Opinion issued March 9, 2009
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
____________
NO. 01-08-00065-CV
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LEXTER KENNON KOSSIE, Appellant
V.
KENNETH WAYNE SMITH, Appellee
On Appeal from the 133rd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2007-71232
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On January 28, 2008, appellant in the above-referenced cause, Lester Kennon Kossie, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s interlocutory order of January 7, 2008, which sustained a contest to Kossie’s affidavit of inability to pay trial-court filing fees and costs. The trial court’s January 7, 2008 order required Kossie to pay trial-court filing fees in the amount of $270, plus certain costs, by February 7, 2008, advising that the case would be dismissed without prejudice if appellant failed to pay said fees and costs by that date.
The general rule, with a few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Interlocutory orders may be appealed only if allowed by statute. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001). The January 7, 2008 interlocutory order from which appellant has appealed is not an order that is made appealable by statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (Vernon 2008). We thus lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the interlocutory indigency order that Kossie has appealed. See Kilsby v. Mid Century Ins. Co. of Tex., No. 14-07-00981-CV, 2008 WL 889428, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.) (memo. op.) (dismissing appeal of interlocutory order sustaining challenge to affidavit of inability to pay costs); see also In re K.J.M., No. 02-08-038-CV, 2008 WL 703960, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 13, 2008, no pet.) (memo. op.) (dismissing appeal of interlocutory order sustaining challenge to indigency affidavit and denying appointment of counsel to represent appellant in habeas challenge to order of contempt in child-support-enforcement action).
On May 29, 2008, the Court notified Kossie that, unless he demonstrated, within 30 days, that we had subject-matter jurisdiction over his appeal, the appeal would be dismissed. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). More than 30 days have passed, and Kossie has not explained why subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Because we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal, we must dismiss it.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Any pending motions are overruled as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Taft, Bland, and Sharp.