Opinion issued May 20, 2010
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-08-00866-CR
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JAMES ERSKIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 262nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1159979
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, appellant James Erskin pleaded guilty with an agreed recommendation to the offense of possession with intent to deliver more than four grams and less than two hundred grams of cocaine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(3)(D), 481.112(a), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Erskin also pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs, which alleged prior felony convictions for delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance. In accordance with the plea bargain, the trial court sentenced Erskin to confinement for 25 years in prison. Although this is a plea-bargain case, the trial court certified Erskin’s right to appeal matters raised by motion and ruled upon before trial.
In one issue, Erskin contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
Background
At approximately 1:50 a.m. on March 29, 2008, Officer J. Cooper, a patrol supervisor with the Deer Park Police Department, saw Erskin speeding on Highway 225. Although the posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour, Cooper measured Erskin’s speed as 77 miles per hour using laser radar. Cooper stopped the car, and as he approached, he noticed that Erskin was staring intently into his rearview mirror. Cooper told Erskin that he had been speeding and asked for his driver’s license and vehicle registration. When Erskin handed over his license, Cooper noticed that Erskin’s hands were shaking. Erskin said that he had come from the north side of La Porte and was going to visit his girlfriend. At the suppression hearing, Cooper testified that Erskin did not maintain eye contact, was breathing heavily, and had a bead of sweat above his brow, despite the cool weather. Cooper smelled a strong aroma, which he described as a “cover odor,” a combination of freshly sprayed cologne and air freshener. Cooper testified that the scent was “overpowering enough to make you nauseous.”
Cooper testified that he called for backup because Erskin was “a good deal larger than me” and because he thought Erskin’s behavior was “abnormal indicative of criminal behavior.” Cooper asked Erskin to step outside the car, to prevent him from driving away, and Cooper called dispatch to check Erskin’s driver’s license and vehicle registration. Cooper continued to talk to Erskin while awaiting backup. He testified that Erskin did not become less nervous; rather Erskin “was still very high end,” and his demeanor “was indicative of a lot of stress.” Cooper also testified that Erskin downplayed his criminal history, initially saying he had not been in trouble for “many years” and then explaining that it had actually been only four years.
While awaiting backup, Cooper learned that Erskin had no outstanding warrants. Nevertheless, Cooper chose not to write a citation until backup arrived. He explained, “That would have required that I got back into my patrol unit to get my ticket book out, at least momentarily I would have taken my eyes off Mr. Erskin or otherwise exposing myself to an off-balance situation to reach in and get my ticket book. I chose not to do that so that I wouldn’t put myself in a position to either be attacked or to allow somebody to flee on the side of the road. Essentially, it’s for officer safety.”
Officer E. Pereira arrived approximately three minutes after Cooper’s call. Cooper testified that he specifically called for Pereira, with the K-9 unit, because Pereira ordinarily worked close to Cooper’s location on Highway 225 at that time of night. However, Pereira testified, “I’ve worked with [Cooper] many times. When he calls for, when he usually calls for my services, I usually know he wants a K-9, an exterior sniff. He basically told me he had a refusal, and he wanted to deploy my dog on the vehicle.”
When Pereira arrived, Cooper asked for permission to search Erskin’s car, which Erskin denied. Pereira’s narcotics-detecting dog sniffed the exterior of Erskin’s car and alerted to the presence of narcotics. Cooper searched the car and found 77.4 grams of crack cocaine and 124.7 grams of powder cocaine in the center console. Erskin was then arrested. The entire traffic stop lasted approximately nine and a half minutes.
Both officers testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Cooper testified, “Based on the Defendant’s behavior, I felt there was criminal activity afoot and continued to detain him, and continued with my investigation at the roadside there, tried to expedite it as much as I could. I believed that he was hiding something, namely, criminal activity.” Pereira testified about the dog sniff and how his dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in Erksin’s car. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:
Based on the evidence that I observed in the videotape that we’ve watched and listened to twice, as well as the testimony of the officers, I find that the officer had a legal reason to first initiate a traffic stop of Mr. Erskin, and then based on the totality of the circumstances, including unusual strong odor of cologne permeating from the car, the continued nervousness. The fact that he was sweating on a cool night. The fact that he was coming from an area known by this officer, who has 18 years’ experience with the Deer Park Police Department, that the north part of La Porte is a high-crime area. As well as other circumstances that were not ambiguous that were testified to.
Erskin then pleaded guilty with an agreed recommendation, and the trial court entered judgment consistent with the plea-bargain. The trial court later issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found:
1. Officer J.D. Cooper conducted a traffic stop of the defendant on March 29, 2008, in the 3800 block of State Highway 225, Pasadena, Harris County, Texas, for the offense of speeding.
2. Officer J.D. Cooper approached the vehicle and observed the defendant to be acting out of the ordinary and abnormally nervous.
3. Officer J.D. Cooper observed the defendant shaking, breathing heavily, perspiring and avoiding eye contact.
4. Officer J.D. Cooper detected a heavy odor of cologne and air freshener coming from the defendant’s vehicle.
5. The defendant was coming from a high narcotics area.
6. Officer J.D. Cooper requested the defendant exit the vehicle.
7. Officer E.J. Pereira and his K9 arrived on the scene as backup for officer safety.
8. Officer J.D. Cooper requested verbal consent to search the defendant’s vehicle.
9. The defendant refused to allow search of his vehicle.
10. Officer E.J. Pereira used his certified narcotics detection dog, Charly, to sniff the exterior of the vehicle.
11. Charly alerted to the vehicle.
12. The defendant stated there was nothing in the vehicle.
13. Officer J.D. Cooper conducted a search of the vehicle and discovered 77.4 grams of crack cocaine and 124.7 grams of powder cocaine in the center console within reach and control of the defendant.
14. Search incident to arrest led to the discovery of $5621.00 of U.S. currency in the defendant’s rear pant pocket.
15. The entire stop was recorded on car video and lasted 9.5 minutes.
In one issue, Erskin appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that Cooper illegally detained him until the arrival of the drug-sniffing dog and conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle without Erskin’s consent.
Standard of Review
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that depend on credibility, while we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327. In a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “This is so because it is the trial court that observes first hand the demeanor and appearance of a witness, as opposed to an appellate court which can only read an impersonal record.” Id. We must sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record evidence and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56.
Analysis
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the evidence in question was obtained during an unlawful detention. He claims that the purpose of the traffic stop was effectuated when the computer check of his driver’s license and vehicle registration was completed and that Cooper prolonged his detention and searched his car without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Initial Traffic Stop Was Justified
A traffic stop is a detention and, therefore, must be reasonable. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Magana v. State, 177 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). To be reasonable, a traffic stop must have been justified at its inception and not longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245; Magana, 177 S.W.3d at 673.
The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999) (“Any peace officer may arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation of [the Rules of the Road].”); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005) (“A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.”). During a routine traffic stop, an officer may detain an individual to check for outstanding warrants. Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 542 (citing Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 n.6). Cooper saw Erskin speeding and measured his speed with laser radar, finding it in excess of the posted speed limit. Cooper had probable cause to stop Erskin for a traffic violation. Therefore, the initial stop and the detention for the time it took to check Erskin’s driver’s license and vehicle registration were lawful.
Trial Court’s Finding Regarding Officer Safety is Supported by Record
Indeed, Erskin does not challenge the initial traffic stop: Erskin contends that he was detained longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop. Although Erskin does not contend generally that officer safety is an insufficient reason to prolong a detention before issuance of a citation, he does argue that Cooper was not actually concerned for his own safety and that his prolonged detention of approximately three minutes was without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
In making this argument, Erskin relies on the differences in Cooper’s and Pereira’s testimony. Cooper testified that he called Pereira for backup to ensure his own safety, but Pereira testified that, usually, when Cooper called him it was for the specific purpose of obtaining an “exterior sniff” by a drug-sniffing dog. In his brief, Erskin argued, “Sergeant Cooper’s testimony again appears to have been less than truthful when Officer Pereira admitted that other officers better suited for ‘backup’ were available.” Thus, Erskin is essentially challenging the trial court’s finding of fact that “Officer E.J. Pereira and his K9 arrived on the scene as backup for officer safety.”
As we have noted, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that depend on credibility. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327. Cooper testified that Erskin’s size and behavior caused him to be concerned for his safety. Cooper also testified that he knew Pereira was closest to his location at that time of night. The trial court found that Cooper called Pereira for “officer safety.” The trial court’s finding of fact is supported by the testimony, and we may not conclude otherwise based on our review of a cold appellate record. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855.
In any case, “a police officer’s subjective motive will never invalidate objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment,” and “subjective intentions play no role in an ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 542 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13, 116 S. Ct. at 1774). If it was objectively reasonable for an officer to call for backup to ensure his safety, the Fourth Amendment does not require us to inquire whether safety concerns were, in fact, the officer’s subjective concern. Erskin does not challenge the objective reasonableness of calling for backup during a traffic stop.
Reason for Stop Not Effectuated Before Backup Arrived
Moreover, Erskin’s detention until Pereira’s arrival was justified because Cooper had not yet effectuated the reason for the stop. Cooper testified that he intended to write Erskin a citation for speeding, which he did not do before Pereira arrived. While a traffic stop may last no longer than is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, there is no set time limit for accomplishing such a purpose. “The propriety of the stop’s duration is judged by assessing whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly.” Sims v. State, 98 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). The measures taken to investigate the offense that prompted the traffic stop and the computer check need not be conducted in any particular order. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In addition, during a traffic stop, officers may take reasonable precautions to ensure their safety. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109–11, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977) (holding that officer may ask driver to step out of car if necessary to ensure officer’s safety); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that officer may handcuff driver and place him in patrol car if necessary to ensure officer’s safety).
Here, Cooper testified that he called for backup and for a routine check of Erskin’s driver’s license and vehicle registration promptly upon initiating the traffic stop. He was not required to issue Erskin a citation for speeding before taking these actions. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 65. A three-minute delay in writing the speeding citation in order to wait for backup and thereby ensure officer safety did not “unduly prolong” the detention and thus was not objectively unreasonable. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109–11, 98 S. Ct. at 333; Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 65 & n.43; Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 771.
Reasonable Suspicion Existed to Prolong Erskin’s Detention
Finally, even if the traffic stop had concluded upon the return of information about Erskin’s driver’s license and vehicle registration, his continued detention was lawful because Cooper had developed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A temporary detention is reasonable if “the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at 38. Reasonable suspicion is determined based on the totality of the circumstances and may arise during the course of a traffic stop. Id.; Sims, 98 S.W.3d at 295 (“After making a stop for a traffic violation, an officer may rely on all of the facts ascertained during the course of his contact with a defendant to develop articulable facts that would justify a continued detention.”). However, there must be an objective basis for the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity. Id. (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750 (2002)).
The trial court found that, during the traffic stop, Erskin was “acting out of the ordinary and abnormally nervous,” shaking, breathing heavily, sweating in cool weather, and avoiding eye contact. The trial court found that there was a heavy odor of cologne and air freshener emanating from Erskin’s vehicle. Finally, the trial court found that Erskin was stopped while traveling from an area known to Cooper for the prevalence of drug crime. The trial court’s findings of fact are supported by Cooper’s testimony. We conclude, as did the trial court, that considering the totality of circumstances, these factors gave rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify Cooper’s three-minute detention of Erskin while awaiting a drug-sniffing dog. See Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38; Sims, 98 S.W.3d at 295.
Erskin argues that none of these factors alone was enough to justify his detention. See Munera v. State, 965 S.W.2d 523, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (explaining that nervousness alone is not reasonable ground for suspicion); Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 303–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain and search appellant who walked away from argument in parking lot of apartment complex in high crime area). Erskin asserts that these factors are also insufficient when considered together, because they are indistinguishable from the conduct of innocent people.
In Woods, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected such an analysis, holding that “the ‘as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity’ construct is no longer a viable test for determining reasonable suspicion.” Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38. The Court of Criminal Appeals observed, “We recognize that there may be instances when a person’s conduct viewed in a vacuum, appears purely innocent, yet when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, those actions give rise to reasonable suspicion.” Id. In this case, Cooper did not encounter someone who was simply wearing too much cologne, behaving nervously, or in the wrong place at the wrong time. Cooper encountered a person who was traveling from a place known for drug crimes, behaving unusually nervously, sweating in cool weather, and apparently attempting to conceal an odor in his car through the use of cologne and air fresheners. The totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Erskin was involved in criminal activity. See id. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Erskin’s motion to suppress, and we overrule Erskin’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Michael Massengale
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Massengale.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).