the apartments across the street from the Blue Mountain Café, testified that appellant, whom she knew, barged into her apartment and told her that he needed a place to hide from the police. Appellant told her that he had just shot and killed Murrell because he stole some shoes and tried to sell some crack to his mother. He showed her the gun, which housed five spent casings and one live bullet. Michelle testified that she was afraid that he might use the remaining bullet to harm her or her children so she let him stay with her for the night. Michelle testified that appellant was acting very nervous and did not calm down until Harlon Harris, one of the men present at the shooting, came over the following day. Appellant asked Harlon to dispose of the gun. Scott then asked appellant to leave. Scott called the police and went to the police station and gave a written statement.

          Harlon and Booker Harris spoke to the police and confirmed that appellant shot Murrell and that Murrell did nothing to provoke the shooting. Appellant fled to Florida, where he was arrested, then extradited back to Texas.

Sufficiency

          In points of error one and two, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, as a matter of law and as a matter of fact because the State’s evidence incriminating him was not credible.

          We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and then determining whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In our review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a neutral light, and we set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. Id. (citing Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

          We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We adhere to the fact finder’s determination concerning the weight to place upon conflicting testimony because resolution of facts often turns on evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We must defer appropriately to the fact finder to avoid substituting our judgment for that of the trier of fact. Id.

          Here, appellant challenges the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the State. Specifically, appellant claims that, under Article V, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution, this Court has the inherent jurisdiction to examine the facts of the case. Tex. Const. art. V, § 17. However, we cannot intrude upon the fact finder’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility accorded any witness’s testimony, which is what appellant is requesting us to do. See Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

          Appellant argues that both Harlon Harris and Scott testified “to facts incriminating appellant” but the testimony was not credible given their actions after the shooting. Harlon “continued to befriend and drive the appellant around town,” and Scott “allowed him to remain in her apartment.” We cannot review the credibility of the witnesses, as the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the witnesses’ testimony. See Jaggers v. State, 125 S.W.3d 661, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). The jury may believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Accordingly, we overrule points of error one and two.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

                                                                        George C. Hanks, Jr.

                                                                        Justice


Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Keyes, and Hanks.


Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).