Opinion issued May 13, 2010
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-09-00083-CV
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Stanley Kubovy D/B/A SKI Imports, Appellant
V.
Carlos Maldonado, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 912415
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Stanley Kubovy, doing business as SKI Imports, challenges the trial court’s judgment, entered after a bench trial, in favor of appellee, Carlos Maldonado, in Maldonado’s suit against Kubovy for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“DTPA”).[1] In three issues, Kubovy, who represents himself pro se on appeal, contends that Maldonado’s DTPA claim is barred by the statute of limitations, “the statute of limitations on mental anguish is barred,” and the trial court erred in overruling two objections that he made during Maldonado’s trial testimony.
We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In his petition, which was filed on January 30, 2008, Maldonado alleged that on October 12, 2005, he took his truck to Kubovy for repairs, and Kubovy’s manager “agreed to perform engine work” for $1,500 in cash for the parts to be used and $5,000 in barter credits for the labor to be expended. Maldonado further alleged that Kubovy “tore down the engine and left the parts outside in the rain,” “refused to perform the agreed upon work, asking for additional funds,” and refused to release the truck to Maldonado. Maldonado asserted that Kubovy had “engaged in unconscionable action”[2] “by taking advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity” of Maldonado “to an grossly unfair degree.”[3] Maldonado sought “out of pocket expenses” in the amount of $40,500 as well as damages for loss of use of the truck, lost profits, repair costs, and mental anguish.
In his original answer, Kubovy generally denied Maldonado’s allegations and asserted the affirmative defense of limitations. In a counterclaim, Kubovy alleged that he had performed the work requested, the truck “still would not run,” he notified Maldonado that he needed to perform additional work on the truck, Maldonado refused to pay the quoted amounts for the additional work, and Kubovy stored the truck. Kubovy sought to recover damages for the storage fees that he incurred.
Kubovy subsequently filed a summary judgment motion, in which he asserted that Maldonado’s DTPA claims, which were filed on January 30, 2008, are barred by limitations. In his response, Maldonado asserted that there are fact issues on the accrual date of his cause of action. He attached to his response his affidavit, in which he testified that in late January 2006, he paid Kubovy $1,500 to “buy parts.” “[A]pproximately one month later,” Kubovy contacted Maldonado and stated that he needed more money to fix “additional problems.” Maldonado refused to pay the additional sums and demanded the release of his truck. Kubovy refused to release the truck unless Maldonado waived all claims, which he refused to do. Maldonado argued that because this evidence established that Kubovy made false and misleading representations to him in February to March 2007, his claims are not time barred.
During Kubovy’s opening statement in the bench trial, he asked the trial court “to keep in mind” that the underlying facts occurred in October to November 2005. The trial court, after indicating that it would not consider the argument,[4] instructed the parties to proceed with trial.
Maldonado testified that in October 2005 he had towed his truck to Kubovy to “look” for the cause of a “noise.” In November 2005, he paid Kubovy $1,500, and he intended to pay for the labor through an organized bartering system. At some point, Maldonado began to inquire with Kubovy about when his truck would be ready, and he was told it would be ready soon. However, Kubovy never returned the truck. In February 2006, Kubovy told Maldonado to retrieve his truck, but when Maldonado arrived with a tow truck, he was told he could not take it because other cars were parked next to it. Also, at some point between late 2005 and March 2006, Maldonado found the engine to his truck “in pieces” outside Kubovy’s garage. Maldonado then contacted his lawyer, who, on March 22, 2006, wrote Kubovy a letter, in which he stated, “Since you have not completed repairs and have not released the vehicle voluntarily, demand is hereby made for immediate release” of Maldonado’s truck. Kubovy never released the truck and demanded that Maldonado sign a release of any claims before he would do so. Maldonado refused to sign a release.
In contrast, Kubovy testified that he had spent eighty-seven hours disassembling Maldonado’s engine, Maldonado owed him approximately $2,500 for this service, and he would not release the truck without payment. After disassembling the engine, Kubovy discovered that the engine had been previously rebuilt, and he told Maldonado that the engine was “complete[ly] shot.” He also suggested that Maldonado get another used engine from a school bus. After this conversation, Kubovy did not see Maldonado for a long time. At some point later, Maldonado refused to sign a release that Kubovy had asked him to sign upon the return of his truck, and Kubovy had the truck stored.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Maldonado on his DTPA claim and awarded Maldonado $6,650 in damages and $5,000 in attorney’s fees.
Limitations
In his first two issues, Kubovy argues that the trial court erred in proceeding to trial because Maldonado’s DTPA claim is barred by limitations and “the statute of limitations on mental anguish is barred.”
First, in regard to Kubovy’s challenge to the award of mental anguish damages, we note that the trial court, in its judgment, did not include an award of mental anguish damages. Second, we note that Maldonado’s DTPA claim is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.565 (Vernon 2002). Although the evidence established that Maldonado first delivered his truck to Kubovy for repairs in October 2005, which was more than two years before Maldonado filed his lawsuit, Maldonado testified that Kubovy made the alleged misrepresentations much later. The trial court could have found, based upon Maldonado’s testimony, that the actionable conduct occurred sometime in February or March 2006. Thus, Maldonado’s testimony provides some evidence that when he filed his lawsuit in January 2008, he did so within two years of the accrual of his DTPA claim. In a trial to the court where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to support it. Pharo v. Chambers County, 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996). Because the trial court did not enter findings of fact or conclusions of law, we imply a finding by the trial court that the actionable conduct occurred sometime after January 30, 2006. Thus, Maldonado’s lawsuit was timely filed. Accordingly, we hold that limitations did not bar Maldonado’s lawsuit and the trial court did not err in allowing the case to proceed to trial.
We overrule Kubovy’s first and second issues.
Evidentiary Issues
In his third issue, Kubovy argues that the trial court erred in overruling two objections that he made during trial because the objected to evidence was irrelevant. Evidentiary rulings are committed to the trial court’s sound discretion. Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 234 (Tex. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Garcia v. Martinez, 988 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. 1999).
Kubovy first complains that the trial court erroneously admitted Maldonado’s testimony about what Maldonado had paid for a business sign that was affixed to his truck. The record reveals that Maldonado offered this testimony in support of his request for damages on the theory that he was either temporarily or permanently deprived of using this sign when Kubovy refused to release the truck to Maldonado. Thus, the testimony was relevant on the issue of Maldonado’s damages. See Tex. R. Evid. 401. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
Kubovy next complains that the trial court overruled his objection of “nonresponsive” to Maldonado’s testimony about matters discussed in an invoice furnished by Kubovy. The record reveals that the question at issue, which was posed by Kubovy, was confusing and contained multiple questions and comments. We cannot say based upon the record that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Kubovy’s objection to Maldonado’s answer to this question.
We overrule Kubovy’s third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Hanks, and Bland.
[1] See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.41–.63 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2009).
[2] See id. § 17.45(5) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
[3] Maldonado also asserted claims for negligent misrepresentation.
[4] The trial court remarked that Kubovy had not filed a motion to dismiss on limitations, and Kubovy responded that he had filed a summary judgment motion, which was set for hearing the following day. The trial court then stated, “No, it can’t be heard prior—I mean, if you didn’t file it timely. I mean, if its been on file since January. So, no. On we go.”